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Abstract		Thomas	Bradwardine	(d.	1349)	was	an	English	philosopher,	logician,	and	theologian	of	some	note;	but	though	recent	scholarship	has	revived	an	interest	in	much	of	his	work,	little	attention	has	been	paid	to	an	early	treatise	he	wrote	on	the	topic	of	future	contingents,	entitled	De	futuris	contingentibus.		In	this	thesis	I	aim	to	address	this	deficit,	arguing	in	particular	that	the	treatise	makes	original	use	of	the	divine	power	distinction	to	resolve	the	apparent	conflict	between	God’s	foreknowledge	on	the	one	hand,	and	human	free	will	on	the	other.		Bradwardine	argues	that	God’s	foreknowledge	operates	in	accord	with	God’s	ordained	power,	and	so	relative	to	God’s	ordained	power,	our	actions	are	indeed	compelled;	however,	because	of	Bradwardine’s	appeal	to	the	distinction	in	power,	he	is	able	to	maintain	that	our	actions	remain	free	relative	to	God’s	absolute	power,	and	are	thus	free,	absolutely	speaking.		This	solution	is,	I	argue,	unique	to	Bradwardine,	although	it	seems	to	be	abandoned	in	his	later	writing.		 Bradwardine’s	approach	to	the	problem	is	heavily	influenced	by	three	figures	in	particular	—	Boethius,	Anselm	of	Canterbury,	and	John	Duns	Scotus	—	each	of	whose	solutions	I	discuss	in	some	detail.		Furthermore,	Bradwardine	explicitly	places	his	own	solution	in	opposition	to	that	of	William	Ockham,	and	so	I	give	substantial	attention	to	examining	Ockham’s	position.		But	while	I	agree	with	Bradwardine’s	assessment	that	Ockham’s	position	undermines	God’s	foreknowledge	in	ways	that	should	be	untenable	to	someone	of	14th-century	Christian	commitments,	I	argue	that	Bradwardine’s	solution	amounts	to	an	equally	untenable	determinism.	An	appendix	contains	excerpts	from	my	own	English	translation	of	the	De	
futuris	contingentibus	(the	first	into	any	modern	language),	in	parallel	with	the	original	Latin.		Keywords:	Thomas	Bradwardine,	William	Ockham,	free	will,	divine	foreknowledge,	medieval	philosophy,	future	contingents,	divine	power	distinction,	ordained	power,	absolute	power,	Boethius,	Anselm,	John	Duns	Scotus,	history	of	philosophy.	 	
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But	I	ne	kan	nat	bulte	it	to	the	bren,	
As	kan	the	hooly	doctour	Augustyn,	
Or	Boece,	or	the	Bisshop	Bradwardyn,	
Wheither	that	Goddes	worthy	forwityng	
Streyneth	me	nedely	for	to	doon	a	thyng,	-	
"Nedely"	clepe	I	symple	necessitee;	
Or	elles,	if	free	choys	be	graunted	me	
To	do	that	same	thyng,	or	do	it	noght,	
Though	God	forwoot	it,	er	that	I	was	wroght;	
Or	if	his	wityng	streyneth	never	a	deel	
But	by	necessitee	condicioneel.	
I	wol	nat	han	to	do	of	swich	mateere;	
My	tale	is	of	a	Cok,	as	ye	may	heere.	.	.	
		 	 Geoffrey	Chaucer	“The	Nun’s	Priest’s	Tale,”	lines	474	-	86		 	
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Introduction 
 
 
Bradwardine's  context 
Thomas  Bradwardine  was  probably  born  in  the  last  decade  or  so  of  the  13th 
century,  somewhere  in  Sussex  —  most  likely  in  the  diocese  of  Chichester.    Though 1
little  is  known  about  his  exact  provenance  or  year  of  birth,  he  rose  to  such 
prominence  in  adulthood  that  we  know  with  a  great  deal  of  certainty  the  exact  date 
of  his  untimely  death:  26  August  1349.    He  was  thus  a  direct  contemporary  of 
William  Ockham  (who  probably  died  at  some  point  between  1347  and  1349 ).   In 2
fact,  Bradwardine  and  Ockham  were  likely  both  in  Oxford  for  much  of  the  1320s  and 
30s,  while  Bradwardine  was  a  fellow  at  Merton  College,  and  undoubtedly  the  two 
crossed  paths  during  that  time. 
In  the  1340s,  Bradwardine's  life  took  an  increasingly  ecclesiastical  and 
political  turn,  and  he  became  chaplain  and  confessor  to  the  King,  Edward  III,  whom 
he  accompanied  on  campaigns  in  France.   In  1348,  Bradwardine  was  appointed 
Archbishop  of  Canterbury;  however,  King  Edward  seems  not  to  have  wanted  to  lose 
Bradwardine’s  services  as  advisor  and  confessor,  and  prevented  his  ascension  to  the 
See  of  Canterbury,  having  John  de  Ufford  made  Archbishop  instead.   But  even  before 
his  consecration  as  Archbishop,  Ufford  succumbed  to  the  plague,  which  was  at  this 
1  Jean-François  Genest  (1979),   “Le  De  futuris  contingentibus  de  Thomas  Bradwardine,”  Recherches 
Augustiniennes  vol.  14  (1979),   p.  251.   In  my  overview  of  Bradwardine’s  life,  I  am  relying  largely  on 
Genest’s   report,  as  well  as  Heiko  Oberman’s  book  Archbishop   Thomas   Bradwardine:  A 
Fourteenth-Century  Augustinian   (Utrecht:  Kemink  &  Zoon,  1957). 
2  Older  scholarship   often  gives  the  later  date,  but  more  recent  scholarship  has  uncovered  evidence  to 
suggest   something   closer  to  the  earlier  date. 
 
 
 
 
2 
time  at  a  particularly  high  point  in  its  ravagings.   Edward  did  not  seek  to  prevent 
Bradwardine’s  appointment  a  second  time,  and  in  June  of  1349,  Bradwardine  was 
consecrated  Archbishop  of  Canterbury,  the  most  powerful  ecclesial  position  in 
England.   But  Bradwardine  fared  little  better  than  his  unlucky  predecessor:  on  the 
26th  of  August,  1349,  while  travelling  back  to  Canterbury  from  his  consecration  at 
Avignon,  he,  too,  died  of  plague.  He  was  buried  at  Canterbury. 
During  his  early  career  at  Oxford,  Bradwardine  established  his  reputation  as 
a  talented  geometer,  mathematician,  and  physicist  among  the  “Oxford  Calculators”, 
writing  treatises  in  these  areas  that  have  received  considerable  attention.  He  was 
also  a  notable  logician,  devising  a  unique  and  influential  solution  to  the  Liar  Paradox 
(Stephen  Read  has  been  a  strong  advocate  for  the  strength  of  this  solution).    It  was 3
during  his  tenure  at  Oxford  that  Bradwardine  became  a  strong  intellectual  opponent 
of  William  Ockham.  In  particular,  Bradwardine  objected  strongly  to  those  elements 
of  Ockham's  teaching  that  he  perceived  as  undermining  the  authority  and  power  of 
God.  In  this  line  of  writing,  Bradwardine  is  best  known  for  the  theological  tome  De 
causa  Dei  contra  Pelagium  –  the  “Pelagians”  being  identified  as  Ockham  and  his 
followers.    In  this  work,  Bradwardine  emphasizes  the  primary  importance  of  God's 4
will  and  action  in  the  work  of  salvation,  and  the  necessity  of  God's  extension  of  grace 
for  our  salvation.   Thus,  contra  the  “Pelagians,”  human  creatures  are  dependent  upon 
God's  action  for  their  salvation  and,  apart  from  God's  will  and  grace,  they  can  do 
nothing  to  independently  merit  salvation.  There  is  much  in  this  work  of 
Bradwardine  that  anticipates  the  emphases  of  various  Reformation  theologians, 
3  There  is  currently  a  vast  literature  on  this  topic,  with  contributions  by  Stephen  Read,  Graham  Priest, 
Catarina   Dutilh  Novaes,  and  others  (see  the  bibliography  for  more  sources);  a  good  place  to  start, 
though,  is  Stephen  Read,  “The  Liar  Paradox  from  John  Buridan  back  to  Thomas  Bradwardine,”  Vivarium 
vol.  40  (2002),   no.  2,  pp.  189  –  218;  and  Read,  “Bradwardine's  Revenge,”  in  J.C.  Beall  (ed.),  Revenge  of  the 
Liar:  New  Essays  on  the  Paradox  (Oxford:  Oxford  UP,  2007).   A  critical  response   to  Read  can  be  found  in 
Yann  Benétreau-Dupin,   “Buridan’s  Solution   to  the  Liar  Paradox,”  History  and  Philosophy  of  Logic  vol.  36, 
no.  1  (2015),   pp.  18-28. 
4  Thomas   Bradwardine,  De  causa  Dei  contra  Pelagium  et  de  virtute  causarum ,  ed.  Henry  Seville  (London: 
1618).   (Reprint,  Frankfurt:   Minerva,  1964.   There  is  currently  an  inexpensive  reprint-of-the-reprint 
available  on  demand   from  Nabu  Public  Domain  Reprints,  with  an  erroneous  attribution  of  authorship  to 
Henry  Seville.) 
 
 
 
 
3 
particularly  John  Calvin  and  John  Knox,  and  various  historians  of  theology  have 
pointed  to  the  probable  influence  Bradwardine  had  on  these  later  thinkers.  5
But  prior  to  writing  this  theological  manifesto,  Bradwardine  treated  the 
related  topic  of  future  contingents  in  a  shorter  treatise  entitled,  unsurprisingly,  De 
futuris  contingentibus  (“On  future  contingents”).   The  topic  of  future  contingents 6
relates  strongly  to  the  questions  of  De  causa  Dei ,  because  it  is  generally  assumed 
that,  in  order  for  human  beings  to  genuinely  act  freely,  there  must  be  a  genuine 
contingency  with  regard  to  their  future  actions.  That  is,  they  must  really  be  free  to 
act  in  either  of  two  ways,  with  no  strong  compelling  force  to  one  way  or  the  other. 
 
Medieval  Degrees  of  Contingency 
To  put  this  in  medieval  terms,  human  free  will  requires  the  existence  of  ad 
utrumlibet  future  contingents  —  “ad  utrumlibet”  being  a  virtually  untranslatable 
phrase  which  in  this  context  designates  contingent  events  which  have  no  strong 
compulsion  to  happen  in  one  way  over  another.   About  this  concept  perhaps  a  bit 
more  should  be  said,  because  it  stands  in  marked  contrast  to  our  contemporary 
understandings  of  contingency.   We  are  typically  inclined  to  divide  events  into  three 
categories:  what  is  necessary;  what  is  impossible;  and  whatever  is  neither  necessary 
nor  impossible  is  simply  termed  “contingent.”   We  make  no  further  distinctions 
between  different  kinds  of  contingency,  and  unless  we  are  determinists  (which,  of 
course,  many  of  us  are),  probably  consider  the  vast  majority  of  events  —  everything 
from  the  Big  Bang  to  the  daily  ebb  and  flow  of  tides  to  our  own  actions  and  decisions 
—  to  fall  within  this  rather  broad  category  of  contingency.   (We  may  in  fact  not 
conceive  of  any  events  as  necessary,  only  the  relationships  between  events.   The 
tides,  for  instance,  are  not  strictly  or  logically  necessary,  but  are  only  necessary 
5  Most  notable   in  this  vein  of  scholarship   is  Oberman  1958. 
6  Thomas   Bradwardine   (1979),   De  futuris  contingentibus ,  ed.  J.-F.  Genest,  Recherches  Augustiniennes  vol. 
14  (1979),   pp.  280  –  336. 
 
 
 
 
4 
insofar  as  certain  physical  relationships  (contingently)  hold  between  the  sun,  moon, 
earth,  and  the  waters  on  the  earth  —  if  the  moon  were  smashed  to  smithereens  by 
an  enormous  asteroid,  the  tides  would  cease  to  function  in  the  ways  we  expect  them 
to.   This  demonstrates  their  contingency.   But  assuming  that  the  heavenly  bodies 
whose  gravitational  pull  influences  the  course  of  the  tides  remain  as  they  are,  then 
relative  to  these  facts,  it  is  necessary  that  the  tides  continue  as  we  expect  them  to 
do.)   To  illustrate  visually,  this  is  perhaps  something  like  the  way  we  tend  to  modally 
catagorize  events  in  our  own  parlence: 
 
IMPOSSIBLE  CONTINGENT  NECESSARY 
 
Late  medieval  logicians,  by  contrast,  conceived  of  the  category  of  contingency  as 
being  subdivided  itself  into  three  categories:  contingens  ut  raro,  contingens  ad 
utrumlibet ,  and  contingens  ut  in  pluribus .     We  might  think  about  these  categories  as 7
being  something  like  “technically  contingent,  but  practically  impossible,”  “ really  and 
truly  contingent,”  and  “technically  contingent,  but  practically  necessary,” 
respectively.   A  revision  of  the  above  table  in  these  terms  would  therefore  look 
something  like  this: 
 
CONTINGENT 
⏞ 
IMPOSSIBLE  UT  RARO AD  UTRUMLIBET UT  IN  PLURIBUS NECESSARY 
 
7  There  are  other  variations   on  these  distinctions  and  terminology.   Contingens  ut  in  pluribus   seems  to  be 
more  or  less  equivalent  to  what  is  sometimes   called  contingens  natum  (its  opposite  being  contingents 
non  natum ).   For  our  purposes,   however,  since  contingencia  ad  utrumlibet   is  what  concerns   us,  we  will 
content  ourselves  with  this  perhaps  somewhat  simplified  formulation.   More  about  this  can  be  found  in 
Henrik  Lagerlund  (2000),   Modal  Syllogistics   in  the  Middle  Ages  (Leiden:   Brill,  2000). 
 
 
 
 
5 
Let  us  explore  this  subdivision  for  a  moment.   On  the  one  hand,  there  are  events 
which,  though  technically  having  it  within  their  power  to  turn  out  otherwise  (and 
therefore  being  contingent),  hardly  ever  (or  perhaps  in  finite  time,  never)  do  so, 
because  they  are  generally  prevented  from  doing  so  by  other  factors.   For  example, 
that  a  raven  is  black  is  a  contingent  fact,  since  on  rare  occasions  an  albino  raven  may 
turn  out  white.   But  since  it  is  almost  always  the  case  that  a  raven  turns  out  black, 
and,  furthermore,  since  there  are  certain  factors  (in  this  case,  mainly  genetic)  which 
generally  prevent  it  from  being  any  colour  other  than  black,  the  medieval  logician 
would  consider  the  raven’s  blackness  to  be  contingent  only  in  the  contingens  ut  in 
pluribus  sense  --  technically  contingent,  but  necessary  for  all  practical  purposes.   On 
the  other  hand,  there  are  events  which,  though  technically  possible,  almost  never 
happen.   These  can  be  seen  logically  as  the  negations  of  the  events  which  are 
contingens  ut  in  pluribus,  such  as  a  raven  not  being  black,  but  white  (or   yellow,  or 
fuchsia).     Such  events  which,  though  technically  contingent,  are  extremely  unlikely 
to  happen  are  called  contingens  ut  raro . 
Finally,  there  is  the  third,  middle  class  of  contingent  events,  designating  those 
events  which  can  really,  plausibly,  and  reasonably  be  considered  to  turn  out  in  either 
of  two  ways,  or  ad  utrumlibet .   It  is  this  category  into  which  Bradwardine 
understands  morally  significant  actions  to  fall.   Such  events  are  really  free,  in  a  sense, 
to  turn  out  in  either  of  two  (or  more)  ways,  like  the  flipping  of  a  coin.   However,  in 
citing  this  example  (the  coin  toss),  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  what 
Bradwardine  and  other  medieval  thinkers  have  in  mind  when  they  consider  ad 
utrumlibet  contingents  is  not  so  much  a  question  of  equal  probability,  but  rather,  an 
event’s  not  being  constrained  or  compelled  by  other  factors.   So  suppose,  for 
instance,  that  I  stoop  to  pick  up  a  pebble  from  the  beach  on  a  summer  holiday: 
considering  that  there  are  thousands  of  pebbles  on  the  beach,  and  that  there  are  any 
number  of  other  actions  I  may  have  chosen  to  perform  at  that  very  moment  (I  might 
instead  have  kicked  the  pebble,  or  performed  a  somersault,  or  taken  off  at  a  run  to 
get  back  home  and  continue  writing  my  thesis),  then  probabilistically  speaking,  the 
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event  in  which  I  stoop  at  that  exact  spot  to  pick  up  that  very  pebble  is  extremely 
unlikely  indeed  (it  may  conceivably  even  be  statistically  impossible).   But  it  is  not  an 
action  which  is  in  any  way  constrained  or  compelled  by  natural  or  metaphysical 
factors  --  it  is  one  which  I  am  at  perfect  liberty  to  either  perform  or  refrain  from 
performing.   And  for  these  reasons,  it  is  considered  to  be  an  ad  utrumlibet 
contingent  action. 
Bradwardine  assumes  that  all  actions  of  moral  significance  fall  into  this 
middle,  ad  utrumlibet  category  of  contingents.   If  human  beings  are  to  have  free  will, 
it  must  be  because  they  can,  in  the  future,  will  actions  which  are  themselves 
contingent  ad  utrumlibet ;  thus  human  free  will  requires  the  existence  of  ad 
utrumlibet  future  contingents.   But   of  course,  a  dilemma  arises  when  such  future 
contingent  actions  and  events  are  considered  in  relation  to  God's  omniscience, 
which  includes  knowledge  of  all  future  things:  how  can  an  act  be  truly  free,  or  an 
event  truly  contingent,  if  its  outcome  is  already  known  by  God  before  it  happens? 
This  is  the  question  which  Bradwardine  sets  out  to  address  in  this  treatise,  and  it  is 
the  solution  he  proposes  that  is  the  central  subject  of  my  investigations  in  this  thesis. 
 
What  has  been  written  to  date 
Bradwardine's  De  futuris  contingentibus  has  received  very  minimal  scholarly 
attention,  so  let  me  provide  a  brief  summary  of  what  has  been  written  about  this 
work  in  contemporary  scholarship.   In  the  1930s,  a  fragmentary  edition  of  the 
treatise  was  prepared  by  E.B.M.  Xiberta.    This  edition  includes  fragments  making  up 8
less  than  fifteen  percent  of  the  work,  making  it  very  incomplete,  but  is  the  earliest 
modern  reference  to  the  work  I  have  so  far  discovered.   Heiko  Oberman 
subsequently  discussed  the  work  briefly  in  his  1957  study  of  Bradwardine's 
8  E.B.M.  Xiberta,   O.  Carm,  “Fragments   d’una  questio  inedita  de  Thomas  Bradwardina,”  in  Festschrift  für  M. 
Grabmann   (Münster,  1935),  pp.  1169  -  1180  in  BB,  Supplementvolume  III,  2  (Publication  from  Cod.  Vat. 
Lat.  813). 
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theology,   but  as  I  will  explain  in  chapter  3,  his  treatment  is  hindered  by 9
misunderstanding  the  structure  of  the  treatise.  No  doubt  his  misunderstanding 
arose,  at  least  in  part,  from  the  lack  of  any  modern  critical  edition,  apart  from 
Xiberta’s  fragments. 
A  complete  modern  critical  edition  was  finally  supplied  by  Genest  in  1979, 
accompanied  by  a  helpful  introduction.    Three  years  later,  Calvin  Normore 10
addressed  Bradwardine's  approach  to  future  contingents  in  his  article  on  the  topic  in 
the  Cambridge  History  of  Later  Medieval  Philosophy .    However,  it  appears  that  at  the 11
time  of  writing,  Normore  was  not  yet  familiar  with  the  (then  brand-new)  edition  by 
Genest,  because  he  focuses  his  discussion  of  Bradwardine  exclusively  on  De  causa 
Dei ,  without  mentioning  even  the  existence  of  De  futuris  contingentibus .   Given  the 
extent  to  which  Normore  discusses  Bradwardine's  treatment  of  future  contingents,  it 
may  appear  to  us  that  his  neglect  to  consider  the  treatise  explicitly  on  the  topic  is  a 
grave  omission;  however,  as  Jennifer  Ashworth  has  pointed  out  to  me,  it  is  quite 
possible  that  Normore's  article  was  prepared  before  the  edition  became  available,  as 
the  Cambridge  History  volume  had  a  very  long  gestation.  12
Genest  again  returned  to  the  topic  in  1992,  this  time  in  a  volume  discussing 
Thomas  Buckingham's  treatment  of  future  contingents  in  contrast  with  that  of 
Bradwardine;   but  as  with  Normore's  earlier  article,  the  focus  of  Genest's  1992 13
treatment  is  De  causa  Dei .   The  De  futuris  contingentibus ,  the  very  work  he  edited 
thirteen  years  earlier,  meanwhile,  receives  scarcely  a  mention.   Finally,  the  last 
evidence  of  modern  engagement  with  the  treatise  that  I  have  been  able  to  discover  is 
an  unpublished  partial  translation  by  Norman  Kretzmann:  at  some  point  before  his 
9  Oberman   1957. 
10  Genest  (1979),   pp.  249  –  336. 
11  Calvin  Normore  (1982),   “Future  Contingents,”  in  N.  Kretzmann,  A.  Kenny,  J.  Pinborg  (eds.),  The 
Cambridge  History  of  Later  Medieval  Philosophy  (Cambridge:   CUP,  1982),  pp.  358  –  81. 
12   I  have  yet  to  learn  from  Normore  directly  whether  he  knew  of  the  treatise  at  the  time  that  he  wrote 
the  Cambridge   History  article,  and  would  be  interested  to  learn  about  this  —  and  also  about  how  he 
came  to  be  interested  in  Bradwardine’s  views  on  the  topic  in  the  first  place! 
13  Jean-François  Genest  (1992),   Prédétermination   et  liberté  créée  à  Oxford  au  XIVe  siècle:  Buckingham 
contre  Bradwardine  (Paris:  J.  Vrin,  1992). 
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death,  Kretzmann  began  drafting  a  translation  of  the  treatise  into  English;  however, 
he  only  completed  a  fraction  of  the  text  (perhaps  about  fifteen  percent ),  and  never 14
wrote  anything  else  on  the  topic.  15
This  small  handful  of  sources  represents  the  sum  total  of  modern  scholarship 
which  has,  to  date,  engaged  in  any  way  at  all  with  this  text  —  and  with  the  exception 
of  Genest’s  fine  edition  from  1979,  none  has  done  so  in  any  very  substantive  way 
(indeed,  in  most  cases,  I  mentioned  them  to  point  out  their  lack  of  engagement  with 
this  treatise).   Perhaps  the  neglect  of  De  futuris  contingentibus  would  be  justified  if  it 
was  viewed  simply  as  an  earlier,  less  developed  version  of  his  arguments  on  future 
contingents,  expressed  more  fully  in  De  causa  Dei ;  if  De  causa  Dei  simply  restated 
and  improved  upon  whatever  was  put  forward  in  De  futuris  contingentibus ,  then  it 
would  make  sense  to  focus  on  the  former.  But  this  is  not  the  case,  as  we  will  discover 
in  what  follows,  and  touch  on  again  in  the  conclusion. 
 
Content  of  the  treatise 
The  De  futuris  contingentibus  of  Thomas  Bradwardine  provides  an  apparently 
original  account  of  future  contingents,  framed  largely  as  a  response  to  William 
Ockham's  influential  treatment  of  the  same  topic.  But  though  Bradwardine's  account 
shows,  I  think,  potential  for  great  interest  as  a  unique  contribution  (whether  or  not 
it  is  ultimately  successful)  to  the  age-old  problem  of  reconciling  God's  prescience 
with  human  free  will,  it  has  received  almost  no  attention  from  contemporary 
14  Notice  that  this  is  about  the  same  percentage   as  the  Xiberta  fragments;  this  leads  me  to  wonder 
whether  it  might  have  been  the  Xiberta   edition  which  Kretzmann  was  working  from.   However,  as  I  have 
been  unable  to  locate  a  copy  of  the  Xiberta   fragments  myself,  I  have  been  unable  to  compare  the 
portions   included   to  either  confirm   or  disconfirm  this  theory. 
15  Copies  of  this  partial  translation   have  circulated  in  unpublished  form;  my  thanks  are  due  Stephen 
Read  for  passing   one  along  to  me,  which  sparked  my  initial  interest  in  this  text.   As  I  have  said, 
Kretzmann’s  translation   is  only  fragmentary.   To  address  this  deficit,  I  have  drafted  a  complete 
translation   of  the  text  (re-translating   even  the  parts  already  translated  by  Kretzmann,  for  the  sake  of 
consistency  of  style),  which  I  hope  might  be  useful  to  others  in  due  course;  portions  of  my  translation 
are  found  throughout  the  body  of  this  thesis,  and  in  the  appendix. 
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scholars,  nor,  it  seems,  from  Bradwardine's  own  contemporaries  and  immediate 
successors.  16
The  form  the  treatise  takes  is  probably  that  of  a  reportatio  (i.e.,  a  student’s 
report  of  Bradwardine’s  lectures),  and  the  evidence  for  this  is  largely  stylistic:  in 
many  ways  it  seems  to  be  a  hastily-prepared  work,  with  infelicities  of  style  and 
grammar  throughout,  and  an  often  haphazard  organizational  structure.   Its  mode  of 
expression  is  also  repetitive  and  formulaic,  suggesting  a  lack  of  fluent  ease  with  the 
Latin  language.   Genest  agrees  with  the  likelihood  of  this  assessment,  saying, 
La  forme  du  texte  est  d’ailleurs  celle  d’une  reportatio ,  comme  le  montrent  les 
multiples  répétitions,  la  syntaxe  très  lourde  et  souvent  incorrecte,  ainsi  que 
les  flottement  qui  sòbservent  parfois  dans  le  plan,  notamment  dans  le 
découpage  des  objections  et  des  réponses.   (Genest  1979,  p.  253) 
 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  also  some  indications  that  the  work  may  have  been 
directly  prepared  by  Bradwardine  himself:  e.g.,  the  text  contains  references  to  his 
own  (lost)  work  De  peccato ,  and  self-deprecating  phrases  like,  “sed  hoc  non  dico 
asserendo,  quia  illam  materiam  non  bene  studui  adhuc”   (DFC  53a),  which  would 17
not  seem  to  be  in  keeping  with  a  report  by  a  student  of  a  Master’s  lecture.    It  is 
worth  noting,  though,  that  the  assessment  that  the  text  is  a  reportatio  need  not  be 
incompatible  with  Bradwardine  having  at  some  point  looked  the  notes  over  himself, 
possibly  adding  a  few  editorial  additions  or  corrections.   It  would  not  have  been 
unusual  for  a  master  to  check  over  a  student’s  reportatio  of  his  lectures. 
 
Preparatory  remarks  about  the  problem 
As  we  will  explore  in  much  greater  detail  in  what  follows,  the  problem  of 
future  contingents  in  the  late  medieval  period  is  one  which  touches  on  many  issues 
16  About  this  latter  issue,  a  bit  more  will  be  said  in  the  Conclusion. 
17  “But  I  do  not  say  this  as  an  assertion,   because   this  matter  has  not  been  well-studied  before  now.” 
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relating  to  epistemology  (particularly  the  knowledge  —  and  foreknowledge  —  of 
God),  metaphysics  (the  nature  of  God’s  relationship  with  time,  questions  of  what 
grounds  contingency,  causation  and  causal  powers,  etc.),  human  nature  and  the 
nature  of  free  will,  ethics  (particularly  the  question  of  responsibility),  logic  and 
modality,  and  more.   It  is  a  multi-faceted  problem,  with  many  different  possible 
approaches,  from  many  different  angles.   In  the  course  of  this  study,  we  will  examine 
in  some  detail  the  approaches  to  this  problem  of  four  philosophers  who  set  the  stage 
for  Bradwardine:  Boethius,  Anselm,  John  Duns  Scotus,  and  William  Ockham.   Each  of 
these  four  has  a  unique  approach  to  the  problem,  relating  to  Bradwardine’s  own 
approach  in  different  ways.   Broadly  speaking,  we  will  find  that  the  approaches  of 
Boethius,  Anselm,  and  Scotus  are  viewed  sympathetically  by  Bradwardine,  and  even 
influence  his  own  view  in  significant  ways;  the  approach  of  Ockham,  however,  is 
taken  by  Bradwardine  to  be  on  entirely  the  wrong  track,  and  demonstrating  its 
shortcomings  is  among  the  primary  purposes  of  his  treatise. 
We  will  find  in  Bradwardine’s  approach  to  the  problem  an  attempted  solution 
that  draws  on  many  elements  of  those  he  admires,  while  creatively  employing  an 
original  application  of  a  distinction  in  God’s  powers  to  try  to  explain  the 
compatibility  between  God’s  foreknowledge  and  human  freedom.   The  distinction 
Bradwardine  makes  use  of  is  not  per  se  original  to  Bradwardine,  but  the  way  in 
which  he  applies  the  distinction  to  solve  this  particular  problem  is,  I  argue, 
something  that  had  not  been  attempted  in  a  sustained  way  before. 
By  the  end  of  this  thesis,  however,  I  will  have  argued  that  Bradwardine’s 
solution,  though  interesting  because  of  its  uniqueness,  is  ultimately  unsuccessful  in 
solving  the  problem  in  a  way  that  a  philosopher  like  Bradwardine  should  find 
satisfactory.   In  his  fervour  to  avoid  the  mistakes  he  sees  present  in  Ockham’s 
solution,  he  himself  winds  up  falling  into  the  trap  of  mistakes  that  are  in  fact  the 
mirror  image  of  Ockham’s. 
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A  note  about  the  texts 
In  my  presentation  of  Latin  primary-source  texts,  I  will  not  presume  of  the 
reader  a  facility  with  Latin,  but  neither  will  I  presume  a  lack  of  interest  in  the 
original  text.   In  the  case  of  each  quotation  that  follows,  it  is  my  aim  to  provide  the 
reader,  firstly,  with  clear,  readable  translations  (of  either  my  own  or  another’s 
devising,  as  indicated  by  my  notes),  but  also  with  easy  access  to  the  original  Latin. 
In  the  case  of  short  quotations  in  passing,  the  Latin  text  of  the  original  will  usually  be 
included  in  a  footnote  (unless  I  am  highlighting  the  use  of  a  particular  phrase  or 
word  in  the  original),  so  as  not  to  disrupt  the  flow  of  the  prose;  but  in  the  case  of 
extended  quotations  inviting  closer  study,  I  will  provide  the  Latin  text  directly  below 
the  translation,  within  the  main  body  of  text,  to  facilitate  ease  of  comparison. 
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Chapter  1 
  Future  Contingents  Up  to  the  14th  Century:  Three  Views 
 
Introduction  
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  give  an  overview  of  each  of  three  major 
solutions  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents  preceding  Bradwardine  which  form 
the  groundwork  for  Bradwardine’s  own  view.   It  is  my  view  that  two  of  these  three 
influential  positions  —  those  of  Boethius  and  Anselm  —  can  be  seen  as  springing 
from  the  same  family  tree  of  solutions  to  the  problem.   The  third,  that  of  John  Duns 
Scotus,  departs  in  marked  ways  from  the  dominant  lineage,  but  is  important  to 
consider  for  its  influence  on  Bradwardine.   Bradwardine,  I  will  argue,  sees  his  own 
view  as  descending  from  the  same  line  as  that  of  Boethius  and  Anselm;  however,  he 
is  also  influenced  in  significant  ways  by  the  rather  different  approach  of  Duns 
Scotus.   I  do  not  intend  for  this  collection  I  have  chosen  to  be  viewed  as  an 
exhaustive  overview  of  the  family  tree  of  solutions  to  the  problem  of  future 
contingents;  indeed,  there  are  many  more  minor  branches  to  be  explored.   And  in 
fact,  I  leave  untouched  in  my  treatment  the  view  which  is  arguably  the  root  of  all  that 
follow,  namely,  that  of  St  Augustine. 
The  virtue  of  brevity  necessarily  requires  the  neglect  of  many  figures  of  great 
interest  and  influence  in  their  own  right,  but  Augustine  —  because  of  his  stature  in 
the  canon,  and  his  well-known  attention  to  this  very  matter  —  is  likely  the  figure 
whose  exclusion  from  this  treatment  requires  the  most  argument.   This  choice  on  my 
part  is  down  to  at  least  three  factors:  firstly,  as  a  study  of  the  medieval  development 
of  the  problem,  Augustine  belongs  a  little  too  much  to  the  Classical  world  to  neatly 
fit  within  that  framework  (indeed,  if  Augustine  needs  attention,  then  surely  Plotinus, 
and  Aristotle,  do,  too);  secondly,  it  is  in  part  because  Augustine’s  solution  is  so 
well-known  and  well-studied  that  it  hardly  needs  recounting  in  these  pages;  and 
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thirdly,  Augustine’s  view  is  so  quickly  and  thoroughly  taken  up,  and  so  dramatically 
extended  by  Boethius,  that  to  rehearse  his  view  separately  would  seem  almost  an 
unnecessary  redundancy. 
I  have  already  said  that  I  see  the  views  of  Boethius  and  Anselm  as  forming  a 
part  of  the  same  family  tree.   Indeed,  the  continuity  of  these  solutions  with  one 
another,  and  Bradwardine’s  with  them,  is  one  of  the  key  elements  I  intend  this  thesis 
to  highlight.   Thus,  in  moving  from  the  study  of  one  figure  to  the  next,  the  reader 
should  not  be  surprised  to  find  substantial  overlap  from  one  view  to  the  next. 
However,  it  is  my  aim  to  emphasize  the  new  ways  in  which  each  thinker  develops  the 
ideas,  and  the  new  components  added  by  each.   Thus,  as  the  lineage  advances  and 
new  bloodlines  are  added  along  the  way,  we  should  not  be  surprised  if  we  note 
subtly  changing  features  gaining  prominence  as  we  progress  chronologically.   And  in 
Duns  Scotus,  we  will  encounter  an  approach  that  is  very  different  from  the  others. 
 
1.1  -  Boethius  on  Future  Contingents 
1.1.1  -  Commentary  on  De  Interpretatione 
The  first  main  discussion  by  Boethius  on  the  issue  of  future  contingents 
occurs  in  his  commentaries  on  Aristotle’s  De  Interpretatione .    Boethius  wrote  two 18
such  commentaries,  but  because  the  second  commentary  is  the  lengthier  and  more 
detailed  of  the  two,  I  will  confine  my  discussion  to  that  one.   In  this  work,  Boethius 
seeks  to  address  the  perennial  problem  of  Aristotle’s  treatment  of  tomorrow’s  sea 
battle.   Aristotle  says  that  statements  about  future  contingents  have  a  truth  value, 
but  have  it  indeterminately.   What  Aristotle  means  by  this,  however,  apart  from  his 
denial  that  everything  happens  by  necessity,  is  far  from  clear.   One  interpretation, 
18  In  Ammonius   Hermiae,   On  Aristotle's  On  interpretation   9 ,  Ammonius   (trans.  by  David  Blank).   With  On 
Aristotle's  On  interpretation  9,  Boethius:  first  and  second  commentaries  (trans.  by  Norman   Kretzmann); 
with  essays  by  Richard  Sorabji,  Norman   Kretzmann  &  Mario  Mignucci ,  (Ithaca,   N.Y.  :  Cornell   University 
Press,  1998);  edition   of  Latin  text  Karl  Meiser  (ed.),  Anicii  Manlii  Severini  Boetii  Commentarii  in  librum 
Aristotelis  Peri  hermeneias   (Leipzig:   1877  -  80),  2  vols. 
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adopted  by  the  Stoics  in  their  (unfavourable)  interpretation  of  Aristotle,  is  that 
Aristotle  intends  by  this  to  abandon  the  principle  of  bivalence,  thereby  committing 
himself  to  the  notion  that  statements  about  future  contingent  events  are  neither  true 
nor  false.   Boethius  rejects  this  interpretation,  and  proposes  in  his  commentary  that 
instead  Aristotle  means  to  say  that  statements  concerning  future  contingent  events 
do  have  a  truth  value,  but  one  which  is   “indefinite  and  changeable”: 
For  Aristotle  does  not  say  this  –  that  both  are  neither  true  nor  false  –  but 
indeed  that  each  is  either  true  or  false,  but  not  definitely  in  the  way  that 
happens  with  past-tense  sentences.   But  [Aristotle  says]  that  in  a  certain  way 
the  nature  of  statement-making  utterances  is  twofold.   Some  of  them  are  such 
that  not  just  are  true  and  false  found  in  them,  but  in  them  one  is  definitely 
true,  the  other  definitely  false.   But  in  others,  one  is  indeed  true  and  the  other 
false,  but  indefinitely  and  changeably  –  and  this  is  a  result  of  their  nature,  not 
our  ignorance  or  knowledge. 
non  enim  hoc  Aristoteles  dicit,  quod  utraeque  nec  verae  nec  falsae  sunt,  sed 
quod  una  quidem  ipsarum  quaelibet  aut  vera  aut  falsa  est,  non  tamen 
quemadmodum  in  praeteritis  definite  nec  quemadmodum  in  praesentibus, 
sed  enuntiativarum  vocum  duplicem  quodammodo  esse  naturam,  quarum 
quaedam  essent  non  modo  in  quibus  verum  et  falsum  inveniretur,  sed  in 
quibus  una  etiam  esset  definite  vera,  falsa  altera  definite,  in  aliis  vero  una 
quidem  vera,  altera  falsa,  sed  indefinite  et  commutabiliter  et  hoc  per  suam 
naturam,  non  ad  nostram  ignorantiam  atque  notitiam.  (2  In  de  interpretatione 
208:7  –  18,  trans.  Marenbon) 
 
There  is  disagreement  in  the  literature  over  how  this  is  to  be  understood.   Norman 
Kretzmann  has  proposed  that  statements  about  future  contingent  events  have  a 
peculiar  “either-true-or-false”  status  up  to  the  point  at  which  they  either  do  or  do 
not  occur.    So,  for  instance,  the  sentence,  “The  White  House  will  be  burned  down 19
on  24  August  1814,”  was,  prior  to  24  August  1814,  either-true-or-false,  but  after  the 
events  of  that  day,  it  acquired  the  truth-value  “True”,  and  this  truth-value  henceforth 
19  Norman   Kretzmann,   “Boethius   and  the  Truth  about  Tomorrow’s  Sea  Battle,”  in  Ammonius  (1998),  29  - 
37. 
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applies  retroactively  to  all  prior  instances  of  the  statement.   As  I  understand 
Kretzmann’s  interpretation  of  Boethius,  he  would  seem  to  have  it  that  before  24 
August  1814,  the  statement  “The  White  House  will  be  burned  down  on  24  August 
1814”  was  either-true-or-false;  but  when  the  White  House  was,  in  fact,  burned  down 
on  24  August  1814,  it  became  the  case  that  the  statement  was  always  definitively 
True. 
Apart  from  the  peculiarity  of  a  sentence  having  been  either-true-or-false  for 
all  of  history,  and  then  suddenly  becoming  definitively  true  for  all  of  history, 
Kretzmann’s  account  seems  to  me  to  have  the  additional  difficulty  of  not 
contradicting  the  Stoic  account  of  Aristotle  that  Boethius  seems  to  have  been  keen  to 
refute.   Indeed,  asserting  a  sentence  to  have  this  “either-true-or-false”  indefinite 
truth-value  amounts  to  the  same  things  as  a  denial  of  bivalence  for  future-tensed 
propositions  concerning  contingent  events. 
It  is  for  these  reasons  that  I  prefer  the  account  offered  by  John  Marenbon, 
though  as  I  mention  below,  even  it  does  not  seem  to  be  an  entirely  satisfactory 
account.    Marenbon  directs  our  attention  to  a  later  passage  in  which  Boethius 20
argues  that  for  someone  to  say,  “There  will  be  a  sea  battle  tomorrow,”  they  speak 
falsely,  even  if  there  is  indeed  a  sea  battle  the  following  day.   This  is  because  Boethius 
understands  the  statement,  “There  will  be  a  sea  battle  tomorrow”  to  be  equivalent  to 
the  statement,  “There  will  necessarily  be  a  sea  battle  tomorrow.”   What  a  person 
ought  rather  to  say  is,  “There  will  be  a  sea  battle  tomorrow  contingently .”   This  is 
because  the  speaker  should  make  clear  that  “it  happens,  if  it  happens,  in  such  a  way 
as  it  will  have  been  able  not  to  have  happened.”  21
So  a  future-tensed  statement  about  a  contingent  event  that  asserts  a  thing 
will  happen  (i.e.,  will  happen  necessarily)  is  always  false;  but  a  future-tensed 
statement  about  a  contingent  event  asserting  that  the  thing  will  happen  contingently 
20  John  Marenbon,  Boethius ,   in  B.  Davies  (ed.)  “Great  Medieval  Thinkers”  series  (Oxford:  OUP,  2003),  37  - 
41. 
21  ita  evenit,  si  evenerit,  ut  potuerit   non  evenire.  (2  InDI  212:14  -  15,  trans.  Marenbon) 
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may  be  true  or  false,  albeit  indefinitely.   It  remains  unclear  what,  exactly,  is  meant  by 
statement  being  true  or  false  “indefinitely,”  but  it  seems  to  imply  an  ability  for  that 
statement’s  truth  value  to  change  up  to  the  point  at  which  it  is  either  confirmed  or 
denied  by  actual  events.   And  I  am  not  positive  that  Marenbon’s  interpretation, 
though  indeed  rather  subtler  and  more  nuanced  than  Kretzmann’s,  entirely  avoids 
the  need  to  reject  bivalence,  at  least  in  any  traditional  form  it  may  take.   But  it  is 
perhaps  for  the  reason  of  these  difficulties  that  Boethius  himself  seems  to  have 
ultimately  turned  aside  from  the  line  of  explanation  pursued  in  the  De 
Interpretatione  commentary  when  he  addresses  related  topics  in  later  works.   The 
primary  instance  of  his  later  approach  is  to  be  found  in  The  Consolation  of 
Philosophy . 
 
1.1.2  -  The  Consolation  of  Philosophy 
In  the  fifth  and  final  book  of  The  Consolation  of  Philosophy ,  Boethius  presents 
an  account  of  God's  knowledge  of  future  things  and  human  freedom  that  was  to  have 
immense  influence  on  discussions  of  the  topic  for  centuries  to  come.    This  book  of 22
the  Consolation  concludes  the  lengthy  discussion  that  has  already  taken  place 
between  Boethius  (the  character)  and  Lady  Philosophy  regarding  fate  and  the 
highest  goods  of  life,  as  he  is  “consoled”  in  his  imprisoned  condition.  But  in  Book  V, 
their  conversation  turns  to  questions  of  God's  foreknowledge,  and  how  human 
beings  might  still  act  freely,  in  spite  of  God's  knowledge  of  their  actions  beforehand. 
 
Discussion  of  “chance”  (CP  V.I) 
The  first  part  of  their  conversation  is  devoted  to  establishing  that  the  only 
22  All  page  references  to  English  translations   of  The  Consolation   of  Philosophy  (CP)  in  this  section   will  be 
to  the  translation   by  Victor  Watts  (revised  edition,  London:  Penguin,  1999).   All  translations  are  Watts’s. 
All  Latin  page  and  section   references  are  to  the  edition  of  H.F.  Stewart,  E.K.  Rand,  and  S.J.  Tester  (SR&T), 
Theological  Tractates  (Cambridge,   MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  1973). 
 
 
 
 
17 
kind  of  chance  there  can  be  is  the  sort  that  happens  when  one's  action  brings  about 
an  effect  that  one  did  not  intend  (CP  117).  The  classic  Aristotelian  example  used  to 
illustrate  this  is  that  of  a  farmer  who  happens  upon  a  treasure  chest  in  the  act  of 
cultivating  a  field  ( Physics  II ,  4  –  5).  The  farmer  did  not  begin  digging  with  the 
intention  of  unearthing  the  chest;  nor  did  the  person  who  hid  the  chest  intend  for  it 
to  be  found  by  the  farmer.  But  this  literal  coincidence  (“coincide-ance”)  of  actions 
results  in  the  “chance”  discovery  of  the  chest  by  the  farmer. 
This  is  the  sort  of  “fortuitous”  chance  that  was  at  work  when  I  ran  into  a 
friend  in  line  at  a  coffee  shop,  just  after  I  had  discovered  that  I  was  25  cents  short  of 
the  change  I  needed  for  my  beverage.  I  did  not  intend  to  see  my  friend  at  the  coffee 
shop;  nor  did  my  friend  come  to  the  coffee  shop  in  order  to  bail  me  out  of  my 
short-changed  predicament.  But  her  happening  to  come  for  coffee  at  just  the  same 
time  that  I  discovered  my  lack  of  change  had  the  fortuitous  result  (for  me,  in  any 
case)  of  saving  me  from  an  embarrassing  situation.  Neither  of  us  intended  the  result 
that  happened;  but  neither  did  the  event  happen  randomly,  without  a  cause. 
This  latter  sort  of  “chance,”  of  an  event  happening  without  any  cause,  is  the 
sort  that  Lady  Philosophy  denies  the  existence  of.  This  un-caused  sort  of  chance 
would  have  been  in  evidence  if  my  friend  had  materialized  beside  me  out  of  thin  air, 
or  if  one  of  the  quarters  in  my  pocket  had  magically  duplicated  itself,  thereby 
making  up  for  the  missing  25  cents.  Cause-less  chance  is  rejected  as  nonsensical  by 
Lady  Philosophy;  but  she  does  concede  that  actions,  performed  with  other  intended 
purposes,  may  coincide  in  such  a  way  that  they  produce  unexpected,  unintended, 
and  perhaps  even  surprising  or  perplexing  results. 
 
Chance  and  free  will  (CP  V.II  -  V.III) 
Boethius'  character  interjects  by  voicing  the  concern  that  without  “uncaused” 
chance,  all  things  would  be  causally  determined:  “[I]s  there  room  in  this  chain  of 
 
 
 
 
18 
close-knit  causes  for  any  freedom  of  the  will?  Or  does  the  chain  of  Fate  bind  even  the 
impulses  of  the  human  mind?”  (CP  118)    While  Philosophy  does  not  clearly 23
indicate  how  the  human  mind  is  free  from  the  “chain  of  Fate”,  she  clearly  asserts  that 
all  rational  beings  also  have  free  will.  But  freedom  is  not  equally  distributed.  In  fact, 
the  quality  of  freedom  possessed  by  human  beings  is  markedly  inferior  to  absolute 
freedom,  particularly  if  they  fall  into  habitually  sinful  behaviour:  celestial  and  divine 
beings  possess  clear  sighted  judgement,  uncorrupted  will,  and  the  power  to  effect 
their  desires.  Human  souls  are  of  necessity  more  free  when  they  continue  in  the 
contemplation  of  the  mind  of  God,  and  less  free  when  they  descend  to  bodies,  and 
less  free  still  when  they  are  imprisoned  in  earthly  flesh  and  blood.   They  reach  an 
extremity  of  enslavement  when  they  give  themselves  up  to  wickedness  and  lose 
possession  of  their  proper  reason.  (CP  118)   In  this,  Boethius  to  a  large  extent 
follows  Augustine,  who  contends  that  our  wills  are  most  truly  free  when  they  are 
ordered  toward  what  is  good  and  righteous,  and  that  we  undermine  and  in  a  sense 
surrender  our  own  freedom  when  we  choose  to  act  evilly.    I  hasten  to  add,  though, 24
that  in  Boethius’  treatment,  the  view  carries  much  stronger  gnostic  overtones, 
insofar  as  the  spiritual  is  elevated  as  morally  superior  to  the  corporeal,  and  the 
corporeal  is  taken  to  be  a  deterrent  to  holiness. 
According  to  Boethius,  then,  the  human  person's  limited  power  to  execute 
her  will,  hindered  still  further  by  the  limitations  a  bodily  existence  brings,  renders 
the  quality  of  human  freedom  greatly  inferior  to  that  of  purely  spiritual  beings  (such 
as  angels),  and  more  inferior  still  to  the  purely  spiritual  and  omnipotent  being  that  is 
God.  But  Boethius  goes  a  step  further  when  he  suggests  that,  in  surrendering  to  sin, 
a  person  becomes  even  less  free  than  they  otherwise  would  have  been.  This  theme 
of  decreasing  powers  of  freedom  in  sinful  creatures  is  one  that  Anselm  will  later  take 
23  Sed  in  hac  haerentium   sibi  serie  causarum   estne  ulla  nostri  arbitrii  libertas  an  ipsos  quoque 
humanorum   motus  animorum   fatalis  catena  constringit?   (SR&T  390) 
24  Augustine   of  Hippo,  De  libero  arbitrio ,  esp.  books  II  and  III.   An  English  translation   of  this  text  can  be 
found  in  Augustine,   On  the  Free  Choice  of  the  Will,  On  Grace  and  Free  Choice,  and  Other  Writings ,  ed.  and 
trans.  P.  King  (Cambridge:   Cambridge   U  P,  2010). 
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up  and  refine,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  succeeding  section. 
But  to  Boethius,  the  character,  the  fact  of  free  will  seems  to  run  contrary  to 
the  fact  of  God's  foreknowledge,  for  “the  two  seem  clean  contrary  and  opposite” 
(119).  He  expresses  the  problem  in  the  following  way: 
If  God  foresees  all  things  and  cannot  be  mistaken  in  any  way,  what 
Providence  has  foreseen  as  a  future  event  must  happen.  So  if  from  eternity 
Providence  foreknows  not  only  men's  actions  but  also  their  thoughts  and 
desires,  there  will  be  no  freedom  of  will.  No  action  or  desire  will  be  able  to 
exist  other  than  that  which  God's  infallible  Providence  has  foreseen.  For  if 
they  can  be  changed  and  made  different  from  how  they  were  foreseen,  there 
will  be  no  sure  foreknowledge  of  the  future,  only  an  uncertain  opinion;  and 
this  I  do  not  think  can  be  believed  of  God.  (PC  119  –  20) 
 
Nam  si  cuncta  prospicit  deus  neque  falli  ullo  modo  potest,  evenire  necesse  est 
quod  providentia  futurum  esse  praeviderit.  Quare  si  ab  aeterno  non  facta 
hominum  modo  sed  etiam  consilia  voluntatesque  praenoscit,  nulla  erit 
arbitrii  libertas;  neque  enim  vel  factum  aliud  ullum  vel  quaelibet  exsistere 
poterit  voluntas  nisi  quam  nescia  falli  providentia  divina  praesenserit.  Nam  si 
aliorsum  quam  provisae  sunt  detorqueri  valent,  non  iam  erit  futuri  firma 
praescientia,  sed  opinio  potius  incerta,  quod  de  deo  credere  nefas  iudico. 
(SR&T  394) 
 
Boethius  is  unsatisfied  with  accounts  of  this  problem  that  seek  to  explain  away  the 
necessity  inhering  in  the  foreseen  act  by  pointing  out  that  God's  knowledge  does  not 
cause  an  action  to  turn  out  in  a  particular  way;  rather,  God  knows  a  thing  will  turn 
out  in  a  certain  way,  because  that  is  the  way  it  will  turn  out.  Boethius'  initial 
objection  to  this  explanation  is  twofold:  first,  he  does  not  think  this  explanation  does 
away  with  the  necessity  of  the  event;  and  second,  he  thinks  it  implies  that  a 
creaturely  action  is  the  cause  of  a  divine  attribute. 
In  the  first  case,  Boethius'  character  argues  the  following  line:  Suppose  an 
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event  happens,  and  God  foreknows  that  it  will  happen  as  it  does.  Then  even  if  God 
foreknows  the  event  because  the  event  will  happen,  it  is  still  the  case  that,  insofar  as 
God  foreknows  the  event  will  happen,  the  event  must  happen.  Were  it  not  to  happen, 
then  God's  foreknowledge  would  have  erred,  which  is  impossible.  Thus,  Boethius 
argues,  because  the  event  cannot  happen  otherwise  without  leading  us  into  an 
impossible  situation,  it  therefore  happens  necessarily. 
In  Boethius'  second  objection  to  this  response,  he  argues  that  to  say  God 
foresees  an  event  because  an  event  will  in  fact  happen,  is  to  say  that  the  event  is  a 
cause  of  some  knowledge  in  God.  This  implies  that  finite,  creaturely  acts  cause 
knowledge  in  God  –  and  hence,  act  on  God  in  such  a  way  as  to  cause  some  divine 
attributes.  Since  God  is  unchanging  and  unchangeable,  and,  furthermore,  the  cause 
of  all  created  things,  this  reversal  of  causal  powers,  Boethius  thinks,  is  absurd.  We 
can  no  more  be  the  cause  of  divine  attributes  than  a  pot  can  be  a  cause  of  its  potter's 
attributes. 
 
Modes  of  Cognition  (CP  V.IV  -  V.V) 
Acknowledging  the  problems  that  Boethius'  character  identifies  with  this 
approach  to  the  problem,  Lady  Philosophy  states  that,  in  fact,  all  previous  attempts 
to  tackle  the  problem  have  failed  in  one  way  or  another.   She  attributes  this  to  the 
failure  of  human  beings  ever  to  understand  the  way  in  which  divine  knowledge 
operates,  and  says  that  if  that  could  be  understood,  then  “all  uncertainty  would  be 
removed”  (CP  124).   She  then  goes  on  to  lay  out  a  schematic  hierarchy  of  types  of 
knowledge,  corresponding  to  a  hierarchy  of  sentient  beings. 
At  the  bottom  of  the  knowledge  hierarchy  is  sense  perception,  which  is  a 
power  possessed  by  animals  which  have  no  locomotive  faculty:  such  creatures  are 
able  to  see,  feel,  and  hear  what  is  present  before  them,  but  cannot  abstract  from  that 
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perception,  or  call  to  mind  perceptions  not  currently  perceived. 
Next  up  in  the  chain  is  the  power  of  imagination,  possessed  by  animals  who 
can  move  themselves  about.   It  is  by  this  power  that  creatures  remember  past 
perceptions,  and  combine  (re-member)  and  abstract  from  past  perceptions  to 
imagine  or  anticipate  perceptions  they  have  not  yet  had.   For  instance,  a  dog 
remembers  that,  in  the  past,  the  sound  of  his  food  hitting  his  dish  in  the  next  room 
preceded  his  finding  food  in  his  dish  when  he  went  to  investigate;  hence,  when  he 
next  hears  the  same  sound,  he  expects  to  find  food  in  his  dish,  as  he  did  before.   Past 
experience  trains  the  animal,  in  a  non-cognitive  way,  to  form  strong  associations 
between  particular  sets  of  circumstances,  so  that  the  animal  reacts  accordingly 
when  he  next  encounters  a  similar  set  of  circumstances.   Note  that,  in  this  schematic, 
the  imaginative  power  employs  the  lower  power  of  sense  perception  in  its 
operation,  transforming  sense  perception  to  function  in  ways  it  could  not  have 
without  the  introduction  of  imagination. 
Similarly,  the  human  power  of  reason,  which  is  the  next  step  in  the  hierarchy 
of  knowledge,  employs  the  lower  faculties  of  sense  perception  and  imagination,  but 
adds  to  these  the  power  to  abstract  from  these  things  to  grasp  universals.  Through 
knowledge  of  universals,  the  human  person  is  able  to  reason  syllogistically.  If  I  am 
correct  in  my  assessment  that  Boethius'  schema  allows  for  a  sort  of  inductive 
reasoning  capacity  in  locomotive  animals,  then  what  distinguishes  human  reason 
from  the  animal  sort  is  its  deductive  character.  Human  beings  have  the  ability  to 
abstract  universal  generalizations  from  observed  phenomena,  and  from  these 
deduce  (syllogistically)  to  arrive  at  new  general  truths.  From  knowledge  we  have 
already  acquired,  we  can  arrive  at  other  truths  concerning  things  we  have  not 
directly  learned  or  experienced;  that  is,  we  can  arrive  at  knowledge  by  deduction. 
According  to  this  view  of  knowledge,  the  human  power  of  knowing  is  on  an  entirely 
different  level  from  that  of  other  animals,  functioning  in  an  entirely  different  way. 
Similarly,  God's  power  of  knowledge  is  on  another  level  again:  Philosophy 
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instructs  her  pupil  that  God  knows  by  way  of  “intelligence”,  or  intellection,  a  mode  of 
knowing  with  a  completeness  and  immediacy  incomprehensible  to  us  mere  mortals. 
God's  knowledge,  Philosophy  contends,  is  of  a  sort  that  enables  “immediate” 
knowledge  of  things  which,  to  us,  are  future  (and  therefore  unknowable  by  us).  But 
this  knowledge  operates  in  a  way  that  does  not  make  the  things  known  by  it 
necessary,  at  least  not  in  an  absolute  sense.  The  fact  that  we  cannot  imagine  how 
such  a  knowledge  could  operate  only  stands  to  reason: 
[H]uman  reason  refuses  to  believe  that  divine  intelligence  can  see  the  future 
in  any  other  way  except  that  in  which  human  reason  has  knowledge.  This  is 
how  the  argument  runs:  if  anything  does  not  seem  to  have  any  certain  and 
predestined  occurrence,  it  cannot  be  foreknown  as  a  future  event.  Of  such, 
therefore,  there  is  no  foreknowledge:  and  if  we  believe  that  even  in  this  case 
there  is  foreknowledge,  there  will  be  nothing  which  does  not  happen  of 
necessity.  If,  therefore,  as  beings  who  have  a  share  of  reason,  we  can  judge  of 
the  mind  of  God,  we  should  consider  it  most  fitting  for  human  reason  to  bow 
before  divine  wisdom,  just  as  we  judged  it  right  for  the  senses  and  the 
imagination  to  yield  to  reason.  (CP  131) 
 
Simile  est  quod  humana  ratio  divinam  intellegentiam  futura,  nisi  ut  ipsa 
cognoscit,  non  putat  intueri.  Nam  ita  disseris:  Si  qua  certos  ac  necessarios 
habere  non  videantur  eventus,  ea  certo  eventura  praesciri  nequeunt.  Harum 
igitur  rerum  nulla  est  praescientia,  quam  si  etiam  in  his  esse  credamus,  nihil 
erit  quod  non  ex  necessitate  proveniat.  Si  igitur  uti  rationis  participes  sumus, 
ita  divinae  iudicium  mentis  habere  possemus,  sicut  imaginationem 
sensumque  rationi  cedere  oportere  iudicavimus,  sic  divinae  sese  menti 
humanam  submittere  rationem  iustissimum  censeremus.  (SR&T  418) 
 
Philosophy  in  this  way  dismisses  our  inability  to  understand  how  knowledge  of 
future  events  could  not  entail  the  necessity  of  these  events:  God's  way  of  knowing 
these  things  is  so  entirely  unlike  our  own  –  it  transcends  our  own  modes  of  thought 
so  completely  –  that  it  is  only  to  be  expected  that  we  cannot  make  sense  of  what  this 
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sort  of  knowledge  is  like. 
In  fact,  if  we  infer,  from  the  way  we  know  our  own  knowledge  to  operate,  that 
God's  foreknowledge  of  an  event  requires  that  event  to  happen  necessarily,  we  have 
inferred  improperly  from  our  own  mode  of  knowing  to  God's.  We  are  only  able  to 
know  that  which  is  necessary  (in  the  case  of  events,  we  are  only  able  to  know  those 
things  which  have  already  happened  –  and  are  thus  necessary);  but  we  should  not 
assume  that  the  same  is  the  case  for  God.  This  error  would  be  analogous,  on 
Boethius'  hierarchical  schema  of  knowledge,  to  a  clam  being  unable  to  comprehend 
how  a  dog,  say,  might  remember  his  master  without  his  master's  being  present.  A 
clam,  having  only  the  power  to  perceive  things  present  to  it,  would  be  unable  to 
grasp  the  power  of  memory  possessed  by  the  dog  in  virtue  of  the  power  of 
imagination.  Similarly,  a  human  being  is  unable  to  comprehend  the  sort  of 
knowledge  which  enables  God,  by  the  power  of  God's  intellect,  to  know  future  events 
with  the  same  immediacy  and  completeness  with  which  we  know  things  present  and 
past  –  nay,  with  an  even  greater  immediacy  and  completeness  than  we  could  ever 
know  any  present  or  past  event. 
 
Eternity  and  the  Nature  of  Necessity  (CP  V.V,  132  -  37) 
Thus,  Boethius  the  writer,  through  the  voice  of  Lady  Philosophy,  lays  the 
foundation  for  his  dictum  that  the  power  of  being  known  is  not  in  the  thing  known, 
but  in  the  knower:  it  is  not  because  future  events  cannot  be  known  that  we  do  not 
know  them,  but  because  we  are  not  the  right  sort  of  knowers.  This  conclusion  leads 
Lady  Philosophy  to  her  final  prose,  a  rapturous  meditation  on  the  way  in  which 
God's  mode  of  knowledge  reflects  his  mode  of  existence  in  eternity,  on  the  nature  of 
eternity,  and  how  a  proper  understanding  of  eternity  leads  us  to  grasp,  at  least 
partially,  the  nature  of  God's  foreknowledge.  “Eternity  …  is  the  complete, 
simultaneous,  and  perfect  possession  of  everlasting  life,”  Philosophy  tells  us  (CP 
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132).    Thus,  the  philosophers  who  hold  that  the  world  is  co-eternal  with  God  are 25
mistaken  –  even  if,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  they  are  correct  to  hold  that  the  world 
has  no  beginning  (CP  133).  For  the  world  exists  in  and  progresses  through  ordered 
time,  possessing  time  only  moment  by  moment,  and  passing  out  of  each  moment 
into  the  next.  This  is  nothing  like  God's  eternal  existence,  which  completely, 
simultaneously,  and  perfectly  possesses  all  of  time. 
As  many  have  observed,  the  notion  of  eternity  may  be  delineated  in  at  least 
two  ways.   John  Marenbon  describes  this  delineation  using  the  following  effective 
terminology :  the  first  way,  which  he  calls  Timeless  eternity  (T-eternity),  is  a  notion 26
of  that  which  exists  without  any  extension  or  position  in  time;  the  second  way, 
Perpetual  eternity  (P-eternity),  applies  to  that  which  exists  in  every  moment  of  time. 
P-eternity  is  further  delineated  into  strong  and  weak  forms:  in  the  weak  form,  time 
has  both  a  beginning  and  an  end,  whereas  in  the  strong  form,  time  lacks  a  beginning, 
or  an  end,  or  both.   Whether  Boethius  has  in  mind  T-  or  P-eternity  in  the  above 
passage  is  not  entirely  clear,  although  there  seems  to  me  to  be  reason  to  prefer  the 
possibility  that  T-eternity  is  intended.   This  is  because  Boethius  does  not  point  to 
God’s  extension  or  position  in  time,  but  rather  to  his  perception  and  experience  of  it. 
In  fact,  it  would  seem  that  locating  God  in  any  particular  place  in  time  would  render 
the  “complete,  simultaneous,  and  perfect  possession”  of  all  time  impossible:  God 
would  only  be  able  to  possess  time  in  this  way  if  he  transcends  particular  instants  in 
time. 
It  is  from  this  simultaneous  and  complete  possession  of  all  time  that  God's 
immediate  knowledge  of  future  events  (or  more  precisely,  events  which  are  future  to 
us )  springs.  And  from  here,  a  distinction  of  necessities  is  introduced,  derived  from 
25  Aeternitas   igitur  est  interminabilis   vitae  tota  simul  et  perfecta  possessio,  quod  ex  collatione 
temporalium  clarius  liquet.   (SR&T  422) 
26  John  Marenbon,  Medieval  Philosophy:  An  Historical  and  Philosophical  Introduction   (London:   Routledge, 
2007),  p.  53;  Marenbon  also  discusses   this  topic,  though  without  using  the  same  terminology  developed 
in  Medieval  Philosophy ,  in  a  number   of  other  places,  including   his  “Great  Medieval  Thinkers”  study 
Boethius  (see  note  above),  pp.  135ff. 
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Arisotle :  on  the  one  hand,  “necessity”  can  be  simple  necessity  (such  as  “all  men  are 27
mortal”),  and  on  the  other,  it  can  be  conditional  necessity  (such  as,  “if  you  know  that 
someone  is  walking,  it  is  necessary  that  he  is  walking”).  (CP  135,  SR&T  428) 
Boethius,  in  the  voice  of  Philosophy,  concludes  that  God's  foreknowledge  of  events 
only  results  in  the  conditional  necessity  of  their  occurrence.   This  conditional 
necessity  of  events  (on  the  condition  of  God’s  knowledge  of  them),  however,  does 
not  make  events  simply  necessary,  any  more  than  a  person's  walking  becomes 
necessary  by  our  observance  of  that  person  walking.   It  is  conditionally  necessary 
that,  if  we  see  her  walking,  then,  necessarily,  she  is  walking  —  because  we  could  not 
have  seen  her  walking  if  she  was  not  walking!  —  but  it  is  not  on  this  account  simply 
necessary  that  she  is  walking.  28
It  is  tempting  to  interpret  this  distinction  between  conditional  and  absolute 
necessity  as  one  of  scope,  and  indeed,  there  are  many  historians  of  philosophy  who 
have  interpreted  Boethius  in  this  way.    Although  this  way  of  understanding 29
Boethius’  distinction  is  passing  out  of  favour,  let  us  examine  for  a  moment  what  it 
would  mean  for  Boethius’  distinction  to  be  one  of  scope.   From  around  the  11th 
century  on,  we  see  with  logicians  like  Peter  Abelard  a  distinction  between  applying  a 
predicate  (like  “necessary”)  to  the  object  of  a  sentence,  and  applying  it  to  the 
sentence  as  a  whole.   Typically,  this  is  described  as  the  distinction  between  applying 
the  predicate  de  re  (concerning  the  thing ,  or  the  object,  of  the  statement)  and 
applying  it  de  sensu  or  de  dicto  (concerning  the  (entire)  statement).   The  reason  it  is 
tempting  to  read  this  distinction  into  Boethius’  argument  is  that  the  way  he  parses 
out  the  necessity  inhering  in  a  conditional  statement  of  necessity,  such  as,  “If  I  see  a 
man  walking,  then  he  is  necessarily  walking,”  sounds  much  like  the  distinction 
27  See  Watts'  footnote,  p.  135. 
28  It  is  useful  to  note  that  Boethius   uses  the  words  “see”  and  “know”  almost  interchangeably,  particularly 
when  speaking   of  God's  foreknowledge/foresight. 
29  See  D.P.  Henry,  The  Logic  of  St  Anselm  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1967),  p.  178;  Richard  Sorabji, 
Necessity,  Cause,  and  Blame:  Perspectives  on  Aristotle’s  Theory  (London:   Duckworth,  1980),  p.  122;  C. 
Kirwan,  Augustine   (London:   Routledge,   1989),  pp.  96  -  98;  Paul  Spade  in  Kenny,  Oxford  Illustrated 
History  of  Western  Philosophy  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,1994),   p.  72. 
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between  de  sensu  and  de  re  necessity:  Boethius  says  that  this  statement  is  true,  so 
long  as  we  understand  the  necessity  of  the  man’s  walking  to  be  dependent  upon  our 
seeing  him  walk.   This  is,  in  a  sense,  much  like  a  de  dicto  reading  of  the  necessity  of 
the  conditional.   It  is  not  the  walking  which  is,  in  and  of  itself,  necessary,  but  the 
relationship  between  our  seeing  the  man  walk  and  his  walking.   The  parallel  is  not 
precise,  since  we  are  not  talking  about  necessity  being  applied  to  the  copula  versus 
the  object  of  the  sentence;  but  it  nevertheless  seems  to  be  a  case  of  defining  the 
scope  on  which  the  predicate  “necessary”  operates. 
Marenbon,  however,  has  argued  that  such  an  interpretation  is  anachronistic. 
Marenbon  does  not  believe  that  Boethius  has  in  view  anything  like  the  later  notions 
of  scope  or  of  de  re  and  de  dicto  necessity.    Marenbon  does  not  think  that  Boethius 30
was  conceptually  equipped  at  this  point  to  make  these  distinctions  of  scope. 
Furthermore,  the  imperfect  parallel  between  the  conditional  statement  of  necessity 
and  one  involving  the  sort  of  distinction  in  scope  picked  out  by  Abelard,  et  al .,  under 
the  monikers  “ de  re ”  and  “ de  dicto ”  is  a  difference  of  considerable  substance.   In 
order  to  translate  the  conditional  statement  of  necessity  into  one  to  which  the  de 
re / de  dicto  distinction  might  apply  involves  a  number  of  conceptual  steps.   The 
conditional  statement  is  formed  something  like  this: 
[I  see  (a  man  is  walking)]    [a  man  is  NEC.  walking] 
What  Boethius  asserts  is  that  the  consequent  of  this  statement  is  true  if  the 
antecedent  is;  but  the  necessity  inhering  in  the  consequent  depends  on  the  truth  of 
the  antecedent,  and  is  therefore  not  necessary  in  an  absolute  sense. 
We  cannot  directly  apply  the  de  re / de  dicto  distinction  to  such  a  sentence, 
30  Marenbon  puts  forward  this  view  in  numerous  places,  including  Marenbon  2003  p.  139  -  42.   For 
other  rejections   of  the  scope  reading  of  Boethius’  distinction,  see  Simo  Knuuttila,  Modalities  in  Medieval 
Philosophy  (London:   Routledge,   1993),  pp.  60  -  61;  H.  Weidemann  “Die  Unterscheidung  zwischen 
einfacher  und  bedingter  Notwendigkeit  in  der  Philosophiae   Consolatio   des  Boethius,”  in 
Philosophiegeschichte  und  logische  Analyse:  Philosophiegeschichte  im  Überblick ,  ed.  A.  Newen  and  U. 
Meixner   (Paderborn:  Schöningh,  1998),  pp.  195  -  207. 
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because  this  distinction  only  clearly  applies  to  simple,  atomic  statements  consisting 
of  subject  and  object  joined  by  a  copula.   The  conditional  sentence  above  is  a 
compound  of  two  such  sentences.   What  we  may  analyze  under  this  distinction, 
however,  is  what  sense  it  is  in  which  the  consequent  is  true,  given  the  truth  of  the 
antecedent.   That  is,  assuming  the  antecedent  (“I  see  a  man  is  walking”)  is  true,  in 
what  sense  is  the  consequent  (“A  man  is  necessarily  walking”)  true?   Focusing  our 
attention,  therefore,  on  only  the  consequent  —  
A  man  is  NEC.  walking 
—  we  may  ask  whether,  given  the  truth  of  the  antecedent,  this  statement  is  true  in 
the  de  re  sense,  or  the  de  dicto  sense.   In  the  former  sense,  we  would  be  saying  that 
his  walking  is  in  fact  necessary;  in  the  latter,  that  the  whole  statement  (“A  man  is 
walking”)  is  necessary.   Those  who  have  sought  to  locate  in  Boethius  a  scope 
distinction  have  tried  to  say  that,  according  to  Boethius,  under  the  condition  “I  see  a 
man  is  walking”,  the  sentence  “A  man  is  necessarily  walking”  is  true  de  dicto ,  but  not 
de  re . 
However,  I  think  it  can  be  argued  that,  given  Boethius’  conditional  necessity 
schema,  this  sentence  is  also  true  de  re ,  as  I  now  show.   Boethius  says  that  given  the 
truth  of  the  antecedent,  the  necessity  of  the  consequent  can  be  granted  relative  to 
the  truth  of  the  antecedent.   But  it  is  not  just  the  case  that  the  the  antecedent,  taken 
de  dicto ,  is  necessary:  rather,  the  very  object  of  that  antecedent  is  necessary  relative 
to  the  truth  of  the  consequent.   In  other  words,  if  it  is  true  that  I  see  a  man  walking, 
then  relative  to  this  truth,  it  is  necessary  that  a  man  is  walking;  but  even  stronger 
than  this,  if  I  see  a  man  walking,  then  relative  to  my  seeing  the  man  walk,  that  man’s 
walking  is  necessary. 
Perhaps  another  example  would  serve  to  clarify  this  point.   Consider  the 
conditional  statement,  “If  the  jellybean  in  my  hand  is  red,  then  the  jellybean  in  my 
hand  is  necessarily  not  blue.”   Now  suppose  that  I  really  do  take  up  a  single,  red 
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jellybean  in  my  hand,  rendering  the  antecedent  true.   Relative  to  the  truth  of  the 
antecedent,  we  may  consider  the  necessity  of  the  consequent  in  two  ways:  in  the 
first  way  (the  de  dicto  or  compound  reading),  we  say  that  the  whole  statement,  “The 
jellybean  in  my  hand  is  not  blue,”  is  necessary;  in  the  second  way  (the  de  re   or 
divided  reading),  we  say  that  the  jellybean  is  necessarily  not  blue  —  in  other  words, 
that  the  “not-blue-ness”  of  the  jellybean  is  necessary.   Those  who  interpret  Boethius 
as  advancing  a  sort  of  scope  distinction  would  say  that  he  embraces  the  former,  but 
not  the  latter,  reading  of  the  necessity  of  the  consequent.   However,  I  think  that  this 
is  to  miss  the  point  altogether  of  Boethius’  notion  of  conditional  necessity,  for  given 
the  truth  of  the  antecedent,  the  consequent  is  necessary  in  all  ways:  in  the  case  of 
this  example,  if  the  jellybean  I  hold  in  my  hand  is  red,  then  its  “not-blue-ness”  is  a 
necessary  property  of  that  jellybean,  relative  to  the  fact  that  it  is  red. 
These  examples  serve  to  illustrate  that  Boethius’  discussion  of  conditional 
necessity  is  not  a  distinction  of  scope.   The  necessity  inhering  in  a  consequent, 
relative  to  the  truth  of  its  antecedent,  is  a  necessity  which  encompasses  both  the 
compound  and  divided  senses  of  necessity.   But  conditional  necessity,  despite 
lacking  perhaps  the  formal  sophistication  of  a  scope  distinction,  nevertheless 
provides  a  useful  analysis  whereby  to  understand  the  sort  of  necessity  inhering  in 
statements  about  the  foreknowledge  of  God:  a  necessity  not  of  the  foreknown  event 
itself,  but  only  relative  to  the  knowledge  God  has  of  it.   As  we  will  see  in  the 
following  section,  this  idea  will  be  picked  up  and  refined  by  Anselm  in  his  own 
analysis  of  the  topic. 
 
1.2  –  Anselm  on  Future  Contingents 
We  turn  now  to  a  discussion  of  Anselm  of  Canterbury’s  treatment  of  the  topic 
of  future  contingents.   It  would  seem  that  Anselm  is  among  the  most  important  and 
influential  direct  sources  for  Bradwardine’s  treatise,  as  is  evident  by  the  abundance 
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of  references  Bradwardine  makes  to  Anselm’s  work,  and  by  the  uncharacteristically 
and  overwhelmingly  positive  treatment  Bradwardine  gives  his  report  of  Anselm’s 
view  (all  this  will  be  discussed  at  much  greater  length  in  ch.  3,  especially  section 
3.4).   For  this  reason,  in  the  context  of  understanding  Bradwardine  on  future 
contingents,  we  ought  to  pay  especially  careful  attention  to  Anselm’s  solution,  and 
observe  how  one  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  played  an  important  role  of  intellectual 
influence  on  his  eventual  successor. 
1.2.1  -  De  concordia 
One  of  Anselm’s  last  works  was  a  highly  influential  treatise  dealing  directly 
with  the  puzzles  of  future  contingents,  called  De  Concordia  Praescientiae  et 
Praedestinationis  et  Gratiae  Dei  cum  Libero  Arbitrio ,  or,  “On  the  concord  of  God’s 
foreknowledge,  predestination,  and  grace  with  free  choice.”    The  work  is  divided 31
into  three  sections,  and  the  title  of  the  work  suggests  quite  handily  how  this  division 
breaks  down:  the  first  section  defends  the  compatibility  of  human  free  will  with 
God’s  foreknowledge;  the  second  with  predestination;  and  the  third  with  God’s 
grace.   It  is  the  first  of  these  sections  that  is  primarily  relevant  to  this  present  study, 
since  God’s  foreknowledge  is  the  chief  concern  of  Bradwardine’s  treatise. 
Accordingly,  I  begin  my  overview  of  Anselm’s  treatment  of  the  topic  of  future 
contingents  with  a  summary  of  his  mature  view  as  found  in  the  De  Concordia 
treatise. 
Following  in  the  pattern  of  Boethius’  solution,  Anselm’s  view  exhibits  two  key 
elements:  first,  a  recognition  that  God’s  mode  of  knowledge  —  and  in  particular, 
God’s  foreknowledge  —  must  operate  in  a  way  quite  different  from  our  own,  so  that 
we  cannot  draw  the  inferences  we  are  accustomed  to  draw  between  certain 
31  Throughout  this  section,   references  to  the  Latin  text  of  De  Concordia  will  be  to  the  edition   of  F.S. 
Schmitt,  in  S.  Anselmi  Opera  Omnia ,  (Edinburgh:  Thomas   Nelson  &  Sons,  Ltd.,  1940-1961),  pp.  244  -  88 
in  the  second   volume;  the  complete  edition   of  the  Opera  Omnia ,  excepting   the  6th  (and  last)  volume,  is 
available  online  through  the  Intelex  Past  Masters  Full  Text  Humanities  library,  crkn.nlx.com.   All  English 
translations   of  De  Concordia  cited  in  this  section   are  those  of  Thomas   Bermingham,  in  Anselm  of 
Canterbury:  The  Major  Works ,  ed.  B.  Davies  and  G.R.  Evans  (Oxford:  OUP,  1998),  pp.  435  -  74. 
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knowledge  and  necessity;  and  second,  an  understanding  of  God’s  timeless  eternality 
(or  “T-eternity”),  such  that  all  events  that  happen  successively  in  time  are 
simultaneously  present  to  God.   But  Anselm  adds  to  this  a  much  more  substantial 
and  robust  logical  analysis  of  the  interplay  between  God’s  foreknowledge  and  the 
contingency  of  acts  and  events  than  that  supplied  by  Boethius.   The  puzzle,  as 
Anselm  lays  it  out,  is  that  it  would  seem  that  “what  God  foreknows  shall  necessarily 
come  to  be  in  the  future,  while  the  things  brought  about  by  free  choice  do  not  issue 
from  any  necessity.”   (1.1,  435)   Yet,  Anselm  insists  that  in  this  work  he  will  seek  to 32
“affirm  the  coexistence  both  of  divine  foreknowledge  (which  seems  to  require  the 
necessary  existence  of  future  things)  and  of  free  choice  (by  which  many  things  are 
believed  to  occur  apart  from  any  necessity),”   and  upholding  these  two  things,  to 33
discover  whether  their  coexistence  is  truly  an  impossibility.  (1.1,  435) 
Anselm  begins  his  treatment  with  a  rehearsal  of  the  position,  perhaps  most 
influentially  expounded  by  Augustine,  but  articulated  in  Boethius’  commentary  on 
De  Interpretatione ,   that  though  God  foreknows  future  free  acts,  God  foreknows  that 34
they  will  happen  freely: 
But  if  something  is  going  to  occur  freely,  God,  who  foreknows  all  that  shall  be, 
foreknows  this  very  fact.   And  whatever  God  foreknows  shall  necessarily 
happen  in  the  way  in  which  it  is  foreknown.   So  it  is  necessary  that  it  shall 
happen  freely,  and  there  is  therefore  no  conflict  whatsoever  between  a 
foreknowledge  which  entails  a  necessary  occurrence  and  a  free  exercise  of  an 
uncoerced  will.  (1.1,  435  -  36) 
 
Sed  si  aliquid  est  futurum  sine  necessitate,  hoc  ipsum  praescit  deus,  qui 
praescit  omnia  futura.  Quod  autem  praescit  deus,  necessitate  futurum  est, 
32  [Q]uae  deus  praescit,  necesse   est  esse  futura,  et  quae  per  liberum  arbitrium  fiunt,  nulla  necessitate 
proveniunt.  (245) 
33  Ponamus   igitur  simul  esse  et  praescientiam   dei,  quam  sequi  necessitas  futurarum  rerum  videtur,  et 
libertatem  arbitrii,  per  quam  multa  sine  ulla  necessitate  fieri  creduntur.  (Ibid.) 
34  By  this  I  mean  Boethius’   assertion,   discussed   above,  that  properly  speaking,  it  is  never  true  to  say  of  a 
future  contingent   event  A,  “A  will  happen,”  as  though  it  will  happen  determinitely;  rather,  one  ought  to 
say,  “A  will  happen   contingently.” 
 
 
 
 
31 
sicut  praescitur.  Necesse  est  igitur  aliquid  esse  futurum  sine  necessitate. 
Nequaquam  ergo  recte  intelligenti  hic  repugnare  videntur  praescientia  quam 
sequitur  necessitas,  et  libertas  arbitrii  a  qua  removetur  necessitas…    (246  ll. 
7  -  11) 
 
It  is  thus  concluded,  on  the  basis  of  this,  that  it  is  not  entirely  accurate  to  assert 
simply  that  God  foreknows  that  something  will  be,  such  as  that  I  will  sin  (or  not  sin), 
but  that  we  ought  instead  to  assert,  if  we’re  to  be  precise,  that  “‘God  foreknows  that  I 
am  going  freely  to  sin  or  not.’”   (1.1,  436,  emphasis  mine.)   If  there  is  any  necessity 35
involved  in  our  action  at  all  on  account  of  God’s  foreknowledge  of  our  action,  it  is 
that  it  is  necessary  that  we  act  freely . 
But  though  this  is  the  first  argument  brought  forward  by  Anselm,  he  seems 
not  to  be  wholly  convinced  that  it  provides  a  compelling  case  for  the  compatibility  of 
God’s  foreknowledge  and  human  free  will,  or  at  least  not  on  its  own  merits.   In  the 
voice  of  a  potential  objector,  Anselm  says, 
‘You  do  not  yet  remove  from  my  will  the  weight  of  necessity  when  you  say 
that  it  is  necessary  that  I  shall  sin  or  not  sin  freely  because  God  foreknows 
this.   For  necessity  seems  to  imply  coercion  or  prevention.   So  if  it  is 
necessary  that  I  sin  voluntarily,  I  conclude  that  I  am  compelled  by  some 
hidden  power  to  will  the  sin;  and  if  I  do  not  sin,  that  I  am  prevented  from 
willing  to  sin.   Therefore  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  by  necessity  that  I  sin,  if  I 
sin,  or  do  not  sin,  if  I  do  not.’  (1.1,  436) 
 
Nondum  aufers  a  corde  meo  vim  necessitatis,  cum  dicis  quia  necesse  est  me 
peccaturum  esse  vel  non  peccaturum  sine  necessitate,  quia  hoc  deus  praescit. 
Necessitas  enim  videtur  sonare  coactionem  vel  prohibitionem.  Quare  si 
necesse  est  me  peccare  ex  voluntate,  intelligo  me  cogi  aliqua  occulta  vi  ad 
voluntatem  peccandi;  et  si  non  pecco,  a  peccandi  voluntate  prohiberi. 
Quapropter  necessitate  videor  mihi  peccare  si  pecco,  vel  non  peccare  si  non 
35  Non  debes  dicere:  praescit  deus  me  peccaturum   tantum  vel  non  peccaturum;  sed:  praescit  deus  me 
peccaturum   sine  necessitate  vel  non  peccaturum.  (246) 
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pecco.  (246  line  25  -  247  line  4) 
 
For  the  benefit,  perhaps,  of  such  an  objector,  Anselm  goes  on  to  defend  the 
compatibility  of  God’s  foreknowledge  and  human  free  will  in  another,  more  original 
way.   The  new  contribution  that  Anselm  makes  to  this  discussion  is  his  development 
of  the  idea  that  when  we  say  that  God  foreknows  something,  and  then  infer  from 
that  statement  that  that  something  will  happen,  we  are  not  actually  adding  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  world  by  that  inference.   In  fact,  a  statement  such  as,  “God 
foreknows  I  will  sin,  therefore  I  will  sin”  amounts  to  a  kind  of  tautology. 
This  explanation  begins  with  a  distinction  of  necessity,  not  unlike  that 
employed  by  Boethius.   The  sort  of  necessity  that  inheres  in  the  happening  of  an 
event,  given  God’s  foreknowledge  of  that  event,  is  not  the  sort  that  either  “compels 
[or]  prevents  the  future  existence  or  non-existence  of  anything.”   (1.2,  437)   By 36
analogy,  Anselm  discusses  the  sort  of  necessity  inherent  in  a  statement  such  as,  “A 
white  things  is  white”:  the  whiteness  of  many  things  which  happen  to  be  white  (like 
a  picket  fence  in  my  neighbourhood)  is  not  necessary  per  se ;  but  insofar  as  we 
identify  a  thing  by  its  whiteness  (calling  it  “A  white  thing”),  in  that  respect,  its 
whiteness  is  necessary.   In  other  words,  if  a  thing  is  white,  then  it  cannot  not  be 
white,  so  long  as  it  is  a  white  thing  (even  if  it  could  cease  to  be  white  —  at  which 
point  we  could  no  longer  properly  call  it  a  white  thing).   The  property  of  being  white 
is  necessarily  part  of  what  makes  it  a  white  thing,  so  long  as  it  remains  a  white  thing. 
To  say  that  a  white  thing  is  white  adds  nothing  to  our  knowledge  of  the  white 
thing,  for  if  we  understand  rightly  what  a  white  thing  is  in  the  first  place,  we  know 
already  that  it  must  be  white.   In  this  sense,  and  in  this  sense  only,  its  whiteness  is 
necessary.    In  the  same  way,  Anselm  argues,  in  a  statement  that  something 37
36  Sed  haec  necessitas   nec  cogit  nec  prohibet  aliquid  esse  aut  non  esse.  (249) 
37  cf.  the  discussion   of  conditional   necessity   in  Boethius,  in  1.1.2  above,  wherein  the  truth  of  the 
conclusion   —  or  in  that  case,  the  consequent   —  is  necessary  conditional   upon  the  truth  of  the 
antecedent. 
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foreknown  by  God  will  happen  —  as  when  I  say,  “God  foreknows  that  I  will  sin,  so  I 
will  sin”  —  the  conclusion  adds  nothing  to  the  meaning  of  the  antecedent,  if  the 
antecedent  is  rightly  understood.   God  only  foreknows  those  things  which  will  in  fact 
happen,  so  a  statement  that  God  foreknows  something  —  like  my  sinning  —  can  only 
be  true  if  I  will,  in  fact,  sin.   Anselm  explains  this  as  follows: 
[I]f  one  rightly  grasps  the  meaning  of  the  word  foreknown ,  by  the  very  fact 
that  something  is  said  to  be  foreknown,  its  future  existence  is  declared.   For  it 
is  not  foreknown  unless  it  shall  actually  be,  since  the  object  of  knowledge  is 
what  is  actually  the  case. 
So  ‘If  God  foreknows  something,  then  it  happens  necessarily’  is 
equivalent  to  ‘If  it  shall  be,  it  shall  be  of  necessity.’   Yet  this  sort  of  necessity 
neither  compels  nor  prevents  the  future  existence  or  non-existence  of 
anything.  .  .  .   When  I  say  ‘If  a  thing  shall  be,  it  shall  be  of  necessity,’  the 
necessity  does  not  precede  but  follows  upon  the  assertion  of  the  thing  as  a 
fact.  .  .  .   For  this  sort  of  necessity  means  nothing  than  that  what  shall  be  shall 
not  be  able  at  the  same  time  not  to  be.  (1.2,  437) 
 
Denique  si  quis  intellectum  verbi  proprie  considerat:  hoc  ipso  quod  praesciri 
aliquid  dicitur,  futurum  esse  pronuntiatur.   Non  enim  nisi  quod  futurum  est 
praescitur,  quia  scientia  non  est  nisi  veritatis.   Quare  cum  dico  quia  si  praescit 
deus  aliquid,  necesse  est  illud  esse  futurum:  idem  est  ac  si  dicam:  Si  erit,  ex 
necessitate  erit.   Sed  haec  necessitas  nec  cogit  nec  prohibet  aliquid  esse  aut 
non  esse.  .  .  .   Nam  cum  dico:  si  erit,  ex  necessitate  erit:  hic  sequitur  necessitas 
rei  positionem,  non  praecedit.  .  .  .   Non  enim  aliud  significat  haec  necessitas, 
nisi  quia  quod  erit  non  poterit  simul  non  esse.   (248  line  5  -  249  line  9) 
 
What  Anselm  would  seem  to  be  saying  is  that  a  statement  such  as  “God  foreknows 
that  I  will  sin,  so  I  will  sin”  is  no  less  a  tautology  than  is  the  statement  “I  will  sin,  so  I 
will  sin,”  since  God  can  only  foreknow  what  will  actually  be  (and  likewise,  anything 
that  will  be  is  foreknown  by  God).   And  just  as  it  is  true  in  such  a  case  to  say,  “I  will 
sin,  so  necessarily  I  will  sin,”  so  it  is  true  to  say,  “God  foreknows  that  I  will  sin,  so 
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necessarily  I  will  sin.” 
But  this  kind  of  necessary  truth  of  a  tautological  statement  does  not  imply 
that  the  action  of  which  it  speaks  is  itself  necessary,  any  more  than  the  truth  of  the 
statement  “I  am  a  chorister,  so  necessarily  I  sing  in  choirs”  implies  that  my  singing  in 
choirs  is  a  necessary  fact  about  me,  but  merely  that  my  singing  in  choirs  is  necessary 
so  long  as  I  may  rightly  continue  to  call  myself  a  chorister.   The  point,  then,  that 
Anselm  primarily  makes  in  De  Concordia  concerning  the  relationship  between  God’s 
foreknowledge  and  future  contingent  actions   is  that  there  is  no  reason  to  infer, 38
from  that  fact  that  a  future  thing  will  necessarily  happen  relative  to  God’s 
foreknowledge  of  it,  to  the  conclusion  that  the  future  thing  is  thus  necessary  in  itself. 
On  the  contrary,  Anselm  claims,  God’s  foreknowledge  causes  no  necessity  in  the 
thing  considered  in  itself. 
But  how,  we  might  wonder,  can  God  fore know  that  which  is  contingent  in  the 
first  place?   Surely  knowledge  requires  certainty,  and  certainty  is  not  possible  where 
uncertain  things  are  concerned;  and  what  could  be  more  un certain  than  a  contingent 
thing?   Once  again  following  Boethius’  lead,  Anselm  appeals  to  the  timeless  eternity, 
or  T-eternity,  of  God:  God  knows  everything  that  will  happen  in  time  —  past, 
present,  and  future  —  because  all  of  created  time  is  eternally  present  to  God: 
“[E]ternity  has  its  own  unique  simultaneity  which  contains  both  all  things  that 
happen  at  the  same  time  and  place  and  that  happen  at  different  times  and  places.”  39
(1.5,  443)   A  particularly  interesting  bit  of  this  discussion,  that  will  have  relevence  in 
the  next  chapter  as  we  consider  Ockham’s  position,  occurs  in  De  Conc.  1.5:  the 
question  at  hand  is  how  passages  of  scripture  should  be  understood  which  speak  of 
God’s  foreknowledge  and  predestination  of  the  blessed,  such  as  this  from  the  Letter 
38  It  is  worth  noting  that  Anselm   seems  to  imply  in  many  places  throughout  the  text  that  actions  of  the 
rational  will  are  in  fact  the  only  events  that  are  truly  contingent   (see,  for  instance,  De  Conc.  1.6),  and 
indeed  that  only  some  of  those  —  namely,  those  which  are  morally  relevant,  or  those  “without  which 
people  cannot  attain  salvation”  —  are  worth  considering  in  any  detail  in  this  treatise. 
39  Habet  enim  aeternitas   suum  simul,  in  quo  sunt  omnia  quae  simul  sunt  loco  vel  tempore,  et  quae  sunt 
diversis  in  locis  vel  temporibus.   p.  254 
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to  the  Romans,  8.29  -  30:  “For  those  whom  [God]  foreknew  he  also  predestined.  .  .  . 
And  those  whom  he  predestined  he  also  called,  and  those  whom  he  called  he  also 
justified,  and  those  whom  he  justified  he  also  glorified.”   (English  Standard  Version) 40
On  the  face  of  such  passages,  it  would  seem  that  God’s  foreknowledge  makes  it  such 
that  those  foreknown  by  God  are  predestined,  justified,  and  glorified  necessarily , 
particularly,  as  Anselm  points  out,  because  St  Paul’s  verb  tenses  throughout  the 
passage  are  past.   The  predestined,  it  would  seem,  were  predestined  from  the 
beginning,  and  thus  are  necessarily  predestined.   Anselm  argues,  however,  that  St 
Paul’s  use  of  the  past  tense  is  merely  reflective  of  his  lack  of  any  tense  adequate  to 
God’s  T-eternity: 
However,  in  order  to  show  that  he  was  not  using  those  verbs  in  their 
temporal  signification,  St  Paul  described  future  happenings  in  the  past  tense. 
For,  temporally  speaking,  God  had  not  already  called,  justified,  and  glorified 
those  whom  he  foreknew  were  yet  to  be  born.   We  can  therefore  understand 
that  it  was  for  want  of  a  verb  signifying  the  eternal  present  that  St  Paul  used 
verbs  of  the  past  tense.   The  reason  is  that  things  which  are  in  the  past  in  time 
are  wholly  immutable   —  like  those  in  the  present  of  eternity.   (1.5,  443) 
 
Ut  autem  ostenderet  idem  apostolus  non  illa  verba  se  pro  temporali 
significatione  posuisse,  illa  etiam  quae  futura  sunt  praeteriti  verbo  temporis 
pronuntiavit.   Nondum  enim  quos  praescivit  adhuc  nascituros  iam 
temporaliter  >>vocavit<<,  >>iustificavit<<,  >>magnificavit<<.   Unde  cognosci 
potest  eum  propter  indigentiam  verbi  significantis  aeternam  praesentiam 
usum  esse  verbis  praeteritae  significationis;  quoniam  quae  tempore 
praeterita  sunt,  ad  similitudinem  aeterni  praesentis  omnino  immutabilia 
sunt.   (254  ll.  16  -  22) 
 
We  have  no  verb  tense  corresponding  to  the  eternal,  so  St  Paul  had  to  settle  for  a 
40  Romans  8.29  -  30  in  full  in  the  Vulgate,  as  quoted  by  Anselm  in  De  Conc.  1.5:  29 nam  quos  praescivit  et 
praedestinavit  conformes  fieri  imaginis   Filii  eius  ut  sit  ipse  primogenitus  in  multis  fratribus  30 quos 
autem  praedestinavit  hos  et  vocavit  et  quos  vocavit  hos  et  iustificavit  quos  autem  iustificavit  illos  et 
glorificavit. 
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verb  of  another  tense:  and  since,  Anselm  claims,  the  past  tense  best  reflects  the 
immutability  of  the  eternal,  the  past  tense  is  what  St  Paul  chose. 
De  Concordia ,  then,  provides  us  with  an  account  of  how  the  foreknowledge  of 
God  operates  without  causing  necessity.   The  other  side  of  the  coin,  though,  is  how 
the  human  will  operates  freely.   In  De  Concordia  itself,  Anselm  gives  passing 
attention  to  this  matter,  but  in  doing  so,  primarily  refers  us  to  his  earlier  works  on 
the  topic  (in  particular,  De  Veritate  (On  Truth),  De  Libero  Arbitrio  (On  Free  Will),  and 
De  Casu  Diaboli  (On  the  Fall  of  the  Devil)).   In  the  next  section,  therefore,  we  consider 
Anselm’s  treatment  of  free  will,  and  because  of  the  attention  of  current  scholarship, 
we  do  so  with  particular  reference  to  De  Casu  Diaboli . 
 
1.2.2  -  De  Casu  Diaboli  and  related  works 
The  historical  discussion  of  future  contingents  is  inextricably  bound  up  with 
discussions  of  free  will,  and  Anselm’s  case  is  no  exception.   Let  me  take  the  following 
paragraphs  to  explain  why  this  connection  is  so  strong.   We  have  already  rehearsed 
the  problems  that  arises  when  future  contingent  events  are  considered  in  relation  to 
God’s  foreknowledge  of  them.   God’s  knowledge  of  how  an  event  will  turn  out  seems 
to  result  in  a  necessity  for  that  event  to  occur  —  at  the  very  least,  a  necessity  of 
fixity,  or  of  inevitability.   We  have  seen  above  how  Anselm  seeks  to  address  this 
aspect  of  the  problem.   But  Anselm  remains  cogniscent  of  the  fact  that,  despite  his 
demonstration  of  the  lack  of  necessity  conferred  on  an  event  by  God’s 
foreknowledge  of  it,  people  may  yet  feel  unconvinced  of  the  freedom  of  their  will  in 
such  circumstances.   For  there  is  still  psychologically  a  strong  tendency  to  feel  that 
our  actions,  or  indeed  any  future  event,  cannot  be  free  if  they  are  already  known  by 
God. 
Perhaps  that  would  not  be  such  a  problem,  in  and  of  itself:  we  could  simply 
deny  that  any  future  events  (or,  in  fact,  any  events  at  all,  at  any  time)  are  contingent, 
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contenting  ourselves  with  a  determined  order  under  the  benevolent  sovereignty  of 
God.   But  if  no  event  is  contingent,  then  it  would  appear  to  be  the  case  that  any 
choice  we  make  to  act  in  a  certain  way  is  itself  determined;  and  if  it  is  determined, 
then  it  would  appear  that  we  do  not  will  to  act  in  that  way  freely.   And  if  we  do  not 
freely  will  an  action,  then  being  held  responsible  for  the  action  seems  grossly  unfair: 
how  can  we  fairly  be  punished  for  an  action  that  we  could  not  have  avoided,  or 
rewarded  for  an  action  that  we  performed  by  no  will  of  our  own?   When  the 
punishments  and  rewards  in  question  are  amplified  to  the  status  of  the  infinite 
punishments  and  rewards  meted  out  by  God’s  Providence,  the  injustice  of  their 
being  unmerited  becomes  all  the  more  apparent!  41
There  are  a  number  of  possible  routes  out  of  this  dilemma,  and  the  route  that 
we  saw  investigated  in  the  previous  section  was  that  of  denying  that  knowledge 
entails  necessity  in  a  thing  per  se ;  but  another  possible  route,  and  the  one  that  is 
41  Some  may  be  concerned   that  I  am  attributing   more  to  human  freedom  than  Christian  orthodoxy  in  the 
Augustinian   tradition   may  allow.   It  has  even  been  suggested  to  me  that  to  attribute  such  power  to  our 
own  freedom  commits   the  heresy  of  Pelagius.    Indeed,  there  are  certain  strands  of  Christian  thought  — 
strands  which  gained  much  greater  prominence  during  the  Reformation,  particularly  in  Calvinism,  and 
which  claimed   an  Augustinian   heritage   —  which  would  have  it  that  the  only  sort  of  freedom  which  we 
exercise  is  the  freedom  to  sin  (it  should  be  noted,  however,  that  it  is  entirely  probable  that  Calvin’s  own 
emphases   on  this  and  many  other  points  were  far  less  extreme  than  those  of  this  followers).   Left  to  our 
own  devices,  we  are,  the  Calvinists  would  have  it,  “totally  depraved,”  and  merit  only  damnation.   It  is 
only  through  the  unearned   act  of  God’s  grace  that  we  are  ever  able  to  avoid  sin.   One  can  remember  the 
nexus  of  tenets  connected  with  this  Calvinist  teaching  with  the  mnemonic  “TULIP,”  learned  by  any  child 
who  participates  in  the  Calvinist  Cadet  Corps  or  the  Calvinettes,  and  a  particularly  apt  mnemonic  given 
the  Dutch  connection   of  many  in  the  Reformed  tradition:  Total  depravity  (that  apart  from  God’s  grace, 
we  are  utterly  devoid  of  any  goodness   of  our  own),  Unconditional  election  (that  those  whom  God  elects 
to  be  saved  are  chosen   without   any  preceding   condition),  Limited  atonement  (that  only  some  are  elect 
to  be  saved),  Irresistible   grace  (that  those  elected  cannot  but  yield  to  the  grace  of  God),  and 
Perseverance  of  the  saints  (that  those  whom  God  elects  will  abide  in  God’s  grace  to  the  end).   Present  in 
this  collection   of  doctrines   is  indeed  an  Augustinian  theme,  namely,  that  of  “prevenient  grace”  —  that  is, 
that  God’s  grace  precedes,   or  “goes  before,”  any  meritorious  action  we  may  perform,  and  thus  it  is 
properly  God,  not  ourselves,  who  deserves  primary  credit  for  any  ability  we  have  to  do  good  and  resist 
evil.   But  not  present  in  the  Augustinian   view,  nor  in  the  dominant  orthodoxy  of  the  Middle  Ages  (East  or 
West),  is  the  doctrine   of  total  depravity.   As  image-bearers  of  God  whose  creation  was  affirmed  as  “good” 
by  God  himself,   there  remains   something   in  the  core  of  our  being,  even  in  our  fallen  state,  corrupted  as 
we  are  by  sin,  that  desires  God  and  God’s  goodness.   The  Law  of  God  is  “written  on  our  hearts,”  and  we 
remain  free  to  heed  it  or  to  ignore  it.   To  say  that  we  are  free  in  this  way  is  not  to  deny  the  prevenience  of 
God’s  grace  in  our  choice  to  do  good  and  resist  evil;  every  good  thing  in  creation  is  only  so  by  the  grace 
of  God.   But  contra  Calvin  et  alia ,  God’s  grace  is  not  “irresistible.”   We  are  offered  this  grace  as  a  free  gift: 
it  remains   within  our  power,  by  our  own  freedom  of  will,  to  reject  it.   We  are  indeed  “free  creatures  of  an 
eternal  God.” 
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highlighted  by  Anselm  in  other  places,  is  to  undermine  conventional  notions  of  what 
free  will  consists  in,  and  how  it  operates.   A  conventional  argument  about  the  puzzle 
of  God’s  foreknowledge,  free  will,  and  responsibility  may  be  rendered  something  like 
this: 
P1.   God  knows  all  events,  past,  present,  and  future. 
P2.   Something  that  is  known  cannot  be  otherwise  than  as  it  is  known. 
C1.   All  events,  past,  present,  and  future,  must  happen  just  as 
they  are  known  to  happen  by  God. 
C2.   (Since  all  of  my  future  actions  are  known  by  God)  All  of  my 
future  actions  must  happen  just  as  they  are  known  to  happen 
by  God. 
P3.   Freedom  of  will  consists  in  being  able  to  will  to  act  in  a  variety  of 
ways 
C3.   An  action  which  must  happen  in  a  particular  way  is  not 
free. 
C4.   My  actions  are  not  enacted  freely.  (C2  and  C3) 
P4.   A  person  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  (i.e.,  merit  or  demerit 
from)  actions  they  were  not  free  to  choose. 
C5.   I  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  my  actions. 
P5.   It  is  unjust  to  reward  or  punish  someone  for  actions  for  which 
they  are  not  responsible. 
P6.   God  rewards  and  punishes  me  for  my  actions. 
C6.   God  is  unjust.   XXX 
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We  have  already  seen  how  Boethius  finds  his  way  out  of  this  absurdity  by 
complicating  and  therefore  disputing  P2,  something  which  Anselm  also  did  in  De 
Concordia .   But  as  we  shall  see,  Anselm  also  complicates  P3. 
Anselm’s  treatment  of  free  will  is  far  from  straight-forward.   One  can 
summarize  fairly  easily  his  definition  of  free  will,  which  is  that  it  is  “the  power  to 
preserve  rightness  of  will  for  the  sake  of  that  same  rightness” ;  but  how  does  this 42
definition  help  us  to  understand  free  will?   Some  contemporary  scholars  have  been 
extremely  critical  of  Anselm’s  definition.   Sandra  Visser  and  Thomas  Williams,  for 
instance,  summarize  potential  problems  with  the  definition  as  follows: 
From  the  point  of  view  of  contemporary  metaphysics,  this  is  one  of  the  most 
unhelpful  definitions  imaginable.   Does  such  freedom  require  alternative 
possibilities,  for  example?   Is  it  compatible  with  causal  determination?   Is  the 
exercise  of  such  freedom  a  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  moral 
responsibility?   The  definition  sheds  no  light  on  these  questions.  43
 
Though  some  of  the  questions  posed  by  Visser  and  Williams  may  be  somewhat 
anachronistic,  it  may  yet  be  worth  considering  Anselm’s  understanding  of  free  will 
along  these  lines,  for  a  contemporary  philosopher,  so  it  is  certainly  worth  keeping 
these  questions  in  the  back  of  our  minds.   But  though  Visser  and  Williams  are 
unconvinced  that  Anselm  can  give  a  consistent  account  of  free  will  in  light  of  these 
questions,  I  am  persuaded  by  Tomas  Ekenberg’s  more  charitable  (and  more 
contextual)  attempt  to  understand  Anselm’s  account  of  free  will.  44
42  De  Libertate  Arbitrii  3,  trans.  Tomas  Ekenberg.   “Ergo  quoniam   omnis  libertas   est  potestas,  illa  libertas 
arbitrii  est  potestas  servandi  rectitudinem   voluntatis  propter  ipsam  rectitudinem . ”   This  definition   is 
repeated  by  Anselm   on  other  occasions,   also,  including  in  De  Concordia  book  I. 
43  S.  Visser  and  T.  Williams,   “Anselm’s  account   of  freedom”,  in  The  Cambridge  Companion   to  Anselm ,  ed.  B. 
Davies  and  B.  Leftow  (Cambridge:   Cambridge   UP,  2004),  179. 
44  Tomas  Ekenberg,  “Voluntary   Action  and  Rational  Sin  in  Anselm  of  Canterbury,”  British  Journal   for  the 
History  of  Philosophy ,  24:2  (March  2016),  215-230. 
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Ekenberg’s  argument  focuses  on  the  discussion  on  De  Casu  Diaboli  (On  the 
Fall  of  the  Devil)  as  a  unique  case  study  of  Lucifer’s  sin  to  infer  some  particularly 
interesting  consequences  for  Anselm’s  theory  of  the  will.   Ekenberg  argues  that 
Anselm’s  view  of  the  rational  will  forms,  historically,  a  unique  midpoint  between  the 
Augustinian  view  and  the  later  view  characterized  by  figures  such  as  John  Olivi  and 
Duns  Scotus.   Like  Augustine,  Anselm  follows  the  notion  that  a  sinful  will,  being  evil, 
cannot  in  fact  really  have  a  cause  or  definite  being.   In  this,  Anselm  adheres  to 
Augustine’s  so-called  “Great  Chain  of  Being,”  wherein  the  being  or  existence  of  a 
thing  increases  proportionately  to  its  goodness;  thus  we  have  God  at  the  very  top  of 
the  chain,  possessing  both  infinite  being  and  infinite  goodness,  until  at  the  bottom, 
the  chain  vanishes  into  absolute  nothingness,  which  is  pure  evil.    But  unlike 45
Augustine,  Anselm  argues  that,  as  is  particularly  evident  in  the  case  of  Lucifer’s  sin, 
our  will  to  do  evil,  though  it  may  not  have  a  cause ,  exactly,  must  yet  arise  from  some 
sort  of  rational  process:  it  must  be  the  case  that  the  will  resulting  in  an  evil  deed 
arises  from  a  rational  desire  for  something  good  (even  if  our  desire  for  that  thing  is 
fundamentally  in  conflict  with  justice).   And  thus  we  see  in  Anselm  the  beginnings  of 
a  doctrine  of  duality  of  will,  or  double  will,  that  would  later  be  developed  by  Olivi 
and  Duns  Scotus. 
In  this  way,  then,  Anselm  examines  both  halves  of  the  problem  of  future 
contingents  as  evident  in  the  dilemma  of  God’s  foreknowledge  and  human  free  will: 
Anselm  both  provides  an  argument  as  to  why  God’s  foreknowledge  entails  no 
necessity  in  the  things  foreknown,  and  provides  a  non-trivial  theory  of  the  way  in 
which  free  will  operates. 
 
1.3  -  Duns  Scotus 
45  The  non-being   of  evil  is  largely  Augustine’s   response  to  at  least  one  aspect  of  the  Problem  of  Evil:  God 
is  the  creator  of  all  that  exists,  and  all  that  exists  is  truly  good;  but  evil,  being  nothing,  has  no  cause,  and 
is  therefore  not  something   caused  by  God  (and  so  not  “God’s  fault,”  so  to  speak). 
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Scholarly  discussion  of  John  Duns  Scotus'  view  of  contingency  was  lively  and 
controversial  in  the  1990s  and  in  the  early  years  of  this  century.   Simo  Knuuttila,  in 
his  overview  of  modal  logic  in  the  Middle  Ages,  put  forward  a  highly  influential 
thesis,  attributing  to  Duns  Scotus  the  seminal  prototype  of  the  concept  he  dubbed 
“synchronic  contingency”  (a  term  I  will  explain  and  discuss  shortly).    Reception  of 46
this  thesis  has  been  mixed,  with  scholars  such  as  Stephen  Dumont,  Scott  Macdonald, 
and  Calvin  Normore  variously  offering  criticisms,  corrections,  and  refinements.    I 47
will  attempt  in  this  section  to  outline  the  background  of  this  discussion,  laying  out 
the  basic  aspects  of  Scotus'  view  on  which  all  are  agreed,  and  the  received  view  prior 
to  Knuuttila’s  controversial  thesis;  I  will  then  outline  Knuuttila’s  thesis,  and 
summarize  the  responses  it  has  received.   Finally,  I  will  summarize  how  Scotus'  view 
of  contingency  allows  him  to  develop  a  unique  account  of  God’s  foreknowledge. 
 
1.3.1  -  Basic  discussion  of  texts 
In  his  2003  article,  Normore  stated  that  because  of  the  (then-)  current  state 
of  manuscript  and  textual  analysis,  the  trajectory  of  Scotus'  writing  was  far  from 
clear.    The  dating  of  Scotus'  works,  and  even  the  identification  of  a  complete 48
authentic  corpus,  was  at  that  point  quite  uncertain,  and  Normore  was  therefore  able 
to  say  very  little  about  how  Scotus'  ideas  of  future  contingents  may  or  may  not  have 
developed  over  the  course  of  his  life.   In  the  decade  or  more  since,  however,  a  great 
deal  of  scholarship,  including  new  critical  editions  of  several  of  Scotus'  works,  has 
advanced  our  understanding  of  the  extent  and  chronology  of  Scotus'  writings.   This 
scholarship  has  primarily  occurred  under  the  auspices  of  the  International  Scotistic 
46  S.  Knuuttila,   Modalities  in  Medieval  Philosophy  (London:   Routledge,   1993). 
47  See,  e.g.,  Stephen  Dumont,  “The  origin  of  Scotus'  theory  of  synchronic  contingency,”  Modern 
Schoolman   vol.  72,  no.  ⅔  (Jan/Mar   1995),   149  -  67;  Scott  MacDonald,  “Synchronic  Contingency,  Instants 
of  Nature,  and  Libertarian   Freedom:   Comments  on  ‘The  Background  to  Scotus'  Theory  of  Will’,”  Modern 
Schoolman   vol.  72,  no.  ⅔  (Jan/Mar   1995),  169  -  74;  Calvin  Normore,  “Duns  Scotus's  Modal  Theory”,  in 
The  Cambridge  Companion   to  Duns  Scotus  (Cambridge:   Cambridge   UP,  2003),  129  -  60. 
48  Normore  129. 
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Commission  of  the  Vatican,  but  also  in  the  form  of  other  independent  research.   Of 
particular  interest  are  the  reportatio ,  lectura ,  and  ordinatio   on  question  I.39  of 49
Peter  Lombard's  Sentences .    These  works  of  veritable  authenticity  are  presumed  to 50
have  been  written  in  the  years  just  before  Scotus  died,   and  have  a  great  deal  to  say 
on  the  topic  of  contingency  in  general,  and  future  contingents  in  particular.   Of 
especial  interest  to  our  current  study,  these  works  represent  some  of  Scotus'  most 
original  —  and  controversial  —  statements  on  the  topic.   Furthermore,  because  of 
their  late  date,  we  can  assume  that  these  works  represent  his  most  developed  and 
mature  thoughts  on  the  matter,  and  are  thus  representative  of  the  view  at  which  he 
ultimately  arrived. 
 
1.3.2  –  Knuuttila  on  Scotus'  Modal  Theory 
As  early  as  1982,  Knuuttila  began  identifying  Scotus  as  highly  original  and 
innovative  in  an  aspect  of  his  modal  theory.    In  the  ancient  and  early-medieval 51
period,  Knuuttila  identifies  an  approach  to  modality  which  does  not  permit 
contingency  in  anything  in  the  present  moment .   This  can  be  traced  back  to  the 
Aristotelian  doctrine  of  “the  necessity  of  the  present”,  which  is  to  say  that  whatever 
is,  when  it  is,  necessarily  is.   On  this  model,  the  present  time  is  “fixed”,  and  thus 
unable  to  be  otherwise,  just  as  the  past  is.   On  some  interpretations,  at  least,  it  would 
seem  on  this  model  that,  because  the  present  moment  is  necessary,  our  choices  in 
49  A  clarification   of  terminology   for  non-medievalists:  reportatio ,  lectura ,  and  ordinatio   are  terms  used  to 
distinguish   between  three  different  genres  of  texts  relating  to  the  lectures  of  a  master  during  the 
Scholastic   period.    A  reportatio  is  a  report  of  a  lecture  —  essentially  class  notes  —  written  by  a  student, 
but  often  examined   and  approved  by  the  master;  a  lectura  is  the  lecture  notes  of  the  master  himself,   not 
necessarily  intended  for  public  consumption;   while  an  ordinatio   is  the  polished,   prepared  work  of  the 
master,  intended  for  distribution   beyond  the  master’s  own  university. 
50  John  Duns  Scotus,   The  Examined   Report  of  the  Paris  Lecture:  Reportatio  I-A ,  vol.  2,  ed.  and  trans.  A.B. 
Wolter,  O.F.M.,  and  O.V.  Bychkov  (St  Bonaventure,  NY:  Franciscan  Institute  Publications,  2008);  John 
Duns  Scotus  Contingency  and  Freedom:   Lectura  I  39 ,  intro.,  trans.,  and  commentary   by  A.  Vos  Jaczn  et  al. 
(Dordrecht:  Kluwer,  1994);  Ordinatio   in  Ioannes   Duns  Scotus,   Opera  Omnia ,  ed.  C.  Balić  (Civitas  Vaticana: 
Typis  Polyglottis  Vaticanis,   1950  -  ). 
51  S.  Knuuttila,   “Modal   Logic”,  in  The  Cambridge  History  of  Later  Medieval  Philosophy ,  ed.  N.  Kretzmann,   A. 
Kenny,  J.  Pinborg  (Cambridge:   Cambridge   UP,  1982),  342  –  57. 
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that  moment  are  also  necessary. 
In  accordance  with  this  Aristotelian  notion,  the  rules  for  obligationes  (i.e., 
obligational  disputations  —  a  late  medieval  logic  game)   attributed  to  William  of 52
Sherwood  stipulate  that  if  a  counterfactual  proposition  about  the  present  time  is  put 
forward  as  possible,  it  must  be  denied.    To  what  extent  these  obligationes  rules  can 53
be  seen  as  reflective  of  philosophers’  actual  intuitions  or  commitments  concerning 
the  necessity  of  the  present  is  debateable,  but  it  nevertheless  shows  a  certain  degree 
of  reticence  to  concede  the  possibility  of  alternatives  to  what  is  in  fact  occurring  at 
the  present  moment. 
Knuuttila  contends  that  Duns  Scotus  radically  breaks  with  the  traditional 
view  of  modality  in  the  present  when  he  denies  this  rule  of  obligationes .   In 
considering  the  obligationes  rule  which  states,  “Everything  that  exists,  when  it  exists, 
exists  with  necessity,”   Scotus  says, 54
I  say  that  the  proposition  “everything  that  exists,  when  it  exists,”  etc.,  can  be 
either  categorical  (or  temporal)  or  hypothetical.   If  it  is  categorical,  then  this 
repetitive  phrase  ‘when  it  exists’  does  not  qualify  all  that  is  implied  in  this 
expression,  but  only  ‘existence,’  and  the  sense  of  ‘everything  that  exists,  when 
it  exists,’  etc.,  is:  ‘every  being,  when  it  exists,  exists  as  necessary  or 
necessarily.’   But  if  it  is  hypothetical,  then  that  repetition  ‘when  it  exists’  is  a 
condition  that  qualifies  the  [whole]  expression  or  the  predicate,  and  the 
sense  is:  ‘every  being  exists  in  a  necessary  manner  —  when  it  exists.’   Hence, 
if  you  draw  an  inference  to  the  case  at  hand,  there  is  a  fallacy  of  [confusing] 
the  qualified  and  unqualified  senses. 
 
[D]ico  .  .  .  quod  haec  propositio  “omne  quod  est,  quando  est,”  etc.  potest  esse 
categorica  sive  temporalis  vel  hypothetica.   Si  sit  categorica,  tunc  haec 
52  For  an  outline   of  what  obligationes  are,  see  Paul  Vincent   Spade,  “Medieval  Theories  of  Obligationes ,” 
The  Stanford  Encyclopedia   of  Philosophy  (online),   revised  2014. 
53   For  a  discussion   of  obligationes  and  counterfactuals,   see,  for  instance,   Paul  Vincent  Spade,  “Three 
Theories   of  Obligationes:   Burley,  Kilvington  and  Swyneshed  on  Counterfactual  Reasoning,”  History  and 
Philosophy  of  Logic ,  vol.  3  (1982),   1  –  32. 
54  Omne  quod  est,  quando   est,  necesse   est  esse.   Reportatio  I  dist.  39,  paragraph  45,  p.  478  in  Wolter  & 
Bychkov. 
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reduplicatio  ‘quando  est’  non  determinat  omne,  quod  est  in  compositione 
implicita,  sed  determinat  tantum  ‘esse,’  et  est  sensus:  ‘omne  quod  est,  quando 
est”  etc.,  id  est  ‘omne  ens,  quando  est,  est  necessarium  vel  necessario.’   Si 
autem  sit  hypothetica,  tunc  reduplicatio  ‘quando  est’  est  modus  determinans 
compositionem  sive  praedicatum,  et  est  sensus:  ‘omne  ens  est  necessario 
quando  est.’   Si  ergo  inferas  ad  propositum,  est  fallicia  secundum  quid  et 
simpliciter.   ( Reportatio  I  dist.  39,  par.  49,  pp.  478  -  79  in  Wolter  &  Bychkov) 
 
In  this  way,  Scotus  explicitly  denies  —  or  at  the  very  least,  heavily  qualifies  —  the 
obligationes  rule,  based  on  the  dictum  of  Aristotle.   What  Scotus  instead  proposes  is 
that  things  which  happen  contingently  remain  contingent,  even  in  the  very  moment 
at  which  they  are  actualized.   On  Knuuttila’s  reading,  the  idea  that  two  opposite 
outcomes  both  remain  possible  in  the  moment  that  one  of  the  two  is  actualized  is  a 
radically  new  idea,  which  he  terms  “synchronic  contingency”. 
Another  way  to  conceive  of  the  difference  is  this:  on  the  one  hand,  we  can 
consider  two  opposites  to  be  possible,  insofar  as  it  is  possible  for  the  first  to  obtain 
at  time  t 1   and  the  other  to  obtain  at  t 2 .   What  Scotus  asserts,  according  to  Knuuttila, 
is  that  at  the  very  same  time  at  which  one  of  a  pair  of  opposites  is  happening,  the 
other  remains  possible  in  that  moment.   In  other  words,  at  the  same  time  t 1 ,  both  P 
and  ~ P  are  possible.   It  is  not  just  that  P  is  happening  now,  and  both  P  and  ~ P  are 
now  possible  insofar  as  ~ P  might  be  the  case  at  some  future  time;  rather,  though  P 
is,  in  fact,  happening  now,  it  also  remains  possible  that  ~ P  could  be  happening  now 
instead .   It  is  this  latter  property,  this 
possibility-to-be-at-the-very-same-time-that-the-opposite-is,  that  marks  out  Scotus' 
view  as  distinctly  original.   It  is  because  of  this  possibility  at  the  same  time ,  with 
respect  to  the  same  time ,  that  Knuuttila  calls  this  sort  of  contingency  “synchronic.” 
It  is  worth  noting  that  this  conception  of  counterfactual  possibility  leads 
directly  to  a  notion  of  possibility  that  is  no  longer  tied,  as  the  principle  of  plenitude 
might  stipulate,  to  what  in  fact  happens  or  is  actualized  in  the  world  of  our 
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experience.   This  leads  to  a  distinction  between  what  is  actually,  or  naturally, 
possible,  and  what  is  (merely?)  logically  possible.   For  something  to  be  logically 
possible,  it  need  not  be  the  case  that  it  could  actually  be  realized  in  the  world.   For 
possibility  in  terms  of  powers,  by  contrast,  in  the  case  of  the  present  contingent 
event,  because  a  particular  event  is  occurring,  its  opposite  could  not  actually  happen 
in  the  present  moment,  by  the  fixity  of  events  past  and  present  —  and  thus  its 
opposite  could  therefore  not  be  “possible”  in  this  sense.   Logical  possibility,  however, 
seems  only  to  require  the  absence  of  any  contradiction  if  the  opposite  of  what  is 
actually  the  case  is  counterfactually  asserted  to  be  the  case  instead. 
 
1.3.3  -  Objections  to  Knuuttila’s  thesis 
In  the  years  since  Modalities  in  Medieval  Philosophy ,  three  main  objections 
have  been  leveled  against  Knuuttila’s  synchronic  contingency  thesis.   The  first  comes 
from  Calvin  Normore,  who  criticises  Knuuttila  for  being  somewhat  careless  in  his 
designation  of  Scotus'  innovation  being  that  of  “ synchronic  contingency,”  and  offers  a 
refinement  of  the  view  which  takes  broader  metaphysical  considerations  into 
account.   The  second  is  from  Stephen  Dumont,  who  identifies  in  the  earlier  writings 
of  Peter  John  Olivi  strong  elements  of  Scotus'  position,  suggesting,  therefore,  that 
Scotus  may  not  have  been  as  original  as  Knuuttila  supposes.   And  the  third  is  that  of 
Scott  MacDonald,  who  doesn’t  see  anything  original  in  any  of  these  14th-century 
writings,  and  thinks,  rather,  that  these  ideas  can  be  traced  back  at  least  as  far  as 
Augustine.    In  this  sub-section,  I  will  outline  each  of  these  objections  in  turn, 55
55  It  has  been  suggested  to  me  by  Lorne  Falkenstein  that  the  idea  of  synchronic  contingency  might  be 
traced  yet  further   back,  at  least  as  far  as  the  ancient  skeptic  philosopher  Carneades,  whose  views  on  the 
matter  may  be  found  reported  by  Cicero  in  the  De  fato .   There  may  indeed  be  an  interesting  line  of 
inquiry   to  be  found  here.   For  the  time  being,  however,  I  will  not  concern  myself  with  pursuing  the 
matter,  both  because   I  think  too  little  can  be  gleaned  from  the  extant  texts  to  determine  with  much 
certainty   what  Carneades   may  or  may  not  have  thought  on  the  matter;  and  because,  even  if  Carneades 
did  have  a  position   very  like  that  of  Scotus,   it  most  certainly  would  not  have  been  known  to  either 
Scotus  or  his  immediate  predecessors. 
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together  with  my  own  responses. 
Normore  believes  that  Knuuttila  has  missed  the  mark  in  suggesting  that 
Scotus'  original  contribution  was  a  view  of  synchronic  —  or  simultaneous  — 
contingency  simpliciter .    As  Normore  understands  Knuuttila,  he  has  claimed  that 56
Scotus  thinks  that  the  possibility  of  contradictories  in  the  same  moment  applies  not 
only  to  the  present,  but  also  to  the  past  and  future  —  mutatis  mutandi  for  the 
appropriate  verb  tenses.   Normore  sees,  rather,  the  relevant  difference  between 
Scotus  and  his  predecessors  to  be  a  notion  of  the  present  being  contingent.   He 
thinks  that  medievals  long  before  Scotus  conceived  of  future  events  being  contingent 
in  a  synchronic  sort  of  way;  furthermore,  he  points  out  that  Scotus  does  not  extend 
this  notion  of  synchronic  contingency  to  points  in  the  past  (an  issue  that  I  will  return 
to  at  the  end  of  1.3),  saying,  “Moreover,  although  he  rejects  the  necessity  of  the 
present,  Scotus  thinks  that  the  past  is  necessary.”    Normore  therefore  thinks  that  it 57
is  wrong  to  label  Scotus'  new  conception  as  being  that  of  synchronic  contingency, 
since  synchronic  contingency  is  not  a  new  notion  with  respect  to  future  points  in 
time,  and  is  not  accepted  at  all  with  respect  to  past  points  in  time.   Normore  prefers 
rather  to  speak  of  Scotus'  notion  of  the  contingency  of  the  present . 
For  my  own  part,  I  do  not  think  that  Knuuttila  himself  was  guilty  of  more 
than  sloppy  diction  in  his  discussion  of  Scotus'  view.   Nowhere  does  Knuuttila 
explicitly  imply,  by  anything  more  than  the  unqualified  phrase  “synchronic 
contingency,”  that  Scotus  extended  this  notion  to  the  past,  or  that  he  was  original  in 
its  application  to  the  future.   However,  in  modern  “possible  world”  notions  of 
contingency,  it  is  quite  natural  to  speak  of  synchronic  contingency  applying  to  all 
points  in  time  —  past,  present,  and  future.   The  semantics  of  possible  worlds  are 
closely  connected  to  the  notion  of  “logical  possibility”,  which  Scotus  is  widely  held  to 
have  to  have  distinguished  from  natural  possibility  in  an  original  way.   Given  the 
novelty  of  Scotus'  distinction  between  what  is  logically  possible,  versus  what  is  only 
56  Normore  2003,  157,  footnote  3. 
57  Normore  2003,  136. 
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naturally  possible,  the  connexion  between  this  distinction  and  possible  world 
semantics,  and  the  fact  that  synchronic  contingency  is  universally  applicable  in  the 
realm  of  possible  worlds  speech,  it  may  seem  natural  to  infer  from  what  Knuuttila 
does  say  that  for  Scotus,  synchronic  contingency  applies  to  all  points  in  time. 
Though  it  is  possible  to  think  that  this  may  follow  from  Knuuttila’s  view,  Knuuttila 
does  not  —  and,  I  think,  would  not  —  make  this  explicit. 
In  large  part,  this  is  so  because  of  the  overwhelming  textual  evidence  that 
Scotus  considered  the  past  to  be  necessary.   In  support  of  the  view  that  Scotus, 
despite  his  belief  in  the  contingency  of  the  present,  still  believed  the  past  to  be 
necessary,  Normore  points  to  a  number  of  passages,  including  the  following  from 
Lectura  I.40,  in  which  Scotus  considers  the  following:  “[W]hat  passes  into  the  past  is 
necessary  —  as  the  Philosopher  wishes  in  Book  6  of  the  Ethics ,  approving  the  saying 
of  someone  who  says  that,  ‘this  alone  is  God  not  able  to  make:  that  which  is  past  not 
be  be  past.’”  Scotus  replies,  “To  the  first  argument,  when  it  is  argued  that  that  which 
passes  into  the  past  is  necessary,  it  is  conceded.”    In  this  concession,  Scotus  makes 58
plain  his  acceptance  of  the  necessity  of  the  past. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Normore  is  wrong  to  attribute  to  Knuuttila  the  (clearly 
false)  view  that  Scotus  applied  synchronic  contingency  to  the  past  as  well  as  the 
present  and  future,  Normore  is  right  to  make  this  clarificatory  correction  to 
Knuuttila’s  use  of  the  phrase  “synchronic  contingency”.   What  is  really  at  stake  in 
Scotus'  writing  is  a  very  specific  case  of  synchronic  contingency,  namely,  that  in  the 
moment  of  the  present.   Synchronic  contingency  in  future  moments  was  generally 
accepted  by  (non-determinist)  philosophers  prior  to  Scotus;  and  synchronic 
contingency  of  past  moments  was  not  accepted  by  Scotus  (and  was  not  even 
entertained  as  possible  for  some  time  after).   It  is  misleading,  therefore,  to  speak 
generally  of  Scotus  having  pioneered  the  notion  of  “synchronic  contingency”  in  an 
unqualified  way.   It  is  far  superior,  being  much  more  accurate,  to  speak  of  Scotus 
58  Lectura  I,  dist.  40,  no.  9,  trans.  Normore  (slightly  altered  for  clarity). 
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putting  forward  the  idea  of  a  “contingent  present.” 
Despite  this,  Knuuttila’s  language  of  “synchronic  contingency”  has 
predominated  in  the  subsequent  scholarly  discussion.   Dumont,  MacDonald, 
Marenbon,  and  others  have  all  taken  on  this  language  when  speaking  of  Scotus' 
contribution  (or  lack  thereof  —  as  we  will  see  discussed  below)  to  the  idea  that 
alternative  possibilities  in  the  present  moment  are  real  possibilities.   It  is  for  this 
reason  that,  though  I  generally  favour  Normore’s  description  of  “contingency  of  the 
present,”  I  will  at  times  concede  to  using  the  term  “synchronic  contingency”  — 
though  it  must  in  such  cases  be  strictly  understood  to  mean  synchronic  contingency 
of  the  present . 
In  addition  to  making  this  clarificatory  point  on  terminology,  Normore 
develops  Knuuttila’s  analysis  in  a  way  that  probes  the  metaphysical  and  causal,  not 
just  the  logical,  implications  of  (synchronic)  contingency  of  the  present.   In 
particular,  Normore   examines  in  much  greater  depth  the  role  played  by  “instants  of 
nature”  in  Scotus'  theory.   In  the  traditional  (Aristotelian)  account  of  possibility,  an 
event  being  possible  requires  the  possibility  of  the  current  circumstances  to  change 
in  such  a  way  that  the  possible  event  occurs.   This  change  requires  the  passage  in 
time  of  a  particular  causal  chain.   What  Scotus  does  to  disrupt  this  picture  is 
introduce  the  notion  of  something  being  causally  prior  to  another  thing,  without 
necessarily  being  prior  in  time.   He  explains  this  by  way  of  an  appeal  to  instants  of 
nature ,  as  opposed  to  instants  of  time.   As  an  example  of  something  which  is  causally 
prior  without  being  prior  in  time,  consider  a  cannonball  resting  on  a  pillow : 59
though  the  cannonball’s  resting  is  simultaneous  in  time  with  the  coinciding 
indentation  in  the  pillow,  the  cannonball  is  causally  prior  to  the  pillow’s  indentation. 
Scotus  would  have  it  that  we  can  understand  the  cannonball  as  occupying  a  prior 
instant  of  nature ,  if  not  of  time.   Thus,  a  causal  relationship  between  two  things  need 
not  be  understood  in  terms  of  succession  in  time,  but  may  be  understood  more 
59  I  am  grateful  to  Lorne  Falkenstein  for  having  suggested  this  example,  which  is  Kant’s. 
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abstractly  as  a  succession  in  nature. 
Dumont,  on  the  other  hand,  has  argued  that  Knuuttila  is  wrong  to  locate  the 
beginnings  of  synchronic  contingency  in  Scotus;  he  believes,  rather,  that  these  ideas 
can  be  seen  in  Scotus'  predecessor,  Peter  John  Olivi.    MacDonald,  in  response  to 60
Dumont,  contends  that  this  notion  of  synchronic  contingency  of  present  (and  even 
past!)  events  has  really  been  around  for  far  longer  than  any  of  Knuuttila,  Normore, 
or  Dumont  claim:  he  sees  this  going  back  at  least  as  far  as  Augustine,  who  posits 
counterfactuals  about  man’s  fall,  stating  that  it  is  possible  that  man  could  have  not 
fallen  —  seeming  to  suggest  that  a  counterfactual  about  a  past  event  is  possible  even 
after  it  has  already  occurred.   61
I  would  accept  (as  has  Knuuttila,  in  later  writing)  that  precursors  to  Scotus' 
theory  can  be  detected  in  earlier  sources,  including  Olivi.   However,  I  think  that 
MacDonald  misses  the  significance  of  Scotus'  development  when  he  claims  that  the 
idea  of  synchronic  contingency  (at  all  times,  even!)  has  been  present  in  the  primary 
literature  as  early  as  Augustine.   What  MacDonald  fails  to  recognize  is  that,  while 
people  have  always  spoken  in  hypothetical  counterfactuals  about  the  past  and 
present,  the  predominating  model  for  understanding  true  contingency  in  the 
medieval  tradition  was  the  frequency  model,  without  any  strongly  articulated  sense 
that  these  counter-factuals  spoken  of  had  any  actual  power  or  potency  to  be.   Of 
course  we  can  talk  of  Adam  not  sinning;  but  there  is  no  power  by  which  that 
alternate  reality  can  be  realized.   For  Scotus,  it  is  most  relevant  to  consider  this  idea 
in  a  present  instant:  if  at  time  t 1 ,  I  decide  to  reach  for  a  cookie,  then  of  course  one 
could  always  talk  hypothetically  about  my  having  decided  not  to  reach  for  that 
cookie  at  t 1 ;  but  the  revolutionary  thing  about  Scotus'  idea  is  that  at  t 1 ,  the  very 
moment  of  my  willing ,  I  yet  had  the  actual  power  to  will  not  to  take  the  cookie.   This, 
pace  MacDonald,  is  far  from  having  been  a  widely  accepted  notion  prior  to  Scotus 
60  Dumont   1995. 
61  MacDonald   1995.   I  have  already  noted  above  the  suggestion  that  Carneades  may  also  have  a  view 
similarly  robust. 
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(even  if  there  may  have  been  earlier  hints  here  and  there). 
 
1.3.4  -  Contingency  of  the  Present  and  God’s  Foreknowledge 
Scotus'  synchronic  view  of  contingency,  or  belief  in  the  contingency  of  the 
present,  allows  him  to  lay  out  a  new  theory  of  God’s  foreknowledge  that  reconciles, 
he  thinks,  God’s  foreknowledge  with  human  freedom.   Firstly,  contingency  of  the 
present  allows  for  the  possibility  of  contingency  in  the  world,  and  in  particular, 
contingency  of  human  will  and  action.   This  is  because  Scotus  believes  that  the  only 
way  for  contingency  to  exist  in  the  world  is  that  the  first  act  of  creation  must  have 
been  contingent.   Otherwise,  if  the  first  act  of  creation  were  necessary,  and  all 
subsequent  history  an  extension  of  that  act  by  necessary  causes,  then  all  of  created 
history  would  itself  also  be  necessary.   If,  however,  that  first  act  of  creation  is 
contingent,  then  everything  which  follows  from  it  —  even  if  it  follows  by  causal 
necessity  —  is  also  contingent.   For  this  reason,  Scotus  stresses  the  contingency  of 
the  first  act  of  creation.   This  act,  however,  is  an  act  of  God’s  will.   In  the  moment  that 
God  wills  creation  into  existence,  it  comes  to  be;  but  since  Scotus  requires  that  that 
act  be  contingent,  it  must  be  so  even  in  the  very  moment  of  its  creation.   Thus,  the 
contingency  of  the  present  allows  God’s  present  act  of  will  to  be  performed 
contingently.   Even  in  the  very  moment  of  willing  creation  into  being,  God  could  will 
otherwise. 
But  then  God’s  act  of  creation  involves  choosing  between  a  number  of 
maximally  consistent  sets  (which,  in  contemporary  parlance,  may  be  seen  as 
equivalent  to  choosing  among  all  “possible  worlds” ).   In  this  contingent  act  of  the 62
will,  God  is  setting  in  motion  all  future  acts  of  creation  —  both  those  which  are 
(necessarily)  causally  determined,  and  those  which  happen  by  a  free  act  of  human  or 
62  For  discussion   of  the  relationship   between  Scotus'  account  and  contemporary  possible  worlds 
semantics,   see  Normore  2002,  154  -  55  (section  V,  “Possible  Worlds”).   Though  Scotus  did  not  explicitly 
speak  of  “possible   worlds,”  there  is  good  reason  to  think  that  possible  worlds  semantics  would 
complement   his  views  quite  nicely. 
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divine  will  (in  the  latter  case,  we  think  particularly  of  instances  of  miracles).   By 
knowledge  of  his  own  will,  he  knows  what  human  creatures  will  be  born  and  live  in 
this  created  order;  and  by  his  intimate  knowledge  of  the  will  of  each  person,  he 
knows  what  choice  they  will  make  in  any  given  circumstance. 
And  so,  on  Scotus'  picture,  God  knows  the  future  by  a  complete  knowledge  of 
the  following  three  things:  (1)  All  causally  (naturally)  determined  events;  (2)  God’s 
own  will,  which  acts  contingently;  and  (3)  the  will  of  all  human  creatures,  which  act 
contingently.   But  knowing  any  of  these  things  in  no  way  necessitates  the  contingent 
acts  of  the  actors.   So  this  morning,  a  Monday  morning,  I  had  two  soft-boiled  eggs  for 
breakfast.   God  knew  that  I  would  have  two  eggs  not  through  any  special  foresight  of 
the  actual  event,  but  because  he  knows  me,  and  knows  me  to  be  the  sort  of  creature 
who  would  choose  to  have  two  eggs  for  breakfast  this  morning.   This  prediction  on 
God’s  part,  through  God’s  knowledge  of  me,  would  be  no  great  feat  if  it  was  the  case 
that  I  ate  two  eggs  for  breakfast  every  day,  or  every  Monday;  if  this  was  part  of  my 
daily  or  weekly  routine,  then  my  husband,  or  even  a  close  friend,  if  she  knew  me  well 
enough,  would  be  able  to  make  the  same  prediction  through  their  knowledge  of  me 
and  my  breakfast  preferences.   But  let’s  complicate  this  picture  a  little  further: 
suppose  it  to  be  the  case  (as  in  fact  it  is)  that  it’s  rather  unusual  for  me  to  have  eggs 
for  breakfast  on  a  Monday;  suppose,  further,  that  I  in  fact  usually  have  a  pair  of 
soft-boiled  eggs  for  my  Sunday  breakfast.   One  might  expect  in  such  a  case  that  God 
would  mistakenly  conclude,  from  God’s  knowledge  of  my  typical  behaviour,  that  I 
would  not  have  eggs  this  morning.   However,  it  happened  that  yesterday  I  slept  late 
and  did  not  have  time  for  my  usual  Sunday  breakfast  ritual,  so  instead  wolfed  down 
a  quick  breakfast  of  toast  and  peanut  butter  before  rushing  off  to  church.   But  God 
knows  my  predilection  for  soft-boiled  eggs,  and  my  disappointment  at  not  having 
had  time  for  my  usual  Sunday  breakfast;  furthermore,  God  knows  that  I’m  the  sort  of 
person  who,  relishing  the  comfort  of  weekly  rituals  (particularly  where  food  is 
concerned),  would  go  out  of  my  way  to  make  up  for  a  missed  treat.   And  so  knowing 
all  of  this,  God  would  know  that  I  would  take  the  next  possible  opportunity  to  eat  a 
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pair  of  soft-boiled  eggs  for  breakfast,  and  thus  conclude  that  I  would  have  two  eggs 
for  breakfast  this  Monday  morning. 
In  summary,  we  have  seen  how  Scotus  introduced  the  new,  important  notion 
of  contingency  of  the  present;  how  this  allows,  through  the  contingency  of  God’s 
creative  act,  for  contingency  in  the  world;  and  finally,  how  God’s  knowledge  of  all 
future  events,  including  contingent  events,  relies  on  God’s  complete  knowledge  of 
the  sorts  of  wills  possessed  by  each  of  God’s  creatures. 
 
1.3.5  -  Contingency  of  the  past? 
One  final  word  before  moving  on:  I  mentioned  before  that  Scotus  did  not 
extend  his  ideas  of  synchronic  contingency  to  the  past,  which  is  a  fact  that  may  strike 
contemporary  philosophers  as  strange.   In  contemporary  philosophy,  we  tend  to 
conceive  of  the  past  as  contingent  quite  easily.   So  let  me  explain  an  idea  I  have  about 
why  this  may  not  have  been  the  case  for  Scotus.   My  idea  is  this:  
Taking  logical  possibility  to  simply  be  the  absence  of  a  contradiction,  consider 
a  contingent  event  A  that  happens  at  present  time  t*.   Then  the  moment  before  A 
happened  (let’s  call  it  t*  -  1  —  for  the  sake  of  argument,  assume  discrete  units  of 
time,  call  them  moments,  and  assume  they  unfold  sequentially  like  the  integers), 
both  A  at  t*  and  ~ A  at  t*  were  possible.   As  we  move  into  the  moment  t*  and  A 
happens,  there  is  no  contradiction  in  thinking  about  moment  t*,  and  all  moments 
leading  up  to  it,  as  being  exactly  as  they  are  with  the  exception  that  A  is  swapped  for 
~ A  at  t*.   However,  A  presumably  has  some  necessary  causal  effects  on  the  moment 
after  its  inception  that  ~ A  would  not  have  —  let’s  call  the  set  of  A ’s  necessary  effects 
in  the  next  moment  Γ,  and  ~ A ’s  effects  Γ’.   So  let’s  say  we’re  now  in  the  moment  after 
A ’s  inception,  t*  +  1.   In  the  actual  course  of  things,  there  is  now  this  set  Γ  of  things 
happening  now,  which  would  not  be  identical  to  the  set  Γ’  that  would  be  happening 
now  had  ~ A  happened  at  t*  instead.   So  if  we  look  back   to  t*  and  mentally  swap  A 
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for  ~ A ,  we  wind  up  with  a  contradiction  when  we  consider  that  moment  together 
with  all  other  moments,  including  the  present  —  namely,  ~ A  happening  at  t* 
contradicts  the  present  state  of  affairs  including  the  members  of  Γ  rather  than  the 
members  of  Γ’.   So  while  ~ A t*   was  possible  at  t*,  ~ A t*   is  no  longer  possible  at  t*  +  1  — 
at  least,  not  without  introducing  the  further  modification  which  swaps  the  members 
of  Γ  for  those  of  Γ’  in  t*  +  1. 
In  other  words,  hypothesizing  changes  to  past  moments  entails  a 
contradiction  with  actual  events  of  subsequent  moments,  whereas  hypothetical 
changes  in  the  present  moment  —  assuming  the  changes  are  alternatives  that  were 
possible  in  the  preceding  moment  —  entail  no  such  contradiction.   This  is  why  I 
think  Scotus  doesn’t  extend  the  principle  of  synchronic  contingency  to  past 
moments  of  time. 
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Chapter  2 
William  Ockham  on  Future  Contingents 
 
Introduction 
William  Ockham  is  a  major  figure  in  the  development  of  the  discussion  of 
future  contingents,  and  his  place  in  this  thesis  is  particularly  important  because  it  is 
primarily  to  Ockham  that  Bradwardine  responds.    Indeed,  as  direct 63
contemporaries  for  several  years  at  Oxford  in  the  late  1310s  and  early  1320s,  it  is 
highly  probable,  perhaps  almost  certain,  that  Bradwardine  and  Ockham  would  have 
engaged  one  another  intellectually  in  person  during  that  time.   Throughout  his 
writing,  Bradwardine  is  extremely  critical  of  Ockham,  and  it  would  not  be  an 
exaggeration  to  assert  that  Ockham  is  Bradwardine’s  chief  intellectual  target.   In  his 
most  famous  work,  De  causa  Dei  contra  Pelagium ,  Bradwardine  explicitly  links 
Ockham’s  philosophy  to  the  ancient  heresy  of  Pelagianism,  denouncing  Ockham  and 
his  followers  in  no  uncertain  terms  as  Pelagians.   In  the  De  futuris  contingentibus ,  the 
earlier  treatise  that  is  the  subject  of  this  study,  it  is  in  the  context  of  condemning 
Ockham’s  position  that  Bradwardine  ventures  his  own  solution.   Ockham’s  position 
is  also  interesting  and  important  from  a  contemporary  standpoint,  since  there  are  a 
number  of  influential  philosophers  of  religion  —  most  notably,  Marilyn  McCord 
Adams  (who,  sadly,  passed  away  just  recently)  and  Alvin  Plantinga  —  who  have  in 
recent  decades  taken  up  and  defended  versions  of  Ockham’s  solution  to  the  problem.
   This  has  generated  some  significant  discussion  in  the  contemporary  literature  for 64
63  I  owe  a  great  debt  of  thanks  to  Alexander  Stöpfgeshoff  for  a  series  of  conversations  he  and  I  had, 
during  his  time  at  Western  in  the  winter  of  2015,  about  William  Ockham’s  view  of  future  contingents, 
and  Bradwardine’s  objections   to  the  same.   These  conversations  helped  me  immeasurably  in  forming 
my  own  understanding  of  Ockham’s  view,  and  contributed  substantially  to  the  shape  and  content  of  this 
and  the  next  chapter. 
64  Adams  has  written  on  this  topic  many  times  and  in  many  places,  most  notably  in  her  translation  (with 
Norman   Kretzmann)   of  Ockham’s  primary   treatise  on  the  topic,  Predestination,   God's  Foreknowledge, 
and  Future  Contingents ,  2nd  ed.,   trans.  and  ed.  M.  McCord  Adams  and  N.  Kretzmann  (Indianapolis: 
Hackett,  1983);  see  also  her  enormous   two-volume  study  of  Ockham’s  philosophy,  William   Ockham 
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and  against  Ockham’s  solution  and  its  merit  as  a  viable  solution.   It  is  therefore 
important  that  we  take  time  at  this  point  to  carefully  consider  Ockham’s  position, 
which  is  the  chief  aim  of  this  chapter.   I  begin  by  outlining,  very  briefly  and  roughly, 
an  account  of  Ockham’s  nominalism,  which  is  important  for  understanding  the 
subsequent  discussion  (2.1).    I  then  lay  out  an  exposition  of  Ockham’s  treatment  of 
the  problem,  focusing  primarily  on  his  text,  De  praedestinatione  et  de  praescientia 
Dei  et  de  futuris  contingentibus  (On  predestination,  God’s  foreknowledge,  and  future 
contingents)  (2.2).    I  will  then,  in  the  final  section,  outline  a  number  of  potential 65
objections  to  Ockham’s  theory,  pointing  out  possible  weaknesses  and  problems  as  I 
see  them  (2.3).   This  will  all  serve  to  set  us  up  to  observe  Bradwardine’s  criticisms  of 
Ockham’s  position  in  the  following  chapter. 
 
2.1  -  Ockham’s  Nominalism 
It  is  going  to  help  our  understanding  of  what  follows  a  great  deal  if  we  first 
take  a  brief  diversion  to  discuss  Ockham’s  understanding  of  the  content  of  a 
proposition.   In  the  late  medieval  period,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  contention  about 
how  exactly  propositions  and  their  terms  are  to  be  understood,  and  in  particular, 
what  precisely  they  represent.   I  do  not  have  space  in  my  present  study  to  explore 
this  in  any  great  precision  or  detail  —  indeed,  many  theses  could  be  (and  have  been) 
devoted  to  this  and  closely  related  topics.   But  at  the  risk  of  trying  to  dissect  the 
problem  with  too  dull  a  knife,  I  will  say  that  the  disagreement  may  be  broadly 
understood  along  the  lines  of  nominalism  versus  realism,  of  both  universals  and  the 
signification  of  terms.   Ockham  is  widely  recognized  as  a  nominalist  of  a  fairly 
(South  Bend,  Indiana:   Notre  Dame,  1987).   William  Lane  Craig  has  provided  a  more  succinct  summary  in 
The  Problem  of  Divine  Foreknowledge  and  Future  Contingents  from  Aristotle  to  Suarez  (Leiden:   Brill, 
1988),  146  -  68.   For  Plantinga’s  treatment   of  the  topic,  see  Alvin  Plantinga,  “On  Ockham’s  Way  Out,” 
Faith  and  Philosophy:  Journal   of  the  Society  of  Christian   Philosophers   3  (July  1986),  235  -  69. 
65  William   Ockham,   Predestination,   God's  Foreknowledge,  and  Future  Contingents  (see  previous  note), 
“PPD”  from  henceforth.   Unless  an  alteration  is  specifically  noted,  all  direct  quotations  are  from  this 
translation,   and  sections   are  numbered  according  to  the  conventions  of  this  edition. 
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thoroughgoing  sort,  explicitly  rejecting  the  so-called  “moderate  realism”  of  many  of 
his  prominent  contemporaries  and  proximate  predecessors.   Some  scholars  have 
even  gone  so  far  as  to  label  Ockham  an  “extreme  nominalist.”    The  “moderate 66
realism”  against  which  Ockham  protests  largely  follows  the  tradition  begun  by 
Aristotle:  this  form  of  realism  does  not  follow  the  Platonist  doctrine  that  universals 
“really”  exist  as  separate  heavenly  entities  independent  from  the  particulars  that 
they  inform,  but  it  nonetheless  maintains  that  universal  properties  really  do  exist 
and  inhere  in  their  particulars.   It  therefore  ascribes  a  certain  metaphysical  reality 
and  independence  to  these  species  and  genera  which  we  term  “universals.”   Though 
there  is  variation  in  the  exact  expression  and  understanding  of  this  doctrine,  this 
basic  principle  —  that  universals  are  real  —  informs  the  understanding  of  many  of 
the  most  prominent  thinkers  leading  into  the  late  thirteenth  and  early  fourteenth 
centuries,  including  Thomas  Aquinas  and  John  Duns  Scotus.  67
Ockham’s  well-documented  nominalism,  therefore,  stands  at  odds  with  many 
of  his  prominent  contemporaries.   Adams  summarizes  a  central  tenet  of  Ockham’s 
approach,  which  she  sees  as  continuous  with  that  of  Henry  of  Harclay,   in  the 68
following  way:   “Everything  that  exists  in  reality  is  essentially  singular  —  i.e., 
logically  incapable  of  existing  in,  as  a  constituent  of,  numerically  many 
simultaneously.”    Unlike  Harclay,  however,  Ockham  derives  as  a  consequence  that 69
66  Joseph  A.  Magno,   “Ockham’s  Extreme  Nominalism,”  Thomist:   A  speculative  quarterly  43  (July  1979), 
414  -  49. 
67  An  eminently  useful  overview  of  the  discussion  of  the  problem  leading  up  to  the  thirteenth  and 
fourteenth  centuries,   which  particularly  sets  up  Ockham’s  response  to  the  same,  can  be  found  in  Adams’ 
important   overview  of  the  philosophy  of  Ockham,   William   Ockham  (1987).    In  particular,  chapter  1 
(“The  Problem  of  Universals,”  pp.  3  -  12),  chapter  2  (“Universals  Are  Not  Things  Other  Than  Names,”  pp. 
13  -  69),  and  chapter  4  (“Universals,  Conventionalism,  and  Similarity,”  pp.  109  -  41)  are  helpful  both  in 
understanding  Ockham’s  context,  Ockham’s  rejection  of  the  dominant  view  of  his  contemporaries,  and 
Ockham’s  own  nominalist   response.    Adams  has  also  written  a  more  concise  overview  of  the  topic  in  The 
Cambridge  History  of  Later  Medieval  Philosophy ,  ed.  Kretzmann   et  al.  (Cambridge:   CUP,  1982), 
“Universals  in  the  early  fourteenth  century,”  pp.  411  -  39. 
68  Henry  of  Harclay  was  a  student   of  Duns  Scotus  and  near-contemporary  of  Ockham  and  Bradwardine 
at  Oxford,  where  he  served  as  University  Chancellor  for  the  last  few  years  of  his  life  until  his  death  in 
1317. 
69  Adams  1982,  pp.  429  and  434. 
 
 
 
 
57 
“universals  are  nothing  other  than  names.”    This  nominalism  will  help  us  later  to 70
understand  some  of  Ockham’s  arguments,  which  are  otherwise  somewhat  puzzling. 
In  particular,  it  is  a  consequence  of  his  anti-realism  that,  when  it  comes  to 
understanding  propositions,  Ockham  does  not  see  the  terms   as  representing 
anything  more  than  the  bare  particulars  to  which  they  refer,  whenever  they  are 
uttered.    A  proposition  does  not  take  on  any  fixed  existence  of  its  own  apart  from 71
the  words  uttered  and  their  immediate  referents. 
Where  this  will  become  particularly  relevant  in  the  following  discussion  is 
understanding  Ockham’s  interpretation  of  propositions  as  they  relate  to  the  passage 
of  time.   It  may  be  generally  assumed  that  when  a  proposition  is  uttered  with  a  time 
referent,  such  as  “Donald  Trump  is  now  the  President-elect  of  the  United  States,”  or 
“ Yesterday ,  Kelowna  had  its  first  snowfall  of  the  year”  (uttered  at  10:08pm  on 
Monday,  5  December,  2016),  that  the  proposition  automatically  ever  hereafter  bears 
the  meaning  imposed  by  the  referents  at  the  time  of  its  utterance.   Thus  the  first 
proposition,  for  instance,  is  eternally  equivalent  to  the  proposition,  “Donald  Trump 
is  the  President-elect  of  the  United  States  on  Monday,  5  December,  2016,  at 
10:08pm,”  and  by  this  token,  is  determinately  true.   But  Ockham  does  not  take 
propositions  to  have  enduring  referential  content  in  this  way.   On  Ockham’s  view, 
propositions  never  mean  anything  more  than  what  the  bare  referents  of  the  words 
themselves  would  imply  at  the  moment  of  their  utterance.   Propositions  are  never 
more  nor  less  than  a  string  of  words  —  words  which  name  things,  but  which  may 
name  different  things  at  different  times,  depending  on  the  context.   Thus,  for 
Ockham,  a  proposition  whose  truth  or  falsity  depends  on  a  particular  moment  in 
time  may  change  in  truth-value  as  time  elapses.   “Donald  Trump  is  now  the 
70  Adams  1982,  p.  434  (this  is  similarly  formulated  in  Adams  1987,  p.  13).   The  primary  sources 
supporting   this  understanding  of  Ockham   on  universals  is  chiefly  to  be  found  in  his  Ordinatio   I,  dist.  2, 
question   4  ( Opera  Theologica  II,  pp.  117ff),  but  is  also  supported  by  his  commentary  on  Aristotle’s  De 
interpretatione  ( Opera  Philosophica  II,  pp.  345ff). 
71  A  classic  text  outlining   Ockham’s  theory  of  propositions  is  that  of  Philotheus  Boehner,  O.F.M.,  “A 
Medieval  Theory   of  Supposition,”  Franciscan  Studies  18,  no.  3  -  4  (September  -  December   1958),  pp.  240 
-  89. 
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President-elect  of  the  United  States”  is  true  as  I  write  this,  but  within  a  matter  of 
weeks,  when  Trump  (presumably)  ceases  to  be  President-elect  and  instead  assumes 
the  role  of  President,  the  proposition  will  correspondingly  cease  to  be  true.   This  is 
certainly  an  idiosyncratic  way  of  understanding  the  truth  of  propositions  over  time, 
but  it  is  an  understanding  which  Ockham  adheres  to  in  a  remarkably  consistent  way. 
And  as  we  shall  see  in  what  follows,  it  is  important  for  understanding  much  of  what 
he  says  concerning  God’s  foreknowledge  of  future  contingents. 
 
2.2  -  Ockham’s  account  of  future  contingents 
Ockham’s  most  sustained  and  focussed  discussion  of  the  topic  of  future 
contingents  occurs  in  his  treatise  On  Predestination,  God’s  Foreknowledge,  and  Future 
Contingents  (PPD),  written  sometime  between  1319  (the  year  that  Ockham 
completed  his  Sentences  commentary)  and  1324  (the  year  that  Ockham  was 
summoned  before  the  Pope  in  Avignon  to  answer  for  charges  of  heresy;  Ockham 
never  again  left  the  Continent  after  that  point,  and  spent  the  remainder  of  his  life 
embroiled  in  and  writing  about  political  controversies,  both  religious  and  secular, 
until  his  death  in  1347).    Other  relevant  discussions  of  future  contingents  in 72
Ockham’s  writing  include  portions  of  his  Sentences  commentary  (his  Ordinatio  book 
I,  distinctions  38  and  39),  his  commentary  on  Aristotle’s  De  interpretatione ,  and  his 
Summa  logicae .    However,  given  that  none  of  these  forms  as  substantial  a 73
discussion  as  that  found  in  PPD,  I  will  primarily  confine  the  discussion  that  follows 
to  that  treatise.   This  treatise  is  composed  of  five  questions,  the  most  substantial  and 
significant  of  which  is  the  second.   In  the  three  subsections  which  follow,  therefore,  I 
will  first  give  a  brief  examination  of  what  precedes  Q.  II  (i.e.,  Q.  I)  (2.2.1);  I  will  then 
give  a  much  lengthier  and  more  detailed  treatment  of  the  second  question  itself 
(2.2.2);  and  finally,  I  will  briefly  discuss  those  minor  questions  which  follow  Q.  II, 
72  Marilyn  McCord  Adams,  introduction,   PPD  pp.  1  -  2. 
73  The  relevant  portions   of  all  three  of  these  works  are  included  as  appendices  to  PPD  (see  f.n.  3,  above). 
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questions  III  through  V  (2.2.3).   Before  moving  on  to  criticisms  of  Ockham’s  view 
(both  my  own  in  this  chapter,  and  Bradwardine’s  in  the  next),  I  will  briefly  highlight 
corroborating  evidence,  from  his  Ordinatio ,  that  Ockham’s  view  of  God’s 
foreknowledge  remained  somewhat  consistent  across  more  of  his  philosophical 
output  than  just  PPD  (2.2.4). 
 
2.2.1  -  PPD  Q.  I 
Ockham  begins  the  treatise  by  addressing  a  question  of  predestination:  are 
passive  predestination  (i.e.,  the  condition  of  being  predestined)  and  passive 
foreknowledge  (i.e.,  the  condition  of  being  foreknown  [to  be  saved])  “real  relations” 
in  the  person  who  is  predestinate  and  foreknown?   (PPD  Q.  I  A)   Ockham  maintains 
that  answering  such  questions  in  the  affirmative  (as  does  Alexander  of  Hales )  leads 74
to  a  contradiction,  given  the  contingency  of  a  person’s  predestinate  state.   Let  me 
explain  now  where  Ockham  sees  the  contradiction. 
By  a  “real  relation,”  Ockham  means  something  intrinsic  to  or  inherent  in  the 
thing  itself.   So  the  question  is  something  like,  is  the  state  of  being  predestined,  or 
being  foreknown  to  be  predestined,  something  that  is  really  intrinsic  to  the  person 
herself? 
Regarding  the  subject  of  predestination  and  foreknowledge,  it  should  be 
observed  that  those  who  suppose  that  passive  predestination  and  passive 
foreknowledge  are  real  relations  in  the  [person  who  is]  predestinate  and 
foreknown  have  necessarily  to  admit  contradictories.  (PPD  Q.  I  A,  pp.  34  -  35. 
Text  in  square  brackets  supplied  by  Adams  and  Kretzmann) 
 
Circa  materiam  de  praedestinatione  et  praescientia  est  advertendum  quod 
ponentes  praedestinationem  passivam  et  praescientiam  passivam  esse 
respectus  reales  in  praedestinato  et  praescito  habent  necessario  concedere 
74  PPD  p.  34,  f.n.  2. 
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contradictoria.   ( Opera  Philosophica  vol.  II,  p.  507,  lines  4  -  7) 
 
Ockham  argues  in  the  negative,  since,  he  contends,  if  being  predestined,  and  being 
foreknown  to  be  predestined,  were  real  relations  (or  intrinsic)  in  the  person,  then  it 
would  seem  to  be  the  case  that  that  person  would  have  no  power  in  themselves  to 
act  in  a  way  that  would  undermine  her  predestinate  state.   Thus  their  predestination 
is  necessary. 
But  being  predestinate  (or  foreknown  to  be  predestinate)  Ockham  takes  to  be 
a  contingent  fact  about  a  person;  and  so  Ockham  takes  it  as  a  given  that  the 
predestinate  person  is  yet  able  to  reject  salvation  by  her  own  freely  chosen  action. 
So  it  seems  to  Ockham  that  insisting  on  the  real  inherence  of  predestination  in  the 
person  leads  to  the  following  contradictory  absurdity:  the  predestinate  person  is 
only  so  contingently;  so  the  predestinate  person  could,  at  some  future  time,  willingly 
reject  salvation  by  her  own  action;  in  such  a  case,  the  person  would  then  be  damned; 
but  if  her  predestinate  state  was  something  really  inherent  in  her  nature,  then  she 
would  then  be  both  predestinate  and  damned,  which  is  impossible. 
A  number  of  assumptions  on  Ockham’s  part  combine  to  yield  this  somewhat 
puzzling  result.   Firstly,  he  takes  it  for  granted  that  any  particular  person’s 
predestinate  state  is  contingent;  in  other  words,  there  is  no  necessity  that  any 
particular  person  should  be  saved.   This  assumption  is  something  which,  though 
certainly  a  desirable  position  from  a  number  of  theological  standpoints,  is  far  from 
obvious.   Secondly,  he  seems  to  be  assuming  a  very  particular  view  of  contingency 
(different  from  either  the  Classical/Augustinian  “principle  of  plenitude”  or  the 
logical  contingency  of  Duns  Scotus),  whereby  the  contingency  of  an  event  is  tied  to 
the  power  of  an  agent  to  make  it  turn  out  differently.   Both  of  these  issues  will  be 
brought  into  greater  focus  as  we  examine  Ockham’s  views  in  greater  depth.   For  now, 
though,  we  will  turn  to  a  more  detailed  examination  of  the  second  question  of  the 
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treatise. 
 
2.2.2  -  PPD  Q.  II 
The  second  question  of  PPD  is,  “In  respect  of  all  future  contingents,  does  God 
have  determinate,  certain,  infallible,  immutable,  necessary  cognition  of  one  part  of  a 
contradiction?”  (PPD  q.  II  A).   It  is  perhaps  surprising,  as  apparent  from  the  way  in 
which  Ockham  structures  his  response,  that  Ockham  considers  this  to  be,  in  fact, 
four  separate  questions:  first,  a  question  of  the  determinacy  of  God’s  foreknowledge; 
second,  the  certainty  and  infallibility  of  God’s  foreknowledge;  third,  the  immutability 
of  God’s  foreknowledge;  and  fourth  and  finally,  the  necessity  of  God’s  foreknowledge. 
This  may  surprise  us,  because  we  often  assume  (as  most  medieval  thinkers  certainly 
did)  that  these  five  properties  of  knowledge  are  interdependent,  or  logically 
equivalent,  in  such  a  way  that  an  affirmative  answer  to  one  would  imply  all  the 
others  (and  similarly,  that  the  denial  of  one  would  entail  the  denial  of  the  others). 
If  we  follow  Ockham  as  far  as  distinguishing  among  these  four  questions, 
however,  we  might  be  further  perplexed  by  the  fact  that  he  does  not  distinguish 
between  “certainty”  and  “infallibility”  of  knowledge  (notice  above  that  these  two 
properties  are  lumped  together  as  a  single  question).   Is  it  not  conceivable  that 
certain  knowledge  may  not  imply  infallible  knowledge,  or  vice-versa  —  at  least  to 
someone  who  is  so  keen  to  push  a  distinction  between,  say,  immutability  and 
necessity ,  for  instance?   “Certainty”  seems  to  imply  a  kind  of  secure  awareness  of 
one’s  own  knowledge  that  “infallibility”  need  not  imply.   A  certain  person  not  only 
knows  something,  but  knows  that  she  knows  it!   We  could  imagine,  for  instance,  that 
someone  has  the  power  of  always  knowing  things  aright,  but  is  not  secure  in  the 
knowledge  of  that  knowledge.   Such  a  person  might  be  said  to  be  infallible,  but  not 
certain:  she  knows  all  things  aright,  but  does  not  know  that  she  knows  them  aright. 
It  may  perhaps  be  the  case,  though  it  is  doubtful,  that  certainty  of  any  particular 
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object  of  knowledge  may  imply  infallibility  of  that  knowledge.   But  regardless, 
Ockham,  in  any  case,  does  not  seem  interested  in  this  distinction,  and  perhaps  Latin 
does  not  carry  the  connotation  of  second-order  knowledge  in  the  word  “certain”  that 
the  English  does.   Granting,  then,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  Ockham’s  division  of  the 
question,  we  come  to  his  replies. 
 
Q.  II  art.  i:  Is  God’s  foreknowledge  determinate? 
Concerning  the  determinacy  of  God’s  foreknowledge  of  contingent 
propositions,  Ockham  affirms  this  position.   In  other  words,  Ockham  affirms  that 
there  is  some  sense  in  which  God’s  knowledge  may  be  said  to  be  determinately  true, 
rather  than  than  occupying  some  indeterminate  middle-ground  between  truth  and 
falsity.   Ockham  contradicts  Aristotle,  however,  when  he  goes  a  step  further  to  claim 
that  even  the  contingent  propositions  themselves  are  determinate.   At  the  heart  of 
the  controversy  is  a  recasting  of  the  nature  of  determinacy.   Marilyn  McCord  Adams 
has  characterized  the  distinction  between  Aristotle’s  and  Ockham’s  conceptions  of 
determinacy  in  the  following  way.   Aristotle  would  describe  determinacy  of  a 
proposition  like  this: 
D1  -  The  proposition  “ x  is  (or  was ,  or  will  be )  A  at  t m ”  is  determinately  true  [or 
false ]  at  t n ,  if  and  only  if  there  is  no  potency  in  things  at  t n   for  x ’s  not  being  (or 
having  been ,  or  being  going  to  be )  [or  for  x’s  being  ( or  having  been,  or  being 
going  to  be)]  A  at  t m .  
75
 
75  This  definition   and  those  that  follow  are  based  on  Adams’  characterization  in  her  introduction  to  PPD, 
pp.  6ff.   For  the  sake  of  streamlining   my  own  presentation,  I  am  condensing  her  characterization  of 
determinate  truth  and  determinate  falsehood   into  one,  which,  while  adding  to  the  number  and 
complexity  of  nested  brackets,  I  hope  results  in  no  substantial  loss  of  clarity.   I  am  also  glossing  over  the 
distinction   Adams  makes  between  an  event  being  determinate,  and  a  proposition   about  that  event  being 
determinately  true  or  false.   It  seems  to  me  that  this  distinction  is  hardly  necessary,  since  it  is  clear  that 
a  proposition   concerning   an  event  is  determinately  true  if  and  only  if  the  event  it  concerns   is 
determinate  (and  similarly,  a  proposition   is  determinately  false  iff  the  “non-event”  it  concerns   is 
determinate). 
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In  other  words,  a  proposition  about  a  state  of  affairs  —  past,  present,  or  future  —  is 
determinately  true  (or  determinately  false)  at  a  particular  time  (now,  for  instance),  if 
and  only  if  there  is  no  power  at  that  particular  time  for  the  state  of  affairs  to  turn  out 
otherwise. 
On  Aristotle’s  understanding  of  determinacy,  a  past  event  (like,  say,  the 
German  invasion  of  Poland  in  1939)  is  determinate  now ,  because  there  is  no  power 
in  things  now  for  things  to  have  turned  out  otherwise  then .   There  is  no  way  now  for 
that  past  state  of  affairs  to  be  reversed  —  Germany  cannot  now  undo  its  1939 
invasion  of  Poland.   What’s  done  is  done.   It  is  because  of  the  lack  of  any  power  in  the 
present  moment  to  undo  things  that  happened  in  the  past  that  Aristotle  considered 
all  past  events  to  be  determinate. 
But  if  we  consider  future  events  from  this  Aristotelian  framework,  and  in 
particular,  future  contingent  events,  we  reach  quite  a  different  conclusion.   For  we 
consider  events  in  the  future  to  be  contingent  precisely  because  of  the  potential  (or 
potency,  or  power)  for  them  to  happen  or  not  to  happen.   Whether  the  flag  will  be 
raised  on  Parliament  Hill  tomorrow  morning  is  a  future  contingent  event,  and  at  this 
point  in  time,  there  is  the  potential  for  it  to  either  happen  or  not  happen.   For  this 
reason,  on  Aristotle’s  account,  tomorrow’s  flag-raising  is  not  determinate  right  now: 
there  is  currently  the  “potency  in  things”  for  the  flag  to  be  raised  or  not.   Tomorrow 
at  noon,  however  (presuming  the  flag  is,  in  fact,  raised  in  the  morning),  tomorrow 
morning’s  flag-raising  will  no  longer  be  indeterminate,  because  there  will  no  longer 
be  any  “potency  in  things”  for  tomorrow  morning’s  flag-raising  not  to  have 
happened.   This  event  will  have  become  determinate.   This  illustrates  the  way  in 
which  the  determinacy  of  an  event  may  be  time-sensitive:  at  certain  points  in  time, 
an  event  may  be  indeterminate,  and  at  others,  determinate.   In  particular,  a 
contingent  event  at  a  time  t n   will  be  indeterminate  at  any  point  in  time  prior  to  t n , 
but  then  determinate  at  any  point  after  t n .  
76
76  Whether   or  not,  on  the  Aristotelian  understanding,  an  event  occurring  at  t n   is  determinate  at  t n   is  a 
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Ockham,  in  marked  contrast  with  Aristotle,  would  seem  to  want  to 
characterize  contingency  in  this  way: 
D2  -  The  proposition  “ x  is  (or  was ,  or  will  be )  A  at  t m ”  is  determinately  true  [or 
false ]  at  t n ,  if  and  only  if  there  is  no  potency  in  things  at  some  time  for  x ’s  not 
being  (or  having  been ,  or  being  going  to  be )  [or  for  x’s  being  (or  having  been, 
or  being  going  to  be)]  A  at  t m .  
77
 
Notice  now  that  the  determinacy  of  an  event  at  a  particular  point  in  time  no  longer 
depends  on  the  point  in  time  at  which  the  question  is  being  considered.   For  an  event 
to  be  determinate  at  a  particular  point  in  time,  it  is  enough  for  there  to  be  some 
point  in  time  —  any  point  in  time,  past,  present,  or  future!  —  in  which  there  is  no 
potency  in  things  for  the  event  to  turn  out  otherwise. 
So  Ockham,  like  Aristotle,  would  consider  all  past  events  to  be  determinate, 
since  there  is  some  point  in  time  (namely,  now!)  at  which  there  is  no  potency  for 
those  events  to  turn  out  otherwise  (Germany  cannot  un-invade  Poland  in  1939,  and 
thus  this  event  is  determinate).   But  Ockham’s  conception  of  determinacy  leads  to  a 
radically  different  understanding  from  Aristotle’s  as  to  the  determinacy  status  of 
future  events.    By  tomorrow  at  noon  on  Parliament  Hill,  there  will  be  no  longer  be 78
any  “potency  in  things”  for  the  morning’s  flag-raising  not  to  have  happened 
(assuming,  of  course,  that  it  goes  ahead  as  usual).   In  virtue  of  this  lack  of  potency 
tomorrow  at  noon  for  it  to  happen  otherwise,  we  now  say  that  tomorrow  morning’s 
slightly  more  complicated  question,   but  is  usually  answered  in  the  affirmative  (since,  for  instance, 
Aristotle  assumes   the  principle   of  the  “necessity   of  the  present”).   Simo  Knuuttila  has  argued  that  a 
revolutionary   aspect  of  Duns  Scotus’   philosophy  is  the  denial  of  this  statement  (see  1.3  for  a  more 
detailed   discussion). 
77  Modified   from  Adams,  p.  10.   Once  again,  I  have  collapsed  the  definitions  of  determinate  truth  and 
determinate  falsity,  and  ignored  the  distinction   between  determinate  events  and  determinate  truth  or 
falsity  of  propositions   concerning   those  events. 
78  Ockham   and  Aristotle  agree  that  present  events  are  determinate,  but  as  we  see  from  their  differing 
understandings  of  determinacy,  their  reasons  for  holding  this  to  be  the  case  differs.   If  Adams  is  correct 
in  her  characterization,   for  Aristotle,  the  determinacy  of  present  events  is  because  of  the  lack  of  potency 
now  for  things  to  turn  out  otherwise   than  they  are  now  turning   out;  for  Ockham,   it  is  because   of  the  lack 
of  potency  at  some  time  (perhaps  a  future  time)  for  things  to  turn  out  otherwise  than  they  are  now 
turning   out. 
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flag-raising  will  happen  determinately.   It  is  enough  for  an  event  to  be  determinate  at 
some  time  (even  if  that  time  is  future)  for  it  to  be  determinate  at  all  times.   And 
here’s  the  rub:  anything  that  has  happened,  or  is  happening,  or  will  happen,  has 
happened,  or  is  happening,  or  will  happen  determinately .   In  other  words,  everything 
happens  determinately . 
There  are  two  aspects  of  this  conclusion  to  examine  and  clarify,  both  of  which 
are  highly  relevant  to  Ockham’s  discussion  and  Bradwardine’s  subsequent 
criticisms:  first,  what  does  this  entail  about  the  epistemological  status  of 
propositions  concerning  events?  and  second,  what  does  this  entail  about  the 
necessity  or  contingency  of  events?   To  the  first,  it  is  obvious  that,  though  all  events 
(and  hence  propositions  concerning  them)  may  be  determinate,  it  does  not  follow 
that  we  can  know  anything  about  them.   Indeed,  if  Ockham  is  right,  then  there  are 
vast  swathes  of  determinate  facts  (namely,  all  those  contingent  things   that  have  yet 79
to  happen)  about  which  we  can  have  absolutely  no  knowledge  whatsoever.   But  God, 
of  course,  is  in  an  entirely  different  epistemological  position  than  we  are.   God’s 
knowledge  is  not  limited  by  whether  something  happens  to  have  already  occurred 
or  not.   It  is  in  this  sense  that  Christians  have  spoken  not  only  of  God’s  omni science 
—  God’s  knowledge  of  all  things  —  but  have  included  in  that  omniscience  God’s 
pre science,  God’s  knowledge  of  future  things.   It  should  be  clear,  now,  that  if  Ockham 
has  no  trouble  calling  future  contingent  events  “determinate,”  then  he  will  have  no 
trouble  calling  God’s  knowledge  of  those  events  “determinate,”  either.   Indeed,  the 
only  reason  why  anyone  might  hesitate  to  call  God’s  knowledge  determinate  is  the 
misgiving  that  that  may  make  the  objects  of  God’s  knowledge  determinate,  also  (this 
is  precisely  the  thrust  of  the  objections  with  which  Ockham  begins  the  section).   But 
if  one  is  perfectly  willing  to  grant  the  determinacy  of  events,  then  there  is  no  longer 
any  cause  for  hesitation  about  the  determinacy  of  God’s  knowledge  of  them.   In  fact, 
79  You  may  be  wondering   at  this  point  whether  I  am  still  justified  in  referring  to  “contingent  things”  at 
all:  Can  something   which  is  determinate  be,  properly  speaking,  also  contingent?   As  I  will  show  in  a 
moment,  Ockham   is  adamant   that  it  can. 
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Ockham  would  object  to  the  very  characterization  of  the  issue  as  one  of  God’s 
determinate  knowledge  “making”  events  determinate;  rather,  events  just  are 
determinate,  in  themselves,  independently  of  God’s  knowledge  of  them.   This,  then, 
is  his  response  to  the  first  part  of  Q.  II. 
But  as  for  the  second  issue  —  What  does  this  entail  about  the  contingency  or 
necessity  of  events?  —  Ockham  is  keen  to  distinguish  between  determinacy  and 
necessity.   On  Ockham’s  account,  the  determinacy  of  an  event  does  not  imply  its 
necessity,  though  the  necessity  of  an  event  does  imply  its  determinacy.   We  will 
examine  this  distinction  more  deeply  shortly,  when  we  come  to  considering  what 
Ockham  means  by  necessity  that  makes  it  distinct  from  determinacy;  but  for  now,  it 
suffices  to  say  that  the  determinacy  of  a  future  contingent  event  does  not  in  any  way 
affect  its  contingency.   The  raising  of  the  flag  tomorrow  morning  on  Parliament  Hill, 
though  determinate  and  known  by  God  determinately,  is  yet  contingent:  it  could 
have  been  otherwise;  God’s  knowledge  could  have  been  otherwise;  the  determinate 
truths  associated  with  this  event  could  have  been  otherwise.   But  the  phrasing  of  this 
should  raise  our  eyebrows  a  bit:  when  we  say  that  a  future  event  is  contingent,  do 
we  mean  to  say  that  it  could  have  been  otherwise,   or  that  it  could  be  otherwise? 
This  issue  will  be  key  to  our  discussion  and  subsequent  objections,  but  for  now,  let’s 
set  it  aside. 
 
Q.  II  art.  ii:  Is  God’s  foreknowledge  certain  and  infallible? 
Ockham  maintains  that  God’s  foreknowledge  is  certain  and  infallible.   Both  of 
the  objections  Ockham  presents  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  article  rest  on  rather 
obvious  fallacies  of  modal  logic.   Since  they  are  so  similar  in  form,  I  will  just  briefly 
discuss  the  second  objection  and  Ockham’s  reply.   The  objection  runs  as  follows: 
If  God  cognized  that  I  would  sit  down  tomorrow,  and  it  is  possible  that  I  shall 
not  sit  down  tomorrow,  suppose  that  in  fact  I  shall  not  sit  down  tomorrow. 
Then  it  follows  that  God  is  deceived.   Since  what  is  impossible  does  not  follow 
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from  the  positing  in  fact  of  what  is  possible,  “God  is  deceived”  is  not 
impossible.  (PPD  QII,  art.  ii  C,  p  56) 
 
[S]i  Deus  novit  me  sessurum  cras,  et  possum  non  sedere  cras,  —  ponatur  in 
esse  ‘non  sedebo  cras’  —,  sequitur  tunc  quod  Deus  decipitur,  quia  ex 
positione  possibilis  in  esse  non  sequitur  impossibile;  igitur  haec  ‘Deus 
decipitur’  non  est  impossibilis.   (OP  II,  p.  522  lines  52  -  55) 
 
This  argument,  like  the  others,  rests  upon  a  fallacy  of  modal  inference.   The  objector 
is  correct  in  general  to  state  that  “what  is  impossible  does  not  follow  from  the 
positing  in  fact  of  what  is  possible”;  however,  if  two  or  more  of  the  premises  of  the 
argument  are  contradictory,  or  “incompossible,”  then  of  course  any  conclusion  may 
follow.    As  Ockham  explains  (PPD  Q.  II  art.  ii  D),  the  difficulty  is  that  the  first  premise 
(“God  cognizes  that  I  will  sit  down  tomorrow”)  and  the  third  premise  (“I  will  not  sit 
down  tomorrow”)  are  “incompossible,”  or  contradictory. 
The  objector  may  protest  that  the  third  premise  must  be  permitted,  since  the 
second  premise  (“It  is  possible  that  I  will  not  sit  down  tomorrow”)  would  seem  to 
require  the  ability  to  posit  it.   Indeed,  there  does  intuitively  seem  to  be  some  sense  in 
which  granting  the  possibility  of  an  event  seems  to  require  the  ability  to  grant  the 
related  assertoric  proposition.   If  it  is  possible  that  it  might  rain  this  afternoon,  then 
it  seems  we  ought  to  be  able  to  suppose  that  it  will  rain.   Such  a  supposition  is  all  well 
and  good,  except  when  other  assertoric  premises  are  involved  that  claim  some  sort 
of  insight  into  future  states.   These  include  straightforward  statements  about  future 
states  (“It  will  not  rain  this  afternoon”),  statements  that  imply  future  states  (“Peter  is 
predestinate”  —  i.e.,  Peter  will  receive  eternal  blessedness),   and  statements  about 80
God’s  foreknowledge.   The  reason  these  sorts  of  statements  pose  a  problem  for  the 
arguments  we  are  discussing  is  that  they  have  the  potential  to  contradict  assertoric 
80  Concerning   this  category  of  statements,   more  will  be  said  in  short  order  (2.2.3). 
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suppositions  based  on  statements  of  the  possibility  of  something  or  other. 
Let’s  consider  this  situation  in  a  slightly  different  way  (as  with  most  things 
logical,  there  are  many  ways  to  skin  this  cat,  and  some  ways  may  make  more  sense 
to  one  person  than  another).   The  premises  of  the  objector’s  argument  are  as 
follows: 
P1  -  God  foreknows  that  I  will  sit  tomorrow. 
P2  -  It  is  possible  that  I  will  not  sit  tomorrow. 
So  suppose 
P3  -  I  will  not  sit  tomorrow. 
The  justification  for  allowing  this  third  premise  is  that  it  is  compatible  with  the 
second.   And  indeed,  there  is  a  certain  sort  of  necessary  relationship  between  the 
two,  which  is  perhaps  why  our  intuition  might  tend  to  deceive  us  as  to  the 
permissibility  of  the  supposition.   But  as  Ockham  implicitly  points  out,  it  is  not  the 
case  that  P3  necessarily  follows  from  P2,  but  rather,  P2  from  P3  (i.e.,  P3    P2).   And 
though  P1  and  P2  may  be  compatible,  and  though  P2  and  P3  are  also  compatible,  P1 
and  P3  are  not.   And  just  because  P3    P2,  this  does  not  mean  that  something 
compatible  with  P2  can  be  posited  alongside  P3  (“For  an  antecedent  can  be 
inconsistent  with  something  with  which  its  consequent  is  not  inconsistent” ).   To 81
posit  P3  together  with  P1  and  P2  is  just  as  ridiculous  as  positing  “Socrates  is 
standing”  alongside  “Socrates  is  sitting”  and  “Socrates  could  stand,”  as  though 
“Socrates  is  standing”  and  “Socrates  is  sitting”  could  happen  simultaneously.  82
Returning  to  an  earlier  issue,  recall  that  (see  the  beginning  of  2.1.2)  Ockham 
has  in  this  section  conflated  two  properties  that  should  perhaps  be  considered 
separately,  namely,  the  certainty  and  infallibility  of  God’s  knowledge.   It  is  perhaps 
81  PPD  Q.  II  art.  ii  D,  p.  58. 
82  Ibid. 
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the  case  that  certainty  of  (all)  knowledge  would  imply  infallibility,  but  the  converse 
does  not  necessarily  hold.   All  of  the  objections  which  Ockham  considers  in  this 
section  seem  primarily  to  address  the  infallibility  of  God’s  knowledge  (establishing 
that  God  cannot  be  deceived),  and  not  God’s  certainty  (whether  God  knows  that  God 
knows).   Perhaps,  however,  if  we  maintain  that  God  has  infallible  knowledge  of  all 
things  that  can  be  known,  this  includes  knowledge  of   the  state  of  God’s  own 
knowledge  —  and  hence,  God  must  know  that  God  knows  (infallibly),  and  thus  know 
all  things  with  certainty. 
 
Q.  II  art.  iii:  Is  God’s  foreknowledge  immutable? 
Ockham  spends  considerable  time  addressing  the  question  of  the 
immutability  of  God’s  knowledge,  and  this  is  of  particular  relevance  for  our 
discussion  because,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  following  chapter,  it  is  one  of 
Bradwardine’s  chief  criticisms  of  Ockham  that  his  account  fails  to  account  for  the 
immutability  of  God’s  knowledge  in  particular,  and  hence  undermines  God’s 
immutability  in  general.   In  this  article,  the  objection/reply  structure  breaks  down 
somewhat:  rather  than  cataloguing  the  objections  at  the  opening  of  the  section,  and 
then  replying  to  each  of  them  (as  he  has  done  up  to  this  point),  the  article  begins 
with  three  objections  followed  by  three  replies,  and  then  four  more  objections  are 
raised  one  at  a  time,  with  Ockham’s  reply  directly  following  each  one.  83
Broadly  speaking,  the  objections  in  this  section  are  of  two  sorts.   The  first 
sort  concerns  the  content  of  God’s  knowledge  (what  it  is  that  God  knows),  and  the 
second  sort  concerns  the  amount  of  God’s  knowledge  (how  much  God  knows,  or 
whether  the  sum  total  of  God’s  knowledge  could  ever  increase  or  decrease).   Even 
though  Ockham  addresses  these  questions  the  other  way  round,  I  will  begin  by 
83  I  will  follow  Adams’  and  Kretzmann’s  convention  of  dividing  this  section  into  five  “parts”  —  one  part 
for  the  first  three  objections,   and  then  four  more  separate  parts  for  each  of  objections  four,  five,  six,  and 
seven. 
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discussing  Ockham’s  responses  to  objections  of  the  second  sort,  because  the 
responses  to  these  objections  lead  naturally  into  objections  of  the  first  sort. 
Several  of  the  objections  posed  (most  obviously  that  of  part  3)  relate  not  so 
much  to  the  content  of  God’s  knowledge,  but  the  sheer  amount .   Recall  the  discussion 
of  2.1  about  Ockham’s  nominalism  as  it  relates  to  the  truth-value  of  propositions 
over  time.   On  Ockham’s  view,  if  states  in  the  world  change,  then  the  truth-value  of 
propositions  concerning  those  states  also  changes.   When  a  proposition  becomes 
true  (in  the  way,  for  instance,  that  the  proposition  “Sarah  Rossiter  is,  at  this  moment, 
standing”  becomes  true  in  the  moment  when  I  rise  to  my  feet),  it  would  seem  that 
God  acquires  knowledge  in  that  moment,  which  has  the  net  effect  of  increasing   the 
amount  of  knowledge  that  God  has.   Conversely,  when  a  proposition  becomes  false 
(as  “Sarah  Rossiter  is,  at  this  moment,  standing”  does  in  the  moment  that  I  sit  back 
down),  God  seems  to  lose  knowledge,  decreasing  the  sum  total  of  God’s  knowledge. 
In  either  of  these  cases,  this  seems  to  constitute  a  measurable  change  in  God’s 
knowledge,  undermining  God’s  immutability. 
Ockham  replies  to  these  objections  in  a  way  that  I  will  illustrate  by  imagining 
every  proposition  about  every  possible  state  of  the  universe  being  like  a  switch  on  a 
switchboard  (the  switchboard  is,  of  course,  my  own  image,  but  I  think  it  faithfully 
conveys  Ockham’s  idea).   At  any  given  moment,  each  switch  is  either  on  (true)  or  off 
(false).   But  each  individual  switch  is  related  to  a  unique  second  switch  representing 
its  contradictory  statement  (i.e.,  its  negation),  such  that  whenever  one  switch  is 
turned  off,  its  contradictory  switch  is  simultaneously  turned  on.   So,  for  example, 
when  I  am  standing,  the  “Sarah  Rossiter  is  now  standing”  switch  is  turned  on,  but 
the  “Sarah  Rossiter  is  not  now  standing”  switch  is  off.   When  I  take  a  seat,  the 
position  of  those  two  switches  reverses.   Because  every  proposition  is  paired  with  its 
contradictory  in  this  way,  it  is  always  the  case  that  precisely  the  same  number  of 
switches  is  turned  on,  because  the  moment  any  single  switch  is  turned  on,  another  is 
turned  off,  and  vice-versa.   God’s  knowledge,  because  it  ranges  over  everything  that 
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can  be  known,   can  be  viewed  as  containing  every  proposition  on  this  universal 84
switchboard  that  is  marked  “on.”   In  other  words,  God’s  knowledge  contains  every 
possible  true  proposition  about  the  state  of  the  universe,  past,  present,  and  future. 
Ockham’s  point  is  that,  the  moment  a  proposition  ceases  to  be  true  (and  so  is 
deleted  from  God’s  knowledge),  it  is  replaced  by  its  contradictory;  likewise, 
whenever  a  proposition  becomes  true  (and  is  added  to  God’s  knowledge),  its 
contradictory  becomes  false  and  is  removed.   In  this  way,  the  amount  of  knowledge 
contained  in  God’s  intellect,  assuming  equal  weight  of  individual  propositions, 
remains  stable. 
All  of  this  addresses  one  aspect  of  mutability,  namely,  that  sort  of  change  that 
manifests  itself  in  an  increase  or  decrease  of  size.   Ockham  maintains  that  God’s 
knowledge  is  immutable  in  that  respect.   But  this  does  not  address  what  is  perhaps 
the  more  pressing  question  of  mutability,  which  pertains,  not  to  the  amount ,  but  to 
the  content  of  God’s  knowledge.   Things  change  not  only  by  becoming  larger  or 
smaller,  but  by  becoming  altogether  different.   Ockham’s  answer  to  this  aspect  of  the 
question  is  not  straightforward,  and,  in  my  estimation,  not  altogether  clear  (PPD  Q.  II 
84  This  assumption,   that  God  knows  everything   that  can  be  known,  is  something   that,  for  the  moment,  I 
will  take  for  granted.   In  our  present  discussion,  it  is  assumed  that  what  can  be  known  (by  God,  at  least) 
includes   all  actual  states  of  the  World,  past,  present,  and  future.   Some  contemporary  theologians  and 
philosophers   (Richard  Swinburne   is  a  prominent  philosopher  who  springs  immediately  to  mind;  in  the 
realm  of  popular   theology,  I  think  also  of  Rabbi  Harold  Kushner,  author  of  When  Bad  Things  Happen   to 
Good  People )  have  questioned   this  assumption,   and  in  particular,  the  assumption  that  future  states  can 
be  known  at  all,  even  by  God.   In  this  way,  it  is  claimed  that  the  problem  of  future  contingents  in  relation 
to  God’s  knowledge  is  resolved:  the  problem  only  arises  when  future  contingents  are  considered  relative 
to  God’s  fore knowledge,  and  the  claim  is  that  such  knowledge  simply  doesn’t  exist.   It  is,  furthermore, 
claimed   that  the  omniscience   of  God  may  be  preserved,  since  God  may  still  be  held  to  know  everything 
that  can  be  known.   What  can  be  known,  however,  does  not  include   future  states.   If  one  were  to  insist 
that  God’s  omniscience   ought  to  imply  knowledge  of  every thing,  whether  it  has  already  happened   or  not, 
the  foreknowledge-denier   would  reply  that  that  is  setting  the  bar  unreasonably  high:  if  future 
contingent   states  are  just  such  that  they  cannot  be  known,  then  why  would  we  seek  to  attribute 
knowledge  of  them  to  God?   God,  like  God’s  creatures,  can  only  sit  back  and  wait  to  see  how  the  story  of 
the  World  will  unfold.   In  my  estimation,   this  makes  nonsense  of  any  claim  to  faith  in  God’s  promises, 
including   the  uniquely  Christian   claim  that  through  Christ’s  resurrection,  all  of  creation  is  being 
redeemed   to  its  ultimate  state  of  perfect  peace.   If  we  refuse  to  grant,  at  least  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that  God  possesses   foreknowledge,  then  we  find  ourselves  in  the  purposeless,  clockwork  universe  of  the 
Deist.   This  would  undermine   central  assumptions  of  medieval  Christian  philosophers  like  Ockham  and 
Bradwardine,  and  put  our  conversation   with  such  philosophers  to  an  end. 
 
 
 
 
72 
art.  iii,  pt  1).   But  let  us  see  if  we  can  make  some  sense  of  it  nonetheless. 
It  may  help  to  begin  by  distinguishing  further  between  two  ways  in  which  the 
content  of  knowledge  may  be  said  to  change.   On  the  one  hand,  knowledge  may  be 
said  to  change  if  the  knower  comes  to  have  knowledge  that  she  did  not  previously 
have,  as  when  I  learned  the  other  day  that  the  word  sepia  comes  from  the  Greek 
word  for  cuttlefish,  σηπία  (cuttlefish  were  the  Greco-Roman  source  of  the 
reddish-brown  ink).   This  sort  of  change  in  the  content  of  knowledge  is  independent 
of  facts  in  the  world.   The  fact  of  the  etymological  history  of  “sepia”  has  been  around 
since  the  beginning  of  its  use  in  the  English  language,  even  though  I  only  began  to 
have  knowledge  of  it  recently.   This  sort  of  change  in  knowledge  represents  a  change 
in  me,  since  prior  to  my  coming  to  have  this  knowledge,  I  was  in  ignorance  of  this 
etymological  fact,  while  afterward,  I  was  no  longer  in  ignorance.   This  sort  of  change 
in  knowledge  is  impossible  for  God,  however,  since  God  possesses  knowledge  of  all 
knowable  things.   God  cannot  learn  something  that  has  been  a  fact  for  some  time, 
since  in  virtue  of  its  being  a  fact,  God  already  knows  it.   So  God’s  knowledge  cannot 
be  said  to  change  in  this  way. 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  knowledge  may  be  said  to  change  if  states  in  the 
world  change  such  that  a  proposition  that  was  at  one  time  false  becomes  true,  or 
vice-versa.   For  instance,  suppose  on  24  December  the  proposition  “The  queen  will 
give  her  annual  Christmas  address  tomorrow”  is  true  (such  that  the  queen  does,  in 
fact,  give  her  Christmas  address  the  next  day).   Then  two  days  later,  the  same 
proposition  is  no  longer  true,  for  it  is  no  longer  the  case  that  the  queen  will  give  her 
address  tomorrow ,  but  rather,  that  she  did  give  her  address  yesterday .   For  a  Being 
who  infallibly  knows  all  true  propositions,  this  seems  to  imply  knowledge  of  the 
proposition  “The  queen  will  give  her  annual  Christmas  address  tomorrow”  on  24 
December,  and  an  absence  of  that  knowledge  (or  knowledge  of  its  contradictory)  on 
26  December.   Does  this  change  in  the  content  of  knowledge  constitute  a  change  in 
the  knower?   About  such  propositions  and  their  associated  change,  Ockham  says, 
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I  maintain  that  just  as  such  propositions  can  change  from  truth  to  falsity  and 
vice  versa,  so  God  can  at  one  time  know  such  a  proposition  and  at  another 
time  not,  and  know  one  after  He  did  not  know  it,  and  not  know  after  He  did 
know,  and  know  a  proposition  that  He  did  not  know  earlier,  without  any 
change  in  Him  as  a  result  of  a  mere  change  in  the  creature  or  in  known 
propositions  of  this  sort  .  .  .  because  our  intellect  can  [do  this]  without  any 
change  in  it.   (PPD  Q.  II,  art.  iii,  part  1  F) 
 
[D]ico  quod  sicut  tales  possunt  mutari  de  veritate  in  falsitatem  et  e  converso, 
ita  potest  Deus  tales  aliquando  scire  et  aliquando  non,  et  scire  aliquam 
propositionem  quam  prius  non  scivit,  sine  omni  mutatione  sui,  propter  solam 
mutationem  in  creatura  vel  in  propositionibus  talibus  scitis  .  .  .  quia  hoc 
potest  intellectus  noster  sine  omni  mutatione  sui.   (OP  II  p.  524  l.  121  -  p.  523 
l.  1) 
 
Ockham  appeals  by  analogy  to  the  function  of  our  own  cognitive  capacities.   When 
facts  in  the  world  change  such  that  propositions  which  were  formerly  true  are  no 
longer  true,  our  knowledge  about  such  facts  change  —  or  at  least  ought  to  change.   If 
we  were  to  persist  in  believing,  on  26  December,  that  the  queen  would  give  her 
Christmas  address  tomorrow,  this  would  represent  a  deficiency  in  our  cognitive 
capacities.   A  change  in  the  content  of  our  knowledge,  under  such  circumstances, 
indicates  that  our  cognitive  faculties  are  in  fact  functioning  well.   Likewise,  if  the 
content  of  God’s  knowledge  was  immutable  in  the  sense  that  it  failed  to  change  to 
correspond  with  the  changing  states  of  the  universe,  this  sort  of  immutability  would 
not  be  a  perfection  in  God’s  nature,  but  a  defect. 
But  what  does  Ockham  mean  by  this  change  in  the  content  of  our  knowledge 
occurring  “without  any  change  in  [our  intellect]”?   Perhaps  he  means  that  what  is 
characteristic  of  our  intellect  is  not  so  much  what  we  know,  but  whether  or  not  our 
knowledge  is  accurate.   If  we  go  from  being  right  to  being  wrong ,  then  our  intellect 
has  undergone  substantive  change.   But  if  the  content  of  our  knowledge  changes  to 
 
 
 
 
74 
correspond  with  changing  states  in  the  world,  then  our  knowledge  remains  correct 
(i.e.,  our  knowledge  remains  knowledge,  as  opposed  to  becoming  false  opinion),  and 
in  this  sense  our  intellect  remains  substantively  the  same.   Whether  this  is  what 
Ockham  has  in  mind,  however,  is  not  entirely  clear,  and  as  Adams  and  Kretzmann 
point  out,  his  own  discussion  and  examples  are  frustratingly  inadequate.  85
Ockham  does  seem  to  give  a  second  sort  of  reply  to  this  question,  which  is 
also  somewhat  sketchy  in  its  presentation,  but  which  nonetheless  also  deserves 
mention,  for  it  will  particularly  affect  our  subsequent  examination  of  propositions 
relating  to  predestination  and  damnation.   The  suggestion  seems  to  be  that  some 
propositions,  at  least,  are  implicitly  keyed  to  correspond  to  a  particular  point  in 
time,  and  that  regardless  of  the  verb  tense  in  which  the  proposition  is  phrased  (past, 
present,  or  future),  it  should  be  implicitly  understood  that  it  is  speaking  of  such  a 
point  in  time.   So  one  way  of  resolving  the  issue  of  the  apparent  change  that  occurs 
between  24  December  and  26  December  with  regard  to  the  queen’s  25  December 
address,  is  to  think  about  the  three  statements,  “The  queen  will  give  her  Christmas 
address  tomorrow”  (uttered  on  24  December),  “The  queen  gives  her  Christmas 
address  today”  (uttered  on  25  December),  and  “The  queen  gave  her  Christmas 
address  yesterday”  (uttered  on  26  December),  as  all  equivalent  to  the  proposition 
“The  queen  gives  her  Christmas  address  on  25  December.”   In  this  way,  when  we 
hear  on  24  December  that  the  queen  will  give  her  Christmas  address  tomorrow, 
what  we  cognize  is  in  fact  equivalent  to  what  we  cognize  when  we  hear  on  26 
December  that  the  queen  gave  her  Christmas  address  yesterday,  namely,  that 
time-independent  assertion  that  the  queen  gives  her  Christmas  address  on  25 
December.   Understood  in  this  way,  it  seems  that  our  intellect  does  not  change 
according  to  states  in  the  world.   Once  again,  however,  this  attempted  reconstruction 
of  Ockham’s  view  cannot  definitively  said  to  be  authentically  “Ockhamist”;  but  in  the 
absence  of  clarity  in  the  source  text,  it  is,  perhaps,  as  good  a  guess  as  any  other  as  to 
85  PPD  p.  60,  fn  80. 
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what  exactly  Ockham  intends  to  say  on  the  matter. 
To  summarize,  Ockham’s  answer  to  the  question  regarding  the  immutability 
of  God’s  knowledge  is  far  from  straightforward.   He  seems  first  to  clear  up  many 
ways  in  which  God’s  knowledge  does  not  change:  God’s  knowledge  does  not  increase 
or  decrease,  and  the  content  of  God’s  knowledge  does  not  change  in  the  sense  of 
learning  about  any  persistent  state  of  the  World.   But  Ockham  does  concede  that 
when  states  in  the  World  change,  God’s  knowledge  of  them  changes  accordingly.   In 
fact,  argues  Ockham,  if  God’s  knowledge  did  not  change  according  to  changing  states 
in  the  world,  this  would  be  a  grave  deficiency  in  God’s  knowledge  (as  it  is  in  our 
own).   Finally,  Ockham  also  introduces  discussion  of  the  complications  that  arise 
with  respect  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  propositions  based  on  the  tense  in  which  they 
are  uttered  (past,  present,  or  future);  the  exact  thrust  of  this  portion  of  his 
argument,  however,  remains  obscure,  and  providing  a  satisfactory  interpretation  is 
inevitably  a  difficult  business  involving  a  fair  bit  of  guesswork. 
 
Q.  II  art.  iv:  Is  God’s  foreknowledge  necessary? 
It  is  in  this  final  article  of  Question  II  that  Ockham’s  responses  become 
particularly  controversial.   Indeed,  it  seems  that  as  the  subsections  of  the  question 
progress,  Ockham’s  position  becomes  increasingly  unorthodox.   In  answer  to  the 
four  questions  posed  —  Is  God’s  foreknowledge  (i)  determinate,  (ii)  certain  and 
infallible,  (iii)  immutable,  and  (iv)  necessary?  —  the  expected  canonical  responses 
are  yes,  yes,  yes,  and  yes!   Ockham’s  responses,  by  contrast,  boil  down  to  something 
more  like  this:  (i)  yes  (though  perhaps  not  for  the  reasons  one  might  think),  (ii)  yes, 
(iii)  mostly  (though  not  to  the  extent  that  it  in  fact  becomes  a  defect  in  God’s 
knowledge),  and  (iv)  no,  with  qualification. 
Ockham’s  response  to  the  fourth  question  begins,  in  good  scholastic  fashion, 
with  a  distinction.   Whether  God’s  knowledge  is  necessary,  argues  Ockham,  depends 
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on  what  exactly  we  mean  by  “necessary  knowledge.”   There  are  two  ways  to 
understand  this: 
[Understood]  in  the  first  way  [it  means]  that  God’s  knowledge  whereby 
future  contingents  are  known  is  necessary.   And  this  is  true,  since  the  divine 
essence  itself  is  one  single  necessary  and  immutable  cognition  of  all  things, 
complexes  as  well  as  non-complexes,  necessary  and  contingent. 
[Understood]  in  the  second  way  [it  means]  that  by  that  knowledge  future 
contingents  are  known  necessarily.   And  in  this  way  [His  knowledge]  is  not 
necessary,  nor  need  it  be  granted  that  God  has  necessary  knowledge 
regarding  future  contingents;  instead,  [His  knowledge  regarding  them]  is 
contingent.  (PPD  Q.  II,  art.  4  L,  p.  67) 
 
.  .  .  uno  modo,  quod  scientia  Dei  qua  sciuntur  futura  contingentia  sit 
necessaria.   Et  hoc  est  verum,  quia  ipsa  essentia  divina  est  unica  cognitio 
necessaria  et  immutabilis  omnium  tam  compexorum  quam  incomplexorum, 
necessariorum  et  contingentium.   Secundo  modo,  quod  per  illam  scientiam 
sciantur  necessario  futura  contingentia.   Et  sic  non  est  necessaria,  nec  debet 
concedi  quod  Deus  habeat  scientiam  necessariam  de  futuris  contingentibus 
sed  potius  contingentem  .  .  .  (OP  II,  p.  529  l.  262  -  p.  530  l.  269) 
 
In  other  words,  if  we  are  speaking  about  God’s  knowledge  as  such,  in  the  way  that  it 
functions,  this  is  necessary.   It  is  necessary,  for  instance,  that  if  a  proposition  is  true, 
then  God  knows  it.   But  in  another  way,  we  might  say  that  the  actual  content  of  God’s 
knowledge  is  necessary.   This,  thinks  Ockham,  is  an  invalid  inference  from  the 
immutability  of  God’s  knowledge,  for  much  of  the  content  of  God’s  knowledge  is  of 
contingent  things,  about  which  no  necessary  knowledge  is  possible.   Instead,  Ockham 
posits,  God’s  knowledge  of  contingent  things  is  itself  contingent. 
But  how,  we  might  wonder,  is  it  possible  to  speak  of  contingent  knowledge  at 
all?   Furthermore,  how  can  Ockham  simultaneously  hold  that  God’s  knowledge  is 
immutable  and  non-necessary?   Further  discussion  of  the  first  question  will  follow 
in  a  later  section  (2.2),  so  for  now,  I  will  primarily  focus  on  trying  to  understand  the 
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second  issue.    How  is  it  that  God’s  knowledge  may  simultaneously  be  said  to  be 
immutable  —  i.e.,  never  changing  —  and  yet  not  necessary? 
It  may  be  helpful  for  thinking  of  God’s  immutable-and-yet-non-necessary 
knowledge  to  consider  by  analogy  something  with  a  high  degree  of  stability,  which 
we  would  yet  not  consider  to  be  necessary.   Consider,  perhaps,  the  Great  Star  of 
Africa  diamond  (Cullinan  I),  which  is  now  set  in  the  Royal  Sceptre  of  the  British 
Crown  Jewels.    If  we  consider  this  stone  from  a  relatively  limited  frame  of  time 86
reference,  then  we  may  be  inclined,  at  least  in  some  senses,  to  consider  the  stone  to 
be  immutable.   Indeed,  nothing  that  I  could  readily  apply  —  not  fire,  nor  a 
sledgehammer,  nor  corrosives,  nor  brute  strength  —  could  in  any  way  measurably  or 
discernibly  alter  the  stone.   Throughout  my  lifetime  (and  that  of  my  mother,  and  of 
my  grandmother),  the  Great  Star  of  Africa  has  remained  perceptibly  unaltered,  and 
is  likely  to  remain  so  for  generations  to  come.   But  though  the  stone  might  therefore 
be  said  to  be,  at  least  in  a  limited  sense,  immutable,  could  it  also  be  said  to  be 
necessary?   Not  at  all,  for  its  existence  and  its  present  state  depend  upon  a  long 
string  of  contingent  events:  that  geological  forces  happened  to  combine  in  just  the 
right  way  to  produce  such  an  enormous  diamond  in  the  first  place;  that  further 
geological  and  meteorological  forces  combined  to  bring  the  stone  to  the  earth’s 
surface;  that  human  society  developed  in  such  a  way  that  diamonds  are  a  highly 
prized  mineral,  and  that  economic  incentives  therefore  compel  people  to  go  to  great 
lengths  to  discover  them;  that  the  stone  was  in  the  particular  river  where  a 
prospector  happened  to  be  panning  for  diamonds;  that  one  particular 
diamond-cutter,  rather  than  others,  was  commissioned  to  divide  and  cut  the  stone, 
and  that  he  happened  to  have  eaten  just  the  right  sort  of  breakfast  to  provide  the 
inspiration  for  the  particular  division  and  cut  that  he  chose;  etc.,  etc.,  etc.   All  of  these 
86  I  suspect   a  much  better  analogy   than  the  one  I  provide  here  could  be  drawn  from  the  physical  or 
chemical   sciences,   in  which  I  am  not  sufficiently  well-versed  to  competently  draw  an  example  for  myself. 
If  the  reader  so  desires,  she  may  think  instead  of  any  phenomenon  which  is  the  case,  which  always  has 
been  the  case,  and  which  always  will  be  the  case,  so  long  as  time  endures  —  but  which  need  not  be  as  it 
is,  and  which  may  just  as  well  have  been  otherwise. 
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contingent  factors  and  more  contributed  to  the  present  state  of  the  Great  Star  of 
Africa  diamond. 
That  the  Great  Star  of  Africa  is  how  it  is  and  not  otherwise  is  therefore  a 
contingent  matter,  despite  its  (relative)  immutability.   In  a  similar  way,  Ockham 
would  have  it  that,  although  God’s  knowledge  is  immutable  (in  a  much  more  robust 
sense  than  the  Cullinan  I  diamond),  God’s  knowledge  might  have  been  otherwise 
than  it  is.   Contingent  factors  (namely,  the  contingent  events  in  the  world)  contribute 
to  God’s  knowledge  being  as  it  is.   Because  many  of  the  things  that  God  knows  could 
be  otherwise  than  they  are,  God’s  knowledge  could  be  otherwise  than  it  is.   What 
this  means  is  that,  though  God’s  knowledge  is  unchangingly  as  it  is  —  i.e.,  immutable 
—  it  is  nevertheless  non-necessary,  at  least  in  the  sense  that  it  could  have  been 
otherwise. 
We  could,  if  we  like,  push  the  analogy  a  little  further  to  illustrate  the  sense  in 
which  God’s  knowledge  is  necessary,  and  thus  understand  the  distinction  Ockham  is 
making  between  the  senses  in  which  God’s  knowledge  is  and  is  not  necessary. 
Though  many  properties  of  the  Cullinan  I  are  contingent  (its  particular  size,  cut, 
setting  in  the  British  Royal  Sceptre,  location  in  the  Tower  of  London,  etc.),  insofar  as 
it  is  a  diamond  of  remarkable  purity,  it  has  also  a  number  of  necessary  properties: 
for  instance,  that  it  is  composed  of  crystallized  carbon,  that  it  has  a  hardness  of  ten 
on  the  Mohs  scale,  that  it  refracts  light  just  as  it  does,  etc.   Indeed,  I  may  look  at  any 
diamond  in  the  world,  including  the  ones  (miniscule  by  comparison)  on  my  own 
finger,  and  assert  the  same  of  them.   Diamond,  qua  diamond,  necessarily  possesses 
these  properties;  these  are  what  make  it  diamond.   Absent  any  of  these  things,  and  it 
would  cease  to  be  the  mineral  that  we  call  diamond.    Similarly,  we  might  say  that 87
87  I  am,  obviously,  glossing   over  the  entire  discussion  in  the  20th-century  literature  about  whether  the 
names  we  apply  to  particular   elements   and  compounds  in  our  world  could  be  meaningfully  applied  to 
substances   in  another   world  which  share  all  perceptible  properties  of  a  substance  in  our  world,  but 
have  a  different  chemical   composition   (I  am  thinking  here  primarily  of  Saul  Kripke’s  important  work, 
Naming   and  Necessity  (Cambridge,   Massachusetts:  Harvard  UP,  1980),  and  the  discussion  it 
engendered).   For  instance,   if  we  came  across  a  substance  in  another  world  that  was  wet,  transparent, 
non-viscous,   odourless,  tasteless,  and  perfect  for  quenching  our  thirst  —  that  is  to  say,  in  all  perceptible 
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God’s  knowledge  is,  by  definition,  the  sort  of  knowledge  that  knows  everything  true. 
So  if  a  proposition  is  true,  it  is  necessarily  the  case  that  God  knows  it.   This  is  a 
necessary  property  of  God’s  knowledge,  and  in  this  sense,  God’s  knowledge  can  be 
said  to  be  necessary.   In  other  words,  there  are  aspects  of  God’s  knowledge  that  are 
necessary  with  respect  to  objects  in  the  world.   Insofar  as  things  in  the  world  are  as 
they  are,  it  is  necessary  for  God  to  know  them.   But  that  does  not  make  God’s 
knowledge  necessary  per  se ,  because  those  events  in  the  world  could  have  been 
otherwise,  and  hence  God’s  knowledge  of  them  could  have  been  otherwise. 
In  this  way,  Ockham  denies  the  necessity  of  God’s  knowledge,  while  affirming 
both  its  immutability  and  its  perfect  consistency  with  the  truth  about  the  world. 
God’s  knowledge  is  non-necessary  precisely  because  events  in  the  world  are 
non-necessary.   Had  things  been  other  than  they  are  (and  the  property  of  something 
to  be  such  that  it  could-have-been-otherwise  is  precisely  what  it  means,  on 
Ockham’s  model,  for  it  to  be  contingent),  then  God’s  knowledge  would 
correspondingly  have  been  otherwise  than  it  is.   So  it  would  be  nonsense,  thinks 
Ockham,  to  assert  that  God’s  knowledge  is  necessary.   Necessity  is  not  a  perfection  of 
knowledge,  because  knowledge  that  was  necessary  could,  on  account  of  its  necessity, 
fail  to  correspond  in  appropriate  ways  to  the  contingent  reality  of  the  world  around 
us.   Ockham  does  not  see  any  inconsistency  at  all  between  the  assertion  that  God  is 
unchanging,  eternal,  and  immutable,  with  the  claim  that  God’s  knowledge  is  not 
necessary,  for  something  can  be  ever-unchanging,  and  yet,  still,  could  have  been 
otherwise. 
We  should  find  this  claim  somewhat  novel  and  surprising  in  a  medieval 
context,  for  it  directly  contradicts  the  long-standing  “Principle  of  Plenitude.”   This  is 
the  notion  that  everything  that  can  happen,  will  indeed  happen  —  given  sufficient 
ways  identical   with  the  substance   we  call  “water”  in  our  world  —  but  happened  not  to  be  H 2 O  (i.e., 
happened   not  to  be  composed   of  molecules   with  that  particular  structure),  could  (or  would)  we  call  this 
substance   water?   Here,  for  the  sake  of  illustrating  my  point,  I  take  for  granted  the  (controversial) 
hypothesis   that  there  is  necessarily  a  strictly  one-to-one  correspondence  between  substances  which 
appear   identical   by  all  physical  measures  we  might  apply,  and  their  chemical  makeup. 
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time.   On  this  view  of  contingency,  a  state  of  affairs  is  contingent  if  at  some  point  in 
time  —  assuming  time  stretches  infinitely  far  forward  —  that  state  of  affairs  is 
realized.   We  have  here  the  nub  of  the  revolution  in  thinking  of  contingencies  largely 
begun  by  Duns  Scotus  (see  again  the  discussion  in  1.3).   Previously  in  the  medieval 
period,  it  had  been  generally  assumed  that  if  a  state  of  affairs  could  never  be 
realized,  even  in  infinite  time,  then  it  is  for  this  reason  an  impossible  state.   And  thus, 
conversely,  its  contradiction  is  necessary.   How  does  this  relate  to  Ockham’s  view  of 
God’s  knowledge?   Well,  suppose  that  some  contingent   event,  like  the  Great  Fire  of 
London,  actually  takes  place.   Then  because  it  took  place,  it  is  true  to  say  that,  for 
instance,  “The  Great  Fire  of  London  destroyed  a  great  part  of  London  in  1666.” 
Because  this  event  actually  happened,  God  necessarily  knows  it.   And  indeed, 
because  God  (presumably)  by  God’s  foreknowledge  knew  that  fire  would  destroy 
large  parts  of  London  in  1666,  God  has  known  this  for  all  eternity.   And  because  it 
will  henceforth  always  be  the  case  that  a  large  part  of  London  was  destroyed  by  fire 
in  1666,  it  will  always  be  the  case  that  God  knows  this.   So  according  to  the  Principle 
of  Plenitude,  it  is  necessary  that  God  knows  that  a  great  fire  destroyed  much  of 
London  in  1666,  since  it  never  has  been  and  never  will  be  otherwise,  even  if  time 
continues  on  infinitely  long.   Because  it  is  never  the  case  that  God  did  not  (or  will 
not)  know  that  there  was  a  Great  Fire  in  London  in  1666,  it  is,  according  to  the 
Principle  of  Plenitude,  impossible  for  God  not  to  know  that  there  is  a  Great  Fire  in 
London  in  1666.   It  therefore  follows  from  this  principle,  not  only  that  God 
necessarily  knows  this  fact  (because  it  is  a  true  fact  about  the  world),  but  that  God’s 
very  knowledge  that  there  was  a  Great  Fire  in  1666  is  in  itself  necessary.   This, 
however,  is  the  very  inference  which  Ockham  denies. 
Simply  because  something  is  never  (or  never  will  be),  in  fact,  the  case, 
Ockham  denies  that  it  follows  that  it  is  impossible  for  that  thing  to  be.   Even  if 
something  never  in  fact  transpires,  even  in  the  whole  history  of  the  world,  Ockham 
maintains  that  it  could  have  been  otherwise,  and  in  this  sense,  that  the  event  may  yet 
be  contingent.   This  is  precisely  the  situation  we’re  dealing  with  with  respect  to 
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God’s  knowledge  of  contingent  events. 
In  sum,  then:  to  the  four  subquestions  of  Q.  II,  Ockham  (1)  affirms  that  God’s 
knowledge  is  determinate,  but  does  so  because  of  his  unconventional  view  that  all 
events  of  the  actual  world  —  past,  present,  and  future  —  are  determinate 
themselves;  (2)  affirms  that  God’s  knowledge  is  certain  and  infallible,  that  is,  that 
God  never  errs;  (3)  affirms  that  God’s  knowledge  is  immutable,  or  is  at  least,  no 
more  mutable  than  knowledge,  rightly-operating,  must  be  in  order  to  appropriately 
track  with  the  changing  circumstances  of  the  world;  and  (4)  denies  that  God’s 
knowledge  is  necessary,  at  least  in  the  sense  that  the  particular  content  of  God’s 
knowledge  is  no  more  necessary  than  the  events  which  are  the  subject  of  that 
knowledge. 
 
2.2.3  -  PPD  Q.  III  -  V 
After  dealing  with  the  questions  of  the  determinacy,  certainty  and  infallibility, 
immutability,  and  necessity  of  God’s  knowledge  in  Q.  II,  Ockham  turns  in  Questions 
III,  IV,  and  V  to  issues  surrounding  the  application  of  these  principles  to  specific 
theological  issues,  and  in  particular,  the  predestination  and  damnation  of  individual 
human  beings. 
The  nub  of  Ockham’s  account  consists  in  positing  that  many  statements 
which  appear,  by  their  present  or  past  tense  constructions,  to  be  about  one 
particular  point  in  time,  are  in  fact  statements  about  quite  another  point  in  time.  88
88  In  the  wake  of  Adams’  rediscovery  of  this  position  of  Ockham’s,  there  has  been  considerable  ink  spilt 
by  contemporary  philosophers   of  religion  debating  the  effectiveness  of  this  view  in  resolving  the 
problem  of  God’s  foreknowledge  and  human   freedom.   Adams  herself  has  at  various  points  defended 
versions   of  Ockham’s  argument,  and  I  have  mentioned  already  Plantinga’s  main  article  on  the  topic,  in 
which  he  (favourably)  presents  his  own  interpretation  of  Ockham’s  understanding  of  tenses;  William 
Lane  Craig  is  another   defender  of  Ockhamist   positions  on  propositional  contingency  and  tense;  see 
Craig,  Divine  Foreknowledge  and  Human   Freedom  (Leiden:   E.J.  Brill,  1990).   Against  these  favourable 
interpretations   of  Ockham’s  position,   however,  have  been  the  criticisms  of  John  Fischer  (“Freedom  and 
Foreknowledge,”  Philosophical   Review,  92  (January  1983),  pp.  67–79),  William  Hasker  ( God,  Time,  and 
Knowledge  (Ithaca:   Cornell   University  Press,  1989)),   and  Linda  Zagzebski  ( The  Dilemma   of  Freedom  and 
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Such  statements  include  those  such  as  “Peter  is  predestinate”  and  “Judas  was 
damned.”   In  the  first  instance,  we  have  a  present-tensed  statement,  which  we 
therefore  assume  to  be  about  a  present  state  of  affairs;  but  Ockham  would  have  it 
that,  since  being  predestinate  is  a  fact  that  is  made  true  or  false  by  a  future  state 
(namely,  receiving,  at  the  last,  either  eternal  blessedness  or  damnation),  this 
sentence  is  in  fact  a  statement  about  the  future.   “Peter  is  predestinate”  may 
therefore  be  considered  as  equivalent  to  the  statement,  “Peter  will  receive  eternal 
blessedness.”   Similarly,  the  second  statement,  “Judas  was  damned,”  despite 
appearing  to  be  a  statement  about  the  past,  is  also  in  fact  about  the  future,  since 
Judas’s  damned  state  then  depends  on  his  receiving,  at  the  last,  the  punishment  of 
eternal  damnation. 
This  discussion  is  confused  in  English  by  the  fact  that  “damned”  may  function 
as  either  an  adjective,  or  a  passive  verb,  or  a  past  participle.   In  the  discussion  above, 
I  intend  by  “Judas  was  damned”  to  indicate  the  Latin  phrase  “ Judas  erat  damnatus .” 
In  Latin,  the  adjective  damnatus  specifically  designates  the  state  of  being  damned  — 
so  a  damnatus  is  a  person  with  the  property  of  being  damned  at  the  last  (in  the  same 
way  that  a  predestinate  is  a  person  with  the  property  of  being  saved  at  the  last).   The 
statement  “Judas  was  damned”  is  ambiguous  in  English,  however,  between  at  least 
three  readings:  (1)  Judas  was  a  person  who  will  be  damned  at  the  last  (the  adjectival 
reading);  (2)  Somebody  (else)  damned  Judas  in  the  past  (passive  reading);  and  (3) 
Judas  was  damned,  but  has  ceased  to  be  so  in  the  time  since  (past  participle 
reading).   In  this  discussion,  (1)  is  the  primary  sense  in  which  the  statement  should 
be  taken,  though  (3)  enters  into  the  discussions  somewhat  (though  when  that 
reading  occurs,  it  will  be  made  quite  clear  by  the  discussion  surrounding  it).   (2)  will 
never  be  the  reading  intended. 
So  Ockham  would  have  it  that  statements  depending  on  a  future  contingent 
outcome  for  their  truth  or  falsity,  even  though  they  may  be  present  or  past  tensed  in 
Foreknowledge  (New  York:  OUP,  1991)),   among  others. 
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grammatical  construction,  should  be  considered  in  the  same  way  as  future 
contingent  statements.   The  apparently  present-tensed  statement  “Peter  is 
predestinate”  is  considered  as  equivalent  to  the  future  contingent  statement  “Peter 
will  receive  eternal  blessedness.”   Similarly,  the  apparently  past-tensed  statement 
“Judas  was  damned”  should  in  fact  be  read  as  equivalent  to  the  future  contingent 
statement  “Judas  will  receive  eternal  damnation.” 
To  use  a  non-theological  example,  we  can  consider  the  way  we  describe 
someone  who  is  expected  to  graduate  as  a  “graduand.”   To  say,  for  instance,  that 
“Theodora  is  a  graduand”  is  to  say  “Theodora  will  graduate”;  just  as  in  the  above 
eschatologically-minded  examples,  this  apparent  present-tense  claim  in  fact  boils 
down  to  a  statement  which  is  future  and  contingent.   One  may  be  inclined  to  object 
that  this  example  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  to  be  a  graduand  implies  that  one 
has  already  done  all  that  is  required  for  the  conferral  of  a  degree,  and  only  awaits 
receiving  the  degree.   I  think  that  this  actually  strengthens  the  analogy,  and 
highlights  a  key  aspect  of  calling  someone  “predestinate”:  everything  required  for 
her  salvation  has  already  been  done  (disanalogously,  though,  what  is  required  has 
been  done  primarily  by  Christ,  rather  than  the  person  herself);  however,  the 
predestinate  is  still  in  a  time  of  waiting  for  ultimate  blessedness,  which  is  the 
ultimate  fulfilment  of  that  salvific  work.   The  predestinate  person  is  living  in  the 
same  sort  of  in-between,  proleptic,   or  what  theologians  sometimes  call  the 89
“already-but-not-yet”  time  that  the  graduand  occupies.   Everything  required  has 
been  accomplished,  but  the  ultimate  conferral  of  the  prize  (be  it  a  degree  or  the 
beatific  vision)  is  yet  to  come. 
But  one  may  be  wondering  at  this  point:  What  is  the  point  of  transforming 
past-  and  present-tensed  statements  into  future-tensed  claims?   The  significance  of 
this  move  is  the  way  it  affects  the  truth  and  modal  status  of  such  statements. 
Because  Ockham  is  working  under  the  Aristotelian  assumption  that  the  past  and  the 
89  Thanks  are  due  to  the  Rev’d  David  Tiessen   for  reminding  me  of  this  word  when  I  was  casting  about  for 
it. 
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present  are  necessary  because  of  their  fixity,  or  inability  to  change,  were  these 
statement  to  in  fact  be  about  the  present  or  the  past,  their  truth  (or  falsity)  would 
imply  their  necessary  truth  (or  falsity).   By  insisting  that  they  are  in  fact  statements 
about  future  contingent  events,  he  is  preserving  the  contingency  of  the  statement, 
because  of  the  indeterminate  status  of  things  which  are  future.  90
Turning,  then,  to  questions  of  God’s  foreknowledge,  Ockham  employs  a 
similar  strategy.   About  any  future  contingent  event  E,  it  may  be  said  that  “God 
foreknows  E”  or  that  “God  foreknew  E.”   The  statement  “God  foreknows  E”  appears 
grammatically  to  be  in  the  present  tense,  and  likewise  “God  foreknew  E”  appears  to 
be  past-tensed.   However,  because  of  the  dependence  of  both  of  these  statements  on 
E  (which  is,  by  assumption,  future  and  contingent),  Ockham  would  have  it  that  these 
statements  are  in  fact  themselves  future  and  contingent  in  some  relevant  sense.   In 
fact,  this  extension  of  future  contingency  goes  beyond  the  mere  statement,  but  to 
God’s  knowledge  itself:  God  now  knows,  presumably,  what  I  will  contingently  choose 
to  eat  for  breakfast  tomorrow.   But  since  the  subject  of  that  knowledge  is  future  and 
contingent,  God’s  knowledge  of  it  is  itself,  in  some  sense,  future  and  contingent. 
In  this  way,  then,  Ockham  provides  an  answer  to  the  question  of  how  God  can 
foreknow  our  actions,  and  yet  our  actions  still  remain  contingent:  God’s 
foreknowledge  does  not  determine  our  future  actions,  since  he  argues  that  our 
future  actions  were  already  determined  in  the  first  place  (and  thus,  for  Ockham, 
determinacy  seems  to  be  beside  the  point);  God’s  foreknowledge  of  our  future 
actions  does  not  make  them  any  less  contingent,  since  he  argues  that  God’s 
foreknowledge  is  itself  contingent;  and  finally,  Ockham  gives  an  indication  of  how  it 
is  that  God’s  foreknowledge  is  contingent,  by  analogy  with  the  implied  future-tense 
of  grammatically  present-tense  statements  such  as  “Peter  is  predestined.”   It  remains 
90  Compare  this  assumption   with  the  position   of  Duns  Scotus,  discussed  in  1.3:  while  affirming  the 
necessity   of  fixity  of  the  past,  Scotus  denies  the  necessity  of  the  present.   Ockham  clearly  does  not  follow 
Scotus  on  this  point,  which  is  perhaps  surprising  given  that  Ockham  follows  in  the  Franciscan 
intellectual   tradition   which  was  at  this  point  heavily  influenced  by  Scotistic  thought. 
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to  be  discussed  whether  Ockham  is  truly  justified  in  simultaneously  maintaining 
that  future  actions  may  be  simultaneously  determinate  and  contingent  —  or 
whether  such  contingency  can  be  truly  called  “freedom”:  but  this  discussion  will 
happen  in  more  depth  in  section  2.3. 
 
2.2.4  -  Ordinatio  I.38 
Before  turning  to  criticisms  of  Ockham’s  position,  I  will  just  briefly  note 
another  work,  earlier  than  PPD,  in  which  Ockham  makes  statements  similar  to  those 
found  in  PPD.   Though  the  discussion  is  much  more  terse,  and  in  ways  much  more 
hesitant,  we  find  already  in  Ockham’s  Ordinatio  commentary  on  the  Sentences  hints 
that  he  was  beginning  to  develop  the  notions  of  Divine  foreknowledge  and 
contingency  that  are  given  a  much  fuller  and  more  confident  treatment  in  PPD.   In 
his  treatment  of  the  38th  distinction  of  Book  I  of  Peter  Lombard’s  Sentences ,  Ockham 
begins  with  a  statement  that  may  make  us  think  he  had  not  yet  developed  his  view 
of  future  contingents  in  relation  to  God’s  foreknowledge  in  any  detail: 
Therefore  I  reply  to  the  question  that  it  has  to  be  held  without  any  doubt  that 
God  knows  all  future  contingent  facts  evidently  and  with  certainty.   But  to 
explain  this  evidently,  and  to  express  the  manner  in  which  He  knows  all 
future  contingent  facts,  is  impossible  for  any  intellect  in  this  life. 
 
Ideo  dico  ad  quaestionem,  quod  indubitanter  est  tenendum,  quod  Deus 
certitudinaliter  et  evidenter  scit  omnia  futura  contingentia.   Sed  hoc 
evidenter  declarare  et  modum  quo  scit  omnia  futura  contingentia  exprimere 
est  impossibile  omni  intellectui  pro  statu  isto.  91
 
Despite  this  rather  unsatisfactory  statement  about  the  way  in  which  God  knows 
91  Philotheus   Boehner,  O.F.M.,  ed.  &  trans.,  Ockham:  Philosophical  Writings  (Edinburgh:  Nelson,   1957),  p. 
133.   This  volume  contains   a  number   of  excerpts  from  across  Ockham’s  philosophical  writing,  organized 
thematically  and  presented  in  Latin-English  parallel  format. 
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future  contingents,  and  despite  Ockham’s  repeated  subsequent  claims  not  to  know 
how  this  is  possible  —  “The  manner  in  which  he  knows  them,  I,  however,  do  not 
know” ;  “this  conclusion  cannot  be  proved  by  any  a  priori  natural  reason  possible  to 92
us”   —  he  nonetheless  goes  on  to  offer  thoughts  about  the  nature  of  God’s 93
knowledge  of  future  contingent  facts: 
But  for  certain  members  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  no 
matter  how  much  God  knows  about  all  future  contingent  facts,  and  as  to 
which  side  of  a  contradiction  will  be  true  and  which  false,  nevertheless  the 
proposition  “God  knows  that  this  side  will  be  true”  is  not  a  necessary  but  a 
contingent  proposition.   This  means  that  no  matter  how  true  the  proposition 
“God  knows  that  this  side  of  the  contradiction  will  be  true”  may  be, 
nevertheless  it  is  possible  that  this  never  was  true. 
 
Verumtamen  pro  aliquibus  artistis  est  sciendum,  quod  quantumcumque  Deus 
sciat  de  omnibus  futuris  contingentibus,  quae  pars  erit  vera  et  quae  falsa, 
tamen  haec  non  necessaria:  “Deus  scit,  quod  haec  pars  erit  vera,”  immo  haec 
est  contingens  in  tantum,  quod  quantumcumque  sit  vera:  “Deus  scit  quod 
haec  pars  contradictionis  erit  vera,”  tamen  possibile  est,  quod  haec  numquam 
fuit  vera.  94
 
Though  Ockham  seems  to  have  added  this  note  near  the  end  to  satisfy  some 
particular  concern  of  his  superiors  (“for  certain  members  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts…”), 
it  clearly  articulates  the  position  that  he  would  come  to  state  much  more  stridently 
and  self-assuredly  in  PPD,  namely,  that  God’s  knowledge  of  contingent  things  is  itself 
contingent.   And  this,  as  we  have  seen,  in  itself  marks  a  decisive  break  with  Anselm, 
Aquinas,  and  other  authorities  on  the  subject,  for  whom  the  necessity  of  God’s 
knowledge  is  doctrine. 
92  Sed  modum   exprimere  nescio .   Ibid. 
93  Ista  conclusio,  quamvis  per  rationem   naturalem  nobis  possibilem   et  a  priori  probari  non  possit…   Ibid., 
p.  134. 
94  Ibid. 
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2.3  -  Problems  with  Ockham’s  model 
I  will  turn  to  Bradwardine’s  objections  to  Ockham  (which  are  different  from 
the  ones  I  raise  below)  in  the  following  chapter.   In  this  section,  though,  I  would  like 
to  consider  first  some  epistemological  questions  (and  potential  problems)  that  are 
raised  by  Ockham’s  apparent  solution  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents  (2.3.1), 
and  then  turn  to  questions  about  the  logical  implications  of  Ockham’s  solution,  and 
in  particular,  the  implications  of  his  redefinition  of  determinacy  (2.3.2).   I  will  then, 
finally,  consider  whether  Ockham’s  model  is  in  fact  compatible  with  the  view  that 
God,  though  timelessly  eternal,  acts  in  the  world  (2.3.3). 
 
2.3.1  -  Epistemological  objections 
Ockham’s  solution  has  hinged  on  the  idea  that  God’s  knowledge  of  contingent 
facts  is  itself  contingent.   In  this  way,  he  avoids  the  dilemma  that  God’s  knowledge  of 
an  event  necessitates  that  event  to  happen,  since  nothing  contingent  necessitates 
anything  at  all  (or  at  least,  does  not  necessitate  it  any  more  strongly  than  relative  to, 
or  conditional  upon,  itself;  see  Boethius’  discussion  of  conditional  necessity,  towards 
the  end  of  1.1.2).   The  first  concern  I  have  with  this  view  is  that  I  am  not  sure  that 
contingent  knowledge  can  really  be  said  to  be  knowledge  at  all,  or  at  least  not 
knowledge  consistent  with  the  dominant  medieval  understanding  of  what 
constitutes  true  knowledge.   It  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  my  current  project  to  give  an 
extensive  account  of  late  medieval  theories  of  knowledge;  however,  I  shall  give  a 
cursory  sketch  just  sufficient  to  suggest  that  its  lack  of  consistency  with  Ockham’s 
position  merits  our  attention,  and  —  if  your  epistemological  disposition  is,  like  mine, 
at  all  similar  to  Ockham’s  contemporaries,  which  I  do  not  presume  that  it  is  —  our 
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concern.  95
Most  late-medieval  Scholastic  thinkers  had  very  robust  criteria  for  what 
attributes  belief  must  possess  to  attain  the  status  of  true  knowledge.   The  classic 
formulation  of  knowledge  as  “justified  true  belief”  characterizes  the  dominant 
theory  of  knowledge  in  the  late  medieval  period  quite  well,  and  the  medieval  criteria 
for  what  constitutes  “justification”  is  generally  quite  strong  indeed  by  dominant 
contemporary  standards.   Correspondingly,  many  medieval  thinkers  had  an 
extremely  modest  estimation  of  whether  and  to  what  extent  human  beings  can  hope 
to  attain  true  knowledge  of  things,  and  medieval  thought  is  marked  throughout  by  a 
strong  sense  of  epistemic  humility.    In  a  few  cases,  this  led  to  outright  skepticism 96
(in  the  cases,  for  instance,  of  Henry  of  Ghent  and  Nicholas  of  Autrecourt).    Given 97
the  high  standard  of  justification  demanded  for  certainty,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that 
at  least  a  few  medievals  despaired  of  the  possibility  of  having  any  knowledge  at  all. 
For  most  medieval  thinkers,  however,  what  saved  them  from  complete  skepticism 
concerning  human  knowledge  was  a  confidence  in  something  like  Augustine’s  idea 
of  “divine  illumination”:  despite  our  limited  and  impoverished  capacities  for 
understanding,  we  are  able  to  have  some  degree  of  certainty  in  our  ability  to  grasp  at 
95  Adams  (1987)   gives  a  much  more  extensive  and  penetrating  overview  of  this  topic  in  the  final  chapter 
of  the  first  volume  of  William   Ockham ,  entitled   “Certainty   and  Scepticism,”  pp.  551  -  629.   In  this  chapter, 
Adams  provides  a  persuasive  argument   for  the  thesis  that  the  dominant  theory  of  knowledge  in  the 
early  fourteenth  century   was  in  fact  a  broadly  skeptical  one,  when  considered  with  respect  to  its  high 
degree  of  epistemic  uncertainty   from  a  human   standpoint.   Thus  she  argues,  pace  the  predominant 
assumptions   of  historians  of  medieval  philosophy  earlier  in  the  twentieth  century  (led,  chiefly,  by 
Etienne  Gilson),   that  when  considered  in  this  light,  then  Ockham  —  far  from  being  the  chief 
representative  of  medieval  skepticism   —  in  fact  provides  a  remarkably  anti -skeptical  theory  of 
knowledge.   Also  useful  in  this  discussion   is  Henrik  Lagerlund  (ed.),  Rethinking   the  History  of  Skepticism: 
The  Missing   Medieval  Background  (Leiden:   Brill,  2009),  a  collection   of  essays  which  trace  many  of  the 
major  movements   in  medieval  epistemological   developments.   Particularly  relevant  to  the  issues  at  hand 
is  the  essay  in  that  volume  by  Claude  Panaccio   and  David  Piché,  “Ockham’s  Reliabilism  and  the  Intuition 
of  Non-Existents,”  pp.  97  -  118. 
96  I  often  think,  for  instance,   of  Anselm   of  Canterbury’s  prologue  to  the  Proslogion ,  with  his  famous 
phrase  —  borrowed  partly  from  Augustine   —  Neque  enim  quaero  intelligere  ut  credam,  sed  credo  ut 
intelligam ,  “Neither   do  I  seek  to  understand   in  order  that  I  might  believe,  but  rather,  I  believe  in  order 
that  I  might  understand.” 
97  For  a  broad  overview  of  skepticism   in  the  medieval  period,  see  Henrik  Lagerlund,  “A  History  of 
Skepticism   in  the  Middle  Ages,”  in  Rethinking   the  History  of  Skepticism   (see  note  above),  pp.  1  -  28,  esp. 
pp.  14ff. 
 
 
 
 
89 
least  fragments  of  true  knowledge  because  of  the  illumination  given  to  us  by  God  in 
our  reasoning  faculty;  this  faculty  is  further  aided,  on  occasion,  by  direct  divine 
revelation  of  truth,  in  which  we  can  have  complete  confidence  because  of  its  source 
and  its  coherence  with  reason.    By  and  large,  though,  because  the  degree  of 98
certainty  we  can  generally  attain  is  quite  small,  the  amount  of  knowledge  we  can 
hope  to  attain  is  comparatively  miniscule. 
Contrasted  with  the  generally  low  estimation  medieval  thinkers  had  of  the 
human  capacity  for  knowledge,  however,  is  an  extremely  high  view  of  the  knowledge 
of  God,  both  in  terms  of  what  God  knows  (i.e.,  everything),  and  the  degree  of 
certainty  with  which  God  knows  it  (i.e.,  absolute).   God’s  knowledge,  from  the 
perspective  of  these  thinkers,  must  be  certain,  immutable,  infallible,  and  necessary 
in  at  least  some  sense,  for  God’s  knowledge  encompasses  not  only  all  that  is,  but  why 
and  how  it  is,  and  God  can  never  be  deceived  (and  thus  can  never  have  knowledge 
which  turns  out  to  be  false).   This  sort  of  knowledge  at  least  appears  to  be  so  robust 
that  it  cannot  be  otherwise :  to  speak  of  this  knowledge  as  contingent,  as  does 
Ockham,  seems  anathema  to  this  robust  sense  of  the  sheer  thorough-going-ness  of 
the  knowledge  of  God,  and  indeed,  seems  to  strike  at  the  very  character  of  God  as 
one  whose  very  essence  is  necessary.   Certainly,  many  philosophers,  particularly 
those  in  the  tradition  of  Classical  Theism,  have  assumed  that  necessity  is  also  a 
property  of  knowledge  itself  —  or  at  least,  of  knowledge  belonging  to  God.   And 
though  we  shall  not  come  to  a  proper  examination  of  Bradwardine’s  views  until  the 
next  chapter,  it  is  worth  noting  here  that  the  necessity  of  God’s  knowledge  is 
certainly  the  assumption  that  Bradwardine  is  working  with  in  his  own  arguments 
against  Ockham,  and  he  spells  it  out  explicitly,  citing  Anselm  as  his  authority: 
In  the  same  way,  necessary  knowledge  and  necessary  will  are  more  perfect 
98  I  am  here  presenting   this  position   in  broadly  Thomistic  terms,  which  more  or  less  describe,  with 
minor  variance   and  difference  in  emphasis,   the  epistemological  position  of  the  vast  majority  of  late 
medieval  philosophers.    At  the  end  of  his  life,  St  Thomas  famously  said  that  his  entire  life’s  work  of 
philosophy  was  “but  straw”:  this  captures  well,  perhaps,  the  epistemic  humility  of  the  medievals, 
recognizing   that  all  that  we  can  know  in  this  life  amounts  to  mere  bits  and  fragments  of  the  truth  —  like 
straw,  it  has  substance,   to  be  sure,  but  it  hardly  amounts  to  anything  at  all. 
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than  contingent  knowledge  and  contingent  will,  just  as  necessity  is  in  itself 
more  perfect  than  contingency.  Necessary  knowledge  of  a  thing  and 
necessary  will  are  therefore  attributed  to  God.  The  antecedent  holds,  since 
contingency  includes  potency  [or  potential,  or  capacity],  and  consequently 
imperfection.  The  consequence  holds  according  to  Anselm. 
 
Item  necessaria  sciencia  et  necessaria  voluntas  perfectior  est  sciencia 
contingenti  et  voluntate  contingenti,  sicut  necessitas  simpliciter  perfectior 
est  contingencia.  Igitur  necessaria  sciencia  rerum  et  necessaria  voluntas  est 
attribuenda  Deo.  Antecedens  patet,  quia  contingencia  includit  potenciam  et 
per  consequens  imperfectionem.  Consequencia  patet  per  Anselmum.  (DFC 
33a) 
 
The  “imperfection”  of  contingency,  if  ascribed  to  the  knowledge  of  God,  would  seem 
to  undermine  the  perfection  of  God’s  knowledge,  and  thus  the  perfection  of  God’s 
esse .   To  Bradwardine  and  many  of  his  contemporaries,  this  is  an  entirely 
unacceptable  consequence.   Likewise,  we  should  wonder  exactly  what  sort  of 
knowledge  God’s  foreknowledge  might  amount  to  if  it  is  contingent  as  Ockham 
claims. 
 
2.3.2  -  Logical  objections 
In  the  discussion  immediately  following,  I  take  it  to  be  not  entirely  settled 
that  something  can  be  simultaneously  determinate  and  contingent ;  or  at  the  very 
least,  that  determinacy  seems  to  undermine  freedom  to  a  significant  extent.   This  is 
clearly  an  extremely  contentious  claim,  and  one  that  remains  hotly  contested  in  the 
contemporary  literature.   Ockham  would  seem  to  be  defending  a  position  not  unlike 
the  contemporary  “compatibilist”  claim  that  an  act  can  be  simultaneously 
determined  and  free.    I  do  not  intend  here  to  make  any  definitive  claims  about  the 99
99  On  this  topic,  much  more  will  be  said  in  the  final  chapter. 
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truth  or  falsity  of  this  position,  as  an  exploration  of  this  question  would  take  us  far 
afield  from  the  primary  focus  of  this  thesis.   But  whether  or  not  this  position  is 
genuinely  tenable,  it  is  certainly  open  to  dispute,  and  it  is  in  this  disputed  realm  that 
I  raise  the  following  criticisms.   They  are,  I  think,  issues  that  require  at  least  a  more 
thorough  defense  on  Ockham’s  part. 
In  light  of  the  context  above,  a  problem  with  Ockham’s  account  is  that,  though 
he  may  have  successfully  created  a  model  on  which  God’s  foreknowledge  does  not 
imply  the  necessity  of  human  action,  he  has  not  entirely  done  away  with  the  problem. 
Rather,  Ockham  has  pushed  the  problems  of  necessity  relating  to  God’s 
foreknowledge  onto  his  uniquely-defined  concept  of  determinacy  (recall  Ockham’s 
departure  from  the  Aristotelian  concept,  as  explained  in  2.2.2).   Though  future 
things  may  not  be  necessary  on  Ockham’s  interpretation,  they  are  determinate.   In 
fact,  for  Ockham,  everything  that  has  happened,  is  happening,  or  will  happen  is 
determinate,  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  at  some  moment  of  time  (namely,  after  it  has 
already  happened),  it  has  no  power  to  be  otherwise.   This  means  that  every  past, 
present,  or  future  state  is  determinate,  which  is  a  view  of  strong  determinacy  far 
more  radical  than  anything  Aristotle  would  have  suggested.   Under  Ockham’s 
interpretation,  we  no  longer  need  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  whether  the  necessity 
of  God’s  knowledge  entails  the  necessity  of  human  action  (since  Ockham  does  not 
claim  that  God’s  knowledge  of  our  actions  is  necessary  at  all).   But  it  seems  that  to 
claim  that  our  future  actions  are  determinate  (as  Ockham  does)  still  undermines  our 
freedom,  at  least  if  considered  in  a  certain  way. 
The  pertinent  question  for  Ockham  becomes,  if  God  determinately  knows  that 
we  will  act  in  a  particular  way,  and  that  act  is  itself  determinate,  can  that  act  truly  be 
said  to  be  contingent,  or  more  importantly,  free?   And  if  so,  in  what  sense  is  such  a 
future  action  free?   Is  it  simply  in  the  sense  of  logical  contingency,  in  that  there  is  no 
inherent  contradiction  in  supposing  that  I  don’t  act  that  way?  or  do  I  actually 
possess  some  sort  of  power  to  act  otherwise?   And  if  only  the  former,  what  does  this 
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actually  say  about  my  freedom  to  act  otherwise?   The  logical  possibility  of  acting 
otherwise  does  not  obviously  seem  to  entail  a  very  real  sort  of  freedom  to  actually 
do  so.   But  if  we  are  speaking  of  the  latter  sort  of  contingency,  as  defined  by  powers, 
can  any  such  power  be  a  real  power  to  act  if  my  action  is  already  determined?   Even 
if,  at  t 1 ,  there  is  some  sense  in  which  I  have  the  power  to  act  otherwise  at  t 2   than  I  in 
fact  will  act,  if  my  action  at  t 2   is  already  determined,  then  that  power  I  possess  can 
never  actually  be  realized.   If  a  power  is  not  realizable,  then  it  seems  peculiar  to 
consider  it  to  be  a  real  power  in  things.   And  thus  the  determinacy  of  an  action 
would  seem  to  imply,  at  least  in  the  most  practical  sense,  that  that  action  is  in  fact 
not  free,  since  I  have  no  realizable  power  to  act  otherwise. 
Arguably,  this  lack-of-power-to-act-otherwise  constitutes  a  sort  of  necessity, 
which  Ockham  denies.   And  so  we  are  led  directly  to  the  question  of  how  Ockham 
conceives  of  necessity.   If  Ockham  defines  determinacy  as  that  which,  at  any  point  in 
time  (before,  during,  or  after  it  happens),  has  no  power  in  itself  to  be  otherwise, 
what  then  does  he  consider  necessity  to  be?   Is  it  a  powers  view,  such  as  what 
defined  determinacy  under  Aristotle’s  model  —  that  which  has  no  power  now  to  be 
otherwise  than  it  is  —  or  is  it  a  logical  necessity  model  —  that  which,  the  denial  of 
which  leads  us  into  a  logical  contradiction?   Ockham  appears  not  to  have  provided  a 
satisfactory  account  of  what  necessity  is,  but  I  think  it  is  most  plausible  to  suppose 
that  what  he  intends  by  necessity  is  what  Adams  has  described  as  Aristotle’s  view  of 
determinacy.   This  reading  would  be  consistent  with  Ockham’s  adherence  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  the  present  and  past,   for  it  is  precisely  in  the  present 
moment,  when  a  contingent  event  is  actualized,  that  it  loses  its  power  to  be 
otherwise.   Indeed,  a  “logical  necessity”  view,  which  would  say  that  something  is 
necessary  if  its  denial  leads  to  a  contradiction,  would  not  seem  to  imply  that  the 
present  is  necessary.   I  have  argued  already  (see  1.3)  that  it  is  precisely  his  adoption 
of  the  logical  notion  of  necessity  that  allows  Duns  Scotus  to  assert  that  the  present 
remains  contingent  (because  in  the  present  moment,  it  involves  no  contradiction  to 
suppose  that  something  could  turn  out  otherwise);  but  as  I  argued,  logical  necessity 
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understood  in  this  way  does  not  allow  Duns  Scotus  to  extend  that  inference  to 
events  in  the  past  (contrary  to  most  contemporary  understandings  of  the 
contingency  of  past  events  in  terms  of  possible  worlds),  because  supposing  that  a 
single  event  turned  out  otherwise  would  entail  a  contradiction  with  all  events  that 
causally  followed  it.   Because  the  notion  of  logical  necessity  does  seem  to  imply  the 
contingency  of  the  present  (if  not  of  the  past,  also),  and  because  Ockham  denies, 
contra  Duns  Scotus,  that  the  present  is  necessary,  I  think  it  can  be  safely  concluded 
that  Ockham  could  not  consistently  ascribe  to  a  notion  of  necessity  as  logical 
necessity.   I  therefore  conclude  that  Ockham  must  have  in  mind  a  time-dependent, 
powers  view  of  necessity,  on  which  the  necessity  of  an  event  is  defined  something 
like  this: 
N:   An  event  x  is  necessary  at  t  if  and  only  if  there  is  no  (real,  realizable)  power 
at  t  for  x  to  be  otherwise. 
 
It  should  be  apparent,  then,  that  on  this  reading  of  Ockham,  what  Ockham  takes  as 
necessity  is  what  Aristotle  (according  to  Adams)  took  to  be  determinacy .   (See 
definition  D1  in  2.2.2,  which  is  based  on  Adams’  Aristotelian  definition  of 
determinacy.) 
But  if  this  is  Ockham’s  view  of  necessity,  then  it  seems  very  hard  to  account 
for  the  fact  that  he  simultaneously  claims  that  God’s  present  knowledge  of  future 
contingent  events  is  contingent.   If  God’s  present  knowledge  is  contingent,  it  would 
seem,  it  must  be  the  case  that  there  is  some  real  (or  realizable)  power  for  God’s 
knowledge  to  be  otherwise  than  it  is.   Ockham  would  have  it  that  this  power  for 
God’s  knowledge  to  be  otherwise  than  it  is  rests  in  the  fact  that  the  subject  of  God’s 
knowledge  yet  has  power  to  be  otherwise  (insofar  as  it  is  contingent),  and  thus  — 
since  God  must  necessarily  know  all  things  that  are  true  —  if  it  were  the  case  that 
the  subject  of  God’s  knowledge  turned  out  otherwise  than  God  currently  knows  it  to 
be,  it  would  be  the  case  that  God’s  knowledge  would  be  other  than  it  is.   It  would 
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therefore  appear  that  Ockham  claims  that  there  really  is  power  for  God’s  knowledge 
to  be  otherwise  than  it  in  fact  is,  since  there  really  is  power  for  its  subject  to  turn  out 
otherwise  than  it  in  fact  will.   The  trouble  with  this  is  that  God  knows  these  things 
now .   Despite  Ockham’s  claim  that  statements  about  God’s  knowledge  of  future 
states  are  in  some  sense  future,  it  is  obviously  the  case  that  they  also  make 
statements  of  fact  about  the  present,  namely,  that  God  now  knows  something 
particular  in  the  future.   We  know  this  to  be  a  statement  of  fact  about  the  present, 
because  it  presupposes  that  God  can  act  on  that  knowledge  in  the  present.   But  this 
is  something  that  we  will  explore  in  more  detail  in  just  a  moment. 
 
2.3.3  -  God’s  action  in  the  world 
Ockham  denies  Duns  Scotus’  claim  that  the  present  is  contingent.   Indeed, 
Ockham  seems  to  embrace  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  the  present 
(and,  by  extension,  the  necessity  of  the  past).   How,  then,  can  Ockham  posit  that 
God’s  present  knowledge  of  future  things  is  contingent?   As  we  have  already 
discussed  (2.2.3),  Ockham  tries  to  mitigate  this  dilemma  by  claiming  that  God’s 
knowledge  of  future  contingent  events  only  appears  to  be  present-directed.   A  claim 
such  as,  “God  knows  that  I  will  work  on  writing  my  thesis  tomorrow”  appears  to  be  a 
statement  about  God’s  present  knowledge,  and  so  would  seem  to  be  a  statement  that 
is  necessarily  true  or  false,  because  it  is  about  the  present;  but  Ockham  would  claim 
that  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  concerns  something  future  and  contingent  (much  like 
the  statement,  “Peter  is  predestinate”),  it  should  actually  be  considered  as  a  future 
contingent  statement.   I  object,  however,  that  this  in  fact  undermines  the  idea  that 
God  has  knowledge  now  of  that  future  contingent  event.   If  God’s  knowledge,  now ,  of 
that  future  contingent  event  (that  I  will  work  on  writing  my  thesis  tomorrow)  has 
any  real  clout,  it  must  be  the  case  that  God  really  has  knowledge  now  about  that 
future  state.   And  if  that  present  knowledge  is  contingent,  it,  being  present, 
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contradicts  the  presupposition  that  present  things  are  necessary. 
One  may  think  that  Ockham  would  wish  to  respond  that  this  can  be 
accounted  for  because  of  God’s  timeless  eternity.   Ockham  certainly  believes  that 
God  is  eternal;  but  like  Scotus,  Ockham  does  not  conceive  of  God’s  eternity  as  an 
existence  timelessly  apart  from  the  created  order,  but  rather,  as  the  idea  that  God 
endures  throughout  the  succession  of  time.    Thus,  Ockham  does  not  allow  himself 100
recourse  to  the  idea  of  God’s  eternity  to  explain  the  puzzle  of  God’s  contingent 
knowledge.   Furthermore,  regardless  of  whether  one  posits  God  to  exist  in  or  apart 
from  the  succession  of  time,  it  remains  the  case  that  God  works  and  enacts  promises 
in  time.   For  example,  God  promised  Abraham,  at  a  particular  point  in  time,  that  he 
would  be  the  father  of  a  great  nation;  that  promise  was  fulfilled,  at  a  particular  later 
point  in  time,  with  the  birth  of  Isaac,  and  consequently  the  beginnings  of  the 
Israelite  people.   Thus,  we  can  speak  of  the  point  in  time  when  God  made  the 
promise  (a  promise  that  was  dependent  upon  God’s  knowledge  of  the  promise’s 
eventual  fulfilment),  a  point  in  time  at  which  God  had  knowledge  of  when  and  how 
the  promise  would  be  fulfilled. 
God’s  promise  to  Abraham  was  not  arbitrary  or  vague,  like  the  promise  of  a 
Chinese  fortune  cookie  or  a  horoscope,  for  which  any  number  of  ordinary  and  very 
likely-to-happen  things  might  be  interpreted  as  the  “fulfilment”  of  the  promise. 
Indeed,  when  Abraham  —  because  his  very  old  wife  was  obviously  barren  — 
attempted  to  take  matters  into  his  own  hands  and  conceived  a  child  by  his 
concubine,  God  clearly  indicated  that  that  child  was  not  the  fulfilment  of  the  promise 
Abraham  had  been  given.   God  knew  the  details  of  how  God’s  promise  to  Abraham 
would  be  fulfilled,  and  some  of  those  details  were  humanly  impossible  —  such  as  the 
conception  of  a  child  by  a  woman  whose  days  of  fertility  were  long  gone.   And  of 
course,  Sarah’s  advanced  age  was  not  the  only  limiting  factor:  St  Paul  jokes  that 
100  Craig  1988,  p.  146.   Included   in  the  endnotes  of  Craig’s  volume  is  also  to  be  found  a  useful  snap-shot 
summary   of  Ockham   on  time  and  eternity,  drawing  on  the  doctoral  thesis  of  Adams  ( The  Problem  of 
God’s  Foreknowledge  and  Free  Will  in  Boethius  and  William   Ockham ,  Cornell   University,  1967). 
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Abraham  himself  was  “as  good  as  dead”  (Hebrews  11.12).   But  from  an  impotent  old 
man  and  an  old  woman  many  years  past  child-bearing  years,  God  promised  that  a 
child  would  be  born.   The  future  contingent  event  of  Isaac’s  birth  at  some  particular 
point  in  time  was  known  by  God  at  the  time  of  God’s  promise-making,  otherwise  God 
would  not  have  been  warranted  in  making  the  promise  that  God  made. 
If  we  are  to  accept  that,  whether  or  not  God’s  own  existence  is  timeless,  God 
acts  in  time-bound  creation,  then  it  must  make  sense,  at  least  relative  to  that 
creation,  to  speak  of  God  knowing  or  acting  now ,  or  in  the  past .   It  is,  after  all,  relative 
to  time-bound  creation  that  we  speak  in  the  Aristotelian  framework  of  the  present 
and  past  being  necessary.   It  would  thus  seem  that  if  God  now  has  knowledge  of 
some  future  contingent  event,  that  knowledge  —  if  not  the  event  itself  —  is 
necessary  by  virtue  of  being  now .   (Thus  the  whole  problem!)   The  problem  of  God’s 
action  in  time  is  made  even  more  robust  when  we  consider  the  earthly  life  of  Jesus 
Christ,  God  incarnate.   Even  if  the  Godhead  inhabits  timeless  eternity,  at  least  in 
general,  not  only  does  God  act  in  time-bound  creation,  but  the  Second  Person  of  the 
Godhead  dwells  bodily  in  time-bound  creation.   A  Nazarene  man  is  born  at  a 
particular,  identifiable  time  in  Classical  history  (ca.  4  B.C.),  when  the  power  of  the 
Roman  Empire  is  approaching  its  height,  and  this  man  lived  out  his  earthly  life  over 
a  period  of  33  Earth-years  before  being  subjected  to  Roman  execution  on  a  cross  ca. 
30  A.D.   The  claim  of  Christians,  including  Ockham  and  Bradwardine,  is  that  this  man 
is  the  eternal  God:  whether  or  not  God  himself  exists  timelessly,  dwelling  beyond  our 
order  of  created  time  and  space,  transcending  the  entire  created  order,  all  of  time 
eternally  present  to  God  by  a  mode  of  knowing  unfathomable  to  mere  time-trapped 
creatures  —  yet,  this  God  acts  in  time  to  announce  and  to  bring  about  God’s  own 
promises  at  particular,  identifiable  historical  moments  (“In  the  days  of  Herod,  king  of 
Judea,”  for  instance  (Luke  1.5)).   The  tension  between  the  timeless  eternity  of  God 
and  the  action  of  God  in  time  is  starkly  illustrated  by  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation. 
Thus,  if  Ockham  explicitly  ascribes  to  the  doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  the 
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present,  we  must  hold  him  to  account  if  he  is  to  also  claim  that  the  knowledge  God 
presently  has  is  contingent,  if  the  subject  of  that  knowledge  is  contingent.   It  does  not 
seem  to  me  that  Ockham  has  provided  a  satisfactory  account  of  how  these  notions 
can  be  reconciled. 
 
Conclusion 
Having  now  surveyed  in  some  depth  Ockham’s  approach  to  the  problem,  and 
considered  a  few  possible  objections  to  his  approach,  we  will  turn  in  the  next 
chapter  to  an  introduction  to  Bradwardine’s  text,  and  discover  his  own  reasons  for 
rejecting  Ockham’s  solution. 
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Chapter  3 
Bradwardine’s  Treatise,  Part  I: 
The  Rejection  of  the  Ockhamist  Solution 
 
Introduction 
We  have  now  examined  in  some  detail  the  solutions  of  four  major  figures  — 
Boethius,  Anselm,  Duns  Scotus,  and  Ockham  —  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents. 
It  is  in  light  of  these  positions  that  we  turn  finally  to  the  titular  subject  of  this 
dissertation,  which  is  the  early  treatise  of  Thomas  Bradwardine  called  the  De  futuris 
contingentibus  (On  future  contingents;  DFC  henceforth).    We  begin  our 101
examination  of  the  DFC  in  this  chapter  with  a  discussion  of  the  structure  of  the 
treatise,  which  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  there  has  been  some 
misunderstanding  on  this  front  present  in  the  literature  on  the  treatise  (3.1).   We 
will  then  turn  to  a  summary  of  the  first  half  of  the  treatise  itself  (3.2),  with  especial 
attention  given  to  Bradwardine’s  criticism  of  Ockham’s  view  as  it  appears  in  that 
section  (3.3).    These  tasks  completed,  we  will  be  ready  to  move,  in  the  next  chapter, 
to  an  examination  of  Bradwardine’s  own  solution  to  the  problem. 
 
101  Thomas   Bradwardine,  De  futuris  contingentibus   (ed.  J.-F.  Genest),   Recherches  Augustiniennes  vol.  14 
(1979),   280  –  336.   This  edition   is  immediately  preceded  by  Jean-François  Genest’s  immensely 
informative  introduction   (ibid.,  249  -  279).   The  mid-twentieth-century  literature  on  Bradwardine, 
including   Heiko  Oberman’s  volume  Archbishop   Thomas   Bradwardine:  A  fourteenth  century  Augustinian 
(Utrecht:  Kemink  &  Zoon,  1958)  and  Genest’s   introduction,  informs  me  that  there  also  exists  an  earlier, 
fragmentary   edition   of  DFC  by  P.  Bartomeu-Maria  Xiberta,  published  in  1935,  but  I  have  not  seen  this 
edition   for  myself  (in  any  case,  Genest  reports  that  Xiberta’s  edition  covers  less  than  15%  of  the  text. 
Genest  1979,  249).   From  Genest’s   description   of  the  Xiberta  extracts,  though,  I  suspect  that  this  may 
have  been  what  Norman   Kretzmann   was  working  from  when  he  drafted  a  translation  of  fragments  of 
the  text  (the  quantity   of  text  included   —  “moins  de  15%”  —  would  seem,  at  any  rate,  to  be  about  the 
same).   It  was,  incidentally,  Stephen  Read  who  first  shared  Kretzmann’s  fragmentary  translation  draft 
with  me,  and  this  document   sparked  my  initial  interest  in  this  text. 
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3.1  -  Structure  of  De  futuris  contingentibus 
Before  moving  on  to  the  explicit  arguments  set  forward  by  Bradwardine,  it 
will  be  worth  our  taking  a  bit  of  time  to  understand  the  general  structure  of  this 
little-studied  treatise.   Indeed,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  partly  because  of 
misunderstandings  of  the  structure  of  DFC  that  its  significance  in  the  history  of 
discussions  of  future  contingents  has  been  overlooked  before  now.   The  treatise 
breaks  down  broadly  into  two  halves:  in  the  first  half,  Bradwardine  examines  and 
critiques  a  number  of  approaches  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents  put  forward 
by  others;  in  the  second  half,  he  lays  out  his  own  solution,  and  responds  to  possible 
objections.   But  due  to  textual  issues  that  will  be  discussed  below,  even  this  basic 
structure  has  been  misunderstood  by  some,  and  consequently  the  content  of  the 
second  half  has  not  consistently  been  recognized  as  even  presenting  an  original 
solution  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents  at  all.   In  this  section,  then,  I  will 
describe  the  structure  of  the  treatise  (3.1.1),  and  then  highlight  and  discuss  the 
textual  problem  that  I  think  has  led  to  a  misunderstanding  of  this  structure  (3.1.2). 
 
3.1.1  -  The  De  futuris  contingentibus ,  Parts  I  &  II 
The  De  futuris  contingentibus  is  comprised  of  two  main  parts: 
 
Part  I   (DFC  3a  -  40g) 
After  a  brief  introduction,  in  which  Bradwardine  outlines  the  problem  of 
reconciling  the  existence  of  future  contingents  with  God's  prescience,   Bradwardine 
lays  out  nine  solutions  to  the  problem  that  have  been  put  forward  by  various 
philosophers  (DFC  3a  -  40g).   In  this  part  of  the  treatise,  Bradwardine  systematically 
considers  each  of  these  nine  opinions,  and  in  scholastic  fashion,  considers 
arguments  in  favour  of  and  opposed  to  each  one.   In  the  following  two  sections  (3.2. 
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and  3.3),  I  will  provide  a  summary  of  these  positions  and  Bradwardine’s  treatment 
of  them,  with  special  attention  (3.3)  to  the  lengthy  discussion  Bradwardine 
undertakes  of  Ockham’s  position.  
 
Part  II   (DFC  41  -  63) 
After  having  outlined  the  solutions  of  others,  and  in  most  cases,  his  criticisms 
of  the  same,  Bradwardine  turns  in  the  second  part  to  a  presentation  of  his  own 
solution,  addresses  objections  possible  objections  to  the  same,  and  explores  his 
solution’s  application  to  various  related  questions  (DFC  41  -  63).   We  will  not  take  up 
a  discussion  of  this  section  until  the  following  chapter,  with  an  analysis  in  the  final 
chapter. 
 
3.1.2  -  A  textual  problem 
Despite  this  seemingly  straightforward  two-part  division  of  the  text,  a 
confusion  that  has  arisen  with  regard  to  the  structure  at  the  point  of  transition 
between  the  two.   This  confusion  is  the  result  of  the  fact  that  just  prior  to  the 
responsio  propria ,  Bradwardine  introduces  this  second  portion  of  the  treatise  by  a 
restatement  of  the  question  at  hand.  But  in  restating  the  question,  the  text  phrases  it 
in  a  way  that  is  subtly  –  but  significantly  –  different  from  the  question  with  which 
the  treatise  began.  The  treatise  opens  with  the  question,  “Whether  God  has 
foreknowledge  of  all  ad  utrumlibet  future  contingents”;   at  this  point,  however, 102
when  we  expect  him  to  provide  his  own  response  to  the  initial  question,  he  instead 
restates  the  question  as,  “Whether  Christ,  who  is  God,  has  foreknowledge  of  all  ad 
utrumlibet  future  contingents”  (emphatic  italics  added).  103
102  utrum  Deus  habeat  prescienciam   omnium   futurorum  contingencium   ad  utrumlibet .   (Heading   at  the 
beginning   of  at  least  two  MSS  (Troyes  and  Vatican),  preceding  what  Genest  numbers  as  paragraph  1.) 
103  utrum  Christus   qui  est  Deus  habeat  prescienciam  omnium   futurorum  contingencium   ad  utrumlibet . 
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With  the  addition  of  three  words  (“ Christus  qui  est ”),  the  initial  question 
becomes  an  entirely  different  –  though  related  –  question:  this  latter  question 
highlights  problems  relating  to  the  nature  of  the  Incarnation,  and  the  complex 
relationship  between  Jesus  Christ's  divine  nature  and  human  nature,  rather  than  just 
the  puzzles  relating  to  God's  foreknowledge  and  future  contingents.   This  latter 
question  echoes  those  of  a  long  tradition  of  questions  about  the  knowledge  of  the 
incarnate  Christ,  from  the  third  book  of  Peter  Lombard’s  Sentences  to  the  Tertia  Pars 
of  St  Thomas’s  Summa  Theologiae  (particularly  questions  9  through  12 ).   What 104
complicates  the  question  of  Christ’s  knowledge  is  his  simultaneous,  complete 
possession  of  both  divine  and  human  natures.   For  by  his  divine  nature,  it  would 
seem  that  Christ  would  possess  all  the  knowledge  (including  the  foreknowledge)  of 
God;  but  by  his  human  nature,  it  would  seem  that  such  complete  and  total 
knowledge  is  impossible.   Thus,  the  question  of  Christ’s  knowledge,  and  for  the  case 
in  question,  his  foreknowledge,  is  far  more  complicated  than  the  more  basic 
question  of  God’s  foreknowledge  (to  be  sure,  I  recognize  the  irony  of  calling  the 
latter  question  “basic”). 
Genest  suggests  that  the  formulation  at  the  beginning  of  the  responsio  propria 
(“Whether  Christ,  who  is  God,  has  knowledge  of  all  ad  utrumlibet  future 
contingents”)  may  indicate  that  the  whole  question  of  the  treatise  really  arose  in 
connection  with  Christ’s  knowledge,  and  may  be  connected  with  Adam  Wodeham’s 
lectures  on  the  subject  in  Oxford  in  1331  -  32.    Genest  thinks  this  indicates  that 105
the  question  Bradwardine  is  really  concerned  with  is  that  of  Christ’s  knowledge.   But 
there  are  reasons,  I  believe,  to  question  this  conclusion.   In  particular,  if 
(DFC  41) 
104  For  a  sense  of  the  complexity  of  this  question,   the  articles  in  these  sections  include,  for  instance,  “Did 
Christ  have  any  knowledge  besides   the  Divine?”  (Q.  9  art.  1);  “Did  he  have  any  acquired  knowledge?”  (Q. 
9  art.  4);  “Did  the  soul  of  Christ  know  all  things  in  the  Word?”  (Q.  10  art.  2);  (on  infused  knowledge)  “Did 
Christ  know  all  things  by  this  knowledge?”   (Q.  11  art.  1);  “The  comparison  of  this  knowledge  with  the 
angelic   knowledge”  (Q.  11  art.  4);  (on  acquired  knowledge)  “Did  Christ  know  all  things  by  this 
knowledge?”   (Q.  12  art.  1);  “Did  he  advance  in  this  knowledge?”  (Q.  12  art.  2);  “Did  he  learn  anything 
from  man?”  (Q.  12  art.  4);  etc. 
105  Genest,  p.  254. 
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Bradwardine’s  main  concern  is  the  knowledge  of  Christ,  as  Genest  speculates,  it 
should  strike  us  as  extraordinarily  strange  that  so  little  of  the  subsequent  discussion 
has  anything  to  do  with  the  particularities  of  the  knowledge  of  the  incarnate  Word. 
With  only  a  few  isolated  exceptions,  the  discussion  concerns  the  knowledge  of  God 
more  generally;  if  Bradwardine  really  intended  to  speak  of  Christ’s  knowledge,  then 
surely  this  would  have  been  brought  forward  more  explicitly,  since  the  issues 
surrounding  Christ’s  knowledge  are  so  very  different  from  and  very  much  more 
complicated  than  those  of  God’s  knowledge  in  general.   This  is  because,  while  much 
of  God’s  foreknowledge  might  be  explained  by  appeal  to  God’s  inhabiting  an  eternal 
moment  which  transcends  time,  if  we  speak  of  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  we  are 
necessarily  speaking  of  God  inhabiting  time  and  space  and  thus  bound  by  those 
things.   If  Christ  is  fully  God,  then  our  set  of  problems  surrounding  God’s  knowledge 
becomes  complicated  even  further  by  the  fact  that  we  seem  to  be  positing 
simultaneously  that  God  transcends  time  —  and  in  this  way  possesses  perfect  and 
complete  knowledge  of  all  events  in  time,  past,  present  and  future  —  and  that  God 
dwells  fully  in  time.   Without  straying  into  one  or  another  trinitarian  heresy 
(particularly  tempting  here  are  modalism  and  tri-partism),  it  is  very  difficult  to  see 
how  these  two  ideas  might  be  reconciled.   It  would  therefore  be  passing  strange  if  a 
treatise  supposedly  devoted  to  the  problem  of  “Whether  Christ,  who  is  God,  has 
knowledge  of  all  ad  utrimlibet  future  contingents”  did  not,  in  fact,  address  any  of 
these  pressing  problems  relating  to  that  question. 
Similarly,  if  this  is  taken  to  be  the  introduction  of  a  new  question,  it  is 
puzzling  that  what  follows  does  not  address  this  second  question  in  any  way  (except 
insofar  as  it  relates  to  the  first).   Additionally,  this  reading  does  not  seem  to  make 
good  sense  of  what  is  actually  happening  structurally  with  the  treatise:  if  the  treatise 
did  break  into  two  parts,  addressing  two  distinct  questions,  then  it  seems  that 
Bradwardine  will  never  have  given  his  own  positive  account  in  response  to  the  first 
question  within  the  section  concerning  that  question,  while  failing  also  to  address 
the  features  of  the  second  question  which  distinguish  it  from  the  first.   Indeed,  as  I 
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have  been  implying  from  the  start,  the  overall  structure  (which,  despite  Genest’s 
conclusions  to  the  contrary,  is  supported  by  Genest's  editorial  presentation)  seems 
to  frame  what  follows  as  Bradwardine's  solution  to  the  original  question;  for  it  is  to 
this  question  that  his  response  most  readily  applies,  and  it  does  not  in  any  way  treat 
the  particular  problems  of  the  question  of  Jesus'  foreknowledge  and  the  Incarnation. 
On  my  view,  it  seems  safe,  therefore,  to  conclude  that  the  second  half  of  the 
treatise,  like  the  first,  is  concerned  with  the  question  of  “Whether  God  has 
foreknowledge  of  all  ad  utrumlibet  future  contingents.”   On  this  view,  then,  the 
addition  of  “ Christus  qui  est ”  in  the  second  instance  of  the  question  is  an  error, 
whether  due  to  a  copyist,  or  to  a  student's  faulty  transcription  (as  the  work  we  have 
does  seem  to  be  a  reportatio ),  or  perhaps  even  to  Bradwardine's  own  slip  of  the 
tongue.    Perhaps  a  more  thorough  investigation  of  this  portion  of  the  extant 106
manuscripts  (something  which  I  have  been  unable  to  undertake  myself)  would  yield 
useful  clues  on  the  matter,  but  as  the  scholarship  currently  stands,  the  reasons  for 
this  error  remain  something  of  a  mystery.  What  does  seem  clear,  however,  is  that 
throughout  the  treatise,  Bradwardine  is  addressing  the  problem  of  God's  knowledge 
of  future  contingents,  and  does  not  seem  concerned  with  the  related  particulars 
regarding  the  knowledge  of  the  Incarnate  Jesus  Christ. 
I  draw  attention  to  this  textual  point  because  I  think  it  is  because  of  this  that 
Heiko  Oberman  has  misunderstood  the  structure  of  the  treatise,  which  substantially 
confuses  his  interpretation.   Oberman  takes  the  second  statement  of  the  question  to 
be  introducing  a  second  part  of  the  treatise  on  the  separate  question  of  Christ's 
foreknowledge.    From  what  I  have  argued  above,  however,  I  believe  that  Oberman 107
106  Richard  Moll  has  quite  validly  objected  that  this  conclusion  seems  somewhat  backwards:  in 
particular,  it  glosses  over  the  fact  that,  from  a  text-editing  perspective,  much  more  authoritative 
credence   ought  to  be  to  the  main  body  text  than  to  editorial  headings;  the  “Christus  qui  est”  appears  in 
the  main  body  of  text,  while  the  appearance  of  the  question  without  those  words  appears  in  an  editorial 
heading,   which  is  presumably  a  later  addition.    Moll  may  very  well  be  right  that  my  conclusion  is 
ill-founded   from  a  textual-historical  perspective;  however,  even  if  it  is  indeed  the  case  that  the  inclusion 
of  “Christus   qui  est”  was  intentional   on  Bradwardine’s  part,  it  remains  a  serious  puzzle  why  his 
subsequent   discussion   does  little  to  address  the  particularities  of  that  question. 
107  Oberman,   pp.  107  ff,  especially  p.  111.   I  should  note  here  that  we  ought  not  to  be  too  harsh  in  our 
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is  mistaken  in  his  assessment  of  the  work's  structure  as  two  distinct  questions.   I 
think  also  that  Genest  is  mistaken  in  supposing  that  the  main  aim  of  the  entire 
treatise  is  the  treatment  of  the  question  of  Christ’s  knowledge.   In  sum,  it  seems  to 
me  to  be  far  more  sensible  to  treat  the  entire  treatise  as  a  continuous  treatment  of 
the  first  question,  and  the  addition  of  the  words  “ Christus  qui  est ”  as  a  textual  error. 
 
3.2  -  The  nine  opinions 
Now  that  we  have  an  idea  of  the  overall  structure  of  the  DFC,  we  are  ready  to 
turn  to  a  summary  of  the  first  part,  in  which  nine  “opinions”  are  examined  by 
Bradwardine  and,  in  almost  every  case,  dismissed.   For  the  most  part,  I  will  be  quite 
brief,  pausing  over  only  a  couple  which  merit  further  examination.   And  I  will  save 
discussion  of  the  eighth  opinion  —  that  of  Ockham  —  ’til  the  next  section  (3.3).   This 
cursory  summary  may  strike  the  reader  as  a  frustrating  offering  of  mere  “teasers,” 
without  much  in-depth  investigation  of  their  merit  or  broader  implications.   But  I 
feel  that  presenting  them  in  this  way  is  in  some  ways  necessary  and  unavoidable  in 
the  current  project:  presenting  each  view,  however  briefly,  seems  necessary  for  an 
adequate  summary  of  an  almost  unknown  work;  and  doing  so  with  brevity  and 
terseness  is  unavoidable  if  we  are  not  to  become  too  distracted  from  the  main  thrust 
of  the  project. 
Something  that  may  be  useful  to  keep  in  mind  when  considering  these  views 
is  the  spectrum  I  laid  out  in  the  main  Introduction  of  solutions  to  the  problem  of 
future  contingents,  from  a  denial  of  free  will  (Determinism)  on  the  one  end,  to  a 
denial  of  God’s  foreknowledge  (Open  Theism)  on  the  other.   For  at  least  some  of  the 
judgment   of  Oberman’s  scholarship   on  this  account:  at  the  time  of  the  publication  of  his  book  on  the 
theology   of  Bradwardine,  no  edition   of  the  complete  DFC  existed,  and  he  had  to  rely  on  the  very 
incomplete  publication   by  E.B.M.  Xiberta,   O.  Carm,  “Fragments  d’una  questio  inedita  de  Thomas 
Bradwardina,”  in  Festschrift  für  M.  Grabmann   (Münster,  1935),  pp.  1169  -  1180  in  BB, 
Supplementvolume  III,  2  (Publication   from  Cod.  Vat.  Lat.  813).   It  is  quite  understandable,  therefore,  that 
he  did  not  have  an  accurate  understanding  of  the  overall  structure  of  the  work. 
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solutions  that  follow,  it  is  useful  to  consider  how  they  might  map  onto  this  spectrum. 
 
Opinions  1  &  2 
The  first  opinion  which  Bradwardine  considers  (DFC  3a  -  8g)  is  that  nothing 
is  future.   This  is  supported  by  a  sophistical  argument  that  the  future  is  nothing 
(because  it  does  not  presently  exist),  and  so  by  inversion,  nothing  is  future.   But  this, 
Bradwardine  argues,  is  not  consistent  with  our  own  experience  of  the  passage  of 
time.   We  experience  time  as  successive,  and  perceive  our  own  present  to  have  been 
future  to  time  past;  that  time  which  stands  in  the  same  relationship  to  our  present  as 
our  present  stands  to  the  past  is  simply  what  we  mean  by  future.   To  say  that  nothing 
will  be  future  does  not  bear  out  our  own  experience  of  times  past. 
The  second  opinion  (DFC  9a  -  9d)  concedes  that  there  are  future  things,  but 
as  the  first  opinion  claims  that  future  things  are  nothing,  the  second  claims  that 
future  things  have  no  power.   In  virtue  of  their  lack  of  power,  the  second  opinion 
asserts  that  future  things  have  no  power  for  being,  or  becoming,  and  are  hence 
unable  to  be.   Bradwardine  responds,  by  appeal  to  Anselm,  that  it  is  not  through  a 
thing’s  own  power  that  it  comes  to  be  in  the  first  place,  but  rather  by  God’s  power:  so 
a  thing’s  powerlessness  to  bring  itself  into  being  is  irrelevant,  since  no-one  claims 
that  that  is  the  power  that  brings  it  about,  anyway. 
 
Opinion  3 
The  third  opinion  (DFC  10  -  12)  expresses  what  Bradwardine  takes  to  be 
Aristotle’s  opinion,  as  made  clear  by  one  of  the  few  explicit  attributions 
Bradwardine  cites  among  the  nine  opinions  (“Et  hoc  patet  per  Philosophum…”,  or, 
“And  this  holds  according  to  the  Philosopher…”).   This  opinion  is  clearly  an 
interpretation  of  Aristotle’s  view  as  laid  out  in  the  De  interpretatione ,  which 
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Bradwardine  summarizes  as  putting  forward  the  view  that  future  contingents  are 
not  determined,  and  thus  that  propositions  concerning  them  have  no  determinate 
truth  value,  so  are  neither  true  nor  false.   It  is  interesting  to  compare  this 
interpretation  to  the  contested  interpretation  of  Boethius,  discussed  in  1.1.1;  and 
also  to  that  of  Ockham,  discussed  in  2.2.2.   (Doing  so  will  uncover  subtle  differences 
in  possible  interpretation  that  may  affect  our  evaluation  of  the  charity  of 
Bradwardine’s  criticisms  of  the  opinion.)   Among  Bradwardine’s  objections  to  this 
claim  is  that  it  would  make  nonsense  of  claims  of  God’s  foreknowledge,  since  God 
could  not  have  determinate  knowledge  of  things  that  were  not  determined. 
Bradwardine  says  that  on  this  account,  the  only  sort  of  foreknowledge  God  might 
have  is  that  “under  a  disjunction”  (i.e.,  the  knowledge  of  the  tautology,  “A  will  happen 
or  A  will  not  happen”),  but  “any  idiot  knows  in  that  way!”  108
 
Opinions  4  &  5 
The  fourth  opinion  (DFC  13a  -  15c)  is  somewhat  peculiar,  and  a  bit  difficult  to 
parse  out:  according  to  this  opinion,  things  which  are  going  to  be,  begin  at  a  certain 
point  to  be  going  to  be.   In  other  words,  future  things  were  not  going  to  be  from 
eternity,  but  only  from  a  certain  point  in  time.   But  Bradwardine  does  not  think  this 
makes  a  whole  lot  of  sense:  suppose  some  future  thing,  A,  begins  to  be  going  to  be  at 
some  future  point  in  time.   Then  is  it  not  the  case  now  that  A  will  begin  to  be  going  to 
be  in  the  future  —  and  hence,  does  it  not  follow  that  even  now  (and  from  eternity!), 
A  is  going  to  be?   Furthermore,  if  something  begins  to  be  going  to  be  at  a  certain 
point  in  time,  then  wasn’t  there  an  earlier  point  in  time  at  which  that  beginning 
began  to  be  going  to  be?   And  prior  to  that,  would  there  not  have  been  a  beginning 
for  that  beginning?   And  so  on  ad  infinitum .   All  in  all,  though,  it  is  not  entirely  clear 
to  me  what  the  upshot  of  this  opinion  is:  in  what  way  does  it  attempt  to  resolve  any 
108  Similiter  sic  sequitur   quod  Deus  nihil  presciret  nisi  sub  disjunctione,  et  sic  scit  quilibet  ydiota.   (DFC 
11c) 
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of  the  problems  inherent  in  future  contingents?   It  is  also  not  an  opinion  that  I 
recognize  as  having  actually  belonged  to  anyone  in  particular,  despite  Bradwardine’s 
confusing  suggestion  that  Aristotle  defends  the  position  (as  well  as  its  refutation  — 
DFC  13c,  14a).   In  any  case,  an  investigation  of  this  confusing  position  —  though 
certainly  beyond  the  scope  of  our  current  endeavour  —  may  be  worth  further  study.
 109
The  fifth  opinion  (DFC  16a  -  d)  is  the  rather  impious  suggestion  that  God  does 
not  in  fact  have  any  foreknowledge  of  future  contingents.   This,  Bradwardine  claims 
—  by  an  obscure  reference  to  a  work  on  dreams  which  he  calls  De  sompno  [sic]  et 
vigilia  —  is  implicitly  affirmed  by  Averroes  (DFC  16b).   Bradwardine  defers  his  reply 
to  this  opinion  until  after  his  own  discussion,  in  which  he  will  make  clear  how  it  is 
that  God  in  fact  does  have  knowledge  of  future  contingents. 
 
Opinion  6 
The  sixth  opinion  (DFC  17  -  19)  is  the  classic  Anselmian-Augustinian  view 
(attributed  by  Bradwardine  to  Anselm)  that,  by  virtue  of  God’s  transcendence  of 
time,  all  of  time  —  past,  present,  and  future  —  is  present  to  God.   God’s 
transcendence  of  time  is  a  result  of  time  being  a  part  of  the  created  order;  time  did 
not  pre-exist  the  creation  of  the  universe,  on  this  view.   Thus,  what  is  future  for  us  is 
not  future  for  God.   Because  of  this,  God’s  knowledge  of  what  is  future  to  us  is  not,  in 
relation  to  God,  fore knowledge  at  all,  since  it  is  only  knowledge  of  what  is  present  to 
God.   Thus,  it  is  claimed  on  this  view  that  there  is  nothing  about  this  sort  of 
knowledge  that  results  in  any  compulsion  for  something  to  turn  out  as  it  is  known  — 
no  more  than  our  knowledge  of  what  is  present  to  us  adds  any  compulsion  for 
something  to  turn  out  as  it  does. 
109  In  particular,  it  may  be  fruitful   to  consider   this  question  in  relation  to  Bradwardine’s  own  treatise  on 
beginning   and  ceasing,   De  incipit  et  desinit ,  ed.  L.O.  Nielson,   in  Cahiers  de  L'Institut   du  Moyen-Âge  Grec  et 
Latin ,  vol.  42  (1982),   pp.  47  –  83. 
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We  have  already  discussed  the  view  of  Anselm  in  great  detail  (1.2),  so  I  will 
not  say  much  more  about  it  here.   Interestingly,  though,  while  Bradwardine  does  put 
forward  a  couple  of  objections  to  this  opinion,  all  are  immediately  given  responses. 
Unlike  all  other  opinions  of  the  first  section,  this  one  ends  not  with  a  sed  contra 
argument,  but  a  respondetur  (DFC  19).   It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  Bradwardine 
does  not,  in  fact,  reject  this  opinion.   As  we  will  see  when  his  own  argument  unfolds, 
it  seems  as  though  Bradwardine  takes  his  own  solution  to  the  problem  of  future 
contingents  to  be  an  elaboration  upon,  or  a  refinement  of,  this  sixth  opinion.   This 
supports  my  argument  that  Bradwardine’s  own  solution  ought  to  be  understood  as 
following  in  a  lineage  of  positions  that  includes  that  of  Anselm. 
 
Opinions  7  (&  8)  &  9 
The  seventh  opinion  (DFC  20)  is  one  which  Bradwardine  claims  to  find  too 
preposterous,  “so  entirely  contrary  to  both  philosophy  and  theology,”  that  it  does  not 
even  merit  a  response:  it  is  the  view  that  nothing  is  contingent,  but  that  everything 
happens  by  necessity.   Although  Bradwardine  does  not  make  the  attribution,  a  view 
like  this  has  been  attributed  by  several  scholars  to  Averroes.   Despite  Bradwardine’s 
emphatic  insistence  that  necessitarianism  is  entirely  untenable  as  a  philosophical  or 
theological  position,  as  we  shall  explore  in  the  following  chapter,  it  may  be  the  case 
that  Bradwardine’s  own  view  strays  alarmingly  close  to  this  position.   Perhaps,  in  his 
adamant  dismissal  of  this  position,  the  Profound  Doctor  doth  protest  too  much. 
The  eighth  opinion  (DFC  21  -  38g)  is  that  which  receives  Bradwardine’s 
greatest  attention  by  far:  it  is  the  opinion  of  Ockham,  which  we  will  examine  in  much 
greater  depth,  along  with  Bradwardine’s  objections,  in  the  next  section  (3.3). 
The  ninth  and  final  opinion  (DFC  39  -  40g),  unattributed  by  Bradwardine, 
claims  that  those  future  things  which  God  explicitly  foretells  (in  prophecy,  promises, 
and  the  like)  are  necessary,  but  all  other  things  are  not.   Bradwardine  has  two  main 
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objections  to  this  claim.   Firstly,  he  takes  it  to  be  the  case  that,  even  if  God  does  not 
explicitly  foretell  something,  that  God  could  foretell  that  thing  if  God  so  wished 
(since  God  freely  spoke  everything  into  being,  and  has  complete  knowledge  of  all 
things  that  will  be);  thus  it  would  appear  to  follow  that  everything  could  be 
necessary.   Bradwardine  seems  then  to  follow  a  line  of  reasoning  consistent  with  an 
S5  modal  system,  concluding  that  if  it  is  possible  for  something  to  be  necessary,  then 
it  is  necessary.   So  this  leads  to  the  result,  already  rejected  in  the  seventh  opinion, 
that  everything  is  necessary.   Furthermore,  this  position  would  seem  to  reverse  the 
causal  relationship  between  what  is  foretold  and  the  foretelling:  things  do  not 
happen,  argues  Bradwardine,  because  they  have  been  foretold,  but  rather,  something 
may  be  foretold  because  it  is  going  to  happen .   He  illustrates  his  point  with  the 
prophecy  of  Isaiah  that  “a  virgin  shall  conceive  and  bear  a  son”:  Jesus  was  not  born 
of  a  virgin  because  Isaiah  prophesied  that  he  would  be;  rather,  Isaiah  prophesied  a 
virgin  birth  because  that  was  the  way  in  which  Jesus  would  be  born  (DFC  40g). 
 
Analysis 
With  this  ninth  opinion,  Bradwardine  concludes  his  survey  of  responses  to 
the  problem  of  future  contingents.   We  may  notice  gaps  in  Bradwardine’s  survey: 
most  notably,  perhaps,  there  is  no  explicit  discussion  of  any  opinion  that  seems  to  be 
like  that  of  Duns  Scotus  (see  1.3).   (I  will  claim  shortly  that  a  strongly  possible 
reason  for  this  absence  in  the  survey  is  that  Scotus’  view  is  one  which  Bradwardine 
himself  will  pick  up  and  elaborate  upon  in  his  own  responsio  propria .)   But  as  has 
been  noted  already  (see  the  Introduction),  in  our  consideration  of  a  spectrum  of 
views  on  the  problem  of  future  contingents  and  God’s  foreknowledge,  there  are  two 
extreme  possible  solutions,  while  all  other  solutions  try  to  avoid  falling  into  either 
extreme:  on  the  one  extreme,  the  problem  is  solved  by  rejecting  the  existence  of 
future  contingents,  in  one  of  various  forms  of  determinism  or  necessitarianism.   The 
trouble  with  this  extreme  is  that  it  would  seem,  at  least  on  the  face  of  it,  to 
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undermine  human  free  will.   On  the  other  extreme  lies  the  denial  that  God  does,  in 
fact,  know  all  things  future.   (In  contemporary  theology,  this  sort  of  solution  arises  in 
the  context  of  what  has  been  called  “Open  Theism”,  as  influentially  espoused  by  the 
late  Clark  Pinnock,  Canadian  Protestant  theologian  at  McMaster  University.  110
Among  philosophers  of  religion,  this  position  has  been  vigorously  embraced  by,  e.g., 
William  Hasker,   and  aspects  of  Open  Theism’s  particular  criticisms  of  Classical 111
Theism  can  be  seen  already  in,  e.g.,  Alvin  Plantinga.    The  direct  denial  of  God’s 112
foreknowledge  is  also  strongly  present  throughout  the  work  of  Richard  Swinburne, 
and  is,  in  fact,  among  the  more  controversial  of  Swinburne’s  theistic  claims. ) 113
However,  this  opposite  extreme  undermines  God's  omniscience. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Bradwardine’s  list  of  nine  opinions  is  not  at  all 
comprehensive,  we  should  note  that  both  of  these  two  extreme  solutions  can  be 
identified  among  them.   Necessitarianism,  which  is  the  seventh  listed,  is  simply 
dismissed  as  “opposed  to  philosophy  as  much  as  to  theology.”  (DFC  20)   We  also  see 
a  denial  of  the  existence  of  future  contingents  in  the  first  opinion,  which  not  only 
rejects  the  contingency  of  future  things,  but  even  their  very  existence!   (DFC  3ff)   On 
the  other  extreme,  something  like  “Open  Theism”  is  found  in  the  third  opinion, 
purportedly  Aristotle’s,  which  says  that  of  a  future  contingent  A,  God  only  knows 
that  A  will  be  or  A  will  not  be.  (DFC  10ff) 
But  none  of  these  eight  opinions  is  really  Bradwardine’s  chief  target  in  this 
project  of  his.   For  that,  we  must  turn  to  his  treatment  of  Ockham’s  position. 
 
3.3  -  Bradwardine’s  case  against  Ockham 
110  See,  e.g.,  Clark  Pinnock,   The  Openness  of  God  (Downers  Grove,  IL:  InterVarsity  Press,  1994);  and  Most 
Moved  Mover:  A  Theology  of  God’s  Openness  (Carlisle:  Paternoster,  2001). 
111  William   Hasker,  Foreknowledge,  Evil,  and  the  Openness  of  God  (London:   Routledge,   2004). 
112  Alvin  Plantinga,  “On  Ockham’s  Way  Out,”  Faith  and  Philosophy  vol.  3  (1986),   pp.  235  -  69.   Reprinted 
in  Thomas   V.  Morris,   ed.,  The  Concept  of  God  (Oxford:  OUP,  1987),  pp.  171  -  200. 
113  Richard  Swinburne,   The  Coherence  of  Theism ,  revised  edition   (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1993). 
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Bradwardine’s  objections  to  Ockham’s  solution  to  the  problem  of  future 
contingents  in  De  futuris  contingentibus  fit  within  his  broader  anti-Ockhamist 
project,  a  project  which  is  seen  most  explicitly  in  the  thousand-page  anti-Pelagian 
polemic  of  the  next  decade,  De  causa  Dei .   In  the  De  futuris  contingentibus ,  however, 
his  objections  to  Ockham  arise  in  the  context  of  his  refutations  of  nine  separate 
solutions  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents.   As  we  have  seen,  these  nine 
solutions  range  from  a  statement  denying  God’s  foreknowledge  (the  fifth  opinion, 
DFC  16a  ff.),  to  a  statement  of  absolute  determinism  (the  seventh  opinion,  DFC  20). 
Almost  all  of  the  nine  opinions  receive  brief,  terse  replies,  some  of  which  have  been 
summarized  above;  but  to  the  eighth,  Bradwardine  devotes  fifteen  or  more  pages  of 
text.   This  eighth  position  is  that  of  William  Ockham. 
Bradwardine's  concentrated  attention  on  this  one  view  seems  not  to  spring 
so  much  from  finding  it  a  particularly  difficult  or  subtle  position  to  reject,  but  rather, 
from  an  impulse  to  show  us  just  how  entirely  bad  the  view  really  is.   It  seems, 
therefore,  that  in  Ockham's  theory,  we  discover  the  primary  motivation  for 
Bradwardine's  treatise  –  and  that  is  to  offer  an  alternative  to  the  solution  of  his 
Oxford  adversary.   One  way  of  understanding  Ockham’s  position  that  helps  us  to 
understand  Bradwardine’s  deep  suspicion  of  it  is  to  observe  that  it  seems  that,  for 
Ockham,  what  is  most  important  in  his  development  of  a  solution  is  the  preservation 
of  the  true  contingency  of  future  events.   That  future  contingents  are  truly 
contingent  is,  as  it  were,  taken  as  a  given,  and  the  rest  of  the  account  developed 
accordingly  to  correspond  with  this  fact.   In  a  certain  way,  it  seems  that  Ockham’s 
position  unfolds  around  the  central  tenet  of  future  contingents,  such  that  he  is 
saying,  “In  light  of  this,  what  is  to  be  said  of  God's  knowledge  of  future  contingents?” 
From  this  perspective,  it  seems  that,  concerning  any  future  contingent  event 
A,  Ockham  would  have  it,  concerning  God’s  knowledge  of  A,  that,  because  A  is 
contingent,  God's  knowledge  of  A  is  also  contingent.   Ockham's  claim  is  that 
knowledge  of  future  events  cannot  be  ascribed  the  same  properties  as  knowledge  of 
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present  or  past  events.  Because  the  subject  matter  of  the  knowledge  in  question  is 
future  and  contingent,  Ockham  would  have  it  that  God’s  knowledge  of  these  things  is 
itself  future  and  contingent  in  some  special  sense.   Through  this  assertion,  Ockham 
blocks  the  conclusion  that  God's  foreknowledge  of  A  entails  the  necessity  of  A:  for  if 
God's  knowledge  of  A  is  future  and  contingent,  we  cannot  ascribe  to  it  the  sort  of 
necessity  generally  thought  to  inhere  in  past  and  present  knowledge.   Since  the 
knowledge  itself  is  not  necessary,  it  therefore  does  not  in  any  way  follow  that  its 
subject,  A,  is  necessary.   But  to  make  this  work,  it  was  necessary  for  Ockham  to  deny 
necessity  of  God’s  knowledge.   And  thus,  Bradwardine  summarizes  Ockham’s  view 
by  saying,  “something  is  going  to  happen  contingently  ad  utrumlibet   and  is 114
foreknown  by  God  in  this  present  instant,  but  .  .  .  it  is  possible,  even  for  this  present 
instant,  that  it  could  not  be  going  to  be,  nor  foreknown  by  God.”    As  has  just  been 115
discussed  in  the  preceding  section,  this  solution  raises  some  important 
epistemological  and  logical  problems.   But  despite  these  other  issues,  as  we  shall 
see,  what  Bradwardine  is  primarily  concerned  with  are  the  ways  this  solution  seems 
to  undermine  the  absolute  omniscience  of  God. 
 
3.3.1  -  Bradwardine’s  case 
Bradwardine  makes  his  case  against  Ockham  in  the  eighth  section  of  the  nine 
purported  solutions  and  rebuttals  that  he  considers  (DFC  21  -  37g).   He  summarizes 
Ockham’s  position  in  the  following  way: 
The  eighth  opinion  posits  that  something  is  going  to  happen  contingently  ad 
utrumlibet  and  is  foreknown  by  God  in  this  present  instant,  but  that  it  is 
possible,  even  for  this  present  instant,  that  it  could  not  be  going  to  be,  nor 
foreknown  by  God  –  nay,  even  more,  that  at  no  time  was  it  ever  going  to  be, 
114  More  about  this  phrase  —  which  means  something  like  “in  either  way”  —  and  my  reasons  for  leaving 
it  untranslated  can  be  found  in  the  first  footnote  of  the  appendix,  as  well  as  in  the  introduction,  p.  4ff. 
115  aliquod   est  futurum   contingens   ad  utrumlibet   et  prescitum  a  Deo  in  isto  instanti  presenti,  et  quod 
tamen  possibile   est  pro  isto  instanti   presenti  quod  non  sit  futurum  nec  prescitum  a  Deo…  (DFC  21;  this 
passage   will  be  quoted  more  fully  in  just  a  moment). 
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nor  [was  it]  foreknown  by  God. 
 
Octava  opinio  est  que  ponit  quod  aliquod  est  futurum  contingens  ad 
utrumlibet  et  prescitum  a  Deo  in  isto  instanti  presenti,  et  quod  tamen 
possibile  est  pro  isto  instanti  presenti  quod  non  sit  futurum  nec  prescitum  a 
Deo,  ymmo  quod  nunquam  fuerit  futurum  nec  prescitum  a  Deo.   (DFC  21) 
 
It  must  be  noted  that  Bradwardine  does  not  explicitly  name  Ockham  as  the 
originator  of  this  view  —  indeed,  few  of  the  nine  opinions,  except  the  third 
(Aristotle)  and  the  sixth  (Anselm),   are  given  an  explicit  attribution. 116
At  least  two  clues  let  us  know  that  it  is  Ockham’s  position  that  Bradwardine 
has  in  his  sights  in  the  eighth  opinion.   Firstly,  the  characterization  fits  at  least  a 
certain  interpretation  of  Ockham’s  position,  and  is  consistent  with  Bradwardine’s 
own  characterizations  of  Ockham’s  position  in  later  writing:  future  contingents  are 
known  by  God  in  a  way  that  is  contingent,  and  thus  in  such  a  way  that  those  events 
could  yet  turn  out  not  to  happen.   In  such  a  case,  then  God  will  not  have  known  them 
to  be  going  to  be,  since  they  would  not  have  happened,  which  seems  to  be  what  is 
expressed  in  the  passage  above.   Secondly,  this  is  the  opinion  which  receives 
Bradwardine’s  most  sustained  attack  by  far,  indicating  Bradwardine’s  intense 
interest  in  replying  to  this  particular  opinion.   Given  Bradwardine’s  evident  interest 
in  refuting  Ockham’s  position  on  future  contingents  in  later  writing  (notably,  the  De 
116  The  sixth  opinion   (DFC  17)  is  attributed  by  Bradwardine  to  Anselm,  though  Genest  has  suggested 
that  this  opinion   is  perhaps  more  accurately  Boethian:“La  sixième  opinion,  qui  remonte  à  Boèce,  mais 
que  Bradwardine  place  ici  spécialement   sous  le  patronage  de  s.  Anselme,  soutient  que  la  connaissance 
que  Dieu  a  de  l’avenir  n’est  pas  à  proprement  parler  une  prescience,  les  futurs  étant  présents  à  l’éternité 
divine.”   (Genest,  263)   I  am  not  convinced  that  Genest  is  correct  to  trace  this  view  to  Boethius  rather 
than  Anselm.    Indeed,   the  sixth  view  seems  certainly  to  reflect  the  view  defended  by  Anselm  in  De 
concordia ,  and  though  Boethius   gestures  toward  a  model  of  this  sort,  his  view  is  much  more  concerned 
with  an  understanding  of  the  way  in  which  God’s  knowledge  differs  from  our  own  so  as  to  make  God’s 
foreknowledge  of  our  actions   non-compelling  (why  “Goddes  worthy  forwityng”  does  not  “streyneth  me 
nedely  for  to  doon  a  thyng,”  as  Chaucer   would  put  it),  and  his  discussion  of  conditional  necessity.   If  I 
were  to  point  to  anyone  as  a  precursor   to  Anselm   in  the  view  that  God  foreknows  all  things  in  virtue  of 
their  being  eternally  present  to  God,  I  would  pick  out  Augustine,  not  Boethius.   But  about  this,  more  will 
be  said  in  the  following  chapter. 
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causa  Dei ),  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  his  preoccupation  with  this  position 
began  somewhat  earlier,  and  is  evident  in  this  work.   Genest  agrees  with  the 
identification  of  the  eighth  view  as  Ockham’s,  and  also  agrees  with  the  assessment 
that  this  opinion  is  the  real  target  of  Bradwardine’s  treatise,  saying  that  “the 
principle  target  for  Bradwardine  is  clearly  the  eighth  opinion,  in  which  we  recognize 
the  Ockhamist  theory  of  future  contingents.”  117
We  have  examined  already,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  a  number  of  potential 
problems  with  Ockham’s  solution,  but  Bradwardine’s  objections  are  somewhat 
different  than  those  outlined  previously.   To  summarize  Bradwardine's  reply,  his 
chief  complaint  against  Ockham's  solution  is  that  attributing  to  God  knowledge  that 
is  contingent  undermines  God's  immutability.  Contingent  knowledge,  at  least  on 
Bradwardine’s  understanding  of  contingency,  must  be  knowledge  that  could  come 
into  or  out  of  existence:  for  God  to  have  such  knowledge  would  imply  that  God  might 
know  A  at  time  t 1 ,  and  cease  to  know  A  at  t 2 .  Loss  of  knowledge  seems,  to 
Bradwardine,  to  constitute  a  substantial  change  in  the  knower,  leading  to  the 
unacceptable  consequence  that  God  is  mutable. 
For  instance,  the  first  objection  Bradwardine  levels  against  Ockham’s  position 
runs  as  follows: 
But  against  this,  consider  the  following:  it  follows  that  it  is  possible  that 
something  would  be  going  to  be  that  is  not  now  going  to  be.  This  consequent 
is  false,  since,  if  it  were  so  [the  following  argument  could  be  made]:  Suppose 
that  it  is  now  that  instant  [in  the  future],  and  [suppose]  that  A  would 
[happen];  it  may  then  be  argued  as  follows:  A  is  now  going  to  be,  and 
previously  A  was  not  going  to  be,  therefore  it  is  changed  from  not-going-to-be 
to  going-to-be;  and  it  is  not  changed  because  of  a  change  in  itself  (since  it  did 
not  exist  before  now);  it  is  therefore  the  case  that,  if  A  is  changed,  it  is 
because  of  a  change  in  something  else.  This  consequent  is  false,  since  in  the 
same  way  that  it  has  just  been  argued  concerning  possibility  that  A  can  be 
changed  from  not-going-to-be  to  going-to-be,  so  too  could  it  be  argued 
117  “Mais  la  cible  principale   de  Bradwardine  est  évidement  la  huitième  opinion,  où  l’on  reconnaît  la 
théorie   ockhamiste  des  futurs  contingents.”  (Genest  263) 
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concerning  [A’s]  essence. 
 
Sed  contra  sic  :  sequitur  quod  possibile  est  quod  aliquod  sit  futurum  quod 
nunc  non  est  futurum.  Consequens  est  falsum,  quia,  si  sic,  ponatur  illud 
instans  in  esse,  et  sit  A,  et  arguitur  sic  :  A  est  futurum  nunc,  et  prius  non  fuit 
futurum,  igitur  mutatur  de  non  futuro  ad  futurum;  et  non  sic  mutatur  propter 
mutacionem  in  seipso,  cum  non  sit  adhuc  ;  igitur  oportet  quod,  si  A  mutatur, 
sit  propter  mutacionem  in  alio.  Consequens  est  falsum,  quia  sic  arguitur  de 
possibili  quod  A  potest  mutari  de  non  futuro  ad  futurum  sicut  arguitur  de 
inesse.   (DFC  22a) 
 
If  it  were  the  case,  argues  Bradwardine,  that  something  could  come  to  be  that  was 
previously  not  going  to  be,  as  would  seem  to  follow  from  Ockham’s  claim  that  God’s 
foreknowledge  is  contingent,  then  something  must  change  between  the  time  when 
the  thing  was  not  going  to  be  and  the  time  that  it  came  to  be,  other  than  the  thing 
itself .   This  is  because  prior  to  the  thing’s  coming  to  be,  nothing  of  it  exists  to 
undergo  change.   We  see  in  this  objection  premonitions  of  things  to  come:  for  in 
what  “other”  thing  might  that  change  occur  than  God? 
The  connexion  to  God’s  mutability  is  drawn  out  more  strongly  in  the  second 
objection,  several  paragraphs  later: 
Secondly,  [one  objects]  to  the  principal  [argument]  in  this  way:  If  God  has 
foreknowledge  of  ad  utrumlibet  future  contingents,  it  follows  that  God  can 
will  and  promise  the  opposite  of  what  is  now  known,  promised,  and  willed  by 
him.  This  consequent  is  false,  since  in  this  way  God  could  be  changed  with 
respect  to  knowledge,  will,  and  promises,  which  is  contrary  to  what  is  said  in 
Malachi  3  [v.  6]:  “I  am  the  L ORD ,  and  I  do  not  change”;  and  so  it  follows  that 
[if]  it  will  not  be  just  as  God  has  promised  or  has  willed  it  to  be,  then  God  is 
changed. 
 
Secundo  ad  principale  sic  :  si  Deus  habet  prescienciam  futurorum 
contingencium  ad  utrumlibet,  sequitur  quod  Deus  potest  velle  et  promittere 
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oppositum  nunc  sciti,  promissi  et  voliti  ab  eo.  Consequens  est  falsum,  quia  sic 
Deus  potest  mutari  de  scitis,  volitis  et  promissis,  quod  est  contra  illud 
Malachie  3:  «  Ego  Dominus  et  non  mutor  »;  et  ita  sequitur  quod  non  erit  sic 
sicut  Deus  promisit  vel  voluit  fore,  igitur  Deus  mutatur.   (DFC  23a) 
 
Bradwardine  is  arguing  that  God’s  foreknowledge,  as  understood  by  Ockham,  leads 
to  the  consequence  that  key  aspects  of  God’s  nature  —  namely,  God’s  knowledge, 
God’s  will,  and  God’s  promise-making  —  are  mutable.   This  is  so  because, 
Bradwardine  reasons,  on  Ockham’s  model,  things  may  turn  out  otherwise  than  they 
were  at  one  point  going  to  turn  out.   So  suppose  at  time  t 1 ,  some  future  event  A  was 
not  going  to  happen.   Then  at  t 1 ,  God  knew  that  A  would  not  happen,  perhaps  willed 
that  A  would  not  happen,  and  perhaps  even  promised  that  A  would  not  happen.   But 
because  of  A’s  contingency,  Bradwardine’s  Ockham  may  suppose  that  A  does  in  fact 
happen,  say  at  time  t 2 .   Were  A  to  happen  at  t 2 ,  after  it  had  been  the  case  at  t 1   that  A 
was  not  going  to  happen  —  along  with  God’s  corresponding  knowledge,  will,  and 
perhaps  even  promises  —  then  at  t 2   God’s  knowledge,  will,  and  promises  are 
substantially  different,  and  consequently,  God  will  have  changed.   This,  as 
Bradwardine  attests,  is  contrary  not  only  to  the  Classical  or  Neoplatonist  notions  of 
God,  but  to  the  character  and  person  of  God  as  presented  in  the  Jewish  and  Christian 
canons  of  Scripture. 
We  next  come  to  a  series  of  objections  relating  directly  to  God’s  promises  as 
revealed  in  prophecy,  which  Bradwardine  frequently  refers  to  as  “seeing  in  the 
Word,”  i.e.  seeing  what  is  revealed  by  the  second  Person  of  the  Trinity,  identified 
throughout  Scripture  as  the  Wisdom,  Word,  or  λογος  of  God.    These  objections  also 118
118  The  identification   of  the  Word  of  God  with  the  second  Person  of  the  Trinity  is  very  ancient  in  the 
Christian   tradition,   tracing  its  origin  at  least  as  far  back  as  St  John’s  Gospel  of  the  first  century,  with  the 
famous  opening   prologue,   “In  the  beginning   was  the  Word  ( λογος ),  and  the  Word  was  with  God,  and  the 
Word  was  God  .  .  .  .  And  the  Word  became   flesh  and  dwelt  among  us.”  (John  1.1,  14a)   St  John  appears  to 
be  quite  deliberate  in  his  appropriation   of  the  term  λογος ,  which  has  a  rich  philosophical   history 
reaching   back  to  the  Presocratics,  from  Heraclitus  onward.   Christian  commentators  on  Old  Testament 
texts,  following  John’s  lead,  quickly  came  to  identify  instances  of  God’s  speech  acts  (e.g.,  in  the  creation 
narratives)  and  references  to  “the  word  of  God”  or  “the  word  of  the  L ORD ”  (e.g.,  Gen.  15.1,  Is.  55.11),   as 
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deal  explicitly  with  problems  relating  to  the  predestined  and  the  reprobate. 
Thirdly,  [it  may  be  objected]  in  this  way  to  the  principle  [argument]:  if 
whatever  is  going  to  be  can  be  not  going  to  be,  then  it  follows  that,  with 
respect  to  the  future,  it  cannot  be  something  revealed  in  the  Word  [i.e.,  by 
God].  This  consequent  is  false,  but  the  consequence  holds,  since  if  it  were  so 
[that  whatever  is  going  to  be  can  be  not  going  to  be],  it  would  follow  that 
what  has  already  happened  can  have  not  happened,  [so  for  example] 
someone  who  died  in  mortal  sin  can  have  not  died  in  mortal  sin,  and  so  also 
someone  who  died  in  a  state  of  grace  can  have  not  died  in  a  state  of  grace,  and 
so  also  a  damned  person  can  not  ever  have  been  damned,  and  a  saved  person 
can  not  ever  have  been  saved.  This  consequent  is  therefore  false.  But  the 
consequence  holds:  I  suppose  that  A  sees  in  the  Word  [i.e.,  has  a  vision  from 
God]  that  B  is  about  to  be,  and  that  it  would  be  expected,  under  penalty  of 
mortal  sin,  that  A  would  foretell  and  affirm  what  A  sees  in  the  Word,  and 
[would  foretell]  nothing  other  than  what  A  sees  in  the  Word.   Then  suppose 
that  A  foretells  that  B  is  going  to  be,  and  that  through  [sharing]  this 
prediction  and  through  obedience  [A]  is  saved,  and  otherwise  [A]  is  not 
[saved].  Then  it  may  be  argued  as  follows:  it  is  possible  for  B  not  to  happen, 
therefore  it  is  possible  for  [A]  not  to  have  foretold  that  B  was  going  to  be;  and 
consequently,  if  [A]  is  saved  precisely  because  of  [A’s]  foretelling,  it  is  possible 
for  [A]  not  to  have  been  saved.  And  so  the  proposition  follows,  namely,  that 
the  past  can  not  be  the  past  [i.e.,  can  not  have  happened],  and  other  things  of 
this  sort,  since  if  B  is  not  going  to  be,  [A]  did  not  see  in  the  Word  [that]  B  is 
about  to  be  going  to  be,  and  consequently,  [A]  did  not  foretell  it  to  be  so,  nor, 
consequently,  was  [A]  saved  because  of  this  [foretelling];  therefore,  etc. 
 
Tercio  sic  ad  principale  :  si  quodlibet  futurum  potest  non  esse  futurum,  igitur 
sequitur  quod  de  futuris  non  potest  esse  aliqua  revelacio  in  Verbo. 
well  as  to  “the  wisdom   of  God”  (e.g.,  Prov.  8),  with  the  second  Person  of  the  Trinity,  incarnate  in  Jesus. 
Instances   of  God  granting  revelation  to  prophets  and  patriarchs  (e.g.,  “The  word  of  the  L ORD  came  to 
Abram  in  a  vision  …”)  are  interpreted  throughout  the  Christian  tradition  as  instances  of  the  acts  of  God 
the  Son.   In  the  medieval  tradition,   this  was  often  depicted  quite  literally  in  artistic  representations  of 
Old  Testament   revelation:   for  example,  in  depictions  of  Moses  hearing  God  speak  to  him  in  the  burning 
bush,  the  face  of  Jesus  is  often  to  be  seen  in  the  burning  bush  (examples  can  be  found  in  medieval  books 
of  Hours,  in  Eastern  iconography,  and  in  Western  stained  glass;  very  often,  the  image  is  of  Christ  as  an 
infant  in  the  arms  of  his  Mother).    Given  this  strong  precedent,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Bradwardine  and 
other  medieval  writers  refer  to  true  prophesy  as  “vision  in  the  Word,”  or  “seeing  in  the  Word,”  despite 
the  odd  ring  it  has  for  us. 
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Consequens  est  falsum  et  consequencia  patet,  quia  si  sic,  sequitur  quod 
preteritum  potest  non  esse  preteritum,  et  qui  decessit  in  peccato  mortali 
potest  non  decessisse  in  peccato  mortali,  et  sic  de  illo  qui  decessit  in  caritate 
potest  non  etc.,  et  sic  dampnatus  potest  nunquam  fuisse  dampnatus  et 
salvatus  nunquam  fuisse  salvatus.  Consequens  est  falsum,  igitur.  Hec 
consequencia  patet,  posito  quod  A  videat  in  Verbo  B  fore  et  quod  precipiatur 
sub  pena  peccati  mortalis  quod  predicet  et  affirmet  illud  quod  vidit  in  Verbo, 
et  non  aliud  vel  alia  quam  omnia  illa  que  videt  in  Verbo.  Tunc  ponatur  quod  A 
predicet  B  fore  futurum,  et  quod  pro  illa  predicacione  et  obediencia  salvetur 
et  aliter  non.  Tunc  arguitur  sic  :  possibile  est  B  non  evenire,  igitur  possibile 
est  ipsum  non  predixisse  B  fore  futurum  ;  et  per  consequens,  si  salvetur  pro 
illa  predicacione  precise,  possibile  est  ipsum  non  esse  salvatum.  Et  sic 
sequitur  propositum,  scilicet  quod  preteritum  potest  non  esse  preteritum  et 
hujusmodi,  quia  si  B  non  est  futurum,  ille  sic  non  vidit  in  Verbo  B  fore 
futurum,  et  per  consequens  non  sic  predixit,  nec  pro  isto  salvatur  per 
consequens;  igitur  etc.  (DFC  24a) 
 
This  is  a  long  and  somewhat  confused  objection,  and  to  understand  it  rightly,  I  think 
it  is  best  to  read  it  as  a  series  of  interrelated  arguments.   Firstly,  there  is  a  repetition 
of  the  first  objection  (that  Ockham’s  view  leads  to  the  contradictory  result  that 
something  that  is  going  to  happen  will  not  happen),  with  a  number  of  specific 
examples  relating  to  the  salvation  and  damnation  of  particular  people.   Secondly, 
there  is  a  largely  implicit  argument  that,  because  of  the  contradiction  of  the  first 
objection,  prophecy  and  revelation  from  God  would  be  impossible  on  Ockham’s 
model.   This  is  because  God’s  revelation,  and  subsequent  prophetic  acts,  depend  for 
their  veracity  upon  what  is  foretold  actually  occurring.   If  something  that  is  going  to 
happen  does  not  happen,  then  no  true  revelation  or  prophesy  concerning  that  thing 
can  properly  be  given.   Thirdly  and  finally,  these  two  arguments  are  combined  in  a 
rather  unintuitive  way,  so  that  the  second  leads  to  a  very  particular  example  of  the 
first:  suppose  that  some  particular  prophet’s  salvation  depends  upon  her  faithfully 
reporting  what  God  supernaturally  reveals  to  her  about  the  future.   Then  if  prophecy 
is  not  possible,  she  will  be  unable  to  make  the  prophetic  reports  upon  which  her 
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own  salvation  depends!   And  so  it  follows  that  although  it  is  the  case  (by 
assumption)  that  she  is  saved  in  virtue  of  her  obedience  to  God’s  revelatory 
demands,  she  is  unable  to  prophesy,  and  thus  it  contradictorily  follows  that  she  is 
not  saved. 
Another  thirteen  major  objections  follow,  but  of  these,  only  a  few  bring 
substantially  new  elements  to  bear  on  the  discussion.   We  will  briefly  consider  two 
more  objections,  for  they  pertain  specifically  to  the  question  of  whether  necessity  is  a 
perfection  in  God  or  not.   Because  this  issue  was  so  important  in  our  discussion  of 
Ockham’s  model  of  God’s  foreknowledge,  Bradwardine’s  response  to  this  issue  bears 
examination.   The  first  of  these  objections  is  the  twelfth,  in  which  Bradwardine 
affirms  the  necessity  of  God’s  knowledge  as  a  perfection  in  God.   We  have  discussed 
already  the  dominant  medieval  assumption  that  in  virtue  of  God’s  perfection,  God’s 
knowledge  is  necessary,  and  we  have  seen  the  way  in  which  this  assumption  is 
exemplified  in  Anselm’s  writing.   Bradwardine  shares  this  assumption,  and,  in  his 
own  arguments  against  Ockham,  he  spells  it  out  explicitly,  citing  Anselm  as  his 
authority: 
In  the  same  way,  necessary  knowledge  and  necessary  will  are  more  perfect 
than  contingent  knowledge  and  contingent  will,  just  as  necessity  is  in  itself 
more  perfect  than  contingency.  Necessary  knowledge  of  a  thing  and 
necessary  will  are  therefore  attributed  to  God.  The  antecedent  holds,  since 
contingency  includes  potency  [for  the  opposite],  and  consequently  [potency 
for]  imperfection.  The  consequence  holds  according  to  Anselm. 
 
Item  necessaria  sciencia  et  necessaria  voluntas  perfectior  est  sciencia 
contingenti  et  voluntate  contingenti,  sicut  necessitas  simpliciter  perfectior 
est  contingencia.  Igitur  necessaria  sciencia  rerum  et  necessaria  voluntas  est 
attribuenda  Deo.  Antecedens  patet,  quia  contingencia  includit  potenciam  et 
per  consequens  imperfectionem.  Consequencia  patet  per  Anselmum.  (DFC 
33a) 
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Bradwardine  unequivocally  denies  Ockham’s  claim  that  necessity  does  not  in  itself 
constitute  a  perfection  of  God.   But  he  does  not  address  Ockham’s  concerns  about 
immutable  knowledge  in  fact  being  faulty  knowledge  (more  on  this  shortly  in  3.3.2). 
However,  Bradwardine  does  address,  and  at  length,  the  concern  that  God’s 
necessity  might  in  some  way  impinge  upon  God’s  freedom  of  will.   This  is  the  topic  of 
the  fourteenth  objection,  which  begins  in  this  way: 
Similarly,  if  necessity  were  excluded  from  God's  volition,  this  would  be  mostly 
due  to  freedom  of  choice.   But  this  necessity  is  in  no  way  incompatible  with 
free  choice;  therefore,  because  of  this,  it  ought  not  to  be  excluded  from  the 
will  of  God,  as  far  as  his  internal  and  external  actions.  This  is  less  the  case  in 
speaking  of  freedom  for  contradictories  ad  utrumque  partem  [i.e.,  the 
freedom  to  act  in  either  of  two  ways],  since  this  sort  of  freedom  is  not  held  by 
God,  nor  by  the  blessed;  therefore,  it  follows  that  necessity  ought  in  no  way  to 
be  excluded  from  God  in  his  action,  since  that  power  for  contradictories  is  not 
part  of  freedom,  nor  does  it  pertain  to  freedom,  according  to  what  Anselm 
indicates  by  saying:  “Who  is  more  free?  God  and  the  blessed  ones,  who 
cannot  sin  and  can  [only]  not  sin,  [are  more  free  than  us  by]  our  freedom,  by 
which  we  can  sin  and  not  sin.”  It  therefore  follows  that  necessity,  but  not 
coercion,  is  compatible  with  true  liberty,  since  coercion  is  not  compatible 
with  God. 
 
Item  si  necessitas  in  volicione  Dei  excluderetur,  hoc  maxime  foret  propter 
libertatem  arbitrii  ;  sed  illa  necessitas  in  nullo  repugnat  libero  arbitrio  ;  igitur 
propter  hoc  non  debet  excludi  a  voluntate  Dei  quoad  operaciones  ejus  ad 
extra  et  ad  intra.  Minor  patet  loquendo  de  libertate  contradictionis  ad 
utramque  partem,  quia  illa  libertas  non  est  ponenda  in  Deo  nec  in  beatis  ; 
igitur  propter  illam  in  nullo  debet  excludi  a  Deo  necessitas  in  sua  actione, 
quia  illa  potestas  contradictionis  non  est  pars  libertatis  nec  pertinet  ad 
libertatem,  secundum  quod  innuit  Anselmus  dicens  :  «  Qui  liberior  est  ?  Deus 
et  beatus,  qui  non  possunt  peccare  et  possunt  non  peccare,  an  [ correxi :  quam] 
libertas  nostra  qua  possumus  peccare  et  non  peccare?  ».  Igitur  sequitur  quod 
cum  vera  libertate  stat  necessitas,  sed  non  coactio,  quia  hec  sibi  repugnat. 
(DFC  35a,  correction  Genest’s;  internal  quotation  from  Anselm’s  De  libertate 
arbitrii  I  (Schmitt  edition,  vol.  I,  p.  208)) 
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Bradwardine  emphasises  the  Anselmian  doctrine  that  true  freedom  of  choice,  or  free 
will,  is  not  the  “freedom  for  contradictories”  by  which  we  are  free  to  act  in  either  of 
two  ways  (e.g.,  to  sin  or  to  refrain  from  sinning);  if  this  were  the  case,  then  God  and 
the  blessed  ones  are  less  free  than  we,  since  they  lack  even  the  ability  to  sin,  and  this 
conclusion  seems  preposterous.   Rather,  freedom  of  choice  is  most  perfectly 
exercised  in  choosing  to  perform  virtuous  acts.   We  are  most  free,  not  when  we 
exercise  our  freedom  to  choose  between  opposing  courses  of  action,  but  when  we 
freely  chose  to  act  in  accordance  with  virtue,  for  it  is  in  choosing  to  act  virtuously 
that  we  become  most  truly  ourselves,  and  hence  most  free.   In  this  way,  Bradwardine 
thinks  that  Ockham  is  on  entirely  the  wrong  track  in  denying  the  necessity  of  God’s 
will  and  knowledge,  and  indeed,  of  God’s  very  essence. 
 
3.3.2  -  Analysis  of  Bradwardine’s  case 
It  may  be  the  case  that  Bradwardine’s  criticisms  of  Ockham  betray  significant 
misunderstandings  of  Ockham  himself.   As  we  have  already  seen  (in  2.2.2,  Q.  II  art. 
iii),  Ockham  denies,  at  least  in  general,  that  God  is  mutable,  and  denies  that  any 
claim  about  the  contingency  of  God’s  knowledge  necessarily  results  in  saying  that 
God  is  mutable.   For  Ockham  does  not  think  that  mutability  necessarily  follows  from 
contingency.   To  see  this,  it  may  be  helpful  to  consider  the  difference  as  one  between 
mutability  as  the  capability  to  change ,  and  contingency  as  the  capability  to  be 
different .   What  I  mean  by  this  is  that  when  we  assert  that  something  is  mutable,  we 
are  claiming  something  about  its  ability  to  change  over  time;  so,  for  instance,  to  say 
that  a  ball  of  playdough  is  mutable  is  to  claim  that  it  may  be  substantially  different  at 
one  time,  t 1 ,  than  it  is  at  another  time,  t 2   (perhaps  at  t 1   it  was  a  non-descript  blob  of 
dough,  and  then  between  t 1   and  t 2   I  transform  the  dough  into  a  scale  model  of  Notre 
Dame  Cathedral,  complete  with  flying  buttresses).   To  assert  that  something  is 
contingent,  however,  is  a  much  weaker  claim:  the  thing  in  question  may  not  be 
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mutable  in  the  sense  that  it  could  undertake  substantial  change  from  t 1   to  t 2 ;  but  we 
may  yet  claim  that  that  thing  could  have  been  otherwise  than  it  is.   In  this  case,  that  it 
is  now  such  as  it  is,  is  not  something  that  can  change  at  any  time  in  the  future;  but 
that  it  is  now  such  as  it  is,  could  have  been  otherwise,  had  the  events  leading  up  to 
this  point  been  otherwise  than  they  were.   (Think  of  something  like  the  Cullinan  I 
diamond,  which  is  —  at  least  in  relative  terms  —  immutable,  but  is  not  necessary, 
since  it  could  have  been  otherwise  than  it  is.   See  p.  74ff) 
On  the  face  of  it,  then,  Bradwardine’s  claims  that  the  contingency  of  God’s 
knowledge  would  result  in  the  mutability  of  God  do  not  seem  to  cohere  with 
Ockham’s  own  account.   However,  if  we  consider  more  deeply  the  implications  of 
Ockham’s  position,  we  may  perhaps  see  some  deeper  inconsistencies  that  make  his 
claims  less  tenable.   It  seems  to  be  the  case  that  Ockham  considers  God’s  knowledge 
to  be  contingent  at  least  in  the  sense  that  it  could  have  been  otherwise  than  it  in  fact 
is.   But  as  we  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  (2.3.2),  it  is  at  least  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  reconcile  this  view  simultaneously  with  the  view  that  the  present  is 
necessary.   With  respect  to  God’s  knowledge,  if  God  now  knows  that  on  Friday  I  will 
contingently  drive  to  my  grandparents’  cottage,  then  Ockham’s  claim  that  God’s 
knowledge  of  that  event  is  contingent  would  seem  to  entail  that  God’s  knowledge 
could  be  otherwise  than  it  in  fact  is;  but  this  would  seem,  at  least  on  the  face  of  it,  to 
stand  in  direct  contradiction  with  the  idea  that  because  God  knows  it  now ,  God’s 
knowledge  couldn't  be  otherwise  than  it  is:  something  that  is  true  now  must  be  true 
necessarily. 
The  logical  problems  of  trying  to  maintain,  as  Ockham  does,  that  God’s 
knowledge  of  future  contingent  events  cannot  properly  be  said  to  be  something 
about  the  present  (but  rather,  that  this  knowledge  is  itself  future  and  contingent  in 
some  special  sense)  lead  to  serious  problems  when  we  come  to  consider  how  God 
might  actually  enact  God’s  will  in  the  world.   And  as  we  have  seen,  these  are 
precisely  among  the  issues  that  Bradwardine  raises  in  his  criticisms  (as,  for  example, 
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in  the  concerns  he  raises  about  prophecy  and  God’s  promises;  though  we  did  not 
explicitly  consider  them  above,  some  objections  also  consider  Christ’s  actions  in  the 
world).   So  it  seems  as  though,  despite  Ockham’s  protestations  that  his  theory  does 
not  imply  the  mutability  of  God,  Bradwardine  is  correct  to  criticize  Ockham  for  a 
model  of  God’s  knowledge  that  undermines  God’s  immutability. 
However,  an  aspect  of  Ockham’s  argument  that  Bradwardine  fails  to 
adequately  address  is  this:  Ockham  makes  the  point  that,  when  it  comes  to 
knowledge,  immutability  may  actually  be  seen,  at  least  from  a  certain  vantage  point, 
as  an  im perfection  (see  2.2.2,  Q.  II  art.  iii).   So  on  the  one  hand,  Ockham  argues  that 
the  contingency  of  God’s  knowledge  does  not  actually  imply  that  God’s  knowledge  is 
mutable;  but  on  the  other,  he  argues  that,  at  least  in  a  certain  sense,  we  may  not  even 
want  to  affirm  the  immutability  of  God’s  knowledge,  since  immutable  knowledge 
may  in  fact  be  bad  knowledge.   After  all,  circumstances  in  the  world  change 
constantly,  so  if  our  knowledge  does  not  also  change  accordingly  to  accommodate 
changes  in  the  world  around  us,  we  will  be  left  with  false  knowledge.   It  used  to  be 
the  case  that  George  W.  Bush  was  the  president  of  the  United  States  of  America. 
When,  in  2001,  I  knew  that  George  W.  Bush  was  the  American  president,  that  piece 
of  knowledge  stood  me  in  good  stead.   But  if  today  I  persisted  in  the  knowledge  (or, 
perhaps  to  speak  more  precisely,  the  belief )  that  Bush  is  the  American  president, 
then  no  amount  of  protestation  about  the  perfection  of  immutable  knowledge  would 
make  me  correct. 
In  order  for  my  knowledge  to  track  true  states  in  the  world,  it  must  be  the 
case  that  the  content  of  my  knowledge  changes  along  with  states  in  the  world. 
Though  Bradwardine  does  not  seem  to  explicitly  address  this  problem,  it  seems 
likely  that  he  has  in  mind  one  of  two  conceptions  of  God’s  immutable  knowledge. 
Either  (a)  he  conceives  of  the  content  of  God’s  knowledge  as  being,  in  a  sense, 
time-tracking,  so  that  God  doesn’t  know,  for  instance,  “Sarah  will  drive  to  her 
grandparents’  cottage  tomorrow”  (which,  even  assuming  I  do,  is  a  statement  that 
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will  become  false  after  today);  but  rather,  what  God  knows  is,  “Sarah  drives  to  her 
grandparents’  cottage  on  Friday,  12  June,  2015”  (which,  assuming  I  do,  remains  true 
tomorrow  and  any  day  thereafter);  or  (b)  this  is  a  context  in  which  Bradwardine 
does  appeal  to  the  timeless  eternity  of  God,  so  that  God’s  knowledge  cannot  be 
properly  said  to  change,  since  change  requires  the  passage  of  time  and  God  is  not 
subject  to  time.   These  two  possible  interpretations  may  be  seen,  in  fact,  as 
potentially  complementary:  if  we  may  conceive  of  the  possibility,  in  any  case,  of 
human  knowledge  operating  in  the  sort  of  time-tracking  manner  just  described  (and 
which  I  also  described  in  2.2.2),  and  thus  not  really  changing  even  when  the  tenses 
of  the  propositions  used  to  describe  that  knowledge  do  change,  how  much  more 
might  such  a  mode  of  knowing  be  ascribed  to  a  timelessly  eternal  God?   In  fact,  this 
may  be  precisely  the  key  for  unlocking  the  puzzle  of  reconciling  the  ideas  of  God 
both  inhabiting  an  eternal  present,  and  acting  in  time  (discussed  at  greater  length  in 
2.3.3):  though  all  of  time  is  simultaneously  present  to  God,  it  may  yet  be  present  to 
God  as  time-indexed.   Though  the  assassinations  of  Julius  Caesar  and  John  F. 
Kennedy  may  be  simultaneously  present  to  God  in  eternity,  they  may  be  present  to 
God  in  such  a  way  that  God’s  contemplation  of  the  one  includes  an  awareness  of  its 
having  happened  two  millennia  before  the  other.   God  does  not  simply  know,  “Julius 
Caesar  is  assassinated,”  and  “John  F.  Kennedy  is  assassinated,”  but  rather,  “Julius 
Caesar  is  assassinated  (15  March  44  B.C.),”  and  “John  F.  Kennedy  is  assassinated 
(November  22  1963  A.  D.)”  (or  whatever  these  date  markers  might  be  in  the  Divine, 
rather  than  Gregorian,  calendar  —  perhaps  indexed  from  the  beginning  of  the 
created  order?).   God’s  simultaneous  knowledge  of  the  two  events  need  not  imply  a 
mistaken  belief  that  they  happen  simultaneously  in  the  world.   In  fact,  it  need  no 
more  imply  this  result  than  my  simultaneous  knowledge  of  Julius  Caesar’s  and  J.F.K.’s 
assassinations  implies  that  I  think  they  happened  simultaneously  (clearly,  I  do  not). 
Considered  in  this  way,  it  may  seem  more  plausible  to  suppose  that  God’s 
knowledge  is  immutable  in  a  way  that  does  not  constitute  an  imperfection  in  God’s 
knowledge  (as  Ockham  claims  that  it  might),  since  on  this  view,  God’s  knowledge 
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would  never  change  in  the  eternal  present,  without  the  immutability  of  God’s 
knowledge  constituting  an  imperfection  in  that  knowledge.   God’s  knowledge,  on 
this  account,  would  always  accurately  track  true  states  of  the  world,  without  ever 
changing.   Furthermore,  while  all  of  time  is  simultaneously  present  to  God,  every 
moment  of  time  is  present  to  God  far  more  fully  than  it  is  to  creatures  who  inhabit 
time.   For  as  time-  and  space-bound  creatures,  every  moment  of  time  is  a  fleeting 
instant,  never  present  for  more  than  the  instant  in  which  it  occurs.   As  soon  as  we 
are  aware  of  it,  it  is  past,  and  we  cannot  retrieve  it  to  take  a  closer  look;  nor  can  we 
be  aware  of  what  passed  in  the  moment  in  any  place  but  the  immediate 
surroundings  present  to  our  senses.   But  for  God,  each  moment  is  always  present, 
and  his  contemplation  includes  every  detail  of  that  moment  in  every  place  in  the 
universe.   The  infinite  vastness  of  every  moment  is  present  to  God  in  God’s  eternal 
contemplation.   In  this  way,  not  only  is  all  of  time  simultaneously  present  to  God  in 
the  infinite  moment  of  eternity,  but  every  moment  of  time  is  more  completely 
present  to  God  than  it  is  even  to  the  creatures  who  inhabit  it.   As  St  Peter  writes, 
“with  the  Lord  one  day  is  as  a  thousand  years,  and  a  thousand  years  as  one  day”  (2 
Pet.  3.8). 
Augustine  gives  a  familiar  analogy  to  describe  God’s  simultaneous  survey  of 
all  of  time:  God’s  foreknowledge,  he  says,  is  like  that  of  a  person  at  the  top  of  a  high 
hill  overlooking  a  road,  who  can  simultaneously  survey  the  road  behind  and  before 
the  wayfarers  who  walk  along  it.   The  wayfarers  may  only  be  able  to  see  a  short 
distance  ahead  —  especially  if  the  road  is  particularly  hilly  or  winding  —  but  the 
person  who  watches  from  the  hill  (and  presumably  has  very  good  eyesight,  or 
maybe  a  pair  of  binoculars)  will  be  able  to  see  what  they  will  encounter  ahead  of 
them  on  the  road  before  they  get  there  —  a  gang  of  highwaymen,  perhaps,  or  a 
wounded  rabbit,  or  a  patch  of  wild  raspberries  by  the  side  of  the  road,  or  a  sudden 
precipice.   This  analogy  is  of  course  imperfect,  since  while  the  person  on  the  hill  may 
be  able  to  anticipate  some  of  the  pleasures  or  dangers  the  wayfarers  will  encounter, 
she  cannot  know  the  details  of  these  encounters  (she  may  know  they  will  find  a 
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wounded  rabbit  in  their  way;  but  will  the  wayfarers  try  to  help  the  rabbit?  or  put  it 
out  of  its  misery,  then  stew  it  for  dinner?);  indeed,  it  is  even  impossible  for  her  to 
know  that  the  wayfarers  will  necessarily  encounter  the  things  she  sees  at  all 
(perhaps  the  highwaymen  will  murder  and  rob  them  before  they  even  reach  the 
raspberries;  or  perhaps  they  will  suddenly  turn  back  the  way  they  came).   But 
overlooking  these  shortcomings,  the  analogy  can  perhaps  be  pressed  further  in  a 
certain  respect  to  illustrate  the  point  I  am  making  above:  the  onlooker 
simultaneously  sees,  say,  a  wounded  rabbit  and  a  patch  of  raspberries  along  the  road. 
But  just  because  she  sees  them  simultaneously  does  not  mean  that  she  supposes  the 
wayfarers  will  encounter  them  simultaneously.   Rather,  she  sees  that  one  comes 
before  the  other  along  the  road,  and  —  assuming  the  wayfarers’  speed  is  steady  — 
she  may  even  be  able  to  tell  approximately  when  each  encounter  will  occur. 
What  I  have  presented  above  goes  beyond  what  Bradwardine  himself 
explicitly  asserts  or  argues.   However  I  think  this  represents  a  plausible  model  of  the 
way  in  which  God  foreknows  events  in  the  created  world,  compatible  with  what 
Bradwardine  does  assert,  which  explains  both  (a)  how  God  can  have  knowledge  of 
future  things  without  necessitating  their  occurrence  (by  appeal  to  God’s 
transcendence  of  time),  and  (b)  how  it  is  that  God  can  yet  know  the  sequence  in 
which  events  occur  for  creatures,  despite  God’s  simultaneous  purview  of  these 
events.   It  seems,  I  think,  to  be  a  model  which  is  compatible  with  Bradwardine’s 
criticisms  of  Ockham,  and  to  which  Ockham  has  denied  himself  access.   For  if 
Ockham  is  correct  that  aspects  of  God’s  knowledge  and  will  are  contingent,  then  it  is 
not  possible  for  God  to  exist  in  an  eternal  realm  apart  from  time.   For  recall  that 
according  to  Ockham’s  powers  conception  of  contingency  and  necessity  (which  I 
have  already  explained  above  must  be  the  view  of  modality  with  which  Ockham  is 
operating),  for  something  to  be  contingent,  there  must  be  some  prior  time  at  which 
there  existed  the  power  for  that  event  to  occur,  and  also  the  power  for  that  event  not 
to  occur.   In  the  case  in  question  —  namely,  the  knowledge  of  God  —  it  would 
therefore  need  to  be  the  case  that  if  God’s  knowledge  of  a  thing  is  contingent,  it  is 
 
 
 
 
127 
because  there  is  some  power  for  it  to  either  turn  out  or  not  to  turn  out.   But  this 
power  is  not  possible  if  God  transcends  time,  for  in  such  a  case  there  can  be  no 
temporally  prior  states  of  God,  with  powers  for  opposites.   Thus,  while  the  timelessly 
eternal  model  of  God’s  foreknowledge  assists  Bradwardine  in  making  his  own  case 
against  Ockham,  it  is  not  a  model  to  which  Ockham  can  appeal  for  any  help. 
This  view  —  that  Ockham  denies  the  timeless  eternity  of  God  —  is  supported 
by  William  Lane  Craig,  who  states, 
For  Ockham  the  relationship  between  God’s  foreknowledge  and  future 
contingents  was  a  literally  conceived  concern,  for  he  held  that  God’s  eternity 
was  not  a  state  of  timelessness,  but  that  God,  though  immutable,  endures 
throughout  all  past,  present,  and  future  time,  which  arises  from  the  order  of 
succession  among  changeable  things.   (Craig,  The  Problem  of  Divine 
Foreknowledge  and  Future  Contingents  from  Aristotle  to  Suarez  (Leiden:  Brill, 
1988),  146) 
 
In  making  this  claim,  Craig  is  apparently  relying  on  the  work  of  Marilyn  Adams  in 
her  doctoral  dissertation,  The  Problem  of  God’s  Foreknowledge  and  Free  Will  in 
Boethius  and  William  Ockham  (Cornell  University,  1967).   This  interpretation  of 
Ockham’s  view  of  eternity  seems  consistent  with  what  I  have  observed  of  his 
thought,  and  supports  my  analysis  above. 
It  may  even  be  argued  that  the  Ockhamist  view  expressed  in  the  eighth 
opinion  constitutes  a  sort  of  outright  denial  of  God’s  foreknowledge,  and  thus  also  a 
brand  of  Open  Theism:  so  claims  Heiko  Oberman,  certainly,  who  thinks  that  this 
brand  of  “foreknowledge”  amounts  to  little  more  than  a  kind  of  “passive  waiting”  on 
the  part  of  God.    This  interpretation  is,  I  think,  supported  by  Bradwardine’s  own 119
criticisms.  (DFC  21ff) 
As  I  bring  this  chapter  to  a  close,  I  would  just  like  to  highlight  once  again  the 
119  Heiko  Oberman,   Archbishop   Thomas   Bradwardine,  a  Fourteenth-Century  Augustinian:   A  study  of  this 
theology  in  its  historical  context  (Utrecht:  Kemink  &  Zoon,  1957),  p.  109. 
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significance  of  Ockham’s  view  in  relation  to  the  DFC  treatise:  Bradwardine's 
excessive  attention  to  this  one  view,  in  comparison  with  the  eight  others,  seems  not 
to  spring  so  much  from  finding  it  a  particularly  difficult  or  subtle  position  to  reject, 
but  rather,  from  an  impulse  to  show  us  just  how  entirely  bad  the  view  really  is.  It 
seems  clear,  therefore,  that  in  Ockham's  theory,  we  find  the  primary  motivation  for 
Bradwardine's  treatise:  to  offer  an  alternative  to  the  solution  of  his  Oxford  adversary. 
Thus,  we  will  turn  in  the  fourth  chapter  to  Bradwardine’s  own  solution  to  the 
problem. 
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Chapter  4 
Bradwardine’s  Treatise,  Part  II: 
Responsio  Propria 
 
Introduction 
We  are  now  halfway  through  our  examination  of  Bradwardine’s  DFC.   In  the 
previous  chapter,  I  laid  out  the  two-fold  structure  of  the  treatise,  and  walked  through 
a  summary  of  the  nine  positions  which  Bradwardine  engages  in  the  first  half.   I  paid 
by  far  the  greatest  attention,  however,  to  the  position  which  clearly  corresponds  to 
Bradwardine’s  interpretation  of  Ockham;  the  opprobrium  with  which  Bradwardine 
considers  this  view  is  abundantly  clear,  and  thus  his  motivation  for  writing  the 
treatise  is  identified  —  namely,  to  correct  the  error,  as  he  sees  it,  of  Ockham’s 
solution.   In  what  follows  below,  I  turn  to  giving  a  detailed  explication  of 
Bradwardine’s  own  arguments  as  presented  in  the  treatise  (4.1).   This  is  followed  by 
a  discussion  of  how  Bradwardine’s  solution  represents,  as  I  claimed  at  the  outset,  a 
continuation,  in  a  sense,  of  the  views  of  Boethius,  Anselm,  and  Duns  Scotus,  but  also 
the  ways  in  which  Bradwardine’s  view  develops  this  trajectory  of  solutions  in  ways 
original  to  him  (4.2,  4.3,  and  4.4). 
 
4.1  -  The  Responsio  propria 
Having  laid  out  the  structure  of  the  treatise  as  a  whole,  we  come  now  to 
discussing  the  content  of  the  second  half,  for  it  is  here  that  we  find  the  most 
interesting  and  original  suggestions  of  this  work.   As  we  shall  see,  Bradwardine 
presents  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents  which  places  a  particular 
and  unique  emphasis  on  a  distinction  in  God’s  power.   For  this  reason,  we  will  first 
spend  some  time  understanding  the  distinction  itself  and  its  history  (4.1.1  and 
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4.1.2),  before  attempting  to  understand  how  it  aids  Bradwardine  in  forming  a 
solution  to  the  problem  (4.1.3).   I  argue  that,  though  Bradwardine  is  by  no  means 
original  in  his  formulation  of  this  distinction,  he  is  original  in  the  application  of  the 
distinction  to  this  particular  problem.   
 
4.1.1  -  God’s  absolute  vs.  ordained  power 
The  heart  of  Bradwardine's  own  solution  begins  with  a  distinction  between 
God's  absolute  and  ordained  power. 
One  replies  by  drawing  a  distinction  regarding  power,  or  what  is  possible,  in 
that  it  is  of  two  sorts;  for  one  sort  is  absolute,  the  other  ordained.  And  I  [now] 
explain  what  I  mean  by  absolute  power  and  by  ordained  power.  Absolute 
power  is  that  [same]  ordained  power;  but  it  is  absolute  power  insofar  as  it  is 
undetermined  relative  to  each  part  of  a  contradiction.  And  ordained  power  is 
that  [same]  power,  insofar  as  it  is  determined  relative  to  only  one  (or  the 
other)  part  of  a  contradiction.  
 
Respondetur  distinguendo  potenciam,  seu  possibile,  eo  quod  duplex  est,  quia 
quedam  est  absoluta,  quedam  ordinata  ;  et  expono  quid  intelligo  per 
potenciam  absolutam  et  per  potenciam  ordinatam.  Potencia  absoluta  est  illa 
potencia  ordinata,  sed  tamen  est  potencia  absoluta  ut  indeterminata  est  ad 
utramque  partem  contradictionis;  et  potencia  ordinata  est  illa  eadem  ut  est 
determinata  ad  alteram  partem  contradictionis  tantum.   (DCF  42f) 
 
God’s  absolute  power  is  distinguished  from  his  ordained  power;  but  Bradwardine  is 
quick  to  clarify  that  he  does  not  mean  that  God  has  two  separate,  distinct  powers. 
Rather,  “absolute”  and  “ordained”  are  two  ways  of  talking  about  God’s  one  power. 
We  may  now  be  inclined  to  ask,  what  is  it  that  constrains  God’s  ordained  power? 
Relative  to  which  “part  of  a  contradiction”  is  it  determined?   We  discover  the  answer 
to  this  question  in  what  immediately  follows: 
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And  absolute  power  in  the  superior  cause  —  namely,  in  God  —  is  his 
ordained  power,  not  insofar  as  it  is  ordained  relative  to  only  one  (or  the 
other)  part  of  a  contradiction,  but  as  it  is  infinite  and  not  determined  or 
ordained  relative  to  one  (or  the  other)  part  [of  a  contradiction].  And  his 
ordained  power  is  [his]  absolute  –  that  is,  infinite  –  power,  not  as 
undetermined  relative  to  one  (or  the  other)  part  of  a  contradiction,  but  as 
determined  in  virtue  of  his  justice,  and  his  mercy,  and  his  will  –  for  example, 
for  producing  something  besides  himself,  immediately  or  mediately,  or  for 
saving  [a  person]. 
 
Et  potencia  absoluta  in  causa  superiori,  scilicet  in  Deo,  est  potencia  sua 
ordinata  non  ut  est  ordinata  ad  alteram  partem  contradictionis  tantum,  sed 
ut  est  infinita  et  non  determinata  vel  ordinata  ad  alteram  partem  .  Et  potencia 
ejus  ordinata  est  potencia  absoluta,  scilicet  infinita,  et  non  ut  indeterminata 
ad  alteram  partem  contradictionis  tantum,  sed  ut  determinata  per  suam 
justiciam  et  misericordiam  et  voluntatem,  ut  ad  producendum  aliquid  ad 
extra,  immediate  vel  mediate,  vel  ad  salvandum.   (DCF  42f) 
 
What  constrains  God’s  ordained  power  and  makes  it  distinct  from  God’s  absolute 
power  are  the  dictates  of  God’s  will  (I  take  it  that  God’s  justice  and  mercy  are 
functions  of  God’s  will,  so  listing  them  separately  is  somewhat  redundant  on 
Bradwardine’s  part ).   So  we  might  perhaps  conceive  of  this  distinction  as  saying 120
that  God’s  one  power  operates  in  two  distinct  modes:  on  the  one  hand,  God's  power 
is  able  to  operate  with  complete  and  unrestrained  freedom,  and  in  this  sense  we 
speak  of  God's  absolute  power;  but  on  the  other,  God  submits  God’s  power  to  the 
dictates  of  God’s  will,  doing  only  that  which  God  wills,  and  nothing  more  –  in  this 
120  Here  we  run  straight  up  against  a  variation   of  the  Euthyphro  dilemma:   is  something  good  (or  just,  or 
merciful)  because   God  wills  it,  or  does  God  will  it  because  it  is  good  (or  just,  or  merciful)?   Regardless  of 
which  way  the  causal  implication   runs,  however,  it  may  be  agreed  (or  at  the  very  least,  granted  for  the 
sake  of  argument)   that  the  extension  of  the  set  “what-God-wills”  is  contained  within  the  set 
“what-is-good”   (and  “what-is-just,”  and  “what-is-merciful”).   By  implying  that  the  containment 
relationship   runs  in  the  direction  I’ve  just  indicated,  I’ve  perhaps  tipped  my  own  hand;  but  it  makes  no 
critical  difference  to  my  argument   if  it  were  to  run  the  other  way,  or  if  the  sets  were  considered  to  be 
identical.    And  so  I  stand  by  my  point  that  Bradwardine’s  list  is  redundant. 
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sense,  we  speak  of  God's  power  being  ordained,  or  ordered,  by  God's  will. 
Let  me  illustrate  this  by  analogy  with  the  power  of  a  chess-player  to  move 
playing  pieces.   Absolutely  speaking,  the  player  has  it  within  her  power  to  move  a 
knight  wherever  she  pleases  —  from  b1  to  g8,  say.   But  why  confine  her  movements 
to  the  board,  even?   She  could  take  the  piece  and  place  it  on  top  of  the  refrigerator,  or 
put  it  in  an  envelope  and  post  it  to  Australia.   All  of  these  possibilities  lie  within  her 
power,  considered  absolutely.   But  when  her  power  is  considered  with  respect  to  the 
game  of  chess  —  the  power  of  the  chess-player  qua  player  of  chess  —  her  options 
become  considerably  more  limited:  that  knight  at  b1,  for  instance,  can  only  be 
moved  to  a3,  c3,  or  d2  —  and  to  these  spaces  only  if  they  are  unoccupied  by  another 
of  her  own  pieces,  and  only  if  it  doesn’t  leave  her  own  king  in  check.   For  as  long  as 
she  is  playing  chess,  her  power  is  ordained  by  the  rules  of  the  game  of  chess.   The 
analogy  between  this  situation  and  the  powers  of  God  is  strengthened  by  the  fact 
that  playing  chess  is  something  that  the  player  has  chosen  to  do.   Knowing  the  rules 
of  chess,  she  has  deemed  it  right  and  good  to  surrender  her  extensive  powers  of 
moving  game  pieces  wherever  she  might  please,  and  to  order  them  in  accordance 
with  those  prescribed,  limited,  finite  movements  allowed  by  the  rules  of  the  game. 
She  has  ordered  her  power  in  accordance  with  her  will . 
Of  course,  God’s  absolute  power  extends  considerably  beyond  those  of  the 
chess-player.   While  the  chess-player  could  move  a  piece  to  anywhere  within  her 
limited  reach,  or  perhaps  toss  it  a  few  dozen  metres  or  pop  it  in  the  post  (where  it 
might  continue  to  be  moved  a  while  longer  by  other  human  beings),  God  could, 
conceivably,  transport  the  piece  absolutely  anywhere  in  the  universe  in  the  blink  of 
an  eye.    God’s  absolute  power,  with  respect  to  all  things  created  and  uncreated,  is 121
121  I  am  assuming,   at  least  for  the  time  being,  that  violating  physical  laws  (such  as  those  that  would 
dictate  that  the  maximum   speed  of  an  object  in  space  is  that  of  light)  does  not  entail  any  logical 
contradiction,   and  thus  lies  within  the  absolute  power  of  God.   However,  the  question  of  whether 
violating   physical  laws  constitutes  a  logical  violation  (by  considering  that  action  in  light  of  the 
equilibrium   of  the  physical  universe)  is  not  one  that  will  be  tremendously  relevant  to  my  discussion,  and 
so  if  the  reader  disagrees  with  my  assessment,  I  would  ask  that  she  simply  concede  this  point  for  the 
sake  of  argument. 
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limited  only  by  logical  possibility,  while  those  of  any  finite  creature  operate  under 
considerable  physical  limitations.   But  on  this  score,  Bradwardine  has  more  to  say, 
and  his  intuitions  may  surprise  us  (I  begin  with  a  recap  of  what  we  have  just  read, 
because  the  context  is  important): 
And  absolute  power  in  the  superior  cause  —  namely,  in  God  —  is  his 
ordained  power,  not  insofar  as  it  is  ordained  relative  to  only  one  (or  the 
other)  part  of  a  contradiction,  but  as  it  is  infinite  and  not  determined  or 
ordained  relative  to  one  (or  the  other)  part.  And  his  ordained  power  is  [his] 
absolute  –  that  is,  infinite  –  power,  not  as  undetermined  relative  to  one  (or 
the  other)  part  of  a  contradiction,  but  as  determined  in  virtue  of  his  justice, 
and  his  mercy,  and  his  will  –  for  example,  for  producing  something  besides 
himself,  immediately  or  mediately,  or  for  saving  [a  person].   And  it  may  be 
said  in  the  same  way  of  power  in  an  inferior  cause  –  namely,  [power  in]  a 
creature  (which  is  not  now,  but  can  be  in  the  future;  or  which  is  now,  and  can 
do  something  in  the  future)  —  similarly  to  the  distinction  just  made 
regarding  power  in  the  superior  cause,  God.   For  there  are  two  sorts  of  power 
in  an  inferior  cause:  [its]  absolute  [power]  is  that  which  in  itself  is  not 
determined  relative  to  being,  rather  than  relative  to  not  being,  as  long  as  [the 
being  or  not  being]  is  future,  or  relative  to  producing  something  in  the  future 
or  not  producing  it  as  long  as  it  has  not  been  produced;  and  [its]  ordained 
power  is  that  by  which  it  is  ordained  relative  to  only  one  (or  the  other)  part 
of  a  contradiction,  [whether]  by  the  superior  cause,  God,  or  by  an  inferior 
cause,  a  creature. 
 
Et  potencia  absoluta  in  causa  superiori,  scilicet  in  Deo,  est  potencia  sua 
ordinata  non  ut  est  ordinata  ad  alteram  partem  contradictionis  tantum,  sed 
ut  est  infinita  et  non  determinata  vel  ordinata  ad  alteram  partem  .  Et  potencia 
ejus  ordinata  est  potencia  absoluta,  scilicet  infinita,  et  non  ut  indeterminata 
ad  alteram  partem  contradictionis  tantum,  sed  ut  determinata  per  suam 
justiciam  et  misericordiam  et  voluntatem,  ut  ad  producendum  aliquid  ad 
extra,  immediate  vel  mediate,  vel  ad  salvandum.  Et  similiter  dicitur  de 
potencia  in  causa  inferiori ,  scilicet  creatura,  que  non  est  sed  potest  esse  in 
futurum  ,  vel  quod  est  et  potest  aliquid  facere  in  futurum  ,  sicut  nunc 
distinguitur  de  potencia  in  causa  superiori,  scilicet  Deo  ;  quia  in  causa 
inferiori  duplex  est  potencia,  scilicet  absoluta,  que  de  se  non  est  determinata 
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plus  ad  esse  quam  ad  non  esse  quamdiu  est  futurum  ,  vel  ad  producendum 
aliquid  in  futurum  vel  ad  non  producendum  quamdiu  non  est  productum  ;  et 
potencia  ordinata  est  illa  qua  ordinatur  ad  unam  partem  contradictionis 
tantum,  per  causam  superiorem,  scilicet  Deum  ,  vel  per  causam  inferiorem, 
scilicet  creaturam.   (DCF  42f,  emphasis  added) 
 
Not  only  is  Bradwardine  urging  a  distinction  between  the  absolute  and  ordained 
powers  of  God,  he  is  proposing  a  similar  distinction  in  creatures.   But  how  is  this  to 
be  understood?   It  seems,  I  think,  that  Bradwardine  is  proposing  that  according  to 
their  absolute  power,  even  creatures  would  be  constrained  by  nothing  “relative  to 
being,”  or  in  other  words,  that  creatures  are  not,  absolutely  speaking,  constrained  by 
their  being  creatures .   It  would  seem,  then,  that  it  is  within  the  absolute  power  of  a 
creature  to  do  anything  that  is  not  contrary  to  logical  possibility  —  that  is,  anything 
that  God  could  do,  absolutely.   This  conclusion  should  surprise  us,  for  it  means  that 
the  absolute  power  of  a  creature  is  on  a  level  with  that  of  the  all-powerful  God.   The 
key  difference  between  creaturely  power  and  divine  power  thus  lies  in  the  difference 
between  their  relative  ordained  powers.   For  God’s  ordained  power  is  ordered,  or 
constrained,  by  God  himself;  whereas  creaturely  ordained  power  is  ordered  not  by 
the  creature  (or  at  least  not  primarily  by  the  creature),  but  by  everything  around  the 
creature,  also:  physical  laws,  the  limitations  of  bodies,  and  so  on,  each  of  which  is 
ordained  by  God.   This  renders  the  ordained  power  of  the  creature  immeasurably 
inferior  to  that  of  God.  122
 
122  Lorne  Falkenstein  has  suggested  that  I  may  be  guilty  of  over-reading  this  passage,  and  taking  it  to 
imply  a  vastly  greater  sense  of  absolute  power  in  a  creature  than  it  in  fact  does.   On  Falkenstein’s 
reading,   all  that  is  meant  by  “absolute  power”  in  a  creature  is  the  power  to  exercise  its  own  will  in 
matters,  uninhibited  by  opposing   forces  (God,  or  other  creatures).   To  be  undetermined  “relative  to 
being”  refers  to  the  being  or  not  being  of  the  thing  freely  caused.   As  I  re-read  the  passage  in  this  light,  I 
take  his  point  that  it  may  not  be  implying  something  quite  as  strong  as  I  take  it  to;  but  I  still  find  it  more 
natural  to  read  the  “being”   relative  to  which  the  power  is  undetermined  as  the  creature’s,  rather  than 
the  caused  thing’s,   being.   Either  way,  however,  it  will  make  little  difference  to  my  subsequent  argument. 
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4.1.2  -  History  of  the  distinction  prior  to  the  14th  Century 
A  very  extensive  study  of  the  history  of  making  this  sort  of  distinction  of 
God’s  power  is  given  by  Lawrence  Moonan.    We  should  note  that  Moonan  — 123
rather  eccentrically  —  chooses  to  render  the  distinction  between  potentia  absoluta 
and  potentia  ordinata  as  that  between  “option-neutral  power”  and  “option-tied 
power.”   He  argues  that  by  doing  so,  he  frees  the  terms  from  the  baggage  that 
phrases  like  “absolute  power”  (suggesting  a  sort  of  despotism),  “ordinate  power” 
(suggesting  the  possibility  of  in ordinate  power),  and  “ordained  power”  (which 
sounds  arbitrary)  have  collected.    However,  no  other  scholars  have,  to  my 124
knowledge,  followed  Moonan’s  usage.   Furthermore,  apart  from  being  cumbersome, 
it  seems  to  me  that  to  render  absoluta  and  ordinata  as  “option-neutral”  and 
“option-tied”  is  to  impose  an  interpretation  on  the  terms  that  strays  a  substantial 
way  from  being  a  straightforward  translation.   Translation  is  always  a  tricky  balance 
between  literal  rendering  and  interpretation;  but  while  I  think  Moonan  is  broadly 
correct  in  his  interpretation  of  the  sense  that  these  terms  come  to  have  in  their 
medieval  use,  I  think  that  by  actually  translating  the  terms  in  this  way,  he  tips  the 
balance  too  far  toward  the  interpretive  side.   Particularly  given  that  he  purports  to 
be  tracing  a  history  of  these  terms  and  their  use  up  to  the  thirteenth  century,  by 
translating  the  terms  which  are  the  object  of  his  study  in  this  loaded  way,  he  winds 
up,  in  a  small  way,  at  least,  begging  the  question.   For  my  own  part,  I  prefer, 
therefore,  to  adhere  to  more  common  translation  practices:  for  potentia  absoluta ,  I 
use  “absolute  power”;  for  potentia  ordinata ,  I  use  “ordained,”  “ordinate,”  and 
“ordered  power,”  more  or  less  interchangeably. 
The  distinction  between  God’s  absolute  and  ordained  power  is  one  that 
arises  primarily  in  logical,  disputational  contexts.   Moonan  points  to  the  difficulty  of 
123  Lawrence  Moonan,   Divine  Power:  The  Medieval  power  distinction   up  to  its  adoption   by  Albert, 
Bonaventure,  and  Aquinas  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1994).   Rather  frustratingly,  this  book  contains  no 
bibliography;  all  sources  must  be  gleaned  from  footnotes  throughout  the  body  of  the  text. 
124  Ibid.,  pp.  18  -  19. 
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discovering  the  true  “source”  of  the  powers  distinction  in  such  a  context: 
The  very  nature  of  dialectical  debate  makes  it  hard  to  identify  authorship  of 
dialectical  devices:  ‘Dialectic  is  a  coorperative  and  progressive  polemic  —  a 
polemic  not  between  persons,  but  between  theses  and  counter-theses. 
Theses  are  not  personal  property,  nor  arguments.’   It  is  for  such  reasons, 
incidentally,  that  anyone  hoping  for  a  unique  and  correct  answer  to  ‘Who 
invented  the  Power  Distinction?’  may  have  to  remain  disappointed.  125
 
It  is  therefore  not  entirely  clear  with  whom  the  power  distinction  originates.   What 
is  clear  is  that  it  arose  in  the  context  of  dialectical  debates  as  a  particular  way  of 
dealing  with  Aristotle’s  Secundum  Quid  fallacy,  and  that  it  was  firmly  embedded  in 
common  philosophical  use  by  Bradwardine’s  time.    I  will  shortly  return  to  a 126
discussion  of  more  particular  instances  of  the  distinction’s  historical  use,  but  first, 
before  we  become  too  sidetracked,  we  should  return  to  Bradwardine  to  see  how, 
exactly,  he  employs  this  distinction. 
 
4.1.3  -  How  the  Distinction  Solves  the  Problem 
In  the  following  passage,  Bradwardine  addresses  an  argument  that  rests  on 
the  assumption  that  if  A  is  a  future  contingent,  then  it  is  the  case  that  “A  can  be  not 
going  to  be”;  and  this,  then,  is  equivalent  to  the  statement  “that  A  will  not  be  is 
possible”: 
Now  in  reply  to  the  proposition  at  issue  [namely,  the  statement:  “A  can  be  not 
going  to  be,  and  God  foreknows  that  A  will  be;  therefore  that  A  will  not  be  is 
possible”,  where  A  is  some  future  contingent],  I  say  that  A  can  be  not  going  to 
be  in  virtue  of  absolute  power,  whether  of  the  superior  or  of  an  inferior  cause. 
For  that  A  is  going  to  be  or  not  going  to  be  is  in  no  way  incompatible  with 
such  a  power  in  the  superior  or  in  an  inferior  cause.  If,  however,  one  is 
125  Ibid.,  pp.  327  -  28;  internal  quotation   G.  Ryle,  “Dialectics  in  the  Academy,”  in  G.E.I.  Owen  (ed.), 
Aristotle  on  Dialectic:   The  Topic,  Proceedings   of  the  Third  Symposium   Aristotelicum  (Oxford,  1968),  p.  76. 
126  Ibid.,  pp.  328  -  29. 
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speaking  of  the  ordained  power  of  the  superior  or  of  an  inferior  cause,  in  that 
case  one  says  that  A  (or  any  future  thing)  cannot  be  not  going  to  be.  For  if  by 
that  power  A  can  be  not  going  to  be,  it  follows  that  God  can  be  deceived  and 
can  err,  and  that  his  knowledge  can  be  mistaken,  and  that  he  can  say  what  is 
false  and  a  lie  —  if  God  has  predicted,  mediately  or  immediately,  that  A  is 
going  to  be. 
 
Nunc  ad  propositum,  dico  quod  A  potest  non  fore  de  potencia  absoluta  tam 
cause  superioris  quam  inferioris,  quia  A  fore  vel  non  fore  in  nullo  repugnat 
tali  potencie  in  causa  superiori  vel  inferiori.   Sed  loquendo  de  potencia 
ordinata  cause  superioris  et  inferioris,  sic  dicitur  quod  A  non  potest  non  fore 
nec  aliquod  futurum,  quia  si  illa  potencia  A  potest  non  fore,  sequitur  quod 
Deus  potest  decipi  et  errare,  et  falli  potest  ejus  sciencia,  et  potest  falsum 
dicere  et  mentiri  si  Deus  predixit  A  fore  mediate  vel  immediate.   (DFC  42g) 
 
We  now  see  the  use  to  which  Bradwardine  puts  the  distinction  between  God's 
absolute  and  ordained  power.   Bradwardine  proposes  that  God's  foreknowledge  is 
enacted  by  his  ordained  power ;  relative  to  this  power,  Bradwardine  concedes, 127
what  God  knows  will  be,  necessarily  will  be.   However,  it  is  not  necessary  relative  to 
his  absolute  power,  and  so,  absolutely  or  logically  speaking,  future  contingents 
which  God  foreknows  remain  contingent  despite  his  knowledge  of  them.   In  this  way, 
Bradwardine  claims  to  resolve  the  apparent  tension  between  God’s  foreknowledge, 
and  the  creature’s  ability  to  act  freely.   God  knows  my  future  acts  by  virtue  of  his 
ordained  foreknowledge,  and  relative  to  this  ordained  power,  I  am  constrained  to  act 
as  God  foreknows;  but  in  an  absolute  sense,  I  am  yet  free  to  act  otherwise. 
Bradwardine  goes  on  to  reply  to  the  person  who  objects  that  this  still  boils 
127  It  is,  perhaps,  a  little  bit  difficult   to  understand   what  it  means  for  a  sort  of  knowledge  to  be  “enacted” 
through  a  particular   sort  of  power,  and  it  may  indeed  be  the  case  that  there  exists  a  better  way  of 
expressing  this  than  I  have  yet  discovered.   In  using  this  expression,  I  am  doing  my  best  to  convey  the 
sense  in  which  God’s  (fore)knowledge  relates  to  the  powers  distinction.   The  most  natural  way  in  which 
I  can  understand   this,  is  that  any  capacity   we  have  —  whether  for  thinking,  acting,  perceiving,  etc.  — 
must  be  empowered  in  order  to  operate.   And  so  when  I  say  that,  according  to  Bradwardine,  God’s 
foreknowledge  is  “enacted”  by  God’s  ordained  power,  what  I  mean  is  that  God’s  ordained  power  is  that 
which  allows  God’s  capacity   for  foreknowledge  to  operate. 
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down  to  determinism.  The  objector  says,  “Since  in  respect  of  ordained  power  A 
cannot  be  going  to  be,  A  cannot  be  going  to  be”.  But  Bradwardine  insists  that,  since  A 
can  be  with  respect  to  absolute  power,  we  properly  draw  the  conclusion  that  A  can 
be  (the  same  inference  does  not  hold  in  the  case  of  ordained  power).   (DFC  43a-b.) 
Let's  take  as  an  example  to  illustrate  this  my  taking  a  train  to  London, 
England,  from  Cambridge,  as  I  did  once  to  present  a  preliminary  version  of  the 
central  arguments  of  this  thesis.  The  day  before  I  went  to  London,  presumably,  God 
foreknew  that  I  would  take  the  10:15  train  from  Cambridge  to  London.  Now, 
thinking  about  this  then-future  event  apart  from  God's  knowledge  of  it,  there  is 
nothing  about  it  which  is  necessary;  any  number  of  things  may  have  prevented  its 
occurrence.  I  may  have  been  running  late  and  missed  the  10:15  train;  I  may  have 
tripped  on  the  platform,  fallen  on  the  tracks,  and  been  run  over  by  the  train;  I  may 
have  decided  that  my  paper  was  not  ready  for  presentation,  and  ashamed  to  show 
my  face,  have  stayed  in  bed  that  morning.  However,  Bradwardine  would  have  it  that, 
insofar  as  God  foreknew  I'd  take  the  10:15  to  London,  and  relative  to  the  ordained 
power  by  which  God  enacted  that  knowledge,   it  was  necessary  that  I  catch  the 128
10:15  train.  But  lest  he  be  accused  of  determinism,  Bradwardine  would  swiftly  add 
that  this  necessity  was  not  absolute:  it  remained  a  possibility,  at  least  in  an  absolute 
sense,  that  God  could  have  suspended  his  ordained  power,  and  by  his  absolute 
power  have  made  it  otherwise.  129
We  thus  see  how  Bradwardine’s  account  makes  use  of  the  distinction 
between  God’s  absolute  and  ordained  power  to  explain  how  God  might  have 
128  See  previous  footnote. 
129  Something   that  remains   somewhat  unclear   here,  and  something  about  which  I  have  yet  to  gain 
certainty   from  the  text  of  DFC  itself,  is  in  what  sense  Bradwardine  means  to  imply  that  God’s  absolute 
power  could  have  been  enacted  rather  than  God’s  ordained  power.   Does  he  simply  mean  that  things 
could  have  been  ordained  differently,  such  that  something  else  could  have  been  brought  into  being;  or 
does  he  mean  that,  even  in  the  current  ordering  of  creation,  God  could  enact  alternative  outcomes  by 
somehow  asserting   God’s  absolute  power  in  the  present  order?   I’m  inclined  to  think  it  more  likely  that 
he  means  something   like  the  former,  rather  than  the  latter;  but  I  have  not  yet  fully  established  this  or  not 
from  my  reading  of  the  text.   It  is,  however,  an  important  question,  and  one  worthy  of  further 
consideration. 
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knowledge  of  our  actions  without  necessitating  those  actions.   Discovering  whether 
Bradwardine’s  account  is  ultimately  coherent,  and  whether  it  ultimately  avoids 
being  deterministic  in  its  zeal  to  preserve  the  perfect  foreknowledge  of  God,  will  be 
the  main  task  of  the  fifth  and  final  chapter.   What  I  hope  to  argue  in  the  remainder  of 
this  chapter,  however,  is  that  Bradwardine’s  use  of  this  distinction  in  the  context  of 
future  contingents  is  original  to  him. 
It  may  be  objected  that  the  distinction  between  the  ordained  and  absolute 
powers  of  God  is  not  original,  for  it  can  be  seen  already  in  the  writing  of  Scotus  and, 
as  Moonan  shows,  it  is  in  extensive  use  even  earlier  than  that.   Let  me  be  clear, 
therefore,  that  it  is  not  my  claim  that  the  distinction  between  God’s  absolute  and 
ordained  power  is  by  any  means  an  invention  of  Bradwardine's:  Scotus,  for  instance, 
expressed  the  distinction  by  saying  that  through  his  absolute  power,  God  is  able  to 
do  anything  that  is  logically  possible;  God  constrains  his  power,  however,  by  his  own 
will,  to  operate  within  the  bounds  of  the  naturally  possible,  and  thereby  ordains,  or 
orders,  his  power.   But  Scotus  was  in  this  case  discussing  the  logically  possible 
versus  the  naturally  possible.   What  I  argue,  rather,  is  that  though  Bradwardine  is  not 
original  in  making  this  distinction,  he  is  original  in  the  use  to  which  he  puts  it,  as  we 
shall  see  as  he  develops  his  argument  further.   Thus,  it  is  not  my  claim  that 
Bradwardine  is  the  first  to  make  use  of  this  distinction  simpliciter ,  but  rather,  that  he 
is  the  first  (and  perhaps  the  only)  to  make  use  of  it  in  this  particular  context,  to 
explain  the  compatibility  of  God’s  foreknowledge  and  the  contingency  of  some 
future  things. 
It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  there  are  a  few  earlier  sources  that  gesture  in 
the  direction  of  this  use,  as  outlined  in  Moonan’s  history.   In  particular,  there  are  a 
few  instances  to  be  noted  of  this  and  similar  distinctions  being  made  in  discussions 
of  a  particular  case  of  future  contingents,  namely,  that  of  the  final  state  of  particular 
souls.   Throughout  the  Middle  Ages,  the  ultimate  beatitude  of  St  Peter,  and  the 
ultimate  damnation  of  Judas  Iscariot,  are  taken  to  be  prototypical  examples  of  future 
 
 
 
 
140 
contingent  events  about  which  we  know  the  truth  value  —  i.e.,  we  know  as 
theological  certainties  that  Peter  is  saved,  and  that  Judas  is  damned,  despite  neither 
of  these  future  events  being  necessary  in  themselves.   Thus,  statements  such  as 
“Peter  is  damned”  and  “Judas  is  saved”  are  taken  to  be  counterfactual  statements 
about  future  events,  statements  which  we  know  to  in  fact  be  false  and  contrary  to 
the  will  of  God,  despite  neither  being  a  strictly  impossible  event  considered  in  itself. 
Thus  we  see,  for  instance,  something  very  similar  to  Bradwardine’s  use  of  the 
power  distinction  in  a  discussion  concerning  damning  Peter  and  saving  Judas  in 
William  of  Auxerre  (d.  1231).    Rather  than  talking  about  this  things  being  possible 130
or  impossible  relative  to  God’s  ordained  or  absolute  power,  however,  William  talks 
about  them  being  possible  de  potentia  of  God,  but  not  de  justitia  of  God  (that  is, 
possible  with  respect  to  God’s  power,  but  not  with  respect  to  God’s  justice).  131
Likewise,  the  Dominican  Hugh  of  St  Cher  (d.  1263)  makes  use  of  a  similar  distinction 
in  his  framing  of  the  problem,  but  speaks  of  the  distinction  as  that  between  God’s 
potentia  absoluta  and  God’s  potentia  conditionata  (that  is,  between  God’s  absolute 
and  conditional  power)  when  speaking  of  God’s  ability  to  damn  Peter  and  save 
Judas.    In  each  of  these  cases,  while  coming  close  to  the  distinction  in  a  way 132
similar  to  Bradwardine,  the  distinction  is  ultimately  articulated  in  slightly  different 
terms,  and  with  different  implications.   Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  note  that, 
while  these  cases  consider  a  particular  special  case  of  future  contingents,  they  do 
not  extend  the  solution  to  future  contingents  more  generally. 
Two  examples  of  the  use  of  the  distinction  which  come  rather  closer  to 
Bradwardine’s  (but  again,  only  in  the  very  particular  case  of  damning  Peter  and 
saving  Judas)  are  to  be  found  in  the  Summa  of  the  English  Franciscan,  Alexander  of 
130   William   of  Auxerre,  Summa  aurea ,  ed.  Ribailler,  I  (1980),   212 
131   Moonan,   pp.  69  -  71. 
132   This  discussion   occurs  in  Hugh  of  St  Cher’s  commentary  on  the  Sentences ,  I  Sent. ,  d.  42,  q.  1,  edited  by 
E.  Randi  and  published   as  “Potentia  dei  conditionata:  Una  questione  di  Ugo  di  Saint  Cher 
sull’omnipotenza  divina  (Sent.  I,  d.  42,  q.  1),”  in  Rivista  di  storia  della  filosofia ,  39  (1984),   pp.  521  -  36; 
discussed   in  Moonan,   pp.  116  -  17. 
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Hales  (d.  1245),  and  the  Sentences  commentary  of  a  philosopher  of  substantially 
greater  historical  import,  Albert  the  Great  (d.  1280),  the  teacher  of  St  Thomas 
Aquinas.   Alexander  explicitly  uses  the  language  of  potentia  absoluta  and  potentia 
ordinata  in  his  discussion  of  the  topic  in  his  Summa  Theologica .    Alexander’s 133
discussion  is  brief,  and  once  again,  the  powers  distinction  is  only  applied  to  this 
particular  example,  not  to  future  contingents  in  general,  but  it  is  nonetheless  worth 
noting.   A  little  later,  Albert  employs  a  very  similar  distinction  (which  he  puts  as  that 
between  potentia  absoluta  —  absolute  power  —  and  potentia  relata  ad  ordinem 
sapientiae  —  power  relative  to  the  ordinances  of  wisdom)  in  his  own  discussion  of 
damning  Peter  and  saving  Judas  in  his  Sentences  commentary.  134
A  final  noteworthy  instance  of  a  pre-Bradwardinian  use  of  the  distinction  in 
the  context  of  future  contingents  comes  in  the  Franciscan  St  Bonaventure’s  (d.  1274) 
mention  —  and  immediate  critique  —  of  a  view  which  sounds  very  much  like 
Bradwardine’s.   Bonaventure  reports  an  opinion  using  the  distinction,  but 
immediately  criticizes  its  use  in  his  reply:  “This  distinction  does  not  seem 
appropriate,  because  God  can  do  nothing  that  he  cannot  do  ordinate .   For  to  be  able 
to  do  something  inordinate  is  not-being-able  ( non  posse ),  like  being  able  to  sin,  and 
being  able  to  lie.”    It  is  not  clear  whose  view  Bonaventure  is  reporting,  but  it 135
sounds  very  much  like  a  prototype  of  Bradwardine’s  own.   What  is  perhaps  more 
interesting  than  the  report  itself,  however,  is  Bonaventure’s  critical  response, 
variations  of  which  will  be  taken  up  when  we  come  to  a  critical  examination  of 
Bradwardine’s  position  in  chapter  4.   In  what  remains  of  this  chapter,  however,  I 
return  to  the  three  views  with  which  I  began  this  study  to  explore  the  relationship  of 
each  with  the  position  of  Bradwardine. 
 
133  Alexander  of  Hales,  Summa  Hales ,  1:  220  -  21;  discussed   by  Moonan,   pp.  140  -  41. 
134  Albert  the  Great,  I  Sent. ,  d.  42c,  art.  3,  ed.  Borgnet,  26;  381b;  mentioned  by  Moonan  pp.  169  -  70. 
135  Bonaventure,  Op.  theol.  Sel. ,  Quaracchi  edition   (1924)   1:  778a,  p.  618;  mentioned  by  Moonan,  p.  202. 
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4.2  -   Bradwardine  and  Boethius 
In  chapter  1,  we  examined  three  positions  on  the  problem  of  future 
contingents  (those  of  Boethius,  Anselm,  and  Duns  Scotus)  which  I  claimed  to  have  a 
particularly  significant  relationship  with  Bradwardine’s  own  solution  as  forebears  in 
a  sort  of  family  tree  of  related  solutions  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents.   In  this 
and  the  following  two  sections,  I  will  examine  this  claim  by  looking  at  each  position 
and  its  relationship  to  Bradwardine’s  in  turn.   We  begin  now  with  discussion  of 
Bradwardine’s  solution  as  it  relates  to  that  of  Boethius. 
 
4.2.1  -  The  similarities  of  Boethius  and  Bradwardine 
Bradwardine’s  solution  to  the  problem  bears  certain  resemblances  to 
Boethius’  famous  solution.   Namely,  both  solutions  rest  on  recasting  our 
understanding  of  God’s  mode  of  knowledge.   Boethius,  as  we  have  seen  (1.1), 
appeals  to  a  mode  of  knowing  in  God  that  is  as  mysterious  to  us  as  our  mode  of 
understanding  and  knowing  is  to,  say,  a  clam.   God’s  mode  of  knowing,  for  Boethius, 
is  fundamentally  above,  beyond,  or  higher  than  our  mode  of  knowing,  and  hence  is 
ultimately  fundamentally  mysterious  to  us.   Thus,  Boethius  claims,  we  can  make 
some  sort  of  limited  sense  out  of  how  God  might  possess  knowledge  of  the  future 
that  does  not  necessitate  the  things  that  God  knows,  in  part,  at  least,  because  God 
does  not  know  things  in  the  same  way  that  we  do. 
Bradwardine  similarly  makes  the  move  of  seeking  to  explain  the 
compatibility  of  God’s  foreknowledge  with  freedom  by  appeal  to  God’s  mode  of 
knowing.   Bradwardine  argues  that  God  knows  future  contingent  events  by  means  of 
a  particular  sort  of  power  —  namely,  God’s  ordained  power  —  and  thus  claims  that 
by  confining  God’s  power  of  foreknowledge  to  the  realm  of  God’s  ordained  power, 
our  freedom  to  act  is  still  preserved  in  an  absolute  sense  (i.e.,  relative  to  God’s 
absolute  power).   Relative  to  God’s  ordained  power,  by  which  God  knows  our  future 
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actions,  these  actions  are  constrained  by  God’s  knowledge  of  them;  but  because 
God’s  ordained  power  is  only  part  of  the  story  of  God’s  power,  relative  to  God’s 
power  absolutely  speaking,  our  actions  are  not  constrained.   Hence,  divine 
foreknowledge  is  claimed  to  be  preserved  alongside  human  freedom  to  act. 
In  both  cases,  then,  this  compatibility  of  God’s  knowledge  of  our  future 
actions  with  the  freedom  of  those  same  actions  is  explained  by  direct  appeal  to  the 
way  in  which  God  knows. 
 
4.2.2  -  Differences 
But  this  account  perhaps  glosses  over  some  of  the  more  pronounced 
differences  between  the  two  solutions.   In  particular,  while  Boethius  makes  his 
appeal  to  the  way  in  which  God  knows,  that  mode  of  knowing  remains 
fundamentally  unexplained  to  us.   We  are  given  logical  reasons  to  think  that  such  a 
mode  of  knowing  might  be  possible  —  reasons  why  God’s  necessary  knowledge  of 
an  action  does  not  make  that  action  necessary,  per  se ,  any  more  than  because  I  am 
sitting  I  am  necessarily  not  standing  makes  my  not  standing  necessary  per  se  —  but 
apart  from  some  vague  and  undeveloped  gestures  toward  what  Anselm  would  more 
explicitly  work  out  by  appeal  to  God’s  timeless  eternity,  we  are  given  no  idea  of  the 
mechanism  whereby  God’s  non-necessitating  foreknowledge  might  work.   In  the  end, 
it  is  primarily  a  mystery  explained  by  analogy  (God’s  knowledge  is  to  ours  as  our 
knowledge  is  to  that  of  animals).   Bradwardine,  by  contrast,  seeks  to  provide  a  more 
complete  explanation  of  how  it  is  that  God’s  knowledge  of  our  actions  need  not 
necessitate  those  actions.   It  is  because  of  the  power  by  which  God  enacts  God’s 
foreknowledge  (i.e.,  ordained)  that  there  is  a  sense  (i.e.,  absolute)  in  which  our 
actions  remain  free. 
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4.2.3  -  A  development  of  Boethius? 
Despite  these  differences,  however,  it  is  possible  to  view  Bradwardine’s 
solution  as  a  development  compatible  with  Boethius.   On  this  view,  it  would  appear 
that  where  Boethius  provides  the  basic  framework  within  which  to  understand 
God’s  foreknowledge  in  relation  to  human  freedom,  Bradwardine  provides  a  fuller 
account  of  the  mechanics  undergirding  the  view.   Boethius  gives  us  reasons  for 
believing  that  the  reconciliation  of  God’s  foreknowledge  with  human  freedom  might 
be  possible:  He  makes  arguments  which  claim  to  demonstrate  no  necessary 
contradiction  between  the  two  notions,  opening  the  possibility  of  conceiving  of 
God’s  foreknowledge  operating  in  a  way  quite  unlike  our  own  mode  of  knowing,  and 
pointing  out  the  lack  of  any  logical  necessity  entailed  in  things  by  God’s  knowledge 
of  them.   But  he  does  not  in  any  way  indicate  how  such  a  knowledge  might  operate, 
or  at  best  gestures  toward  the  Anselmian  notion  (also  present  to  some  degree  in 
Augustine)  that  God’s  timeless  eternity  privileges  God  to  a  perspective, 
inconceivable  by  us  time-bound  creatures,  free  from  the  constraints  of  time  and 
space.   However,  Boethius’  explication  of  God’s  foreknowledge  as  possible  because  of 
God’s  eternality  ( De  consolatione  Philosophia  Book  V,  prose  VI)  is  relatively  sketchy 
and  incomplete,  leaving  us  yet  with  little  sense  of  how  God’s  foreknowledge  operates 
in  a  way  that  does  not  necessitate  the  things  foreknown. 
Bradwardine,  by  contrast,  seeks  to  provide  an  account  which  helps  us  to 
understand  how  exactly  this  non-necessitating  foreknowledge  of  God  is  possible. 
Whereas  Boethius  allows  us  to  contemplate  the  mere  possibility  of  such  knowledge 
in  God  by  appeal  to  analogy  (the  analogy  of  our  knowledge  as  compared  to  that  of  a 
non-rational  animal,  or  analogous  ways  of  grasping  at  the  notion  of  all  of  eternity 
being  present  to  God),  Bradwardine  seeks  to  give  an  account  of  the  mechanism 
whereby  such  knowledge  comes  to  pass.   Bradwardine  does  not  seek  merely  to  show 
us  by  way  of  various  analogies  that  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  God’s  foreknowledge 
of  things  does  not  compel  the  objects  of  God’s  knowledge  to  come  about;  but  rather, 
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Bradwardine  offers  a  theory  of  the  way  in  which  such  knowledge  is  possible.   He 
seeks  to  give  an  explanation  of  the  exact  sense  in  which  we  can  claim  freedom  of 
action,  despite  God’s  knowledge  of  that  action  before  we  do  it. 
In  doing  so,  however,  Bradwardine  does  not  contradict  Boethius’  premises. 
Nothing  in  Bradwardine’s  solution  undermines  the  central  premise  that  God’s  mode 
of  knowing  is  essentially  different  from  and  transcends  our  own.   His  solution  also 
invokes  the  Boethian  distinction  between  absolute  and  conditional  necessity.   But 
Bradwardine  seeks  to  explain  in  more  detail  how,  exactly,  those  differences  in  God’s 
knowledge  from  our  own  operate.   I  think,  therefore,  Bradwardine’s  solution  can  be 
understood  as  a  possible  development  of,  or  elaboration  of,  that  of  Boethius. 
 
4.3  -  Bradwardine  and  Anselm 
We  have  observed  already  the  influence  exhibited  by  Anselm  on 
Bradwardine’s  summary  of  alternative  solutions  to  the  problem  of  future 
contingents.   The  opinion  of  Anselm,  we  have  seen,  is  one  of  the  few  to  receive  an 
explicit  attribution.   More  importantly,  however,  of  the  nine  opinions  put  forward, 
Anselm’s  is  the  only  one  that  does  not  appear  to  be  rejected  outright.   We  see  this 
structurally  from  the  fact  that  in  the  objections  and  responses  to  the  Anselmian 
view,  every  objection  posed  receives  a  response.   Since  every  objection  raised  seems 
to  be  dealt  with,  and  since  the  section  concludes  with  a  defense  of  the  view,  rather 
than  an  attack  (which  is  the  way  in  which  all  other  sections  conclude),  it  seems  that 
Bradwardine  is  ultimately  seeking  to  defend  Anselm’s  view  as  correct. 
Furthermore,  in  the  objections  and  responses  that  follow  the  responsio 
propria ,   Anselm  is  perhaps  the  most-cited  authority  after  Holy  Scripture.   Again  and 
again,  Bradwardine  supports  his  arguments   by  making  reference  to  works  of 
Anselm,  particularly  the  De  concordia  and  the  De  casu  diabolo . 
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But  if  Anselm’s  work  has  so  much  purported  influence  on  Bradwardine’s 
account,  are  we  able  to  discern  marked  similarities  between  Anselm’s  account  and 
Bradwardine’s?   Is  the  content  of  the  two  accounts  really  very  similar  at  all?   In  what 
follows,  I  will  examine,  firstly,  the  ways  in  which  Bradwardine  and  Anselm’s 
respective  accounts  really  seem  not  to  have  anything  to  do  with  one  another  at  all;  I 
will  them  propose  a  way  in  which  these  views  might  be  reconciled  as  compatible 
with  one  another,  arguing  in  particular  that  Bradwardine  intended  for  his  view  to  be 
compatible  with  that  of  Anselm. 
 
4.3.1  -  The  divergence  of  Bradwardine’s  view  from  Anselm’s 
On  the  one  hand,  it  may  not  appear  at  first  blush  that  Bradwardine’s  view  and 
Anselm’s  have  much  in  common  at  all.   In  fact,  the  two  seem  to  be  focusing  on 
different  things  entirely.   Anselm’s  solution  to  the  problem  of  reconciling  God’s 
foreknowledge  and  human  freedom  rests  on  an  examination  of  the  nature  of  time 
itself,  and  God’s  relationship  to  it.   It  is  only  because  of  God’s  transcendence  of  time, 
according  to  Anselm,  that  God  has  knowledge  of  things  that  are,  to  us,  future.   God 
surveys  the  whole  expanse  of  time  in  a  moment,  from  the  perspective  of  eternality; 
God  simply  “sees”  all  of  history  spread  out  before  God.   Thus,  Anselm’s  solution 
relies  on  a  particular  understanding  of  the  nature  of  time,  on  the  one  hand,  as 
created  by  God  and  fundamentally  relative  to  the  perspective  of  the  being 
experiencing  it;  and  of  eternity,  on  the  other,  as  that  timeless  existence  in  which  God 
dwells,  but  from  which  God  is  able  to  observe  all  at  once  the  entirety  of  created  time. 
By  contrast,  in  the  present  treatise,  Bradwardine  seems  hardly  at  all 
interested  in  the  nature  of  time  or  perspectives  of  time.   Though  Bradwardine  picks 
up  Anselm’s  solution  in  his  summaries  (3.1),  and  speaks  of  the  relativity  of 
perspectives  of  time  when  he  does,  notions  of  time  do  not  explicitly  enter 
Bradwardine’s  discussions  of  his  own  solution.   Instead,  his  focus  is  exclusively  on 
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the  operation  and  interaction  of  God’s  power  and  knowledge.   It  seems  conceivable, 
in  fact,  that  on  Bradwardine’s  solution,  God  may  not  in  fact  transcend  time. 
Bradwardine’s  solution  is  consistent,  it  seems,  with  a  notion  of  God  that  constrains 
God  within  the  bounds  of  time.   If  God’s  knowledge  operates  in  a  way  entirely  unlike 
our  own  (as  Boethius  suggests),  then  it  does  not  seem  impossible  to  imagine  that 
God  could  know  future  things  while  being  situated  in  a  particular  place  in  time.   In 
such  a  case,  Bradwardine  would  offer  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  how  such 
knowledge  of  the  future  does  not  dictate  the  events  of  the  future,  despite  God’s 
knowledge  in  time  of  things  future  even  to  God.   I  should  clarify  at  this  point  that  I 
am  not  proposing  that  Bradwardine  does ,  in  fact,  deny  God’s  transcendence  of  time;  I 
am  merely  pointing  out  that  his  solution  is  not  inherently  inconsistent  with  a  view 
that  fails  to  ascribe  transcendence  of  time  to  God. 
 
4.3.2  -  Consonance  between  Bradwardine’s  view  and  Anselm’s 
As  when  we  considered  Bradwardine’s  view  in  relation  to  that  of  Boethius 
(4.2),  it  seems  to  me  that  the  key  to  understanding  the  relationship  between 
Anselm’s  and  Bradwardine’s  view  is  understanding  the  respective  modes  in  which 
their  solutions  operate.   In  the  preceding  section,  I  argued  that,  while  Boethius’ 
solution  offers  us  reason  to  think  that  Divine  foreknowledge  does  not  necessitate 
determinism,  Bradwardine  offers  us  an  explanation  of  how  such  non-determining 
Divine  foreknowledge  actually  operates.   The  difference  between  Bradwardine’s 
view  and  Anselm’s,  however,  is  somewhat  more  subtle.   For  in  this  case,  we  have  in  a 
sense  two  separate  examinations  of  the  “ how ”  of  God’s  foreknowledge:  both 
Bradwardine  and  Anselm  seem  to  be  offering  explanations  of  how  God’s 
foreknowledge  does  not  necessitate  future  events,  Anselm  by  appeal  to  a  particular 
view  of  time  and  God’s  eternality,  and  Bradwardine  by  an  examination  of  God’s 
power  and  the  way  in  which  that  power  operates. 
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However,  as  was  the  case  with  Boethius,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  different 
approaches  employed  by  Anselm  and  Bradwardine  can  be  reconciled  when 
considered  as  ways  of  examining  two  different  aspects  of  the  problems  that  arise 
from  the  puzzles  surrounding  God’s  foreknowledge.   Anselm  provides  us  with  a 
particular  picture  of  God’s  relation  to  creation,  one  that  focuses  on  the  grand-scale, 
cosmic  make-up  of  the  universe.   All  that  is  created  exists  within  the  framework  of 
time;  indeed,  time  itself  is  of  the  order  of  creation.   God,  however,  is  metaphysically 
prior  to  the  created  order,  if  not  temporally  prior  (since  temporal  priority  makes 
little  sense  apart  from  a  notion  of  time).   Anselm  is  painting  a  broad  sweeping 
picture  of  the  cosmos,  created  and  Divine,  and  shaping  our  understanding  of  the 
relationship  between  the  two. 
Bradwardine,  by  contrast,  focuses  instead  on  the  very  nature  and  operations 
of  God.   Bradwardine’s  analysis  of  the  operation  of  God’s  knowledge  is  independent 
of  the  created  order.   Rather  than  examining  God’s  knowledge  in  relation  to  that  of 
God’s  creatures,  Bradwardine  seeks  to  describe  God’s  knowledge  by  an  examination 
of  God’s  self.   Put  another  way,  Bradwardine’s  analysis  of  how  God  knows  future 
things  is  independent  of  the  created  order  in  which  those  future  things  exist. 
Whether  or  not  anything  future  exists,  God  knows  what  God  knows  by  virtue  of 
God’s  ordained  power.   Even  if,  per  impossibile ,  time  and  the  material  universe  it 
accompanies  had  not  been  created,  this  is  the  way  in  which  God’s  knowledge  would 
operate. 
But  simply  because  Anselm  and  Bradwardine  focus  on  God’s  knowledge  from 
quite  different  perspectives,  this  does  not  mean  that  their  explanations  are 
incompatible.   As  was  the  case  in  the  previous  section  (Bradwardine  and  Boethius, 
4.2),  it  is  possible  in  this  case,  I  think,  to  maintain  that  both  Anselm’s  position  and 
Bradwardine’s  may  be  compatibly  maintained  —  even  as,  for  instance,  it  may  be 
compatibly  maintained  that  “red”  is  the  colour  which  reflects  light  of  about 
wavelength  700  nanometres,  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  “red”  is  passionate,  fiery,  and 
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the  colour  of  a  flamenco  dancer’s  skirt,  on  the  other.   Each  philosopher  is  seeking  out 
different  sorts  of  causes  in  his  respective  explanation  of  how,  precisely,  God’s 
foreknowledge  (especially  of  human  action)  does  not  compel  (those  actions).   While 
I’m  not  sure  that  one  can  really  separate  the  sorts  of  causes  that  Anselm  and 
Bradwardine  identify  in  the  manner  of  Aristotle’s  four  causes  —  as  it  seems  that 
both  Anselm  and  Bradwardine  are  concerned  with  the  efficient  cause,  in  a  sense,  of 
God’s  foreknowledge  —  we  may  yet  recognize  that  they  are  looking  to  different 
aspects  of  a  causal  explanation. 
Indeed,  I  think  it  may  be  fairly  asserted  that  Bradwardine,  at  least,  perceives 
his  solution  as  being  compatible  with  Anselm’s  in  this  way.   Our  strongest  clue  to  this 
fact  is  the  way  in  which  Bradwardine  handles  Anselm’s  view  in  the  expositional 
section.   Recall  that  Bradwardine  lays  out  a  total  of  nine  views  on  the  question  of 
future  contingents  before  moving  on  to  his  own  solution.   Of  these  nine,  his 
treatment  of  the  sixth  view  (which  he  —  rather  unusually  —  explicitly  attributes  to 
Anselm)  is  unique:  whereas  with  all  the  other  eight  views,  his  scholastic-style 
objection-and-response  section  of  arguments,  for  and  opposed,  invariably  ends  with 
a  sound  denunciation  of  the  view,  when  it  comes  to  the  sixth  view,  he  concludes  the 
section  with  a  whole  series  of  arguments  in  support  of  the  view.   This  fact,  coupled 
with  Bradwardine’s  frequent  citation  of  Anselm  throughout  the  remaining  corpus  — 
and  particularly  throughout  his  defense  of  his  own  solution  —  would  seem  to 
indicate  not  only  Bradwardine’s  high  regard  for  Anselm  and  his  work,  but  his  strong 
agreement  with  what  Anselm  thinks  on  the  matter. 
 
4.4  -  Comparisons  with  Scotus’  solution 
We  have  now  examined  the  relationship,  and  likely  consonance,  between 
Bradwardine’s  view  and  both  Boethius’  and  Anselm’s.   In  both  cases,  I  made  fairly 
similar  arguments  about  their  compatibility  and  complementarity.   And,  indeed,  I 
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think  it  may  be  quite  easily  seen  that  Boethius’  and  Anselm’s  respective  solutions  to 
the  problem  of  future  contingents  are  compatible  with  one  another:  Anselm’s  view 
would  appear  to  be  a  direct  development  of  Boethius’  hint  that  God’s 
non-necessitating  foreknowledge  is  possible  because  of  God’s  transcendence  of  time. 
Thus  the  views  of  Boethius,  Anselm,  and  Bradwardine  together  constitute  a  sort  of 
family  tree  of  solutions,  each  one  descending  from  those  previous. 
In  the  case  of  Duns  Scotus,  the  situation  is  perhaps  a  little  bit  different.   This 
is  because  Scotus  departs  from  the  views  of  his  predecessors  in  rather  dramatic 
fashion  by  explicitly  denying  the  timeless  eternity  of  God,  and  Bradwardine  does  not 
follow  Scotus  on  this  count.   In  fact,  the  primary  point  of  contact,  or  at  least  that  of 
particular  interest,  between  Scotus’  thought  and  Bradwardine’s  solution  to  this 
problem  lies  not  in  Scotus’  treatment  of  future  contingents,  per  se .   Instead,  we 
observe  as  Bradwardine’s  primary  “Scotusian”  influence,  if  I  may  be  permitted  the 
neologism,  an  aspect  of  Scotus’  thought  that  never  explicitly  comes  to  bear  in  Scotus’ 
own  treatment  of  the  problem  of  future  contingents  in  relation  to  God’s 
foreknowledge.   It  is  Scotus’  development  of  the  distinction  between  God’s  absolute 
and  ordained  power  that  will  exercise  such  a  profound  influence  on  Bradwardine’s 
solution  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents  in  the  treatise  at  hand;  but  in  Scotus’ 
own  work,  this  distinction  plays  no  role  whatsoever  in  his  treatment  of  future 
contingents.   In  what  follows,  I  will  first  briefly  talk  about  the  role  the  distinction 
does  play  in  Scotus’  writing;  I  will  then  discuss  how  Bradwardine  appropriates  the 
distinction  in  an  entirely  new  way  (highlighting  once  again  the  particular 
uniqueness  of  Bradwardine’s  DFC  solution  in  this  respect);  and  finally,  I  will  discuss 
whether  Bradwardine’s  reappropriation  of  Scotus’  distinction  in  the  context  of 
future  contingents  is  compatible  with  Scotus’  own  solution  to  the  problem  of  future 
contingents  as  we  saw  laid  out  in  1.3. 
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4.4.1  -  Scotus  on  Absolute  and  Ordained  Power 
Scotus  employs  the  distinction  between  God’s  absolute  and  ordained  powers, 
but  he  does  so  in  a  somewhat  different  context  than  does  Bradwardine.   In  Scotus’ 
case,  the  distinction  arises  (in  the  Ordinatio  I.44)  when  he  comes  to  consider 
whether  God  could  have  created  the  world  in  a  way  other  than  God  in  fact  did,  or 
whether  God  could  act  in  a  way  other  than  God  does.   He  rephrases  the  Lombard’s 
question  —  “whether  God  could  have  made  things  better  than  he  did”   —  and 136
instead  asks  the  question,  “Could  God  have  made  things  otherwise  than  he  has 
ordered  them  to  be  made?”    We  might  almost  wonder  if  rephrasing  the  question  in 137
this  way  does  not  somewhat  beg  the  question,  for  by  posing  it  in  terms  of  God’s 
ordinance,  it  leads  him  directly  to  his  own  response,  which  is  to  make  a  distinction 
between  God’s  ordained  and  absolute  power: 
I  reply:  in  every  agent  acting  intelligently  and  voluntarily  that  can  act  in 
conformity  with  an  upright  or  just  law  but  does  not  have  to  do  so  of  necessity, 
one  can  distinguish  between  its  ordained  power  and  its  absolute  power.   The 
reason  is  that  either  it  can  act  in  conformity  with  some  right  and  just  law,  and 
then  it  is  acting  according  to  its  ordained  power  (for  it  is  ordained  insofar  as 
it  is  a  principle  for  doing  something  in  conformity  with  a  right  or  just  law),  or 
else  it  can  act  beyond  or  against  such  a  law,  and  in  this  case  its  absolute 
power  exceeds  its  ordered  power. 
 
Respondeo:  In  omni  agente  per  intellectum  et  voluntatem,  potente 
conformiter  agere  legi  rectae  et  tamen  non  necessario  conformiter  agere  legi 
rectae,  est  distinguere  potentiam  ordinatam  a  potentia  absoluta;  et  ratio 
huius  est,  quia  potest  agere  conformiter  illi  legi  rectae,  et  tunc  secundum 
potentiam  ordinatam  (ordinata  enim  est  in  quantum  est  principium 
exsequendi  aliqua  conformiter  legi  rectae),  et  potest  agere  praeter  illam  legen 
vel  contra  eam,  et  in  hoc  est  potentia  absoluta,  excedens  potentiam 
136  “utrum   Deus  potuit  res  melius  fecisse  quam  fecit.”  Ordinatio   I.44,  in  John  Duns  Scotus,   Duns  Scotus  on 
the  Will  and  Morality ,  selected  and  trans.  with  introduction   by  A.  B.  Wolter,  O.F.M.  (Washington  D.C.: 
Catholic   University  of  America   Press,  1986),  254-55.   Translations  throughout  this  section  are  Wolter’s, 
unless  otherwise   noted. 
137  “utrum   Deus  possit  aliter  facere  res  quam  ab  ipso  ordinatum  est  eas  fieri.”   Ibid. 
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ordinatam.  138
 
Indeed,  according  to  Scotus,  not  only  God,  but  every  free  agent  has  this  ability  to 
either  act  in  accordance  with  some  rule,  or  against  it,  and  in  this  sense  has  both 
power  to  act  ordainedly,  or  absolutely.  139
In  the  case  of  God,  however,  the  relationship  between  his  ordained  and 
absolute  power  is  somewhat  different  from  our  own,  since  whereas  constraints  on 
our  own  power  are  largely  imposed  by  external  ordinances,  it  is  God  who  constrains 
the  ordering  of  God’s  power  by  God’s  own  will.   Thus  for  us  creatures,  it  is  not  in  fact 
possible  for  our  absolute  power  to  extend  beyond  our  ordained  power,  since  the 
limits  of  our  ordained  power  are  not  set  by  us;  in  the  case  of  God,  however,  God  could 
have  ordained  God’s  power  differently,  and  thus  could  have  acted  or  created 
otherwise: 
[W]henever  the  law  and  its  rectitude  are  in  the  power  of  the  agent,  so  that  the 
law  is  right  only  because  it  has  been  established,  then  the  agent  can  freely 
order  things  otherwise  than  this  right  law  dictates  and  still  can  act  orderly, 
because  he  can  establish  another  right  or  just  law  according  to  which  he  may 
act  orderly. 
 
[Q]uando  in  potestate  agentis  est  lex  et  rectitudo  legis,  ita  quod  non  est  recta 
nisi  quia  statuta,  tunc  potest  aliter  agens  ex  libertate  sua  ordinare  quam  lex 
illa  recta  dicet;  et  tamen  cum  hoc  potest  ordinate  agere,  quia  potest  statuere 
aliam  legem  rectam  secundum  quam  agat  ordinate.  140
 
Scotus  concludes  that  God  is  in  fact  able,  absolutely  speaking,  to  have  established  his 
138  Ibid. 
139  “Et  ideo  non  tantum   in  Deo,  sed  in  omni  agente  libere  —  qui  poetest  agere  secundum  dictamen  legis 
rectae  et  praeter  talem  legem  vel  contra  eam  —  est  distinguere  inter  potentiam  ordinatam  et 
absolutam.”   Ibid. 
140  Ibid.,  256-57. 
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ordinances  in  any  way  that  does  not  entail  a  contradiction:  God  could  have  ordained 
things  to  be  other  than  God  did  —  and  in  such  a  case,  since  God’s  ordinances  would 
have  been  different,  God’s  actions,  though  inordinate  with  respect  to  our  present 
state,  would  have  been  ordinate  with  respect  to  that  alternative  state. 
Since,  however,  God  in  fact  established  God’s  ordinances  in  the  way  that  God 
did,  God  cannot  —  or  perhaps  it  might  be  more  correct  to  say,  would  not  —  now  act 
in  a  way  contrary  to  God’s  own  ordinances.   The  division  of  powers,  as  Richard  Cross 
puts  it,  “is  just  a  convenient  way  of  stating  that  God  can  do  more  than  he  has  actually 
done”;  however,  “anything  that  God  does  is  brought  about  by  his  ordained  power.   It 
is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  Scotus  holds  God’s  absolute  power  to  be  some  kind  of 
executive  power  capable  of  overruling  the  ordained  power.”    This  becomes  clear  in 141
the  way  Scotus  expresses  what  it  would  have  been  like  if  God  had  ordained  an 
alternative  order  to  our  present  one: 
I  say,  therefore,  that  God  can  act  otherwise  than  is  prescribed  not  only  by  a 
particular  order,  but  also  by  a  universal  order  or  law  of  justice,  and  in  so 
doing  he  could  still  act  ordainedly ,  because  what  God  could  do  by  his  absolute 
power  that  is  either  beyond  or  runs  counter  to  the  present  order,  he  could  do 
ordainedly. 
 
Dico  ergo  quod  Deus  non  solum  potest  agere  aliter  quam  ordinatum  est 
ordine  particulari,  sed  aliter  quam  ordinatum  est  ordine  universali  —  sive 
secundum  leges  iustitiae  —  potest  ordinate  agere ,  quia  tam  illa  quae  sunt 
praeter  illum  ordinem,  quam  illa  quae  sunt  contra  ordinem  illum,  possent  a 
Deo  ordinate  fieri  potentia  absoluta.  142
 
Had  God  ordained  an  order  other  than  the  order  God  in  fact  ordained,  then  all  of  his 
actions  would  be  ordained  according  to  that  order. 
141  Richard  Cross,  Duns  Scotus ,  in  the  Great  Medieval  Thinkers  series  (Oxford:  OUP,  1999),  59.   (Cross’s 
emphasis.) 
142  Duns  Scotus,   258-59,   emphasis   added. 
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But  although  God  can  only  actually  act  in  accordance  with  God’s  ordained 
power,  Scotus  yet  prescribes  remarkable  freedom  to  God’s  power  absolutely 
speaking,  as  we  see  in  the  following  passage: 
God,  therefore,  insofar  as  he  is  able  to  act  in  accord  with  those  right  laws  he 
set  up  previously,  is  said  to  act  according  to  his  ordained  power;  but  insofar 
as  he  is  able  to  do  many  things  that  are  not  in  accord  with,  but  go  beyond, 
these  pre-established  laws,  God  is  said  to  act  according  to  his  absolute  power. 
God  can  do  anything  that  is  not  self-contradictory  or  act  in  any  way  that  does 
not  include  a  contradiction  (and  there  are  many  such  ways  he  could  act);  and 
then  he  is  said  to  be  acting  according  to  his  absolute  power. 
 
Deus  ergo,  agere  potens  secundum  illas  rectas  leges  ut  praefixae  sunt  ab  eo, 
dicitur  agere  secundum  potentiam  ordinatam.;  ut  autem  potest  multa  agere 
quae  non  sunt  secundum  illas  leges  iam  praefixas,  sec  praeter  illas,  dicitur 
eius  potentia  absoluta:  quia  enim  Deus  quodlibet  potest  agere  quod  non 
includit  contraditionem,  et  omni  modo  potest  agere  qui  non  includit 
contradictionem  (et  tales  sunt  multi  modi  alii),  ideo  dicitur  tunc  agere 
secundum  potentiam  absolutam.  143
 
Absolutely  speaking,  then,  God’s  power  extends  to  anything  at  all  that  does  not  entail 
a  contradiction,  even  though  God’s  actual  power  only  extends  as  far  as  God  has 
ordained. 
This,  then,  gives  us  a  fairly  good  understanding  of  Scotus'  understanding  and 
use  of  the  Divine  powers  distinction,  and  one  can  see  from  the  passages  quoted  how 
important  this  distinction  might  be  for  Scotus'  explanation  of  the  way  in  which 
logical  necessity  and  metaphysical  necessity  are  distinguished  from  one  another. 
What  is  chiefly  notable  for  our  purposes,  however,  is  what  the  discussion  is  not :  the 
context  in  which  Scotus  discusses  the  distinction  and  makes  use  of  it  for  his  own 
purposes  is  not  at  all  related  to  his  discussion  of  future  contingents  and  God’s 
143  Ibid.,  256-57. 
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foreknowledge.   Instead,  it  is  a  discussion  about  God’s  ability  to  have  acted 
differently  than  God  did  in  the  past . 
 
4.4.2  -  Bradwardine’s  Appropriation  of  the  Distinction 
Bradwardine,  as  we  have  seen  (4.1),  makes  use  of  this  distinction  between 
God’s  ordained  and  absolute  power  in  a  key  way  in  his  own  solution,  and  in  so  doing, 
he  is  applying  this  distinction  in  a  context  quite  unlike  that  of  Scotus.   Indeed,  it  is 
my  contention  that  Bradwardine  is  in  fact  relatively  unique  among  medieval  authors 
in  his  application  of  the  distinction  between  absolute  and  ordained  Divine  power 
specifically  to  the  problem  of  God’s  foreknowledge  and  future  contingents.   Though 
others  before  and  after  him  speak  of  this  distinction  in  other  contexts,  I  have  been 
unable  to  discover  any  that  do  so  directly  in  the  context  of  the  problem  of  future 
contingents  (at  least  not  beyond  the  passing  mentions  in  the  “damning  Peter  and 
saving  Judas”  discussions  mentioned  above).   This  makes  this  treatise  a  particularly 
interesting  piece  in  the  history  of  the  future  contingents  discussion,  being  as  it  is 
something  of  an  anomaly. 
Even  in  Bradwardine’s  own  later  writing  on  the  topic,  he  does  not  revisit  this 
distinction  in  any  pertinent  way.   Indeed,  the  account  of  future  contingents  implicitly 
present  throughout  the  De  causa  Dei  corpus  is  virtually  indistinguishable  from  that 
of  Scotus.   The  uniqueness  of  Bradwardine’s  solution  in  this  particular  work,  of 
course,  raises  some  intriguing  questions:  how  widely  read  was  this  treatise,  and  did 
it  have  any  broader  influence  in  Bradwardine’s  own  time,  or  that  immediately  after 
him?   Why  did  other  figures,  like  Scotus,  who  were  already  quite  keen  to  apply  the 
distinction  between  God’s  absolute  and  ordained  power  in  other  contexts,  not  do  so 
when  speaking  of  the  problem  of  future  contingents?   Why  does  Bradwardine 
himself  abandon  the  approach  in  subsequent  treatments  of  the  same  topic?   We  will 
not,  in  our  present  study,  find  satisfactory  answers  to  all  of  these  questions,  but  they 
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will  be  treated  in  more  detail  in  the  final  chapter  and  conclusion. 
 
4.4.3  -  Scotus’  and  Bradwardine’s  Solutions  Compared 
If,  as  we  have  seen,  Bradwardine’s  solution  relies  on  appropriating  a  Scotist 
distinction,  but  one  which  Scotus  himself  never  exploited  for  these  purposes,  then 
we  might  quite  justifiably  wonder  whether  Bradwardine’s  Scotist-flavoured  solution 
is  in  fact  compatible  with  Scotus’  own  solution  to  the  problem.   Does  the  distinction 
which  Scotus  develops,  but  never  uses  for  this  purpose,  actually  benefit  the  topic  of 
future  contingents,  or  does  it  constitute  an  unnecessary  obfuscation?   These  and 
other  questions  will  be  more  thoroughly  addressed  in  the  following  chapter.   In  the 
meantime,  however,  I  shall  say  just  a  few  words  about  the  relationship  between 
Scotus'  solution  and  that  of  Bradwardine  in  the  DFC. 
It  seems  to  me  that  Scotus’  and  Bradwardine’s  solutions  are  in  fact  quite 
complementary.   Indeed,  they  may  reflect,  in  a  way,  two  sides  of  the  same  coin  — 
Scotus  emphasizing  the  primacy  of  the  will,  and  God's  knowledge  of  his  own  will, 
while  Bradwardine  emphasizes  God's  knowledge,  and  that  knowledge  as  ordained 
by  the  will.   It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  it  may  be  possible  for  Scotus'  and 
Bradwardine’s  accounts  to  be  reconciled  to  form  a  single,  unified  account  of  God’s 
foreknowledge  and  human  free  will. 
What  might  this  unified  account  look  like?   Well,  suppose  it  is  the  case  that  in 
any  given  moment,  it  is  truly  the  case  that  I  can  either  perform  action  A  or  not-A , 
because  in  either  case,  no  contradiction  follows.   Presume  furthermore,  as  Scotus 
would  seem  to  have  it,  that  God  knows,  before  I  perform  either  action,  which  I  will 
choose,  simply  by  his  complete  and  perfect  knowledge  of  me  and  my  will.   Does 
God’s  knowledge  of  that  action  make  it  any  less  free?   Scotus'  response  is  that  God’s 
knowledge  of  my  action  does  not  compel  my  action  in  any  way,  since  his  knowledge 
was  based  on  a  knowledge  of  my  will  and  what  action  I  would  freely  perform,  given 
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the  sort  of  person  I  am,  with  the  sort  of  will  I  possess,  and  so  it  remains  logically 
possible  that  I  could  have  acted  otherwise  than  I  in  fact  did.   Bradwardine,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  say  that  just  because  God  knows  I  will  perform  action  A  (or  not-A ) 
does  not  compel  my  action,  because  that  knowledge  of  God  operates  according  to 
God’s  ordained  power;  and  thus,  relative  to  God’s  absolute  power,  I  remain  free.   It 
would  seem  a  reasonable  consolidation  of  these  two  views  to  posit  that  God  knows 
what  I  will  will  before  I  actually  will  it,  by  virtue  of  his  knowledge  of  my  will,  and 
that  that  knowledge  proceeds  under  the  auspices  of  God’s  ordained  power.   In  this 
way,  Scotus’  insistence  on  the  contingency  of  my  action  is  preserved,  since  not  only 
is  there  no  contradiction  in  supposing  that  I  act  otherwise  than  I  do  (so  there  is  no 
logical  necessity  that  I  act  as  I  do);  but  also,  no  necessity  proceeds  from  God’s 
foreknowledge  of  my  action,  since  that  foreknowledge  is  enacted  according  to  God’s 
ordained  power,  and  so  relative  to  God’s  absolute  power  it  remains  possible  for  me 
to  act  otherwise. 
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Chapter  5 
Critical  Evaluation  of  Bradwardine’s  Solution 
 
 
Introduction 
In  this  final  chapter,  which  is  comparatively  brief,  I  will  concern  myself  with  a 
critical  evaluation  of  Bradwardine’s  solution  to  the  problem  of  future  contingents. 
In  particular,  I  will  examine  whether  Bradwardine’s  solution  successfully  resolves 
the  apparent  logical  conflict  between  simultaneously  holding  that  God  foreknows  all 
things,  and  that  human  beings  exercise  free  will,  ultimately  concluding  that  it  does 
not.   To  this  end,  I  will  first  consider  a  sort  of  schematic  of  ideas  to  systematically 
categorize  strategies  for  solving  the  problem  (5.1);  I  will  then  consider  what  a 
successful  solution  to  the  problem  ought  to  achieve,  and  how  this  is  to  be 
understood  in  light  of  the  schematic  (5.2);  I  will  then  explain  how  Bradwardine’s 
solution  fails  to  be  successful  in  this  way  (5.3). 
 
5.1  -  The  problem  and  its  solutions 
In  this  section,  I  will  first  spend  some  time  highlighting  the  exact  points  at 
which  the  “problem”  of  future  contingents  arises  and  discussing  its  variants,  with 
special  attention  to  the  problem  related  to  the  so-called  argument  for  “theological 
fatalism,”  since  this  is  the  primarily  relevant  context  for  our  present  study  (5.1.1). 
We  have,  in  ways,  already  assumed  and  touched  on  much  of  what  will  be  laid  out  in 
this  section,  but  it  is  helpful  at  this  point  to  revisit  the  problem  itself,  and  to  lay  it  out 
in  a  systematic  way.   I  will  then  outline  the  main  families  of  solutions  to  the  problem 
represented  in  the  historical  discussion,  dividing  these  families  of  solutions  into  two 
broad  categories:  the  compatibilist  solutions  (5.1.2),  and  the  incompatibilist 
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solutions  (5.1.3). 
 
5.1.1  -  The  problem  and  its  variants 
In  the  context  at  hand,  future  contingents  are  a  problem  because  their 
existence  seems  to  lead  to  the  contradictory  convergence  of  two  theses.   I  focus  here 
on  the  problem  as  it  arises  in  a  theistic  context,  but  it  is  worth  noticing  that  a 
completely  parallel  problem  arises  in  the  materialist  context  of  causal  determinism.
   Firstly,  it  is  taken  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  God’s  omniscience  that  God’s 144
knowledge  extends  to  all  things,  not  only  past  and  present,  but  also  future.   In  a 
particularly  Christian  theistic  context,  the  power  of  God  to  enlighten  prophets 
concerning  future  events  would  seem  to  confirm  this  supposition  concerning  God’s 
omniscience.   When  this  belief  is  taken  together  with  the  authoritative  tradition  of 
scriptural  statements  like  the  following,  the  impetus  for  adhering  to  belief  in  God’s 
foreknowledge  becomes  yet  stronger:  “Lord,  let  me  know  mine  end,  and  the  number 
of  my  days”  (Ps  39.5);  “Before  a  word  is  on  my  tongue,  O  Lord,  you  know  it 
altogether”  and  “Your  eyes  saw  my  unformed  substance;  in  your  book  were  written, 
every  one  of  them,  the  days  that  were  formed  for  me,  when  as  yet  there  was  none  of 
them”  (Ps  139.4,  16);  “‘I  know  the  plans  I  have  for  you,’  declares  the  Lord”  (Jer 
29.11).   But  we  also  have  strong  motives  —  motives  to  do  with  ideas  of 
responsibility,  justice,  reward  and  blame,  as  well  as  the  almost  irresistible  conviction 
of  our  own  subjective  psychological  experience  —  to  believe  that  there  are  at  least 
some  matters  over  which  we  exercise  choice  and  activities  of  the  will  that  may  be 
144  A  good  place  to  start  for  contemporary  discussions  of  causal  determinism  is  the  Stanford 
Encyclopedia   of  Philosophy  article  on  the  topic  by  Carl  Hoefer,  “Causal   Determinism,”  The  Stanford 
Encyclopedia   of  Philosophy  (Spring   2016  Edition),   Edward  N.  Zalta  (ed.),  URL  = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/determinism-causal/>.   For  a  discussion  of  the 
compatibilist   position   between  causal  determinism  and  free  will,  see  Michael  McKenna  and  D.  Justin 
Coates,  “Compatibilism,”  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia   of  Philosophy  (Summer   2015  Edition),   Edward  N. 
Zalta  (ed.),  URL  =  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/compatibilism/>;  for 
arguments   opposed,   see  Kadri  Vihvelin,  “Arguments  for  Incompatibilism,”  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia   of 
Philosophy  (Fall  2015  Edition),   Edward  N.  Zalta  (ed.),  URL  = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/>. 
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truly  said  to  be  uncoerced  and  free.   It  is  these  instances  of  perceived  free  will  that 
give  rise  to  some  of  the  most  compelling  instances  of  what  we  wish  to  believe,  in  any 
case,  to  be  examples  of  future  contingents.   That  tomorrow  I  sin  in  some  particular 
way,  or  act  meritoriously   in  some  way,  I  wish  to  believe  are  events  over  which  I  have 
some  control,  and  are  thus  able  to  turn  out  or  not  turn  out  according  to  the  dictates 
of  some  power  that  I  possess  in  myself.   (More  on  the  relationship  between  free  will 
and  responsibility  will  be  said  shortly.) 
In  her  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  article  on  foreknowledge  and  free 
will,  Linda  Zagzebski  provides  a  schematic  for  analysing  the  problem  of  future 
contingents  —  more  specifically,  the  problem  of  understanding  God’s  foreknowledge 
in  relation  to  those  future  contingents  tied  to  human  free  will  —  and  its  various 
solutions  that  I  think,  while  not  perfect  in  every  respect,  will  be  helpful  for  us  in  our 
own  analysis  of  Bradwardine’s  solution.    The  structure  that  she  lays  out  for 145
analysing  the  problem  and  the  various  approaches  to  its  solution  is  usefully 
systematic,  and  though  my  own  analysis  and  conclusions  differ  from  hers  in  several 
ways,  in  much  of  what  follows,  I  am  indebted  to  the  structure  and  framework  for 
analysis  that  she  provides. 
I  will  begin,  therefore,  by  recounting  the  problem  in  the  rough  form  that 
Zagzebski  uses.   Zagzebski  outlines  the  problem  in  the  form  of  an  argument  for 
“theological  fatalism,”  the  premises  of  which  she  delineates  in  a  way  similar  to  the 
following,  where  P  is  some  action  that  will  happen  in  the  future,  resulting  from  the 
choice  of  a  created  agent  (the  same  argument  applies,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  such 
events  in  the  present) : 146
145  Linda  Zagzebski,   "Foreknowledge  and  Free  Will",  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Summer 
2016  Edition),   Edward  N.  Zalta  (ed.),  URL  = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/>. 
146  For  the  purposes   of  the  present  section,   I  am  setting  aside  an  important  point  of  Zagzebski’s:  she 
highlights  that  it  is  the  infallibility  of  God’s  knowledge  that  makes  the  problem  such  a  pressing  one.   The 
issue  of  the  degree  of  justification   which  a  true  belief  requires  to  constitute  knowledge,  at  least  in  a 
medieval  context,  is  one  which  I  took  up  in  greater  detail  already  in  the  second  chapter.   Zagzebski  is 
quite  right  to  take  into  account   the  fact  that,  particularly  in  a  contemporary  context,  quite  a  low 
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P1. Yesterday,  God  knew  P . 
P2. If  something  happened  in  the  past,  it  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
fixed. 
P3. God’s  knowledge  yesterday  of  P  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  fixed. 
(P1  and  P2) 
P4. Necessarily,  if  God  knew  P  yesterday,  then  P  (since  God’s  knowledge  is 
infallible). 
P5. If  a  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  fixed,  and  necessarily  ( a    b ), 
then  b  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  fixed.   (Transfer  of  necessity 
principle) 
P6. So  P  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  fixed.   (P3,  P4,  and  P5) 
P7. If  P  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  fixed,  then  the  agent  who  will 
bring  about  P  cannot  do  otherwise  than  bring  about  P . 
P8. So  the  agent  cannot  do  otherwise  than  bring  about  P .   (P6  and  P7) 
P9. If  an  agent  cannot  do  otherwise  than  she  does,  she  does  not  act  freely. 
C. The  agent  who  will  bring  about  P  will  not  do  so  freely.   (P8  and  P9) 
standard  of  justification   is  generally  required  for  something  to  be  considered  to  be  “knowledge”  in  some 
kind  of  meaningful   sense,  at  least  when  speaking  of  human  knowledge.   But  in  the  present  discussion, 
this  point  is  less  important   for  three  reasons:   firstly,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  to  me  that  contemporary 
notions   of  what  might  constitute  adequate  justification  are  reflective  of  the  historical  context  at  hand. 
While  perhaps  nothing   quite  so  strong  as  a  priori  deduction   may  be  required,  certainly  something 
stronger  than,  say,  a  report  from  an  authority   is  necessary  for  something  to  be  considered  sufficiently 
“justified”   as  to  be  knowledge.   Secondly,  knowledge  requires  that  the  subject  of  its  belief  be  true :  if  what 
the  supposed   knower  knows  turns  out  not  to  be  the  case,  then  this  demonstrates  that  the  belief,  being 
untrue,   was  never  knowledge  at  all.   It  therefore  seems  exceedingly  strange  to  me  that  knowledge  — 
either  God’s  or  man’s  —  might  ever  be  fallible.   Fallible  knowledge  that  turns  out  to  be  false  simply  isn’t 
knowledge  at  all,  but  merely  false  belief.   And  thirdly  and  finally,  the  distinction,  even  if  it  is  valid,  seems 
irrelevant  in  the  present  context  precisely  because  it  is  God’s  knowledge  that  is  at  issue,  so  whatever 
disagreements   may  exist  in  the  contemporary  literature  about  whether  and  to  what  extent  human 
knowledge  may  be  fallible,  these  disagreements  presumably  cease  to  be  relevant  when  we  speak  of  the 
knowledge  of  an  infallible  God. 
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I  have  modified  Zagzebski’s  presentation  of  the  argument  and  terminology  in  a 
number  of  minor  ways  (for  instance,  Zagzebski  uses  a  term  “now-necessary,”  which  I 
take  to  mean  the  necessity  of  fixity,  or  something  very  like  it  —  though  I  find  the 
terminology  “now-necessary”  to  be  misleading,  because  it  seems  to  apply  more 
strongly  to  events  in  the  past  than  those  in  the  present,  or  “now”),  but  none  of  these 
alterations  change  the  substance  of  her  presentation.   What  we  have,  then,  is  an 
argument  that  seems  to  show  that,  if  we  accept  that  God  foreknows  all  things,  it 
follows  that  human  beings  can  never  act  freely  (and  by  extension,  that  future 
contingents  do  not  exist). 
Calvin  Normore  argues  that  future  contingents  actually  give  rise  to  at  least 
three  distinct,  though  interrelated,  problems.    Normore  distinguishes  among  (1) 147
the  problem  of  reconciling  the  principle  of  bivalence  (that  every  proposition  is  either 
true  or  false)  with  the  existence  of  future  contingents;  (2)  the  problem  of  reconciling 
foreknowledge  in  general  with  the  existence  of  future  contingents;  and  (3)  the 
problem  of  reconciling  the  foreknowledge  of  God  in  particular  (in  all  of  God’s 
infallibility,  immutability,  and  impassibility)  with  the  existence  of  future  contingents. 
I  am  unconvinced  that  the  distinction  between  (2)  and  (3)  is  an  altogether  useful 
one,  since  foreknowledge  of  the  infallible  sort  that  gives  rise  to  the  problem  is  only 
relevant  with  respect  to  the  foreknowledge  of  God  (either  God’s  own  foreknowledge, 
or  God’s  foreknowledge  as  prophetically  revealed  to  human  beings).   We  in  our 
creaturely  way  may  presume  to  have  knowledge  about  what  will  or  will  not  happen, 
but  our  knowledge  of  such  things  is  in  no  way  presumed  to  be  infallible,  and  thus 
there  is  no  contradiction  with  supposing  that  things  may  turn  out  otherwise  than  we 
suppose  that  they  will. 
Perhaps  the  problem  of  our  apparent  lack  of  freedom  would  not  be  so 
147  Calvin  Normore,  “Future  Contingents,”  in  N.  Kretzmann  et  al.  (eds.)  The  Cambridge  History  of  Later 
Medieval  Philosophy  (Oxford:  OUP,  1982),  pp.  358  -  59. 
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troubling  were  it  not  also  closely  linked  with  intuitions  about  responsibility  and 
justice,  rewards  and  punishments.   I  do  not  take  for  granted  that  freedom  —  in 
particular,  freedom  for  contradictories  —  is  a  necessary  condition  for  responsibility; 
indeed,  as  we  will  shortly  examine  in  greater  detail,  many  have  given  arguments  to 
the  contrary.   But  there  is  an  undeniably  strong  intuitive  pull  toward  the  conclusion 
that  justice  in  reward  and  punishment  requires  responsibility  on  the  part  of  those 
being  rewarded  or  punished  for  their  actions;  and  that  responsibility  requires  that 
the  agents  be  relevantly  free  in  their  action;  and  that  relevant  freedom  includes  the 
freedom  to  act  otherwise.   All  of  these  assumptions  will  come  to  be  questioned  in 
what  follows. 
However,  it  appears  to  be  the  case,  by  the  terms  of  the  argument  above,  that 
since  God  knows  all  future  human  actions,  those  actions  cannot  really  turn  out 
otherwise.   As  I  have  said,  perhaps  this  in  itself  would  not  be  so  very  troubling:  what 
does  it  really  matter  to  my  lived  experience  of  freedom  that  God  may  have  already 
known  the  outcome  of  my  choices  before  I  make  them?  But  this  only  seems  to  be  of 
little  importance  when  considering  the  quantitative  bulk  of  human  choices,  not 
those  which  are  qualitatively  most  important.   For  it  is  arguably  the  case  that  most 
possible  future  contingents  are  of  little  or  no  moral  consequence  in  and  of 
themselves,  and  whether  or  not  these  things  are  foreknown  or  determined  by  God 
would  appear  to  be  neither  here  nor  there;  but  when  it  comes  to  the  morally 
significant  choices  of  human  beings,  that  these  choices  are  truly  contingent  —  and 
thus  truly  free  —  would  appear  to  have  monumentally  important  consequences. 
Indeed,  it  appears  to  be  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  doctrine  of  hell  (i.e.,  the 
doctrine  that  eternal  separation  from  God  —  with  or  without  other  punishments 
and  tortures,  depending  on  whether  one  consults  Dante  or  other  theologians  on  the 
matter  —  awaits  those  who  utterly  reject  God  by  their  actions  in  this  life),  taken 
together  with  the  justice  of  God,  that  human  beings  must  accept  or  reject  God  freely 
and  of  their  own  volition.   For  if  the  choice  is  compelled,  then  punishment  for  such  a 
choice  would  seem  supremely  unjust  (just  as  we  would  consider  those  forced  into 
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illegal  actions  while  under  bondage  to  be  victims,  rather  than  perpetrators,  of 
crime).   Of  course,  justice  in  meting  out  consequences  for  actions  would  presumably 
extend  to  rewards  as  well  as  punishments;  but  it  is  perhaps  less  upsetting  to  think 
that  some  may  receive  an  unmerited  reward,  than  it  is  to  think  that  some  may 
receive  an  undeserved  punishment  (particularly  when  contemplating  punishments 
of  extreme  intensity  and  eternal  duration).  148
So  having  outlined  some  of  the  main  ways  in  which  future  contingents  pose  a 
problem,  we  turn  in  the  next  subsections  to  a  systematic  overview  of  the  main 
strategies  solutions  to  the  problem  have  followed.   When  this  task  is  completed, 
there  will  follow  an  examination  of  what  would  be  required  of  a  true  solution  to  this 
problem,  in  order  that  we  may  then  judge  Bradwardine’s  solution  against  that 
measure. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  troubling  conclusion  of  this  fatalist  argument,  a  number 
of  strategies  may  be  advanced.   The  argument  itself  appears  valid  in  form,  and  so  a 
rational  person  must  either  find  fault  with  one  or  more  of  its  premises,  or  accept  the 
truth  of  its  conclusion.   Zagzebski  has  broadly  delineated  between  two  sorts  of 
approaches  to  the  problem,  in  a  way  that  will  be  helpful  for  us  in  our  own  analysis149
:  on  the  one  hand,  there  are  approaches  that  attempt  to  uphold  both  of  the  seemingly 
contradictory  pillars  of  God’s  foreknowledge  together  with  human  freedom.   These 
are  the  approaches  which,  on  account  of  their  attempt  to  show  the  compatibility  of 
God’s  foreknowledge  with  human  free  will,  are  termed  “compatibilist”  (or  perhaps 
we  might  want  to  say  more  precisely  in  our  present  context,  “theological 
compatibilist”).   On  the  other  hand,  in  the  face  of  the  argument  for  theological 
fatalism,  some  have  either  accepted  its  conclusion  (that  we  do  not  possess  freedom 
148  Though  Jesus’  parable  of  the  labourers  in  the  vineyard  (Matthew  20)  might  seem  to  undermine  this 
notion,   as  well:  in  the  parable,  all  the  labourers,  regardless  of  whether  they  worked  a  full  day,  a  half  day, 
or  even  just  the  last  hour  of  the  day,  receive  a  full  day’s  wages.   This  “unmerited  reward”  for  those  who 
worked  only  a  very  little  time  outrages  those  who  had  laboured  the  full  day  in  their  sense  of  justice.   (cf. 
Matthew   20)  
149  Zagzebski   2016. 
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of  action  or  will),  or  rejected  its  first  premise  (that  God  foreknows  anything).   Either 
or  both  of  these  commitments  may  be  rejected  without  an  outright  rejection  of  the 
existence  of  God,  though  to  be  sure,  a  rejection  of  either  commitment  is  bound  to 
substantially  impact  the  way  in  which  one  conceives  of  God.   (Some,  indeed,  have 
rejected  the  foreknowledge  of  God  by  rejecting  the  notion  of  any  kind  of  god  at  all; 
and  others  the  existence  of  freedom  on  the  part  of  human  beings  by  adhering  to  a 
doctrine  of  strict  causal  determinism  or  one  of  its  variants.   But  these  sorts  of 
positions  are  not  relevant  to  our  present  discussion,  focussed  as  it  is  on  the  theistic 
context  of  Bradwardine  and  his  interlocutors.)   These  approaches  are  termed 
“incompatibilist,”  since  they  view  the  doctrines  of  divine  foreknowledge  and 
(human)  freedom  as  incompatible,  and  rather  than  try  to  maintain  the  two 
commitments,  they  reject  one  or  the  other. 
I  will  argue  shortly  that  the  incompatibilist  approaches  should  not  be 
considered  “solutions”  to  the  problem,  per  se,  relying  instead  on  a  kind  of  cop-out 
that  avoids  the  problem  in  the  first  place.   But  before  doing  that,  I  will  briefly  outline 
the  main  families  of  solutions  as  Zagzebski  sees  them. 
 
5.1.2  -  Compatibilist  solutions 
The  compatibilist  solutions  as  a  group  comprise  a  number  of  families  of 
solution  strategies,  which  I  will  outline  in  turn  below. 
The  first  family  of  solutions  are  those  which  follow  along  the  lines  of  the 
majority  interpretation  of  Aristotle’s  discussion  of  tomorrow’s  sea  battle  in  De 
interpretatione  IX:  these  solutions  deny  that  a  proposition  concerning  a  future 
contingent  event  can  have  any  truth-value  at  all,  and  thus  deny  the  principle  of 
bivalence  at  least  with  respect  to  propositions  about  certain  future  things.   In  so 
doing,  they  undermine  the  very  definitions  of  terms  in  the  argument  as  laid  out 
above:  P  was  defined  to  be  some  future  contingent  event  which  happens ,  assuming 
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from  the  outset  that  there  is  a  truth  to  be  known  about  P .   Zagzebski  calls  this  the 
Aristotelian  approach,  but  it  is  possible  that  Boethius  also  held  a  similar  view  —  or 
at  least  defends  something  like  it  in  his  commentary  on  the  De  interpretatione  (as 
discussed  in  1.1).  150
The  second  family  of  solutions,  which  has  by  far  the  most  illustrious  and 
influential  heritage  in  the  Western  Latin  tradition,  is  that  characterized  by  a 
rejection  of  the  first  premise  of  the  theological  fatalist  argument  —  but  not  on  the 
grounds  that  God  doesn’t  know  the  relevant  future  contingent  fact,  but  on  the 
grounds  that,  as  an  eternal  being  beyond  temporal  existence,  it  is  improper  to  speak 
of  God  as  knowing  something  yesterday  (or  today,  or  tomorrow).   Thus,  the  natural 
inferences  we  may  wish  to  make  about  necessity  inhering  in  certain  things  in  virtue 
of  their  being  past  fail  to  apply  when  speaking  of  God,  because  God  is  beyond  the 
temporal  indicators  of  past,  present,  and  future.   Zagzebski  calls  this  the  “Boethian 
solution,”  and  we  have  already  seen  that  Boethius  did  indeed  gesture  toward 
something  like  this  (see  1.1);  but  we  have  also  seen  that  the  position  was  already 
proposed  prior  to  Boethius  by  Augustine,  and  was  later  much  more  robustly 
developed  by  Anselm  (1.2),  and  so  I  would  be  much  more  inclined  to  call  this  the 
Augustinian/Anselmian  position.   We  have  seen  already  what  a  profound  influence 
this  solution  had  throughout  the  Middle  Ages  and  on  Bradwardine’s  own  solution, 
and  its  legacy  continues  to  this  day.   Eleonore  Stump  and  Norman  Kretzmann,  for 
instance,  have  stalwartly  defended  the  position  in  the  realm  of  contemporary 
philosophy  of  religion,  and  younger  scholars  in  the  field  —  myself  included  — 
continue  to  find  the  position  attractive  and  defensible.    But  a  number  of  very 151
influential  philosophers  of  religion  have  also  criticised  this  position  over  the  last 
several  decades,  and  these  critics  include  Nicholas  Wolterstorff,  Richard  Swinburne, 
150  Among   contemporary  proponents   of  this  approach  are  J.R.  Lucas,  The  Future:  An  Essay  on  God, 
Temporality,  and  Truth  (London:   Blackwell,  1989);  and  David  Kyle  Johnson,  “God,  Fatalism,  and 
Temporal  Ontology,”  Religious  Studies ,  45  (2009)   no.  4,  435–54. 
151  See,  e.g.,  Eleonore  Stump  and  Norman   Kretzmann,  “Eternity,”  Journal   of  Philosophy ,  78  (August  1981), 
429–58;   Michael   Rota,  “The  Eternity  Solution   to  the  Problem  of  Human  Freedom  and  Divine 
Foreknowledge,”  European  Journal   for  Philosophy  of  Religion ,  2  (2010)   no.1,  165–186. 
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and  Zagzebski  herself.  152
Next  is  the  position  of  William  Ockham,  which  we  have  already  spent  a  great 
deal  of  time  examining.   Ockham’s  solution,  attributing  a  certain  sort  of  contingency 
even  to  past  things  which  themselves  pertain  to  future  contingents  (such  as 
propositions  like  “Peter  was  predestinate”  —  recall  that,  in  terms  of  tense,  the 
proposition  appears  to  be  about  the  past;  but  Peter’s  predestinate  state  is  really 
about  the  future  —  namely,  his  ultimate  future  state  of  beatitude),  would  seem  to 
undermine  all  of  the  second,  third,  and  fourth   premises  of  the  argument  for 
theological  fatalism.   We  have  already  seen  the  way  in  which  Marilyn  McCord  Adams 
incited  a  sort  of  rediscovery  and  revival  of  Ockham’s  position  (see  chapter  2).   Alvin 
Plantinga  defended  what  might  be  seen  as  a  sort  of  version  of  Ockhamism  in  his 
1986  paper,  “On  Ockham’s  Way  Out,”   and  a  few  others,  including  William  Lane 153
Craig,  have  ventured  defenses  of  their  own.   But  many  others  have  been  severely 154
critical  of  this  approach,  for  reasons  that  should  by  this  point  be  apparent  (see 
chapter  2.3,  and  Bradwardine’s  criticisms  in  chapter  3).    Zagzebski  puts  forward  a 155
criticism,  perhaps  not  highlighted  in  my  own  discussion  before,  that  Ockham’s 
solution  seems  to  be  guilty  of  ad  hockery:  for  what  exactly  is  it  about  God’s  past 
knowledge  that  makes  it  a  special  case  exempting  it  from  the  same  sort  of  necessity 
as  other  past  things?    I  am  not  convinced,  however,  that  Zagzebski’s  accusation  is 156
apropos,  since  Ockham  does  not  seem  to  see  God’s  past  foreknowledge  as  a  unique 
case  of  apparently-past-tense  things  to  which  the  usual  sorts  of  tense  conditions  do 
not  apply,  but,  rather,  as  something  that  is  of  a  kind  with  a  whole  class  of  other  sorts 
152  See,  e.g.,  Nicholas   Wolterstorff,  “God  Everlasting,”  God  and  the  Good:  Essays  in  Honor  of  Henry  Stob ,  C. 
Orlebeke  and  L.  Smedes   (eds.)  (Grand  Rapids:  Eerdmans,  1975);  Richard  Swinburne,  The  Coherence  of 
Theism   (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1977);  Linda  Zagzebski,  The  Dilemma   of  Freedom  and 
Foreknowledge  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1991).   Other  criticisms  come  from,  e.g.,  Clark 
Pinnock,   but  his  position   will  be  addressed  in  more  particularity  a  little  further  on. 
153  Alvin  Plantinga,  “On  Ockham's  Way  Out,”  Faith  and  Philosophy ,  3  (1986)   no.  3,  235–269. 
154  E.g.,  William   Lane  Craig,  Divine  Foreknowledge  and  Human   Freedom  (Brill's  Studies   in  Intellectual 
History  19.   Leiden:   E.J.  Brill,  1990). 
155  See,  e.g.,  John  Martin  Fischer,  “Ockhamism,”  Philosophical  Review,  94  (January  1985):  81–100; 
William   Hasker,  God,  Time,  and  Knowledge  (Ithaca:   Cornell   University  Press,  1989). 
156  Zagzebski   2016. 
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of  apparently-past-tense  things  which  actually  concern  the  future  (see  2.2.3  for  a 
more  detailed  discussion  of  this). 
Molinism  —  following  Luis  de  Molina  —  forms  another  family  of  solutions, 
arguing  that  God  possesses  a  so-called  “middle  knowledge”  concerning  a  class  of 
propositions  which  have  been  termed  “counter-factuals  of  freedom.”   In  the 
contemporary  literature,  this  view  has  been  defended  by  William  Lane  Craig,  in  a 
lengthy  exchange  between  him  and  William  Hasker.    In  essence,  what  Molinism 157
argues  is  that  God  does  not  have  direct  infallible  knowledge  of  our  future  actions  — 
but  he  has  direct  infallible  knowledge  of  the  sorts  of  people  we  are  and  the  ways  in 
which  we  would  act  under  particular  hypothetical  circumstances.   This  move  is 
supposed  to  preserve  the  contingency  of  those  actions,  but  I  see  no  way  around  the 
fact  that  this  solution  seems  to  merely  re-frame  the  problem  in  slightly  different 
terms;  because  not  only  can  God  infallibly  infer  from  God’s  knowledge  of  me  and  my 
hypothetical  actions  to  knowledge  of  what  I  will,  in  fact  do,  but  God  is  also  directly 
responsible  for  creating  me  as  I  am,  with  the  character  and  inclinations  that  I  have, 
and  so  if  God  knows  how  I  will  act  in  a  particular  hypothetical  situation  because  of 
his  knowledge  of  me,  it  would  seem  that  God  is  indirectly  responsible  for  all  of  my 
actions  because  of  God’s  creation  of  me. 
The  final  family  of  solutions  (not  necessarily  disjoint  from  other  families)  is 
that  which  calls  into  question  premise  nine:  that  genuine  alternative  possibilities  are 
required  for  an  agent  to  act  freely.   Zagzebski  attributes  this  view  to  Augustine,  who 
does  accord  the  greatest  degree  of  freedom  to  the  blessed,  who  cannot  but  act 
righteously.   But  I  think  we  once  against  see  this  idea  developed  much  more 
157  See,  e.g.,  William   Lane  Craig,  “Robert  Adams's   New  Anti-Molinist  Argument,”  Philosophy  and 
Phenomenological  Research  (54  (1994)   no.  4:  857–861);   and  “On  Hasker's  Defense  of  Anti-Molinism,” 
Faith  and  Philosophy  (15  (1998)   no.  2:  236–240)   for  Craig’s  defenses  of  the  view.   See,  e.g.,  William 
Hasker,  God,  Time,  and  Knowledge  (Ithaca:   Cornell   University  Press,  1989);  “Middle  Knowledge:  A 
Refutation   Revisited,”  Faith  and  Philosophy  (12  (1995)   no.  2:  223–236);   “Explanatory  Priority: 
Transitive  and  Unequivocal,  a  Reply  to  William  Craig,”  Philosophy  and  Phenomological  Research 
(57(1997)   no.  2:  389–393);   and  “Anti-Molinism  is  Undefeated!”  Faith  and  Philosophy  (17  (2000)   no.  1: 
126–131)   for  Hasker’s  arguments   to  the  contrary. 
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thoroughly  by  Anselm,  as  Tomas  Ekenberg  has  shown.    It  is  worth  noting  here  the 158
active  and  controversial  debate  that  continues  to  this  day  about  the  complex 
relationship  between  freedom  of  will,  determinism,  and  moral  responsibility. 
Among  the  most  significant  developments  in  the  contemporary  debate  are  those 
which  (perhaps  not  unlike  Anselm)  provide  arguments  in  support  of  the  thesis  that 
alternative  possibilities  are  not  required  for  a  person  to  be  exercising  freedom  in  a 
way  that  entails  personal  responsibility.   In  his  seminal  article  of  1969  entitled 
“Alternate  Possibilities  and  Moral  Responsibility,”  Harry  Frankfurt  argues  that 
responsibility  for  an  action  does  not  require  genuine  alternative  choices  by  appeal  to 
a  thought  experiment  like  the  following:   suppose  Alfred  intends  to  shoot  Claudia; 159
suppose,  furthermore,  that  Bertha,  a  mad  neuroscientist  who  has  it  in  for  Claudia, 
wants  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  way  for  Alfred  to  mess  up  the  job.   Bertha  secretly 
sedates  Alfred  and  implants  a  device  in  his  brain  that  will  allow  her  to  force  Alfred  to 
shoot  Claudia  if,  at  the  crucial  moment,  he  gets  cold  feet.   Now  suppose  that  Alfred, 
after  forming  the  intention  to  shoot  Claudia,  actually  does  so  of  his  own  volition,  so 
that  Bertha  has  no  need  to  activate  her  brain-implant  device.   In  this  situation,  Alfred 
could  not  do  otherwise  than  shoot  Claudia;  and  yet,  since  the  action  was  carried  out 
under  his  own  volition  and  in  accordance  with  his  own  intention,  it  nevertheless 
seems  reasonable  to  attribute  to  Alfred  moral  responsibility  for  his  action. 
Such  a  view  would  seem  to  cohere  well  with  the  view  of  freedom  suggested 
by  Augustine  and  developed  much  more  fully  by  Anselm.   Recall  that  Anselm  argued 
that  the  most  truly  free  beings  are  those  which  cannot  but  avoid  sin  and  act  with 
perfect  goodness.    Thus,  the  blessed  in  heaven,  whose  wills  are  united  with  God’s 160
in  such  perfect  sanctity  that  it  has  become  an  impossibility  that  they  should  sin  are 
158  See,  e.g.,  Thomas   Ekenberg,  Falling  Freely  (Dissertation,   Uppsala   University,  2005);  “Free  Will  and 
Free  Action  in  Anselm   of  Canterbury,”  History  of  Philosophy  Quarterly ,  22  (2005)   no.  4.,  301  -  18. 
159  Harry  Frankfurt,  “Alternate  Possibilities   and  Moral  Responsibility,”  Journal   of  Philosophy ,  46 
(December   1969),  829–839. 
160  Recall  (from  1.2.2)  that  Anselm   defines   free  will  as  the  “the  power  to  preserve  rightness  of  will  for 
the  sake  of  that  same  rightness”   —  and  thus,  those  beings  are  most  free  who  never  fail  to  preserve 
rightness  for  its  own  sake. 
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seen  by  Anselm  to  be  the  ones  who  are  most  truly  free,  for  their  freedom  to  act  is 
unencumbered  by  conflicting  desires  and  impulses  to  depravity.   But  despite  the  fact 
that  alternative  courses  of  action  are  not  open  to  them,  because  their  wills  are  in 
such  complete  conformity  with  what  is  good  and  righteous,  they  are  themselves 
actively  willing  those  righteous  acts  that  they  do.   And  so  it  appears  that  they  are 
exercising  the  sort  of  freedom  that  entails  responsibility  on  Frankfurt’s  model.  161
 
5.1.3  -  Incompatibilist  solutions 
I  spoke  earlier  of  there  being  two  extreme  solutions  possible  to  the  problem 
of  future  contingents  and  God's  foreknowledge,  and  these  two  form  the  poles  of  the 
incompatibilist  approaches:  on  the  one  extreme,  the  problem  is  solved  by  rejecting 
the  existence  of  future  contingents.  This  amounts  to  determinism,  and  (at  least  on 
most  understandings)  may  lead  to  the  outright  denial  of  human  free  will.   On  the 
other  extreme  lies  the  denial  that  God  does,  in  fact,  know  all  things  future.  In 
contemporary  theology,  this  sort  of  solution  arises  in  the  context  of  what  has  been 
called  “Open  Theism”,  as  influentially  espoused  by  the  late  Clark  Pinnock,  Canadian 
Protestant  theologian  at  McMaster  University.    Denials  of  God’s  foreknowledge 162
can  also  be  seen  quite  explicitly  in  the  thought  of  Richard  Swinburne.    However, 163
this  approach  undermines  God's  omniscience  (this  is  because  it  thereby  makes  his 
foreknowledge  either  non-existent,  or  fallible),  which  has  almost  always  been  among 
the  properties  that  Christians  have  traditionally  ascribed  to  God. 
 
5.2  -  What  constitutes  a  true  solution? 
161  For  a  much  more  in-depth   discussion   of  the  relationship  between  Frankfurt’s  views  and  Anselm’s,  see 
Ekenberg  2005b. 
162  Clark  Pinnock,   The  Openness  of  God  (Downers  Grove,  IL:  InterVarsity  Press,  1994);  Most  Moved  Mover: 
A  Theology  of  God’s  Openness  (Carlisle:  Paternoster,  2001). 
163  Swinburne   1977. 
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In  what  follows,  I  will  explain  what  I  think  a  true  solution  to  the  problem 
ought  to  achieve,  and  why  I  think  the  incompatibilist  solutions  fail  to  obtain  this  end. 
I  will  also  explain  why  it  is  that  some  of  the  apparently  compatibilist  solutions  — 
and  particularly,  the  Ockhamist  solution  —  despite  appearances  to  the  contrary,  in 
fact  boil  down  to  an  incompatibilist  approach  and  therefore  fail  as  solutions.   I  will 
then,  briefly,  provide  reasons  why  I  think  that  the  Augustinian/Boethian/Anselmian 
approach  —  by  appeal  to  the  timeless  eternity  of  God  —  is  the  most  promising  path 
to  a  true  solution  and  an  authentically  compatibilist  understanding  of  the 
relationship  between  the  foreknowledge  of  God  and  human  freedom  of  will  and 
action. 
 
5.2.1  -  What  a  solution  is  not 
The  problem  of  future  contingents,  and  in  particular,  the  problem  of  divine 
foreknowledge  and  free  will,  is  a  problem  precisely  because  there  is  an  apparent 
conflict  between  two  important  commitments  which  many  people  throughout 
history  (and  in  our  present  day)  wish  to  hold.   A  solution  to  the  problem  that  is 
successful,  then,  must  maintain  both  of  these  commitments.   A  so-called  solution  to 
the  problem  that  simply  sets  aside  one  or  the  other  or  both  of  these  commitments 
has  not  actually  resolved  the  problem,  but  has  merely  dismissed  it. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  do  not  admit  the  incompatibilist  solutions  outlined 
above  as  true  solutions  to  the  problem.   The  problem  is  one  of  reconciling  two 
apparently  contradictory  commitments,  and  so  simply  discarding  one  of  the 
commitments  to  resolve  the  conflict  does  nothing  to  reconcile  the  two  to  one 
another.   It  is  not  enough  for  the  success  of  a  solution  to  be  simply  internally 
consistent ;  it  must  also  simultaneously  uphold  the  foreknowledge  of  God,  and  the 
freedom  of  the  human  will,  and  uphold  both  of  these  things  in  as  robust  a  sense  as 
possible.   To  say  that  one  has  solved  the  problem,  merely  by  discarding  one  or  the 
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other  of  these  two  tenets,  is  like  claiming  to  have  saved  a  troubled  marriage  by 
killing  off  one  of  the  spouses. 
Let  me  be  clear,  however,  that  I  do  not  mean  by  this  to  suggest  that 
incompatibilist  positions  are  untenable  philosophical  positions  per  se .   If  a 
philosopher  is  not  committed  to  either  or  both  of  the  premises  that  (1)  God 
possesses  foreknowledge  of  all  things,  and  that  (2)  human  beings  exercise  free  will, 
then  there  is  no  reason  at  all  for  her  to  be  concerned  about  maintaining  either  or 
both  premise.   In  fact,  given  the  great  difficulty  faced  by  anyone  who  does  try  to 
maintain  (1)  and  (2),  it  is  quite  reasonable  indeed  to  conclude  that  either  or  both  of 
(1)  and  (2)  is  untenable.   But  for  the  philosopher  who  is  willing  to  part  with  (1)  or 
(2),  the  problem  of  future  contingents  in  relation  to  the  foreknowledge  of  God  does 
not  exist,  or  at  least,  does  not  exist  in  nearly  so  robust  a  way  as  it  does  for  the 
philosopher  to  takes  both  (1)  and  (2)  to  be  intractable  commitments.   Such  a 
philosopher  is  just  not  the  sort  of  person  for  whom  the  problem  is,  well,  much  of  a 
problem  to  begin  with.   The  problem  is  such  only  for  those  whose  pre-existing 
commitments  make  it  impossible  to  reject  either  premise  (1)  or  premise  (2).   This  is 
all  I  mean  when  I  say  that  the  incompatibilist  fails  to  solve  the  problem:  that  the  sort 
of  solution  the  incompatibilist  offers  is  not  the  sort  that  would  satisfy  the 
philosopher  for  whom  the  problem  really  exists,  because  such  a  person  is  unwilling 
to  concede  either  (1)  or  (2)   in  the  first  place. 
Now,  I  also  believe  it  to  be  the  case  that  many  attempts  to  provide  a 
compatibilist  solution  fail  in  the  same  way,  because  they  are  in  fact  thinly-veiled 
in compatibilist  approaches.   In  particular,  and  as  I  have  already  discussed  at  length 
in  chapter  2,  Ockham’s  solution  strays  too  far,  in  my  view,  towards  a  denial  of  God’s 
foreknowledge.   At  the  very  least,  Ockham’s  solution  reduces  God’s  foreknowledge  to 
something  far  less  robust  than  the  tradition  is  committed  to  maintain.   God’s 
foreknowledge,  as  Ockham  would  have  it,  is  so  reduced  as  to  seriously  call  into 
question  that  God’s  immutable  and  impassible  nature.   However,  as  I  will  soon 
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discuss  in  5.3,  it  seems  likely  to  me  that  Bradwardine’s  solution  —  which 
Bradwardine  understood  as  an  answer  to  the  error  of  Ockham’s  —   strays  too  far  the 
other  way,  and  ultimately  ends  up  denying  human  beings  any  meaningful  freedom  of 
will. 
 
5.2.2  -  The  promise  of  the  Anselmian  approach 
In  my  own  view,  the  approach  to  the  problem  which  appears  to  offer  the  most 
promise  as  a  genuine  solution  —  in  that  it  maintains  a  robust  notion  of  both  God’s 
foreknowledge  and  of  human  freedom,  and  that  it  seems  rationally  compelling  and 
internally  consistent  —  is  that  of  Augustine,  Boethius,  and  Anselm  (and  of  course, 
many  others).   This  is  the  approach  which  relies  on  an  appeal  to  the  atemporal 
eternality  of  God  to  explain  how  God’s  knowledge  of  all  things,  past,  present,  and 
future  are  not  thereby  made  necessary  because  of  God’s  knowing  them.   It  seems  to 
me  that  this  approach  does  the  best  job  of  any  of  them   in  maintaining  a  firm 
commitment  to  the  notion  that  God  knows  —  really  knows  —  my  future  actions, 
whilst  also  maintaining  that  those  future  actions,  and  the  choices  and  willings 
relating  to  them,  are  really  mine ,  and  are  really  free.   It  also  seems  to  me  that,  by 
introducing  an  additional  plane  of  existence,  as  it  were,  in  which  our  normal  notions 
of  necessity  relative  to  the  passage  of  time  fail  to  apply,  this  approach  offers  a 
solution  which  is  rationally  tenable.   Granted,  this  very  move  of  introducing  an 
additional  plane  of  existence,  while  providing  a  rational  way  out  of  the  problem, 
introduces  complexities  that  are  extremely  difficult  to  fully  grasp:  for  how  can  we,  as 
beings  whose  only  experience  of  the  world  is  in  time,  even  begin  to  understand  what 
timeless  existence  might  mean,  or  how  logic  applies  in  such  a  realm?   But  is  not  an 
adequate  reason,  in  my  view,  to  reject  the  approach. 
Some  object  to  this  approach  because  it  seems  hard  to  understand  how  a 
timelessly  eternal  God  might  relate  to  the  world  in  time.   If  all  of  time  is 
 
 
 
 
174 
simultaneously  present  to  God,  how  is  it  that  God  can  know  in  what  sequence  events 
happen,  with  respect  to  God’s  creatures?   And  thus,  how  can  God  decide  to  intervene 
in  events  at  a  particular  point  in  time,  and  not  another?   As  I  have  made  plain  before, 
however,  I  think  this  objection  is  laid  to  rest  by  analogy:  insofar  as  I  know  about  past 
events,  they  are  equally  and  simultaneously  present  to  me;  but  this  does  not  mean 
that  I  perceive  them  as  simultaneous  with  each  other,  and  I  am  able  to  understand  a 
sequential  order  to  them  (Julius  Caesar  was  assassinated  prior  to  the  birth  of 
Mohammed,  which  was  prior  to  the  Norman  invasion,  which  was  prior  to  the  French 
Revolution,  which  was  prior  to  the  election  of  Donald  Trump,  for  instance).   In  the 
same  way,  God’s  simultaneous  perception  of  all  created  time  does  not  mean  that  God 
is  unable  to  understand  that  there  is  a  sequence  in  events. 
Others,  such  as  Zagzebski,  object  that  God’s  eternal  knowledge  of  the  future 
makes  the  things  known  no  less  necessary  than  would  God’s  knowledge  in  time  of 
the  future.    But  this  objection  erroneously  presumes  to  think  about  timeless 164
eternity  as  though  it  is  just  like  the  past.   In  reality,  a  true  understanding  of  timeless 
eternity  and  its  relationship  with  modality  is  impossible  to  fully  grasp  except  by 
analogy,  precisely  because  our  entire  experience  is  “en-timed.”   We  may  catch 
fleeting  glimpses  of  what  timelessness  is  through  the  lense  of  theoretical  physics  or 
transcendental  meditation,  perhaps,  but  we  cannot  wholly  escape  our  created, 
embodied  experience  in  time  to  wholly  understand  what  this  plane  of  existence  is 
like. 
We  have  seen  already,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  that  Bradwardine  views  his 
own  solution  as  lying  in  the  lineage  of  the  Anselmian  approach,  and  indeed, 
Bradwardine  seems  truly  committed  to  the  timeless  eternality  of  God  and  sees  his 
own  solution  as  a  development  of  this  approach.   However,  as  we  will  see  in  the  next 
section,  Bradwardine’s  solution  fails  to  truly  follow  in  the  spirit  of  Anselm  et  alia :  in 
Bradwardine’s  attempt  to  develop  the  approach  of  Anselm,  he  takes  a  tack  that  lands 
164  See,  e.g.,  Zagzebski   2016. 
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him  in  the  incompatibilist  trap  of  determinism. 
 
5.3  -  Shortcomings  of  Bradwardine’s  solution 
As  an  internally  logically  consistent  interpretation  of  the  operation  of  God’s 
foreknowledge  in  relation  to  future  contingents,  Bradwardine’s  solution  seems  quite 
satisfactory  in  many  ways.   It  makes  a  certain  logical  sense  that  if  God’s 
foreknowledge  operates  by  God’s  ordained  power,  then  it  is  only  relative  to  that 
power  that  the  things  foreknown  are  necessary.   This  leaves  open  the  possibility  that 
some  future  things  may  be  contingent  absolutely  speaking,  or  relative  to  God’s 
absolute  power.   (This  comes  very  close,  theoretically,  to  a  doctrine  of  possible 
worlds  contingency:  taking  just  the  actual  world,  as  ordained  by  God,  all  things  must 
happen  as  they  happen,  and  so  seem  to  be  necessary  in  that  respect;  but  it  could 
have  been  the  case,  absolutely  speaking,  that  an  alternative  world  was  actualized  by 
God,  and  in  that  alternative  world,  some  things  might  have  worked  out  differently.) 
But  as  I  have  argued  in  the  section  above,  it  is  not  sufficient  for  a  solution  to  merely 
be  consistent  to  truly  be  a  viable  solution  to  the  problem  at  hand.   If  it  is  to  really 
solve  the  problem  of  the  apparent  contradiction  of  God’s  foreknowledge  and  human 
freedom,  then  a  true  solution  must  necessarily  avoid  denying  either  God’s 
foreknowledge  or  human  freedom. 
Bradwardine’s  solution  comes  as  a  response  to  Ockham’s,  which  Bradwardine 
identifies  —  rightly,  I  think  —  as  having  sacrificed  a  robust  understanding  of  God’s 
omniscience  for  the  sake  of  preserving  a  particularly  robust  understanding  of 
freedom  of  the  human  will:  in  the  troubled  marriage  between  divine  foreknowledge 
and  human  freedom,  Ockham  has  killed  off  God’s  foreknowledge  in  an  attempt  to 
save  the  marriage.   But  has  Bradwardine,  in  his  own  solution,  successfully  avoided 
sacrificing  the  other  spouse,  namely,  free  will?   As  I  argue  in  what  follows,  I  do  not 
think  that  he  has. 
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I  spoke  earlier  of  incompatibilist  approaches  encompassing  two  polar 
extremes  of  rejecting  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  central  tenets  that  form  the  core  of 
the  problem:  the  first,  what  I've  anachronistically  called  “Open  Theism,”  is  the  result 
of  discarding  in  one  way  or  another  the  centrality  of  God’s  omniscience;  the  second, 
and  what  most  would  conventionally  call  determinism  of  one  stripe  or  another, 
involves  the  rejection  in  some  way  of  the  freedom  of  human  beings  in  will  and/or 
action.   It  is  the  latter  of  these  two  incompatibilist  traps  in  which,  I  contend, 
Bradwardine  finds  himself  ensnared.   In  avoiding  Ockham’s  Scylla  of  Open  Theism, 
he  has  instead  landed  in  the  Charybdis  of  determinism. 
In  particular,  if  Bradwardine  is  to  save  human  freedom,  there  seems  to  me  to 
be  something  a  bit  backwards  about  his  account:  surely,  if  we  are  at  all  concerned  to 
preserve  freedom  of  the  will,  it  is  relative  to  God's  ordained  power  that  we  would 
really  want  to  be  free,  since  it  is  this  ordained  power  which  operates  according  to 
the  constraints  of  God's  justice,  mercy,  etc.   Freedom  in  an  absolute,  or  logical  sense, 
seems  hardly  to  be  freedom  at  all,  since  what  good  is  it  in  a  created  order  that  is 
subject  to  God's  ordered  power?   In  other  words,  if  the  world  as  created  by  God  is 
fashioned  and  governed  exclusively  according  to  God’s  ordained  power,  then  God’s 
absolute  power  seems  almost  not  to  matter  for  any  practical  purpose.   What  I  mean 
by  this  is  that,  despite  the  existence  of  absolute  power  to  act  otherwise,  any  action 
God  does  perform  is  by  means  of  God’s  ordained  power;  and  thus  God’s  absolute 
power  apart  from  what  God  ordains  never  has  any  bearing  on  the  actual  course  of 
events  in  the  world.   But  if  God’s  absolute  power  does  not  matter,  practically 
speaking,  then  neither  does  freedom  relative  to  that  power. 
For  suppose  it  is  foreknown  by  God  that  a  person  will  die  apart  from  his  grace 
and  so  be  damned:  Bradwardine  may  contend  that,  absolutely  speaking,  it  is  possible 
that  she  will  seek  God's  grace  and  so  be  saved  (even  though  she  in  fact  doesn't);  but 
given  that  it  is  actually  the  case  that  God  foreknows  that  she  will  be  damned,  it  is, 
with  respect  to  God's  ordained  power,  necessary  that  she  be  damned;  and  since  it  is 
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only  by  this  ordained  power  that  God  actually  operates,  this  seems  to  be  the  only 
power  that  really  matters  with  respect  to  our  actual  freedom.  It  may  be  the  case  that 
it  is  logically  possible  that  our  damnandus  (damnanda?)  will  amend  her  life  in 
accordance  with  God's  grace,  and  so  be  saved;  but  on  her  way  to  the  hell  fires,  it  will 
be  small  comfort  to  know  that  she  was  free  to  be  saved,  logically  speaking! 
Bradwardine’s  employment  of  the  distinction  of  powers,  rather  than  solving 
the  problem,  simply  puts  the  problem  in  slightly  different  terms.   While  previously, 
the  concern  was  how,  relative  to  God’s  power  and  omniscience  simpliciter ,  we  might 
truly  exercise  freedom,  now  the  concern  is  how  we  might  be  said  to  be  truly  free 
given  that  our  actions  are  necessary  relative  to  God’s  ordained  power.   Indeed,  it 
seems  to  me  that,  for  all  practical  intents  and  purposes,  for  one’s  actions  to  be 
necessary  relative  to  God’s  ordained  power  is  precisely  for  them  not  to  be  free.   This 
is  because,  though  God  nevertheless  has  absolute  power  relative  to  which  the  action 
is  non-necessary,  God’s  ordained  power  is  the  only  power  that  God  ever,  in  fact, 
exercises,  and  so  in  a  very  strong  sense,  it  is  the  only  power  that  really  matters.   For 
how  can  a  power  that  is  never  employed,  and  that  we  know  never  will  be  employed, 
make  any  difference  to  the  true  and  practical  freedom  of  an  action? 
Much  earlier,  in  the  introduction  and  again  in  chapter  4,  I  introduced  the 
analogy  of  a  game  of  chess  to  illustrate  the  difference  between  God’s  ordained  and 
absolute  power.   Allow  me  now  to  return  to  that  analogy.   If  you  and  I  are  playing 
chess  —  that  is,  playing  by  the  rules  of  the  game  —  then  whatever  power  or  freedom 
we  may  have  in  an  absolute  sense  for  moving  pieces  becomes  irrelevant  within  the 
constraints  of  the  chess  game.   If  I  decide  I  want  to  move  my  pawn  from  A2  to  C2 
(i.e.,  sideways),  you  will  cry,  “You  can’t  do  that!”   And  it  is  no  matter  that,  in  an 
absolute  sense,  I  can  do  that  —  I  have  it  within  my  absolute  power  to  do  that.   It’s 
not  even  worth  the  grammar  pedant’s  quibble  that  what  you  really  meant  is  that  I 
may  not  do  that:  so  long  as  I  am  playing  chess,  in  a  very  strong  sense,  I  cannot  move 
my  pawn  sideways.   So  long  as  we  are  playing  chess,  and  so  long  as  I  wish  to 
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continue  in  the  game,  there  are  very  real  and  very  definite  constraints  on  the  way  in 
which  I  may  move  pieces.   My  power  is  ordained  by  the  rules  of  the  game.   If  I  violate 
any  one  of  these  rules  in  virtue  of  my  absolute  power,  then  I  am  no  longer  playing 
chess  at  all.   With  respect  to  the  game  of  chess,  my  absolute  power  for  moving  pieces 
wherever  I  please  really  doesn’t  matter ;  the  only  relevant  power  I  have  is  that 
ordained  by  the  rules  of  the  game. 
In  the  solution  Bradwardine  creates  for  us,  God’s  created  order  is,  if  you  will, 
a  chess  game  on  a  grand  scale  (though  please  don’t  push  this  analogy  farther  than  I 
intend!).   It  seems,  however,  that  in  Bradwardine’s  view,  it  is  a  game  in  which  the 
players  only  ever  have  one  choice  of  move.   Every  move  is  forced,  and  any  sense  of 
choice  we  have  is  mere  illusion.   Recall  in  particular  that  Bradwardine  explicitly 
states  that,  relative  to  God’s  ordained  power,  our  actions  are  necessary : 
Now,  to  the  proposition  [wherein  A  is  some  future  contingent  event  that  in 
fact  will  happen],  I  say  that  A  could  not  happen  according  to  absolute  power  . 
.  .  since  for  A  to  happen  or  not  to  happen  would  in  no  way  contradict  such  a 
power  .  .  .  .  But  in  speaking  of  the  ordained  power  .  .  .  it  is  said  in  this  way 
that  neither  A,  nor  any  other  future  thing,  cannot  not  happen ,  since  if  by 
that  power  A  could  not  happen,  it  would  follow  that  God  could  be  deceived 
and  err,  and  his  knowledge  could  fail,  and  he  could  speak  falsely  and  he  could 
lie,  if  God  predicted,  mediately  or  immediately,  that  A  will  happen. 
 
Nunc  ad  propositum,  dico  quod  A  potest  non  fore  de  potencia  absoluta  .  .  . 
quia  A  fore  vel  non  fore  in  nullo  repugnat  tali  potencie  .  .  .  .  Sed  loquendo  de 
potencia  ordinata  .  .  .  sic  dicitur  quod  A  non  potest  non  fore  nec  aliquod 
futurum ,  quia  si  illa  potencia  A  potest  non  fore,  sequitur  quod  Deus  potest 
decipi  et  errare,  et  falli  potest  ejus  sciencia,  et  potest  falsum  dicere  et  mentiri 
si  Deus  predixit  A  fore  mediate  vel  immediate.  (DFC  42g,  emphasis  mine. 
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Omitted  are  repeated  instances  of  the  phrase,  “in  causa  superiori  vel 
inferiori,”  a  secondary  distinction  which  is  irrelevant  to  our  current 
discussion.) 
 
In  stating  that  a  future  thing  cannot  not  happen,  Bradwardine  is  making  a  fairly 
explicit  statement  about  the  necessity  of  the  event,  at  least  relative  to  God’s  ordained 
power. 
It  is  my  contention  that  to  be  necessary  relative  to  God’s  ordained  power  is 
tantamount  to  being  necessary  simpliciter ,  given  that  God’s  ordained  power  is  the 
only  power  that  matters  relative  to  us.   For  if  God  never  acts  contrary  to  God’s 
ordained  power  —  i.e.,  if  every  action  of  God,  throughout  eternity,  is  enacted 
according  to  God’s  ordained  power  —  then  anything  necessary  relative  to  that 
perpetually-realized  power  is,  if  not  necessary  absolutely  speaking,  at  least 
contingens  ut  in  pluribus  —  or  technically  contingent,  but  never  not  the  case.   It  is 
certainly  not  contingent  ad  utrumlibet ,  as  it  would  seem  Bradwardine  wishes  to 
claim.   This  seems  to  imply  that  by  all  relevant  measures,  our  actions  are  determined 
in  quite  a  strong  sense.   And  so  it  appears  that  Bradwardine’s  attempt  to  provide  a 
compatibilist  solution  in  the  line  of  Anselm  fails,  and  what  he  has  instead  produced 
is  an  incompatibilist  version  of  determinism. 
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Conclusion 
 
Summary 
In  this  thesis,  I  have  provided  an  introductory  study  of  Bradwardine’s  De 
futuris  contingentibus ,  a  work  which  provides  a  version  of  his  solution  to  the 
problem  of  divine  foreknowledge  and  human  free  will.   This  study  required,  firstly, 
the  examination  of  the  positions  of  three  major  figures  whose  solutions  shaped  and 
influenced  Bradwardine’s  own:  in  Boethius’  position,  we  observed  the  first  of  the 
solutions  appealing  the  a  difference  in  the  operation  of  God’s  knowledge  from  our 
own.   Boethius  argues  that  it  is  primarily  because  God’s  knowledge  operates  on  a 
plane  higher  than  our  own  that  we  cannot  understand  how  its  operation  does  not 
necessitate  its  future  objects.   Also  present  in  Boethius’  solution,  albeit  subtly,  is  the 
suggestion  that  God’s  timeless  eternity  enables  this  non-necessitating  knowledge  of 
things  to  come.   In  Anselm’s  position,  we  saw  a  much  fuller  development  of  the 
notion  of  God’s  timeless  eternity,  together  with  a  more  robust  discussion  of  how  the 
entire  expanse  of  created  time  —  past,  present,  and  future  —  might  be 
simultaneously  present  to  God,  with  a  simultaneity  that  does  not  obscure  succession 
in  God’s  sight.   In  Anselm’s  position,  we  also  encountered  a  version  of  free  will  that 
might  allow  for  freedom  despite  the  lack  of  alternatives.   The  view  of  Duns  Scotus 
fits  less  neatly  into  the  trajectory  begun  by  Boethius  and  Anselm,  in  that  it  did  not 
require  (and  indeed,  Scotus  elsewhere  flatly  denies)  the  presumption  of  God’s 
timeless  eternity;  with  Scotus,  we  saw  instead  a  new  engagement  with  the  notion  of 
contingency  which  pushed  the  parameters  that  dominated  medieval  assumptions  up 
to  that  point.   This  is  coupled  in  Scotus'  thought,  in  a  way  that  is  perhaps  not  entirely 
seamless,  with  an  understanding  of  God’s  foreknowledge  relying  on  God’s 
knowledge  of  God’s  own  will.   As  subsequent  chapters  showed,  the  positions  of  all 
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three  of  these  figures  have  a  role  to  play  in  Bradwardine’s  own  solution. 
This  thesis  required,  secondly,  that  we  take  significant  time  to  understand  the 
position  of  Bradwardine’s  chief  intellectual  adversary,  William  Ockham.   Ockham’s 
view,  like  that  of  Scotus  (his  fellow  Franciscan)  did  not  rely  upon  (and  in  fact, 
rejected  outright)  any  notion  of  God’s  timeless  eternity.   Instead,  Ockham  developed 
a  complex  understanding  of  modality  and  verb  tense  which  led  him  to  the 
conclusion  that  our  future  free  acts  are  not  necessary,  despite  being  known  by  God, 
because  God’s  knowledge  of  them  is  not  necessary.   I  responded  to  Ockham’s  position 
with  a  discussion  of  my  own,  centring  on  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  what  sense 
can  be  made  of  this  notion  of  “contingent  knowledge.”   I  also  engaged  some  logical 
difficulties  that  seem  to  me  to  spring  from  Ockham’s  notion,  and  discussed  whether 
Ockham’s  solution  does  not  just  push  the  problem  onto  determinacy,  rather  than 
necessity,  in  his  newly-defined  set  of  terms. 
I  was  then  ready,  thirdly,  to  introduce  Bradwardine’s  treatise  itself,  beginning 
with  Bradwardine’s  consideration  of  other  solutions  to  the  problem.   Naturally,  we 
paid  by  far  the  greatest  attention  to  Bradwardine’s  rejection  of  the  Ockhamist 
position,  since  this  is  clearly  the  position  that  is  of  greatest  importance  for 
Bradwardine  in  his  efforts  to  provide  an  alternative  solution.   But  Bradwardine’s 
objections  to  Ockham  were  mostly  quite  different  from  my  own,  focusing  on  the 
danger,  as  he  sees  it,  for  Ockham’s  notion  of  contingent  divine  foreknowledge  to 
undermine  the  immutability  and  omniscience  of  God.   Bradwardine  was  very 
concerned  that  Ockham’s  preoccupation  with  human  freedom  led  him  into  a 
heretical  neglect  of  these  central  attributes  of  God,  as  the  tradition  of  Classical 
theism  would  have  it.   In  his  own  solution,  therefore,  Bradwardine  seeks  to  restore  a 
robust,  Classical  sense  of  the  sovereignty  of  God,  with  full  authority,  power,  and 
autonomy,  expressed  in  the  perfections  of  omniscience,  omnipotence,  and 
immutability.   Bradwardine  embraces  the  Boethian/Anselmian  notions  of  the 
timeless  eternity  of  God,  and  adapts  the  Scotistic  distinction  between  the  absolute 
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and  ordained  power  of  God  to  serve  his  purposes  in  explaining  how  it  is  that  God  can 
have  knowledge  of  our  actions  without  necessitating  them.   He  does  this  by  saying 
that  God’s  foreknowledge  operates  through  the  ordained  power  of  God,  and  thus 
human  actions  foreknown  in  this  way  are  only  necessary  ordinately  speaking; 
relative  to  God’s  absolute  power,  however,  they  remain  free  and  undetermined. 
Finally,  I  analyzed  the  merit  of  Bradwardine’s  solution,  relating  it  to  a 
schematic  of  possible  solutions.   I  broadly  laid  out  the  main  families  of  solutions 
within  the  two  categories  of  compatibilist  and  incompatibilist  solutions,  and  then 
argued  that  the  incompatibilist  positions  —  though  tenable  positions  in  their  own 
right  —  fail  to  really  be  solutions  to  the  problem  of  divine  foreknowledge  and  free 
will  in  a  true  sense,  because  they  are  only  acceptable  as  solutions  to  the  kind  of 
person  for  whom  the  problem  would  never  have  truly  existed  in  the  first  place.   The 
problem  arises  only  for  the  person  for  whom  God’s  foreknowledge  of  all  things  and 
human  freedom  are  both  deep,  unavoidable  commitments  that  cannot  be  discarded. 
I  then  argue  that  some  solutions  which  aim  to  be  compatibilist  inadvertently  erode 
the  foundation  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  commitments,  and  thus  ultimately 
wind  up  being  incompatibilist  solutions  despite  themselves.   Ockham’s  solution,  I 
contend,  is  one  such  solution,  since  it  weakens  the  sense  in  which  God  foreknows 
anything  to  the  point  where  it  seems  almost  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  kind  of 
“passive  waiting,”  as  Oberman  expressed  it.   So  Ockham  ultimately  winds  up 
undermining  his  commitment  to  God’s  foreknowledge.   Bradwardine,  however,  in  his 
enthusiasm  to  avoid  the  apparently  heretical  pitfalls  of  Ockham’s  solution,  commits 
this  opposite  error:  the  notion  of  freedom  that  Bradwardine  preserves  is  one  that  is 
so  weak  as  to  ultimately  boil  down  to  determinism.   And  thus  Bradwardine,  too, 
winds  up  an  incompatibilist,  despite  himself. 
 
Remaining  questions 
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There  are  a  number  of  remaining  avenues  of  enquiry  relating  to  the  De  futuris 
contingentibus  that  I  have  been  unable  to  explore  in  the  course  of  this  thesis  study. 
One  of  these  questions  is  that  of  the  relationship  between  Bradwardine’s  solution  to 
the  problem  as  presented  in  the  De  futuris  contingentibus ,  and  some  years  later,  in 
the  much  more  well-known  work  De  causa  Dei .   For  it  seems  that  in  that  latter  work, 
the  division  of  God’s  power  ceases  to  play  a  central  role  (or  any  role  at  all)  in 
Bradwardine’s  treatment  of  God’s  foreknowledge  and  human  freedom.   He  does 
retain  in  that  work  a  very  robust  sense  of  the  sovereignty  and  power  of  God,  placing 
secondary  importance  on  whether  or  not  human  action  can  really  be  free  under  such 
circumstances.    But  when  it  comes  to  actually  giving  an  account  of  divine 165
foreknowledge  and  human  freedom,  it  winds  up  coming  across  in  a  way  that  seems 
not  unlike  the  solution  of  Scotus,  with  a  strong  dose,  too,  of  Anselmian  emphasis  on 
the  eternity  of  God.    Absent  is  the  creatively  original  approach  of  the  DFC, 166
employing  the  divine  powers  distinction.   So  a  major  question  for  further  inquiry  is, 
why  did  Bradwardine  not  maintain  the  division  in  God’s  power  as  a  useful 
mechanism  for  dealing  with  the  problem  of  divine  foreknowledge  and  human 
freedom  when  he  came  to  address  the  problem  a  second  time?   A  fuller  answer 
would  require  a  much  more  careful  study  of  DCD  and  other  works  of  Bradwardine’s 
than  I  am  presently  able  to  provide,  but  I  would  at  this  point  hazard  a  guess  that  it 
may  have  been  the  case  that  Bradwardine  came  to  recognize  the  weaknesses  of  his 
first  solution.   Perhaps  he  came  to  realize  that  to  posit  that  we  are  only  free  relative 
to  God’s  absolute  power  in  fact  undermines  our  freedom  in  a  very  significant  way. 
So  perhaps  DCD  is,  among  other  things,  an  attempt  by  Bradwardine  to  provide  a 
better  answer  to  the  problem  than  he  had  in  his  previous  treatise  on  the  topic. 
165  Bradwardine’s  strong  emphasis   on  the  sovereignty  of  God  has  been  seen  by  some  scholars  —  among 
them,  Oberman   and  Leff  —  to  prefigure  similar  emphases  in  the  writings  of  some  early  reformers,  most 
notably  John  Calvin. 
166  De  causa  Dei  itself  is  a  very  large,  intimidating   tome,  available  only  in  a  difficult-to-read 
seventeenth-century  edition   (or  one  of  its  reprints).   I  do  not  pretend  to  have  read  through  it  in  its 
entirety   myself  yet;  however,  a  snapshot   summary  of  Bradwardine’s  treatment  of  the  topic  of  future 
contingents   in  the  DCD  is  given  by  Calvin  Normore  in  “Future  Contingents,”  in  Kretzmann  et  al.  (eds), 
The  Cambridge  History  of  Later  Medieval  Philosophy  (Cambridge:   CUP,  1982),  358  -  81,  esp.  374  -  75. 
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A  second  significant  question  that  arises  from  this  study  is  that  of  the 
historical  reception,  transmission,  and  influence  of  the  work.   There  are  many  clues 
that  Bradwardine’s  writing  was  influential  and  well-known  in  the  fourteenth  and 
fifteenth  centuries.   Oberman  and  Leff  trace  the  likely  influence  that  Bradwardine 
had  on  theological  developments  leading  up  to  the  great  rift  in  the 
early-sixteenth-century  Church  which  we  call  the  Reformation.   In  particular,  these 
scholars  trace  a  line  of  intellectual  influence  connecting  Bradwardine  with  none 
other  than  John  Calvin.   My  own  favourite  piece  of  evidence  of  Bradwardine’s 
influence,  however,  is  the  following  passage  from  Geoffrey  Chaucer’s  “The  Nun’s 
Priest’s  Tale”  in  The  Canterbury  Tales  (the  translation  below  is  my  own,  with  no 
effort  made  to  preserve  the  original  metre  or  rhyme  in  any  way): 
But  I  ne  kan  nat  bulte  it  to  the  bren, 
As  kan  the  hooly  doctour  Augustyn, 
Or  Boece,  or  the  Bisshop  Bradwardyn, 
Wheither  that  Goddes  worthy  forwityng 
Streyneth  me  nedely  for  to  doon  a  thyng,  - 
"Nedely"  clepe  I  symple  necessitee; 
Or  elles,  if  free  choys  be  graunted  me 
To  do  that  same  thyng,  or  do  it  noght, 
Though  God  forwoot  it,  er  that  I  was  wroght; 
Or  if  his  wityng  streyneth  never  a  deel 
But  by  necessitee  condicioneel. 
 
But  I  cannot  sift  it  [as  wheat]  to  the  bran 
As  can  the  holy  Doctor  [of  the  Church],  Augustine, 
Or  Boethius,  or  the  Bishop  Bradwardine: 
Whether  God’s  worthy  foreknowledge 
Compels  me  by  need  to  do  a  thing  — 
By  “need”  I  mean  simple  necessity  —  
Or  if  free  choice  might  be  granted  to  me 
To  do  or  not  do  that  same  thing, 
Although  God  foreknew  [my  choice]  before  I  was  even  made; 
Or  if  God’s  knowledge  does  not  compel  anything 
Except  by  conditional  necessity.   (lines  474  -  84) 
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The  very  fact  that  Chaucer  is  mentioning  Bradwardine  by  name  —  in  the  same 
breath,  even,  as  such  illustrious  greats  as  Boethius  and  Augustine  —  indicates  that 
Bradwardine  must  have  been  something  of  a  household  name,  even  a  couple  of 
decades  after  his  death.   Yet  more  remarkable,  though,  is  the  context  in  which 
Chaucer  mentions  Bradwardine,  for  the  very  topic  being  alluded  to  is  that  of  the  De 
futuris  contingentibus ,  namely,  divine  foreknowledge  and  human  freedom!    There 167
can  be  no  clearer  evidence  than  this  passing  mention  in  Chaucer’s  hugely  popular 
poem  that  Bradwardine’s  attempts  to  tackle  to  problem  of  divine  foreknowledge  and 
human  freedom  were  widely  known,  at  least  among  the  educated. 
Despite  this  evidence  that  Bradwardine  was  famous  for  his  work  on  the  topic, 
I  have  found  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  De  futuris  contingentibus  treatise  in 
particular  was  much  read  or  imitated.   Much  further  textual  and  paleographic  study 
of  Bradwardine’s  contemporaries  and  immediate  successors  would  be  necessary  to 
establish  with  any  greater  degree  of  certainty  the  kind  of  direct  influence  the 
treatise  may  have  had;  but  the  immediate  evidence  would  appear  to  point  to  the 
influence  being  very  slight.   There  seem  to  be  few  surviving  manuscripts,  for  one 
thing;  and  for  another,  I  have  not  so  far  discovered  any  evidence  of  the  characteristic 
element  of  the  DFC’s  solution  —  namely,  the  reliance  on  the  divine  powers 
distinction  —  being  reported  or  taken  up  by  any  subsequent  philosophers  of  the 
fourteenth  century.   There  are  two  main  possibilities  that  I  can  see  as  to  why  this 
might  be:  it  may  be  the  case  that  this  was  a  text  that  simply  failed  to  gain  a 
critical-mass  following,  and  so  was  forgotten  about  (certainly,  its  stylistic 
shortcomings  would  not  have  made  it  an  easy,  accessible  text  for  students  or  other 
masters  of  arts  hoping  to  read  up  on  current  ideas);  or  perhaps  it  was  read  by  some, 
even  circulated  for  a  time,  but  not  taken  up  by  anyone  because  its  shortcomings  as  a 
167  If  ever  my  research  is  accused   of  being  dry  and  irrelevant  to  today’s  young  people,  I  pull  out  this 
reference  in  Chaucer.   I  call  it  my  pop-culture  tie-in  —  because  really,  how  much  more  hip  does  it  get 
than  Chaucer? 
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coherent  account  were  too  apparent. 
These  speculations,  however,  are  based  on  far  too  little  evidence,  as  yet,  to 
make  any  certain  pronouncements.   Indeed,  it  may  even  turn  out  that  further  study 
yields  evidence  of  the  text  having  had  a  greater  influence  among  Bradwardine’s 
contemporaries  and  immediate  successors  than  I  currently  believe  there  to  be. 
Regardless  of  the  text’s  influence,  however,  there  remains  much  of  inherent  interest 
about  it;  and  despite  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  solution  it  offers  to  the  problem  of 
divine  foreknowledge  and  human  freedom,  it  yet  provides  an  intriguing  case-study 
of  a  creative  attempt  by  a  fourteenth-century  philosopher  to  craft  a  new  solution  to  a 
perennial  problem  of  philosophy,  and  a  unique  window  into  the  early  thought  of  the 
Doctor  Profundus .  168
 
 
   
168  Doctor  Profundus   (“the  profound  doctor”)  is  the  epithet   by  which  Bradwardine  was  known  to 
subsequent   generations  of  medieval  scholars. 
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Appendix 
 
DE  FUTURIS  CONTINGENTIBUS  169
 
 
Utrum  Deus  habeat  prescienciam 
omnium  futurorum  contingencium  ad 
utrumlibet. 170 
 
   1.   Quod  non,  quia  sid  posset 
sciencia  Dei  falli  et  mutari. 
Consequens  est  falsum,  quia  sic 
Deus  posset  decipi.   Illud  sequitur 
quod  illa  contingencia  ad  utrumlibet 
sunt  necessaria.   Consequens  est 
falsum. 
 
   2a.   Ad  oppositum  questionis 
arguitur:  nullum  contingens  ad 
utrumlibet  est  quod  non  scit,  igitur 
etc.  Antecedens  probo,  quia  si  detur 
oppositum  et  sit  A  illud  futurum 
contingens  ad  utrumlibet  quod  non 
ON  FUTURE  CONTINGENTS 169 
 
 
Whether  God  has  foreknowledge  of  all  ad 
utrumlibet   future  contingents. 170
 
 
   1.   [It  may  be  argued]  that  [God  does]  not, 
since  it  would  then  be  possible  for  God's 
knowledge  to  be  mistaken  and  to  be 
changed.   The  consequent  is  false,  since 
then  God  could  be  deceived.   It  follows  from 
this  that  these  contingent  things  are 
necessary.   [This]  consequent  is  false. 
 
   2a.   In  opposition  to  the  question  it  may  be 
argued:  no  contingent  thing  is  such  that 
[God]  does  not  know  [it],  therefore,  etc.   I 
prove  the  antecedent:  [Proof:]  if  the 
opposite  is  granted  –  so  that  A  is  some 
future  contingent  thing  that  God  does  not 
169  The  Latin  text  is  transcribed  from  the  complete  edition  prepared  by  Jean-François  Genest  in  “Le  De  futuris 
contingentibus  de  T.  Bradwardine,”  Recherches  Augustiniennes  vol.  14,  249  -  336.   The  paragraph 
numbering  is  also  that  of  Genest.   Unless  noted  otherwise,  I  have  adhered  to  Genest’s  editorial  decisions 
throughout.   Because  I  am  not  including  Genest’s  editorial  notes,  no  copyright  infringement  is  entailed  by 
this  use.   In  continental  Europe  (which  is  where  the  edition  was  created),  critical  editions  are  only  covered 
by  copyright  for  thirty  years  —  it  is  now  thirty-seven  years  since  this  edition  was  published  —  and  in 
Canada,  only  the  critical  apparatus  of  an  edition  (not  the  text  itself)  is  ever  covered  by  copyright.   (See 
Thomas  Margoni  and  Mark  Perry,  ‘Scientific  and  Critical  Editions  of  Public  Domain  Works:  An  Example  of 
European  Copyright  Law  (Dis)Harmonization’,  Canadian  Intellectual  Property  Review  27,  no.  1  (2011): 
157–170.)   The  translation  is  entirely  my  own.   I  have  completed  a  draft  translation  of  the  entire  treatise,  but 
in  the  interest  of  space,  am  only  including  excerpts  in  the  present  document  (the  entire  treatise,  in  the 
present  format,  is  over  one  hundred  pages  in  length). 
170  “ Ad  utrumlibet ”  is  a  virtually  untranslatable  term  which  designates  those  contingent  things  which  are 
really  likely  to  turn  out  one  or  the  other  of  two  (or  possibly  more)  possible  ways;  it  is  used  in  contrast  with 
ut  in  pluribus  and  ut  in  paucioribus  or  ut  raro  contingencies,  which  are  events  which,  though  technically 
contingent,  are  practically  speaking  almost  certain  to  happen  (or  not  to  happen,  respectively).   Throughout 
the  remainder  of  the  text,  I  will  typically  leave  ad  utrumlibet  untranslated,  or  even  omit  it  in  the  English 
entirely,  unless  a  point  is  being  made  which  rests  on  the  distinction  between  ad  utrumlibet ,  ut  in  pluribus , 
and  ut  in  paucioribus / ut  raro  contingencies.   Some  other  translators  of  medieval  sources  have  rendered  the 
phrase  “indefinite  contingency”  or  “contingency  (-)  in  (-)  either  (-)  of  (-)  two  (-)  ways”;  I  find  the  former 
imports  too  much  technical  baggage  which  may  or  may  not  be  present  in  the  original  context,  while  the  latter 
is  extremely  cumbersome.   In  almost  all  instances  of  its  use  in  this  text,  plain  old  “contingency”  will  do  the 
job  just  fine. 
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scit,  et  arguitur  sic:  A  erit  quia  est 
futurum,  igitur  Deus  sciet  A  esse 
quando  erit  actu  existens;  et  non  per 
ipsum  A  hoc  sciet,  quia  sic  sciencia 
sua  acquireretur  sibi  ex  nobis 171 ; 
igitur  sequitur  quod  sciet  A  esse 
quando  erit  per  essenciam  suam  hoc 
representantem  sibi  quando  A  erit; 
et  si  sic,  igitur  sequitur  quod 
essencia  sua  non  representat  A  esse, 
nec  fore,  nec  preteritum  esse  nunc, 
et  postea  representabit  A  esse;  et  sic 
sequitur  quod  essencia  sua  mutatur. 
Consequens  est  falsum. 
 
   2b.   Similiter  sic:  sequitur  quod 
essencia  divina  non  representaret 
res  esse  naturaliter,  sed  voluntarie. 
Consequens  est  falsum,  quia  si 
voluntarie,  igitur  prius  voluit 
essenciam  suam  sic  illam  rem 
representare  sibi  per  aliam 
mensuram;  et  cum  non  sit  major 
racio  quare  prius  per  aliam 
mensuram  quam  ab  eterno,  sequitur 
quod  ab  eterno  hoc  representavit;  et 
habetur  propositum. 
 
 
   2c.   Confirmatur,  quia  aliter 
aliquando  esset  magis  sciens  et 
aliquando  minus,  scilicet  quando  scit 
rem  esse  quam  prius  quando  non 
scit  rem  esse;  et  sic  aliquando  erit 
magis  perfectus,  aliquando  minus 
perfectus.  Consequens  est  falsum. 
 
 
   2d.   Similiter  sequitur  quod  A  non 
cadit  sub  providencia  Dei  et 
conservacione  sua.   Consequens  est 
falsum.   Et  similiter,  si  A  sit  aliquis 
know  –  it  may  be  argued  as  follows:  A  will 
be,  since  it  is  future,  thus  God  will  know  A  to 
be  when  A  does  in  fact  exist;  and  he  will 
know  this  not  through  A  itself,  since  then 
his  knowledge  would  itself  be  acquired  from 
us ;  it  therefore  follows  that  God  will 171
know  A  to  be  when  it  is  represented  to  God 
through  God’s  own  essence  when  A  will 
exist;  and  if  so,  then  it  follows  that  God’s 
essence  does  not  now  represent  A  to  be,  nor 
to  be  going  to  be,  nor  to  have  been,  and  yet 
later  it  represents  that  A  is;  and  so  it  follows 
that  God's  essence  is  changed.   [This] 
consequent  is  false. 
 
   2b.   Similarly,  then:  it  follows  that  the 
divine  essence  would  not  naturally 
represent  that  a  thing  is  [i.e.,  through  the 
nature  of  the  divine  essence],  but  wilfully 
[through  its  will].   [This]  consequent  is  false, 
since  if  it  were  wilful,  then  it  previously 
willed  its  own  essence,  so  that  thing 
represents  itself  by  means  of  another 
measure;  and  since  there  is  no  more  reason 
why  [this  should  happen]  first  through 
another  measure  than  from  eternity,  it 
follows  that  this  representation  is  from 
eternity;  and  we  have  the  proposition. 
 
   2c.   [This]  is  confirmed,  since  otherwise 
[God's]  knowledge  would  at  one  time  be 
greater  and  at  another  time  less;  indeed, 
God  would  at  one  time  know  something  to 
be  that  he  did  not  know  to  be  at  a  prior 
time;  and  so  God  would  at  one  time  be  more 
perfect,  and  at  another  time  less  perfect. 
This  consequent  is  false. 
 
   2d.   It  similarly  follows  that  A  [i.e.,  a  future 
contingent  thing]  does  not  fall  under  the 
providence  and  keeping  of  God.   [This] 
consequent  is  false.   And  similarly,  if  A  were 
171  Here,  it  is  assumed  that  A  is  some  action  of  the  (human)  will,  and  so  this  is  why  God’s  knowledge  would 
be  “acquired  from  us.” 
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homo,  sequitur  quod  aliquis  homo 
potest  esse  de  numero  electorum 
qui  ab  eterno  non  fuit  electus. 
Consequens  est  falsum.   Et  sic  de 
reprobatis. 
 
   2e.   Similiter  sequitur  quod  Deus 
non  ageret  ad  productionem  A,  vel 
sequitur  quod  si  agat,  agit 
necessario  ad  productionem;  quia,  si 
libere  agat  ad  productionem  A, 
igitur,  quando  A  non  fuit,  cognovit  A 
fore,  et  pari  racione  ab  eterno 
cognovit  A  fore. 
 
 
   2f.   Item  Deus  scit  multa  futura, 
quia  omnes  operactiones  nostras 
bonas  et  malas,  quia  aliter  non  sciret 
illas  premiare  et  punire;  sic  pari 
racione  scit  omnia  futura. 
Antecedens  patet,  quia  prophete 
sciebant  multa  futura,  igitur  et  Deus, 
quia  aliter  non  foret  Deus 
perfectissimus  qui  potest  esse. 
 
 
   2g.   Similiter  sequitur  quod  non 
debemus  Deum  racionabiliter  orare 
pro  futuris. 
 
   2h.   Similiter  sic  sequitur  quod 
homo  purus  plura  scit  quam  Deus 
scit,  quia  futura. 172 
 
 
   2i.   Similter  sequitur  quod  Deus 
potest  decipi  et  errare  credendo 
illud  non  esse  quod  est,  quia  non 
to  be  some  person,  it  follows  that  a  person 
who  was  not  elect  from  eternity,  could  be 
numbered  among  the  elect.   [This] 
consequent  is  false.   And  so  too  [with  a 
person  who  is]  among  the  reprobate. 
 
   2e.   It  similarly  follows  that  God  does  not 
act  to  produce  A,  or  it  follows  that  if  God  did 
so  act,  God  would  act  necessarily  to  produce 
[A];  because,  if  God  were  to  freely  act  to 
produce  A,  then  when  A  did  not  exist,  God 
would  have  been  aware  that  A  was  going  to 
exist,  and  by  similar  reasoning,  God  would 
have  been  aware  from  eternity  that  A  was 
going  to  be. 
 
   2f.   In  the  same  way  God  knows  many 
future  things,  because  [God  knows]  all  of 
our  good  and  bad  deeds,  since  otherwise  he 
would  not  know  which  to  reward  and  which 
to  punish;  and  so  by  the  same  reasoning, 
God  knows  all  future  things.   [This] 
antecedent  holds:  since  prophet[s]  know 
many  future  things,  therefore  also  so  does 
God,  since  otherwise  God  would  not  be  the 
most  perfect  being  that  can  be. 
 
   2g.   It  similarly  follows  that,  rationally,  we 
ought  not  to  pray  to  God  for  future  things. 
 
 
   2h.   It  similarly  follows,  in  another  way, 
that  a  [being  that  is]  purely  human  knows 
more  than  God  knows,  since  [the  person 
knows]  future  things.  172
 
   2i.   It  similarly  follows  that  God  can  be 
deceived  and  err  by  believing  that 
something  does  not  exist  which  does,  since 
he  does  not  have  knowledge,  at  the  time 
172  In  this  reductio  argument,  Bradwardine  seems  to  mean  that  even  non-divine  human  beings  have 
knowledge  of  some  things  in  the  future  (by  means  of  anticipation,  inductively  learned  by  experience):  when  I 
see  a  dark  storm  cloud  approaching,  I  know  that  it  will  rain.   So  if  God  truly  knows  nothing  that  is  future, 
then  he  would  know  even  less  than  his  creatures. 
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habet  scienciam,  quando  non  est,  de 
illo  non  esse. 173 
 
   2j.   Similiter  sequitur  sic  quod  illud 
psalmi  esset  verum  ad  litteram: 
“Non  videbit  Dominus,  nec  intelliget 
Deus  Jacob”  (Ps.  93.7). 174 
that  it  does  not  exist,  of  that  non-existent 
thing.  173
 
   2j.   It  similarly  follows,  in  another  way,  that 
this  Psalm  would  be  true  when  it  says:  “The 
Lord  will  not  see,  nor  will  the  God  of  Jacob 
understand”  (Ps.  93/94.7).  174
 
<Prima  opinio> 
 
   3a.   In  ista  questione  est  una  opinio 
que  ponit  quod  nihil  est  futurum. 
Quod  probatur  sic:  futurum  nihil  est, 
igitur,  per  conversionem,  nihil  est 
futurum.   Antecedens  patet,  quia 
futurum  distinctum  contra  presens 
nulla  res  est. 
 
  … 
 
   4.   Sed  contra  istam  opinionem 
arguitur  sic:  hec  opinio  destruit 
illam  opinionem  que  ponit  tria 
tempora,  scilicet  preteritum,  presens 
et  futurum.   Similiter  dyalecticam, 
que  ponit  futura  contingencia  ad 
utrumlibet,  et  scienciam  naturalem, 
que  ponit  plura  evenire  a  casu,  et 
medicinam  et  astronomiam,  que 
docent  judicare  de  futuris,  et 
propheciam  et  revelacionem,  que 
sunt  de  futuris.   Hec  igitur  opinio  est 
falsa.   Respondetur  igitur  ad 
argumenta. 
…  
 
 
<First  opinion> 
 
   3a.   Concerning  this  question,  there  is  an 
opinion  put  forward  that  nothing  is  future. 
This  is  proven  as  follows:  the  future  is 
nothing,  and  therefore,  by  conversion, 
nothing  is  future.   The  antecedent  holds, 
since  the  future  is  distinguished  from  the 
present  [by  the  fact  that]  nothing  [future]  is. 
 
…  
 
   4.   But  against  this  opinion  it  may  be 
argued  as  follows:  this  opinion  destroys  that 
opinion  which  holds  [there  to  be]  three 
times,  namely,  past,  present,  and  future.   By 
a  similar  logic,  which  holds  there  to  be 
future  contingents;  and  natural  knowledge, 
which  holds  many  things  to  come  about  by 
chance;  and  medicine  and  astronomy,  which 
show  how  to  determine  future  things;  and 
prophecy  and  revelation,  which  are  about 
future  things.   This  opinion  is  therefore 
false.   The  argument  is  therefore  answered. 
 
 
…  
 
<Secundo  opinio> 
 
   9a.   Secunda  opinio  in  ista 
questione  est  quod  aliquod  est 
futurum,  sed  illud  non  potest  esse, 
<Second  opinion> 
  
   9a.   The  second  opinion  on  this  question  is 
that  something  is  future,  but  cannot  exist, 
since  the  future,  when  it  is  yet  nothing,  does 
173  I  take  this  to  be  an  argument  from  God’s  immutability. 
174  This  passage,  in  context,  represents  the  false  boast  of  an  evildoer. 
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quia  futurum,  cum  nihil  sit,  non 
habet  aliquam  potenciam  et  ita  non 
habet  aliquod  posse. 
 
   b.   Sed  respondetur  cum  Anselmo 
quod  aliquid  dicitur  posse  esse 
respectu  hujus  verbi  “esse”,  non  quia 
ipsum  potest  esse  per  potenciam 
suam,  sed  per  aliam  potenciam,  et 
ita  mundus  potuit  esse  antequam 
fuit.  Et  ita  est  in  proposito. 
 
 
   c.   Sed  contra  :  tunc  eadem  racione 
potest  vere  concedi  quod  dominus 
potest  edificare  domum,  quia  alius 
potest  edificare  domum. 
Consequens  est  falsum. 
 
   d.   Respondetur  negando 
consequenciam,  sed  tamen  posset 
esse  sic  universaliter:  domus  potest 
esse,  igitur  aliquis  potest  facere 
quod  domus  sit. 
not  have  any  power,  and  so  does  not  have 
any  ability. 
 
 
   b.   But  one  responds  along  with  Anselm 
that  something  is  said  to  be  able  to  exist 
with  respect  to  this  word  “to  exist,”  not 
because  it  itself  is  able  to  exist  through  its 
own  power,  but  through  the  power  of 
another;  and  so  the  world  was  able  to  exist 
before  it  was  made.   And  so  it  is  in  the 
proposition. 
 
   c.   But  against  this:  by  that  same  reasoning 
it  could  be  truly  conceded  that  the  Lord  is 
able  to  make  the  Lord,  since  another  [thing] 
can  make  the  Lord.   This  consequent  is  false. 
 
 
   d.   One  responds  by  denying  the  inference 
made  —   the  Lord  is  able  to  exist,  therefore 
something  else  is  able  to  make  it  that  the 
Lord  would  be  —  even  though  it  still  can 
still  be  so  universally. 
 
 
<Tercia  opinio> 
 
   10.   Tercia  opinio  est  quod  hec  est 
vera  :  'aliquod  futurum  ad 
utrumlibet  est  futurum  vel  non 
futurum”,  ut  accipitur  in  sensu 
composito,  sed  hec:  “aliquid  est 
futurum”,  similiter  hec  :  “aliquid  non 
est  futurum”,  nec  est  vera,  nec  faIsa, 
quia  nulla  talis  in  sensu  divisa  de 
futuro  est  vera  vel  falsa.  Et  hoc  patet 
per  Philosophum,  qui  dicit  quod  de 
futuris  contingentibus  non  est 
veritas  determinata.  Et  per 
consequens  nulla  talis  in  sensu 
divisa  est  vera  vel 
<Third  opinion> 
 
   10.   The  third  opinion  is  that  this  is  true: 
“Some  ad  utrumlibet  [contingent]  future 
thing  is  going  to  be  or  is  not  going  to  be,” 
when  taken  in  the  compounded  sense,  but 
this  sentence:  “Something  is  going  to  be”, 
and  similarly  this  sentence:  “Something  is 
not  going  to  be”,  is  neither  true,  nor  false, 
since  no  such  [proposition]  concerning  the 
future  is  true  or  false  in  the  divided  sense. 
And  this  holds  through  [the  teaching  of]  the 
Philosopher,  who  says  that,  concerning 
future  contingents,  truth  is  not  determined. 
And  consequently,  no  such  [proposition]  is 
true  or  false  in  the  divided  sense,  since  [for] 
every  true  thing  it  is  true  that  it  is,  and  for 
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falsa,  quia  omne  verum  est  verum 
quod  est,  et  omne  tale  est 
determinate  verum  etc. 
 
   11.   Sed  respondetur  primo  racioni 
huic,  et  post  arguetur  contra 
opinionem  istam  :  quia  Philosophus 
non  vult  per  hoc  plus  habere  nisi 
quod  nulla  talis  est  nobis  nota  esse 
vera  loquendo  naturaliter,  eo  quod 
potest  esse  et  non  esse  et  contingens 
est.  Sed  non  vult  dicere  quod  hec 
non  est  vera  :  “aliquid  est  futurum” 
nec  “aliquid  non  est  futurum”  tum 
quia  secundum  Philosophum  de 
quolibet  quod  est,  erit  vel  fuit  dicitur 
affirmacio  vel  negacio  et  de  nullo 
eorum  ambo 175   ;  igitur,  cum  plura 
erunt  que  non  sunt,  sequitur 
propositum  quod  hec  est  vera  : 
“aliquid  est  futurum”. 
 
…  
 
   c.   Similiter  sic  sequitur  quod  Deus 
nihil  presciret  nisi  sub  disjunctione, 
et  sic  scit  quilibet  ydiota  ;  igitur. 
 
 
…  
every  such  thing,  it  is  determinately  true, 
etc. 
 
 
   11.   But  one  replies  to  this  first  argument 
(and  will  afterwards  argue  against  this 
opinion)  because  the  Philosopher  means  by 
that  no  more  than  that  no  such 
[proposition]  is  known  to  us  to  be  true 
(naturally  speaking),  in  that  it  can  be  and 
not  be  and  is  contingent.  But  he  does  not 
want  to  say  that  neither  “Something  is  going 
to  be”  nor  “Something  is  not  going  to  be”  is 
true,  because  according  to  the  Philosopher 
concerning  whatever  is,  will  be,  or  was,  it 
may  be  asserted  in  either  the  affirmative  or 
in  the  negative,  but  never  both ;  therefore, 175
since  many  things  will  be  that  do  not  [now] 
exist,  it  follows  that  the  proposition 
“Something  is  going  to  be”  is  true. 
 
 
…  
 
   c.   It  similarly  follows  that  God  would 
foreknow  nothing,  except  under  a  disjuntion 
–  and  any  idiot  knows  in  that  way! 
Therefore,  [etc.]. 
 
…  
 
<Quarta  opinio> 
 
   13a.   Quarta  est  opinio  que  ponit 
aliquid  esse  futurum  ad  utrumlibet, 
sed  illud  non  semper  fuit  vel  est 
futurum,  sed  quod  potest  incipere 
esse  futurum  ;  quia  aliquod  potest 
esse  quod  non  erit,  igitur  aliquid 
potest  esse  futurum  quod  non  est 
nunc  futurum. 176   Et  sit  illud  A  et 
<Fourth  opinion> 
 
   13a.   The  fourth  opinion  is  the  one  that 
supposes  something  to  be  an  ad  utrumlibet 
future  [contingent],  but  that  it  was  not 
always  or  is  [not  always]  going  to  be  [a 
future  thing],  but  rather,  that  it  can  begin  to 
be  going  to  be;  since  something  is  able  to  be 
that  will  not  be,  therefore  something  can  be 
future   that  is  not  currently  future.   Let 176
175  Here  Bradwardine  asserts  the  principle  of  bivalence  and  the  law  of  the  excluded  middle. 
176  Or  “going  to  be,”  similarly  throughout. 
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arguitur  sic  :  A  potest  esse  futurum 
et  A  non  est  nunc  futurum,  igitur  A 
potest  incipere  esse  futurum. 
Consequencia  patet  per 
exposicionem  de  li  '  incipit  '. 
 
…  
 
   14a.   Sed  contra  per  Philosophum  : 
"  Non  refert  dicere  per  millesimum 
annum  aliquid  esse  futurum  vel 
quantumcumque  tempus”.  Igitur 
futurum  non  incipit  esse  futurum. 
 
 
   b.   Item  si  aliquod  futurum  aliquo 
tempore  incipiat  esse  futurum,  sit 
gracia  exempli  quod  A  futurum 
incipiat  esse  futurum  in  B  tempore 
vel  instanti,  et  arguitur  sic  :  A  incipit 
esse  futurum  in  B  instanti  futuro, 
igitur  A  erit  futurum  in  B  instanti 
futuro,  et  si  sic,  igitur  A  non  incipiet 
(or  “incepit”)  esse  futurum  in  B 
futuro.  Sic  arguitur  de  quolibet 
instanti  futuro  et  tamen  post  nunc  A 
est  futurum,  et  sic  arguitur  quod  A 
nunquam  incipit  [esse  futurum]  vel 
incipiet  esse  futurum. 
 
…  
 
such  a  thing  be  A,  and  argue  as  follows:  A 
can  be  future,  and  A  is  not  currently  future; 
therefore,  A  can  begin  to  be  future.   The 
consequence  holds  by  the  definition  of  the 
word  “begin”. 
 
…  
 
   14a.   But  against  this,  according  to  the 
Philosopher,  “It  doesn't  matter  [whether] 
you  say  a  thousand  years,  or  however  much 
time,  for  something  to  be  future”.   Therefore 
something  that  is  going  to  be  does  not  begin 
to  be  future. 
 
   b.   Similarly  if  something  future  begins  to 
be  future  at  some  point  in  time,  consider  the 
example  that  A,  a  future  thing,  begins  to  be 
future  at  the  time  or  instant  B,  and  then 
argue  as  follows:  A  begins  to  be  future  at  the 
future  instant  B,  therefore  A  will  be  future 
at  the  future  instant  B;  and  if  this  is  so,  then 
A  does  not  begin  to  be  future  at  the  future 
[instant]  B.   If  so  it  is  argued  from  whatever 
future  instant,  and  at  each  subsequent  one, 
A  is  going  to  be.   And  so  it  is  argued  that  A 
never  begins,  nor  will  begin,  to  be  future. 
 
 
 
…  
<Quinto  opinio> 
 
   16a.   Quinta  est  opinio  quod  aliquid 
est  futurum  contingens  ad 
utrumlibet,  sed  illud  non  prescitur  a 
Deo,  quia  si  sic,  sciencia  Dei  potest 
falli  et  Deus  potest  decipi,  quod  est 
falsum. 
 
   b.   Confirmatur  per 
Commentatorem  in  De  sompno  [sic] 
et  vigilia ,  quod  sompnia  vera  non 
<Fifth  opinion> 
 
   16a.   The  fifth  is  the  opinion  that 
something  is  an  ad  utrumlibet  future 
contingent,  but  that  thing  is  not  foreknown 
by  God,  since  if  it  were,  God's  knowledge 
could  fail  and  God  could  be  deceived,  which 
is  false. 
 
   b.   This  is  confirmed  by  the  Commentator 
in  the  treatise  On  sleeping  and  waking ,  that 
dreams  are  not  really  in  us  except  for  those 
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sunt  in  nobis  nisi  de  illis  que 
accidunt  in  majori  parte,  et  ideo  non 
de  futuris  contingentibus  ad 
utrumlibet. 177 
 
…  
 
   d.   Sed  ad  ista  argumenta 
respondebitur  post,  dicendo  ad 
questionem. 
 
that  happen  for  the  most  part  [or  which 
usually  occur],  and  therefore  do  not  concern 
ad  utrumlibet  future  contingents.  177
 
 
…  
 
   d.   But  this  argument  will  be  dealt  with 
after  we  have  discussed  the  question. 
<Sexta  opinio> 
 
   17.   Sexta  est  opinio  que  ponit  quod 
nihil  est  Deo  futuram,  licet  plura  sint 
futura  in  propriis  naturis  ;  et  hec  est 
opinio  Anselmi,  qui  dicit  quod  Deus 
non  habet  proprie  prescienciam 
aliquarum  rerum  ab  eo  scitarum,  eo 
quod  omnia  futura  sunt  sibi 
presencia. 
 
…  
 
<Sixth  opinion> 
 
   17.   The  sixth  is  the  opinion  that  holds  that 
nothing  is  future  for  God,  although  it  allows 
that  many  things  would  be  future  with 
respect  to  their  own  natures;  and  this  is  the 
opinion  of  Anselm,  who  says  that  God  does 
not  properly  have  foreknowledge  of 
anything  that  is  known  by  him,  since  all 
future  things  are  present  to  him. 
 
…  
 
<Septima  opinio> 
 
   20.   Septima  opinio  est  que  ponit 
quod  nihil  est  futurum  contingens 
ad  utrumlibet,  sed  omnia  que 
eveniunt,  necessario  eveniunt.   Sed 
ista  opinio  est  tam  contra 
philosophiam  quam  theologiam, 
ideo  hic  illa  non  reprobatur. 
<Seventh  opinion> 
 
   20.   The  seventh  opinion  is  that  which 
posits  that  nothing  is  an  ad  utrumlibet 
future  contingent,  but  that  all  things  that 
happen,  happen  of  necessity.   But  this 
opinion  is  so  entirely  contrary  to  both 
philosophy  and  theology,  that  it  will  not  be 
refuted  here. 
 
<Octava  opinio> 
 
   21.   Octava  opinio  est  que  ponit 
quod  aliquod  est  futurum 
contingens  ad  utrumlibet  et 
prescitum  a  Deo  in  isto  instanti 
presenti,  et  quod  tamen  possibile  est 
<Eighth  opinion> 
 
   21.   The  eighth  opinion  posits  that 
something  is  going  to  happen  contingently 
ad  utrumlibet  and  is  foreknown  by  God  in 
this  present  instant,  but  that  it  is  possible, 
even  for  this  present  instant,  that  it  could 
177  The  significance  of  this  reference,  and  how  it  relates  to  the  opinion  at  hand,  is  obscure  to  me. 
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pro  isto  instanti  presenti  quod  non 
sit  futurum  nec  prescitum  a  Deo, 
ymmo  quod  nunquam  fuerit 
futurum  nec  prescitum  a  Deo. 
 
   22a.  Sed  contra  sic  :  sequitur  quod 
possibile  est  quod  aliquod  sit 
futurum  quod  nunc  non  est  futurum. 
Consequens  est  falsum,  quia,  si  sic, 
ponatur  illud  instans  in  esse,  et  sit  A 
,  et  arguitur  sic  :  A  est  futurum  nunc, 
et  prius  non  fuit  futurum,  igitur 
mutatur  de  non  futuro  ad  futurum; 
et  non  sic  mutatur  propter 
mutacionem  in  seipso,  cum  non  sit 
adhuc  ;  igitur  oportet  quod,  si  A 
mutatur,  sit  propter  mutacionem  in 
alio.  Consequens  est  falsum,  quia  sic 
arguitur  de  possibili  quod  A  potest 
mutari  de  non  futuro  ad  futurum 
sicut  arguitur  de  inesse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…  
 
   23a.   Secundo  ad  principale  sic  :  si 
Deus  habet  prescienciam  futurorum 
contingencium  ad  utrumlibet, 
sequitur  quod  Deus  potest  velle  et 
pramittere  oppositum  nunc  sciti, 
promissi  et  voliti  ab  eo.  Consequens 
est  falsum,  quia  sic  Deus  potest 
mutari  de  scitis,  volitis  et  promissis, 
quod  est  contra 
illud  Malachie  3°  [Malachi  3.6]  :  « 
Ego  Dominus  et  non  mutor»;  et  ita 
sequitur  quod  non  erit  sic  sicut  Deus 
promisit  vel  voluit  fore,  igitur  Deus 
mutatur. 
 
not  be  going  to  be,  nor  foreknown  by  God  – 
nay,  even  more,  that  at  no  time  was  it  ever 
going  to  be,  nor  [was  it]  foreknown  by  God. 
 
 
   22a.   But  against  this,  consider  the 
following:  it  follows  that  it  is  possible  that 
something  would  be  going  to  be  that  is  not 
now  going  to  be.  This  consequent  is  false, 
since,  if  it  were  so  [the  following  argument 
could  be  made]:  Suppose  that  it  is  now  that 
instant  [in  the  future],  and  [suppose]  that  A 
would  [happen];  it  may  then  be  argued  as 
follows:  A  is  now  going  to  be,  and  previously 
A  was  not  going  to  be,  therefore  it  is 
changed  from  not-going-to-be  to 
going-to-be;  and  it  is  not  changed  because 
of  a  change  in  itself  (since  it  did  not  exist 
before  now);  it  is  therefore  the  case  that,  if 
A  is  changed,  it  is  because  of  a  change  in 
something  else.  This  consequent  is  false, 
since  in  the  same  way  that  it  has  just  been 
argued  concerning  possibility  that  A  can  be 
changed  from  not-going-to-be  to 
going-to-be,  so  too  could  it  be  argued 
concerning  [A’s]  essence. 
 
…  
 
   23a.   Secondly,  [one  objects]  to  the 
principal  [argument]  in  this  way:  If  God  has 
foreknowledge  of  ad  utrumlibet  future 
contingents,  it  follows  that  God  can  will  and 
promise  the  opposite  of  what  is  now  known, 
promised,  and  willed  by  him.  This 
consequent  is  false,  since  in  this  way  God 
could  be  changed  with  respect  to 
knowledge,  will,  and  promises,  which  is 
contrary  to  what  is  said  in  Malachi  3  [v.  6]: 
“I  am  the  LORD,  and  I  do  not  change”;  and 
so  it  follows  that  [if]  it  will  not  be  just  as 
God  has  promised  or  has  willed  it  to  be, 
then  God  is  changed. 
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…  
 
   24a.   Tercio  sic  ad  principale  :  si 
quodlibet  futurum  potest  non  esse 
futurum,  igitur  sequitur  quod  de 
futuris  non  potest  esse  aliqua 
revelacio  in  Verbo.  Consequens  est 
falsum  et  consequencia  patet,  quia  si 
sic,  sequitur  quod  preteritum  potest 
non  esse  preteritum,  et  qui  decessit 
in  peccato  mortali  potest  non 
decessisse  in  peccato  mortali,  et  sic 
de  illo  qui  decessit  in  caritate  potest 
non  etc.,  et  sic  dampnatus  potest 
nunquam  fuisse  dampnatus  et 
salvatus  nunquam  fuisse  salvatus. 
Consequens  est  falsum,  igitur.  Hec 
consequencia  patet,  posito  quod  A 
videat  in  Verbo  B  fore  et  quod 
precipiatur  sub  pena  peccati 
mortalis  quod  predicet  et  affirmet 
illud  quod  vidit  in  Verbo,  et  non 
aliud  vel  alia  quam  omnia  illa  que 
videt  in  Verbo.  Tunc  ponatur  quod  A 
predicet  B  fore  futurum,  et  quod  pro 
illa  predicacione  et  obediencia 
salvetur  et  aliter  non.   Tunc  arguitur 
sic  :  possibile  est  B  non  evenire, 
igitur  possibile  est  ipsum  non 
predixisse  B  fore  futurum  ;  et  per 
consequens,  si  salvetur  pro  illa 
predicacione  precise,  possibile  est 
ipsum  non  esse  salvatum.  Et  sic 
sequitur  propositum,  scilicet  quod 
preteritum  potest  non  esse 
preteritum  et  hujusmodi,  quia  si  B 
non  est  futurum,  ille  sic  non  vidit  in 
Verbo  B  fore  futurum,  et  per 
consequens  non  sic  predixit,  nec  pro 
isto  salvatur  per  consequens;  igitur 
etc. 
 
 
 
…  
 
   24a.   Thirdly,  [it  may  be  objected]  in  this 
way  to  the  principle  [argument]:  if  whatever 
is  going  to  be  can  be  not  going  to  be,  then  it 
follows  that,  with  respect  to  the  future,  it 
cannot  be  something  revealed  in  the  Word 
[i.e.,  by  God].  This  consequent  is  false,  but 
the  consequence  holds,  since  if  it  were  so 
[that  whatever  is  going  to  be  can  be  not 
going  to  be],  it  would  follow  that  what  has 
already  happened  can  have  not  happened, 
[so  for  example]  someone  who  died  in 
mortal  sin  can  have  not  died  in  mortal  sin, 
and  so  also  someone  who  died  in  a  state  of 
grace  can  have  not  died  in  a  state  of  grace, 
and  so  also  a  damned  person  can  not  ever 
have  been  damned,  and  a  saved  person  can 
not  ever  have  been  saved.  This  consequent 
is  therefore  false.  But  the  consequence 
holds:  I  suppose  that  A  sees  in  the  Word 
[i.e.,  has  a  vision  from  God]  that  B  is  about 
to  be,  and  that  it  would  be  expected,  under 
penalty  of  mortal  sin,  that  A  would  foretell 
and  affirm  what  A  sees  in  the  Word,  and 
[would  foretell]  nothing  other  than  what  A 
sees  in  the  Word.   Then  suppose  that  A 
foretells  that  B  is  going  to  be,  and  that 
through  [sharing]  this  prediction  and 
through  obedience  [A]  is  saved,  and 
otherwise  [A]  is  not  [saved].  Then  it  may  be 
argued  as  follows:  it  is  possible  for  B  not  to 
happen,  therefore  it  is  possible  for  [A]  not  to 
have  foretold  that  B  was  going  to  be;  and 
consequently,  if  [A]  is  saved  precisely 
because  of  [A’s]  foretelling,  it  is  possible  for 
[A]  not  to  have  been  saved.  And  so  the 
proposition  follows,  namely,  that  the  past 
can  not  be  the  past  [i.e.,  can  not  have 
happened],  and  other  things  of  this  sort, 
since  if  B  is  not  going  to  be,  [A]  did  not  see 
in  the  Word  [that]  B  is  about  to  be  going  to 
be,  and  consequently,  [A]  did  not  foretell  it 
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…  
 
   33a.   <Duodecimum  ad  principale>. 
Item  necessaria  sciencia  et 
necessaria  voluntas  perfectior  est 
sciencia  contingenti  et  voluntate 
contingenti,  sicut  necessitas 
simpliciter  perfectior  est 
contingencia.  Igitur  necessaria 
sciencia  rerum  et  necessaria 
voluntas  est  attribuenda  Deo. 
Antecedens  patet,  quia  contingencia 
includit  potenciam  et  per 
consequens  imperfectionem. 
Consequencia  patet  per  Anselmum. 
 
…  
 
   35a.   <Quartum  decimum  ad 
principale.>  Item  si  necessitas  in 
volicione  Dei  excluderetur,  hoc 
maxime  foret  propter  libertatem 
arbitrii  ;  sed  illa  necessitas  in  nullo 
repugnat  libero  arbitrio  ;  igitur 
propter  hoc  non  debet  excludi  a 
voluntate  Dei  quoad  operaciones 
ejus  ad  extra  et  ad  intra.  Minor  patet 
loquendo  de  libertate 
contradictionis  ad  utramque  partem, 
quia  illa  libertas  non  est  ponenda  in 
Deo  nec  in  beatis  ;  igitur  propter 
illam  in  nullo  debet  excludi  a  Deo 
necessitas  in  sua  actione,  quia  illa 
potestas  contradictionis  non  est 
pars  libertatis  nec  pertinet  ad 
libertatem,  secundum  quod  innuit 
Anselmus  dicens  :  «  Qui  liberior  est  ? 
Deus  et  beatus,  qui  non  possunt 
peccare  et  possunt  non  peccare,  an 
[quam?]  libertas  nostra  qua 
possumus  peccare  et  non  peccare?  ». 
to  be  so,  nor,  consequently,  was  [A]  saved 
because  of  this  [foretelling];  therefore,  etc. 
 
…  
  
   33a.   <The  twelfth  argument  to  the  first.> 
In  the  same  way,  necessary  knowledge  and 
necessary  will  are  more  perfect  than 
contingent  knowledge  and  contingent  will, 
just  as  necessity  is  in  itself  more  perfect 
than  contingency.  Necessary  knowledge  of  a 
thing  and  necessary  will  are  therefore 
attributed  to  God.  The  antecedent  holds, 
since  contingency  includes  potency  [for  the 
opposite],  and  consequently  [potency  for] 
imperfection.  The  consequence  holds 
according  to  Anselm. 
 
 
…  
 
   35a.   <The  fourteenth  argument  to  the 
first.>  Similarly,  if  necessity  were  excluded 
from  God's  volition,  this  would  be  mostly 
due  to  freedom  of  choice.   But  this  necessity 
is  in  no  way  incompatible  with  free  choice; 
therefore,  because  of  this,  it  ought  not  to  be 
excluded  from  the  will  of  God,  as  far  as  his 
internal  and  external  actions.  This  is  less  the 
case  in  speaking  of  freedom  for 
contradictories  ad  utrumque  partem  [i.e., 
the  freedom  to  act  in  either  of  two  ways], 
since  this  sort  of  freedom  is  not  held  by  God, 
nor  by  the  blessed;  therefore,  it  follows  that 
necessity  ought  in  no  way  to  be  excluded 
from  God  in  his  action,  since  that  power  for 
contradictories  is  not  part  of  freedom,  nor 
does  it  pertain  to  freedom,  according  to 
what  Anselm  indicates  by  saying:  “Who  is 
more  free?  God  and  the  blessed  ones,  who 
cannot  sin  and  can  [only]  not  sin,  [are  more 
free  than  us  by]  our  freedom,  by  which  we 
can  sin  and  not  sin.”  It  therefore  follows  that 
necessity,  but  not  coercion,  is  compatible 
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Igitur  sequitur  quod  cum  vera 
libertate  stat  necessitas,  sed  non 
coactio,  quia  hec  sibi  repugnat. 
 
…  
 
with  true  liberty,  since  coercion  is  not 
compatible  with  God. 
 
 
…  
< Nona  opinio> 
 
   39.   Alia  est  opinio  in  ista 
questione,  quod  illa  sunt  necessaria 
que  Deus  predixit  fore,  sed  alia 
futura  non. 
 
   40a.   Sed  quia  verbum  Dei 
extrinsecum, 178   tum  mediate  vel 
immediate  dictum,  non  plus  obligat 
Deum  ad  aliquid  faciendum  vel  non 
faciendum  quam  Verbum  ejus 
intrinsecum,  igitur  sequitur,  cum 
Deus  ab  eterno  dixit  omnia  futura 
fore  Verbo  intrinseco,  sequitur  quod 
omnia  futura  sunt  necessaria,  vel 
quod  illa  futura  non  sunt  necessaria 
que  Deus  dixit  verbo  extrinseco 
mediate  vel  immediate. 
 
…  
 
   g.   Item  super  illo  verbo  :  «Ecce 
virgo  concipiet»  etc.,  dicit  glosa  quod 
hoc  non  est  ut  Christus  impleret 
prophecias,  sed  e  contrario  quod 
ideo  erant  prophetata  quia  Christus 
erat  sic  facturus;  igitur  sequitur 
quod  prophecia  vel  verbum 
extrinsecum  non  est  causa  rerum 
futurarum,  sed  e  contrario  etc. 
<Ninth  opinion> 
 
   39.   Another  opinion  regarding  this 
question,  [holds]  that  those  things  which 
God  predicted  would  happen  are  necessary, 
but  other  future  things  are  not  [necessary]. 
 
   40a.   But  since  the  extrinsic   word  of  God, 178
once  it  has  been  declared  mediately  or 
immediately,  no  more  obliges  God  to  make 
or  not  make  something  than  does  his 
intrinsic  Word,  it  therefore  follows  that, 
when  God  spoke  all  future  things  into  being 
from  eternity  by  the  intrinsic  Word,  then  all 
future  things  that  God  spoke  by  the  extrinsic 
work,  mediately  or  immediately,  would  be 
necessary. 
 
 
 
…  
 
   g.   Similarly,  on  this  passage  --  “Behold,  a 
virgin  shall  conceive”,  etc.  --  it  says  in  the 
gloss  that  this  is  not  in  order  that  Christ 
would  fulfil  the  prophecies,  but  rather  the 
contrary,  that  they  were  prophesying  in  this 
way  because  Christ  was  to  be  born  in  this 
way;  it  therefore  follows  that  the  prophecies 
or  the  extrinsic  word  are  not  the  cause  of 
the  future  things,  but  rather  the  contrary, 
etc. 
 
 
178  In  distinguishing  between  the  extrinsic  and  intrinsic  Word  of  God,  I  take  Bradwardine  to  be  making  a 
distinction  between  God’s  spoken  word,  outwardly  declared,  and  the  Wisdom  or  Word  of  God  that  is  the 
Second  Person  of  God’s  own  Triune  self. 
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<Responsio  propria  ad  questionem> 
 
   41.   Nunc  respondetur  ad 
questionem  qua  queritur  utrum 
Christus,  qui  est  Deus,  habeat 
prescienciam  omnium  futurorum 
contingencium  ad  utrumlibet, 
dicendo  quod  sic  ;  et  ad  principalem 
racionem,  quando  arguebatur  sic  : 
igitur  habet  scienciam  omnium 
futurorum  contingencium  ad 
utrumlibet,  concedo  consequenciam 
et  consequens. 
 
   42a.  Sed  contra  :  sic  aliqua  forent 
contingencia  ad  utrumlibet. 
 
 
   b.   Respondetur  concedendo 
conclusionem  . 
 
   c.   Contra:  sic  igitur  sciencia  Dei 
potest  falli  et  per  consequens  Deus 
potest  falli  et  decipi  et  errare. 
 
 
   d.   Respondetur  consequenciam 
negando  et  conclusionem  quoad 
omnes  partes  ejus.  Et  cum  arguitur 
contra  sic  :  A  est  aliquod  futurum 
contingens  ad  utrumlibet  quod  Deus 
in  illo  instanti  presenti  prescit  fore, 
et  arguitur  sic  :  A  non  erit  et  Deus 
prescit  A  fore,  igitur  Deus  prescit 
aliquod  fore  futurum  quod  non  erit, 
et  per  consequens  quod  non  est 
futurum,  et  per  consequens  Deus 
errat  illa  presciencia,  et  per 
consequens  decipitur  et  sua  sciencia 
fallitur  :  antecedens  est  possibile  et 
consequencia  est  bona,  igitur  et 
consequens  est  possibile,  --- 
respondetur  negando  antecedens. 
 
<The  proper  response  to  the  question> 
 
   41.   Now  to  respond  to  the  question  that 
was  asked,  whether  Christ,  who  is  God,  has 
foreknowledge  of  all  ad  utrumlibet  future 
contingents,  I  say  that  it  is  so;  and  to  the 
first  argument,  when  it  is  argued  in  this  way 
—  “therefore  he  has  knowledge  of  all  ad 
utrumlibet  future  contingents”  —  I  concede 
the  consequence  and  the  consequent. 
 
 
 
 
   42a.   But  against  this:  if  this  were  the  case, 
there  would  be  some  ad  utrumlibet  future 
contingents. 
 
   b.   One  responds  by  conceding  the 
conclusion. 
 
   c.   Against  this:  if  this  were  the  case,  it 
would  follow  that  the  knowledge  of  God 
could  fail,  and  consequently,  God  could  fail 
and  be  deceived  and  err. 
 
   d.   One  responds  by  denying  the 
consequence  and  the  conclusion  in  all  of 
their  parts.   And  when  it  is  argued  against 
this  in  the  following  way  —  “Suppose  A  is 
some  ad  utrumlibet  future  contingent  that 
God  in  this  instant  foreknows  what  will 
happen,  then  this  follows:  A  will  not  be,  and 
God  will  foreknow  A  to  be  future,  therefore 
God  foreknows  something  to  be  future  that 
in  fact  will  not  be,  and  consequently  [God 
knows  something]  that  is  not  in  fact  future, 
and  consequently  God  errs  in  this 
foreknowledge,  and  so  is  deceived,  and  is 
failed  by  his  knowledge:  the  antecedent  is 
possible  and  the  consequence  is  good,  so 
therefore  the  consequent  is  possible”  —  one 
responds  to  this  argument  by  denying  the 
antecedent. 
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   e.   Contra  :  A  potest  non  fore  et 
Deus  prescit  A  fore,  igitur  A  non  fore 
est  possibile. 
 
 
   f.   Respondetur  distinguendo 
potenciam,  seu  possibile,  eo  quod 
duplex  est,  quia  quedam  est 
absoluta,  quedam  ordinata  ;  et 
expono  quid  intelligo  per  potenciam 
absolutam  et  per  potenciam 
ordinatam.  Potencia  absoluta  est  illa 
potencia  ordinata,  sed  tamen  est 
potencia  absoluta  ut  indeterminata 
est  ad  utramque  partem 
contradictionis;  et  potencia  ordinata 
est  illa  eadem  ut  est  determinata  ad 
alteram  partem  contradictionis 
tantum  .  Et  potencia  absoluta  in 
causa  superiori,  scilicet  in  Deo,  est 
potencia  sua  ordinata  non  ut  est 
ordinata  ad  alteram  partem 
contradictionis  tantum,  sed  ut  est 
infinita  et  non  determinata  vel 
ordinata  ad  alteram  partem  .  Et 
potencia  ejus  ordinata  est  potencia 
absoluta,  scilicet  infinita,  et  non  ut 
indeterminata  ad  alteram  partem 
contradictionis  tantum,  sed  ut 
determinata  per  suam  justiciam  et 
misericordiam  et  voluntatem,  ut  ad 
producendum  aliquid  ad  extra, 
immediate  vel  mediate,  vel  ad 
salvandum.   Et  similiter  dicitur  de 
potencia  in  causa  inferiori,  scilicet 
creatura,  que  non  est  sed  potest  esse 
in  futurum  ,  vel  quod  est  et  potest 
aliquid  facere  in  futurum  ,  sicut  nunc 
distinguitur  de  potencia  in  causa 
superiori,  scilicet  Deo  ;  quia  in  causa 
inferiori  duplex  est  potencia,  scilicet 
absoluta,  que  de  se  non  est 
determinata  plus  ad  esse  quam  ad 
 
   e.   Against  this:  A  could  not  be  going  to  be, 
and  God  might  foreknow  A  to  be  going  to 
be;  therefore  it  is  possible  for  A  to  not  be 
going  to  be. 
 
   f.  One  replies  by  drawing  a  distinction 
regarding  power,  or  what  is  possible,  in  that 
it  is  of  two  sorts;  for  one  sort  is  absolute,  the 
other  ordained.  And  I  [now]  explain  what  I 
mean  by  absolute  power  and  by  ordained 
power.  Absolute  power  is  that  [same] 
ordained  power;  but  it  is  absolute  power 
insofar  as  it  is  undetermined  relative  to 
each  part  of  a  contradiction.  And  ordained 
power  is  that  [same]  power,  insofar  as  it  is 
determined  relative  to  only  one  (or  the 
other)  part  of  a  contradiction.   And  absolute 
power  in  the  superior  cause  —  namely,  in 
God  —  is  his  ordained  power,  not  insofar  as 
it  is  ordained  relative  to  only  one  (or  the 
other)  part  of  a  contradiction,  but  as  it  is 
infinite  and  not  determined  or  ordained 
relative  to  one  (or  the  other)  part  [of  a 
contradiction].  And  his  ordained  power  is 
[his]  absolute  –  that  is,  infinite  –  power,  not 
as  undetermined  relative  to  one  (or  the 
other)  part  of  a  contradiction,  but  as 
determined  in  virtue  of  his  justice,  and  his 
mercy,  and  his  will  –  for  example,  for 
producing  something  besides  himself, 
immediately  or  mediately,  or  for  saving  [a 
person].   And  it  may  be  said  in  the  same  way 
of  power  in  an  inferior  cause  –  namely, 
[power  in]  a  creature  (which  is  not  now,  but 
can  be  in  the  future;  or  which  is  now,  and 
can  do  something  in  the  future)  —  similarly 
to  the  distinction  just  made  regarding 
power  in  the  superior  cause,  God.   For  there 
are  two  sorts  of  power  in  an  inferior  cause: 
[its]  absolute  [power]  is  that  which  in  itself 
is  not  determined  relative  to  being,  rather 
than  relative  to  not  being,  as  long  as  [the 
being  or  not  being]  is  future,  or  relative  to 
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non  esse  quamdiu  est  futurum  ,  vel 
ad  producendum  aliquid  in  futurum 
vel  ad  non  producendum  quamdiu 
non  est  productum  ;  et  potencia 
ordinata  est  illa  qua  ordinatur  ad 
unam  partem  contradictionis 
tantum,  per  causam  superiorem, 
scilicet  Deum  ,  vel  per  causam 
inferiorem,  scilicet  creaturam. 
 
   g.   Nunc  ad  propositum,  dico  quod 
A  potest  non  fore  de  potencia 
absoluta  tam  cause  superioris  quam 
inferioris,  quia  A  fore  vel  non  fore  in 
nullo  repugnat  tali  potencie  in  causa 
superiori  vel  inferiori  .  Sed  loquendo 
de  potencia  ordinata  cause 
superioris  et  inferioris,  sic  dicitur 
quod  A  non  potest  non  fore  nec 
aliquod  futurum,  quia  si  illa  potencia 
A  potest  non  fore,  sequitur  quod 
Deus  potest  decipi  et  errare,  et  falli 
potest  ejus  sciencia,  et  potest  falsum 
dicere  et  mentiri  si  Deus  predixit  A 
fore  mediate  vel  immediate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   43a.  Sed  contra  :  quia  de  potencia 
ordinata  A  non  potest  non  fore, 
igitur  A  non  potest  non  fore. 
 
   b.   Respondetur  negando 
consequenciam  et  consequens,  quia 
de  potencia  absoluta  tam  cause 
superioris  quam  inferioris  A  potest 
non  fore,  et  sequitur  :  de  illa 
potencia  A  potest  non  fore,  igitur  A 
potest  non  fore. 
 
producing  something  in  the  future  or  not 
producing  it  as  long  as  it  has  not  been 
produced;  and  [its]  ordained  power  is  that 
by  which  it  is  ordained  relative  to  only  one 
(or  the  other)  part  of  a  contradiction, 
[whether]  by  the  superior  cause,  God,  or  by 
an  inferior  cause,  a  creature. 
 
 
 
   g.   Now  in  reply  to  the  proposition  at  issue 
[namely,  the  statement:  “A  can  be  not  going 
to  be,  and  God  foreknows  that  A  will  be; 
therefore  that  A  will  not  be  is  possible”, 
where  A  is  some  future  contingent],  I  say 
that  A  can  be  not  going  to  be  in  virtue  of 
absolute  power,  whether  of  the  superior  or 
of  an  inferior  cause.  For  that  A  is  going  to  be 
or  not  going  to  be  is  in  no  way  incompatible 
with  such  a  power  in  the  superior  or  in  an 
inferior  cause.  If,  however,  one  is  speaking 
of  the  ordained  power  of  the  superior  or  of 
an  inferior  cause,  in  that  case  one  says  that 
A  (or  any  future  thing)  cannot  be  not  going 
to  be.  For  if  by  that  power  A  can  be  not 
going  to  be,  it  follows  that  God  can  be 
deceived  and  can  err,  and  that  his 
knowledge  can  be  mistaken,  and  that  he  can 
say  what  is  false  and  a  lie  —  if  God  has 
predicted,  mediately  or  immediately,  that  A 
is  going  to  be. 
 
   43a.   But  against  this:  since  in  respect  of 
ordained  power,  A  cannot  be  not  going  to 
be,  then  A  cannot  be  not  going  to  be. 
 
   b.   One  responds  by  denying  the 
consequence  and  the  consequent,  since  in 
respect  of  the  absolute  power  of  the 
superior  cause  –  as  much  as  for  the  inferior 
cause  –  A  can  be  not  going  to  be,  and  so  it 
follows:  according  to  that  power,  A  can  be 
not  going  to  be;  therefore,  A  can  be  not 
going  to  be. 
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…  
 
63.   .  .  .  Et  sic  patet  quod  potencia 
libera  libertate  contradictionis  est  in 
quolibet  viatore  ;  que  quidem 
potencia,  licet  non  determinetur  ad 
actum  priusquam  habet  actum 
naturaliter  per  seipsam,  nec  per 
aliquam  causam  creatam,  tamen 
determinatur  ad  actum  suum  prius 
naturaliter  per  Deum.  Qui  est 
benedictus  in  secula  [seculorum]. 179 
Amen. 
 
Explicit  Bradwardus  de  futuris 
contingentibus. 
 
…  
 
63.   .  .  .  And  it  shows  in  this  way  that  free 
power,  [in  the  sense  of]  freedom  of 
contradictories,  is  in  any  wayfarer;  and  this 
power  is  a  certain  power,  not  determined  to 
act  before  it  naturally  has  an  act  by  itself, 
nor  by  another  created  cause,  yet  naturally 
determined  to  its  own  act  in  the  first  place 
by  God  –  Who  is  blessed  for  ever  and  ever, 
world  without  end.    Amen. 179
 
 
 
Here  ends  Bradwardine  on  future 
contingents. 
 
 
179  While  not  a  literal  translation,  this  reflects  the  traditional  English  rendering  of  “saecula  saeculorum,”  as  in 
the  final  line  of  the  Gloria  Patri  (“Glory  be  to  the  Father,  and  to  the  Son,  and  to  the  Holy  Ghost  …  and  ever 
shall  be,  world  without  end.   Amen.”). 
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